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The Context of Government 
New South Wales was so named by James Cook in 1770, and settled 
in 1788 as the first British colony in Australasia. That colony once 
covered all the land from which the Northern Territory and the 
other future states except Western Australia, which began separate-
ly, were later carved—and the islands of New Zealand, Fiji, and 
Samoa as well. The area remaining after the last major amputation 
(of Queensland) in 1859 left New South Wales the second smallest 
of the mainland colonies—amounting to one-tenth of the continent 
or about the size of France and the British Isles combined. But 
with a head start in settlement, and a variety of natural advantages. 
New South Wales became the wealthiest and most populous state 
of Australia, and the capital, Sydney, is the largest as well as the 
oldest city in the country. 
The state lies wholly within the temperate zone, and its east-
west gradations of topography and rainfall, in parallel bands 
running roughly from north-east to south-west, are more significant 
than any north-south variation. Hence with only a few notable 
exceptions, the intensity of occupation and development decreases 
steadily from the coast inland. 
The narrow coastal strip, whose central portion contains rich 
seams of black coal and the only important natural harbours, is 
well watered by regular rainfall and a score or so of shortish rivers 
dropping eastward to the sea. The tableland forming the main 
watershed, whose steep eastern scarp parallels most of the coastline 
at an average distance of seventy-five kilometres inland, contains 
part of the central coal measures and some other minerals, and 
extensive grazing uplands. Varying from 50 to 160 kilometres in 
width, its height is mostly between 600 metres and 900 metres, 
rising to over 1,200 metres in the New England Range and the 
Blue Mountains and to over 2,000 metres in the Southern Alps 
or Snowy Mountains. In this tableland rise the westward-flowing 
rivers of the Murray-Darling system, with the upper Darling and 
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some tributaries forming part of the northern boundary of the state, 
and the Murray forming almost the whole of the southern boundary. 
These rivers first traverse the gentle western slopes and then 
meander slowly across the almost unbroken plain—most of it not 
very far above sea level—which covers the western two-thirds of 
the state. The whole of this area lies west of the twenty-inch rainfall 
line, and of the remainder some twelve million hectares are too 
steep to cultivate, leaving about one-quarter of the state reasonably 
suitable for agriculture without irrigation. 
Without irrigation the dry, flat country of the far west plain is 
suitable only for very extensive grazing, mainly of sheep, though 
it contains the still rich silver-lead-zinc lodes of Broken Hill and 
the low-grade copper-lead-zinc ores at Cobar. Sheep-raising is 
interspersed with other forms of primary industry throughout the 
tablelands and western slopes and in the Riverina, which lies 
between the Murray and the Murrumbidgee. The eastern Riverina 
includes the important Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, while the 
western Riverina is mainly sheep country, with a broad strip of 
wheat-growing in the south along the Murray. The wheat belt 
proper corresponds roughly with the northern, central and south-
western slopes, and the eastern half of the Riverina; but the slopes 
are also important sheep country, and cattle-grazing extends 
through the northern slopes to the western plain as far as the 
Darling River. The northern and southern tablelands graze sheep 
and cattle; the central tableland is mostly confined to sheep, with 
some wheat-growing in its western half. The north coast is mainly 
a dairying and beef cattle-raising area, with sugar-cane and some 
tropical fruit-growing in the extreme north; mining on some of its 
ocean beaches, with those of southern Queensland, makes Australia 
the world's leading producer of rutile and zircon. Dairying and 
cattle-raising are also the main rural industries in the Hunter River 
valley and on the south coast. Economically and politically domi-
nating the whole state, however, is the mid-coastal region centred 
on the Sydney metropolis, and bounded by the coal-oriented 
industrial conurbations of the Newcastle area in the north, 
Wollongong in the south, and the coal-mining city of Lithgow on 
the central tableland. 
New South Wales presents, in fact, a prime example of the 
urbanization and centralization which are characteristic of Austral-
ia as a whole. The obvious measure of both phenomena is the 
distribution of population. The central and far western plains 
covering three-fifths of New South Wales, hold only one-twentieth 
of its people; almost all the rest live within four hundred kilometres 
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of the coast, and even the population employed in primary industry 
is thickest in the central coastal region, being mainly engaged in 
intensive cultivation for the urban markets. At the 1971 census 88 
per cent of the state's population of 4.6 millions lived in "urban 
centres" of a thousand or more inhabitants (compared to the 
average of 81 per cent for the other states), and 69 per cent were 
concentrated in the major urban centres of Sydney (2,700,000), 
Newcastle (250,000) and Wollongong (186,000), which also contain 
nine-tenths of the state's industrial strength. In fact, these three 
adjacent conurbations and their immediate hinterlands, occupying 
about 5 per cent of the area of New South Wales, held at that 
time about a quarter of the population of Australia. Outside that 
area, by contrast, the only urban centres in New South Wales with 
a population over 25,000 were Albury, Broken Hill (which had 
ceased to grow), and Wagga Wagga. There were eleven other 
centres with populations over 15,000, but the typical country town 
of New South Wales had fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, and even 
in the major country centres the growth rate was considerably lower 
than in all other states except perhaps Western Australia. (The 
state's population at the 1976 census was 4,777,103.) 
This high level of centralization and urbanization is of course 
deeply rooted in geographical and historical realities and sustained 
by powerful forces. White settlement and development radiated 
from the original convict establishments at Sydney and Newcastle. 
Sydney kept its monopoly of political power as the seat of a highly 
centralized system of administration and as the dominant centre 
of commerce, finance, and population. In an economy vitally 
dependent on overseas trade, the relative scarcity of other navigable 
harbours on the New South Wales coast and the pervasive mountain 
barrier behind it were at least plausible excuses—some historians 
think quite adequate reasons—for focusing the fan-shaped road and 
rail connections with the hinterland on the two original ports; and 
this in turn reinforced the dominance of the capital. In any case 
the limited scope for any rural activity other than extensive 
agricultural and pastoral occupation militated against a more even 
spread of population through the state, and the combination of these 
factors gave little basis for the growth of substantial provincial 
towns. 
In overall population density, metropolitan concentration, diver-
sity of economic activity, and degree of industrialization as meas-
ured by the proportion of people employed in secondary industry, 
New South Wales ranks second after Victoria, which has always 
been ahead on these counts since the 1860s when her politicians 
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pioneered the policy of tariff protection. However, on the same 
criteria New South Wales is well ahead of the other states, except 
Tasmania in respect of density and South Australia in respect of 
industrialization. 
As secondary industry developed, market and cost considerations 
and access to port facilities confined it to the large coastal cities 
—with the minor exceptions of inland mining centres and railway 
depots. Most country towns remained merely servicing centres and 
trading entrepots for the surrounding farmers. In a state whose 
history is coterminous with the industrial revolution and where 
government has been "ample" from the beginning, the structure 
of economic activity, confirmed by technological evolution, has 
always favoured urban and particularly metropolitan dominance: 
primary production has been characteristically capital-intensive and 
market-oriented, with labour needs declining while output in-
creased; manufacturing has made much heavier demands for labour 
than primary industry has done; and the cities themselves have 
generated an even greater growth in tertiary occupations. New 
South Wales long ago passed the point where more people were 
employed in public administration, transport and communication, 
personal services, entertainment, banking and education than in 
primary and secondary industry combined.' Urban centralization 
is an inherent aspect of modern society; moreover, it has always 
been inevitable in New South Wales—strengthened by the majority 
preference of its European invaders (like their Aboriginal predeces-
sors) for the easier and pleasanter conditions of life near the 
seaboard. 
In spite of these facts. New South Wales governments for half 
a century or more have paid lip service to the notion of "decen-
tralization", and more recently have sought to institutionalize this 
by subsidies and other encouragement to inland industrial develop-
ment, by establishing special departments and agencies to co-
ordinate development projects, and by administrative reorganization 
on a regional basis. These efforts have received a fillip from a 
growing concern over the diseconomies and disehchantments of 
excessive metropolitan growth. Indeed, since the mid-1960s there 
has been a small but rising net migration out of Sydney to the 
smaller capitals and to other parts of New South Wales. But this 
is negligible compared to Sydney's total growth by natural increase. 
The results achieved by the conventional state programmes up to 
the 1970s made no appreciable impact on the long-term tendency 
for the metropolitan population to grow fastest, for that of most 
larger country towns to grow at a moderate rate, and for that of 
smaller towns and rural areas to remain stationary or decline 
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Towns that received decentralization funds showed no greater 
increase in population than towns that received little or no aid. The 
most optimistic hopes for more intensive rural development, based 
mainly on the potential of the Snowy Mountains scheme for 
increasing the irrigated area in the Riverina, were that maximum 
development of available rural land in the state might double the 
existing population outside Sydney. Even those modest hopes no 
longer seem realistic, and since 1969 it has been generally recog-
nized that any substantial decentralization must mean accelerated 
urban development in the non-metropolitan area, concentrated 
within selected "growth centres".^ 
The growing contrast between metropolitan concentration and 
rural diffusion has sharpened the tension between city and country 
interests. The latter have believed since the 1890s that state 
governments have been dominated by city pressure groups, includ-
ing the middlemen who trade in primary products or in farm 
supplies and machinery. They argue that state government spending 
on development has neglected rural areas in favour of the cities, 
and in particular that the pattern of rail and road routes from the 
northern tablelands and Riverina has been deliberately centralized 
on Sydney at the expense of more direct outlets to the New South 
Wales coast or the nearer ports at Brisbane and Melbourne. It is 
the combination of these resentments with the numerical strength, 
geographical concentration, and economic insecurity of the wheat 
and dairy farmers in New South Wales, helped by a favourable 
electoral distribution, that has enabled them to establish and 
maintain a persistently autonomous Country Party, though the 
graziers have also been important, especially on the financial side. 
This party's strength has lain in the northern and southern sections 
of the wheat and mixed-farming belt of the western slopes and 
Riverina, the mainly pastoral area of the northern tablelands, and 
the north coast and Hunter Valley dairying region. 
Two-thirds of the state's electorates are in the Sydney, 
Wollongong, and Newcastle conurbations. The Country Party opted 
out of this area almost from the beginning.^ The majority of the 
electorates concerned (including all the Newcastle and generally 
all the Wollongong seats) are in industrial centres and suburbs and 
held by Labor. In Sydney, even more than in Melbourne, there 
is a sharp geographical segregation of population by social standing 
partly because of the high "desirability" (hence expensiveness) of 
the eastern harbour. North Shore, and northern beach suburbs and 
their topographical and locational unsuitability for industrial de-
velopment. Here and in one or two of the old-established western 
suburbs just beyond the inner urban fringe lie the bulk of the 
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regular Liberal Party electorates. Its few other "safe" seats are in 
a handful of country towns and semi-rural electorates close to 
Sydney—containing orchards, market gardens, poultry farms, lux-
ury country homes, and holiday resorts." 
Between 1947 and 1966, commercial and industrial development 
in central Sydney and the inner suburbs reduced the resident 
population of the City of Sydney by 26 per cent and of the ten 
inner municipal areas by over 6 per cent, though the population 
of the metropolitan area as a whole increased by half. Adjustment 
took place by population movement and outer suburban growth, 
followed by newer industrial development, mainly in the Cum-
berland Plain west and south-west of the city, favoured by 
topography and transport routes. Metropolitan "swinging" seats are 
naturally to be found either in these areas of changing social and 
economic structure or in non-industrial suburbs of mixed social 
composition close to the city centre. 
One expects to find a strong labour movement and party in the 
oldest and most populous state, with a history of bitter conflict 
between haves and have-nots going back to convict days, and a high 
development of mining and manufacturing industry. But there is 
the apparent paradox that in Victoria, relatively more developed 
industrially, the Labor Party has an almost unbroken record of 
failure in state politics, while in New South Wales, beginning in 
1910, Labor has been in office nearly half the time during the 
present century. In fact the size of the Victorian Labor vote, as 
a percentage of total vote in the state, has not since the 1890s been 
far short of that in New South Wales; Labor's main difficulty in 
Victoria has been the exceptional concentration of Labor voters in 
relatively few electoral divisions, mostly in the metropolitan area, 
which prevents the party from winning a proportionate number of 
seats. Because of a more favourable geographical distribution of 
voting support. Labor has had substantial periods of rule in the 
much less industrialized states of Western Australia and Tasmania, 
to say nothing of Queensland where the electoral system was for 
a time weighted in Labor's favour. In New South Wales, strong 
Labor support comes not only from the industrial suburbs of the 
metropolis but also from the mining constituencies and large 
railway and public works centres inland, and from pastoral districts 
where employees outnumber owners and managers. On the other 
hand, the advanced development of tertiary industries swells the 
proportionate numbers of white-collar employees whose votes are 
more evenly divided between Labor and its opponents.' 
Among the few demographic factors differentiating the Austral-
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ian states, the most striking are the patterns of migration and 
religious affiliation—and of course the two are to some extent 
related. New South Wales had the smallest population increase of 
any state except Tasmania in the post-war period—60 per cent 
between the censuses of 1947 and 1976, compared with Western 
Australia's 128 per cent and the Australian average of 79 per cent. 
In 1971, the last census year for which these details are available, 
the proportion of residents of New South Wales born overseas— 
now a rough index to level of post-war immigration—was slightly 
below the Australian average, and appreciably below that of the 
three southern mainland states. However, New South Wales shared 
in the general increase in the proportion of avowed Catholics in 
the Australian population, which moved from 21 per cent in 1947 
to 27 per cent in 1971. New South Wales had the highest proportion 
of Catholics for most of the period, reaching nearly 29 per cent 
in 1971, when Victoria just passed her; South Australia had easily 
the lowest (under 21 per cent in 1971). New South Wales also 
had the second highest percentage of professed Anglicans through-
out (36 per cent in 1971), and the lowest proportion of non-
conformists and people of other faiths (24 per cent compared with 
South Australia's 41 per cent).^ 
The relation between denominational distribution and politics in 
Australia has not been comprehensively studied. Interest has 
centred on the importance of Catholicism for the Labor Party, with 
particular reference to the crippling schisms which split the party 
over conscription in 1916 (when Irish Catholic prelates were 
prominent in the struggle), and which produced the Democratic 
Labor Party in the 1950s (when leading Catholic laymen also were 
active). It is clear that Labor has been weakened by this factor 
much less in New South Wales than in Victoria, partly because 
of the different political stances of the Catholic hierarchies in the 
two states. For some years after the 1959 election the New South 
Wales Liberal Party showed concern about the negligible number 
of Catholics among its parliamentary candidates and in the upper 
ranks of its organization: the first and only Catholic president of 
the New South Wales division was elected in I960.'' Protestant and 
Catholic groups have prominently sought to sway governments and 
public opinion on social issues—in opposite directions in the cases 
of gambling and state aid to private schools, but differing only in 
degree on such matters as hotel drinking hours, religion in schools, 
and censorship. A handful of radical Protestant churchmen have 
been consistently vocal on wider issues such as foreign policy, from 
a standpoint contrasting sharply with the kind of Catholic views 
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represented in the D.L.P. The "sectarian issue" has remained as 
important as elsewhere in Australia, though never as frenetic as 
in the fourth quarter of last century, and much abated since all 
parties accepted the principle of state aid (to private schools or 
their pupils) in the mid-1960s. 
New South Wales shares with Victoria the major concentrations 
of economic power in Australia. Of the one hundred biggest 
companies in the country in 1973, forty-two had their headquarters 
in Melbourne and forty-six in Sydney; but of these, three-quarters 
of the top twenty were based in Melbourne. Of the dozen mining 
companies included in this list, eight had their headquarters in 
Melbourne and three in Sydney. Australia's industrial giant, the 
Broken Hill Proprietary Company, had its head office in Melbourne, 
though its major steelworks dominate the life of Newcastle and 
Wollongong. Another of the country's largest monopolies, the 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company, is based in Sydney, as also are 
the biggest single pastoral, building-cum-development, transport, 
shipping, and oil companies. Despite the financial predominance of 
Melbourne, Sydney holds the headquarters of Australia's oldest and 
largest private trading bank, the Bank of New South Wales, and 
of the central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia. It is also the 
home of two of the four major newspaper and commercial radio-
television chains in the country—the other two being in Melbourne. 
The organizational aspect of industry has been shaped partly by 
the predominance of the two largest state capitals, and partly by 
the location of the federal Department of Employment and In-
dustrial Relations (formerly Labour and National Service) and the 
country's main industrial tribunal, the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission, in Melbourne from the days when it was the seat of 
federal government. It is natural to find there the federal head-
quarters of most commercial, manufacturers', and employers' 
associations (though several have moved to Canberra in recent 
years) and of the Australian Council of Trade Unions. However, 
of the eighteen members of the executive of the A.C.T.U. at the 
end of 1976, seven were from New South Wales, including, besides 
the state branch representative, five of the seven "industry group 
representatives" and one of the two vice-presidents. Further, of 
thirty-six Australian unions (not all affiliated with the A.C.T.U.) 
claiming twenty thousand members or more in September 1976, 
twenty had their head offices in Sydney, fourteen in Melbourne, 
and one each in Canberra and Adelaide. Those with headquarters 
in Sydney embraced eleven of the fifteen largest unions in Australia 
and included such significant groups as the Amalgamated Metal 
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Workers and Shipwrights, the Australian Workers' Union, the 
Australasian Society of Engineers, the Electrical Trades Union, the 
Ironworkers Union, the Australian Railways Union, and the Build-
ing Workers' Industrial Union. 
The fluctuating balance of power between the contending in-
terests and parties since the Labor Party was founded in 1891 helps 
to explain both the general fairness of the state's electoral system 
and its important aberrations. The main one has always been the 
much more generous representation of the country voter than the 
city dweller. Since 1927 this discrimination has taken the statutory 
form of fixing the total numbers of parliamentary seats in the main 
city and rural areas of the state so as to provide more rural than 
city seats for a given number of voters. Until a given distribution 
of seats is changed, the discrimination is automatically increased 
by the rural-urban drift. Partly by manipulation of this basic 
division, partly through the drawing of electorate boundaries, and 
partly through other features of the system, distributions have also 
been alternately skewed in favour of the different party or parties 
in power. Among Australian electoral systems, that of Tasmania 
comes nearest to realizing the principle of "one vote, one value". 
The federal system is nominally closer to the principle than that 
of New South Wales, but under recent Liberal-Country adminis-
trations came to favour the rural voter more blatantly in practice. 
In other states there have been far more discriminatory systems. 
With political forces so diverse and so evenly matched, the party 
struggle is sharply and on the whole cleanly contested. In such a 
highly industrialized and urbanized state the struggle has become 
bitter in times of crisis like the Great Depression. When there were 
high stakes in the manipulation of legislative power or the use of 
public money, intrigue and corruption and occasionally electoral 
malpractice naturally followed. But since the turn of the century, 
when the disposal of Crown lands ceased to be a major temptation 
to politicians, such trangressions have been more noticeable in the 
internal affairs of political parties and the administration of urban 
local authorities than at the state government level. It is true that 
government patronage has been used to buy off parliamentary 
opponents up to recent times, and a very close election result in 
any constituency will usually produce its call for a recount on 
grounds of alleged irregularities in voting. Otherwise the main 
complaints have been about the clandestine influence of favoured 
interests on governments of either complexion. In these respects 
there is nothing unusual about New South Wales. 
The seniority, size, and relative sophistication of the state are 
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reflected in a more elaborately shaped apparatus of government 
than those of most other states, for example in matters like cabinet 
organization, departmental structure, public service control and 
training, and professionalized political party organizations. As 
already mentioned, there have been gestures towards geographical 
dispersal of administration, but authority for important decisions 
generally remains in Sydney, though it is there divided among a 
number of powerful, semi-autonomous, and ill-coordinated central 
agencies of the state government. Strict central control is main-
tained—with some justification—over the generally useful but 
unheroic doings of elected local councils, whose most politically 
significant functions are the care of local roads and works and the 
regulation of building and other urban development. 
Underlying and informing the whole of politics and adminis-
tration, however, are what New South Wales shares with the other 
states: the limitations and frustrations of a subordinate unit in an 
increasingly centralized federation. The state's government cannot 
command the resources of talent, money, or power required by its 
"residual" but by no means inconsiderable functions under the 
federal system: the direct promotion and control of material 
development and its consequences for conservation and the "quality 
of life"; land-use planning and control; public utilities including 
transport, power and water supply, and works contributing to the 
economic infrastructure; the regulation of commercial and in-
dustrial activity; the provision of education and the more intimate 
social services; and last but not least, the framing and enforcement 
of most criminal, commercial, industrial, and social law. This list 
shows the silliness of comparing the states, as is sometimes done, 
to "glorified local authorities", but it also suggests the conflicts 
inherent in their retaining such broad responsibilities while so 
largely dependent on federal financial aid (often subject to federally 
imposed conditions) for the level of competence with which they 
can discharge them. With the competition for political and ex-
ecutive ability, as well as financial resources, heavily weighted in 
Canberra's favour, the undeniable shortfalls in state administration 
become rationalizations for direct federal intervention into one field 
or another, undeterred by the refusal of the electors to approve any 
corresponding redistribution of constitutional powers. As a result 
of the federal manipulations of public finance as between the states, 
the governments of New South Wales and Victoria turn out, on 
balance, to be net losers, those of the other states to be net gainers 
at their expense. This suggests that the two most populous states 
are also the most prosperous. 
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This brief sketch has examined some features of the land, people, 
and economy of New South Wales that seem relevant to its politics 
and government, and speculated about possible connections. It can 
be no more than speculation. Quite possibly the common British 
origin of the settlers in all the Australian colonies, and of all their 
constitutional frameworks and principles, have done more to shape 
their modern system of governance than all the differences in their 
physical and social environments. It is impossible to say how 
important those differences are at all. Most studies of Australian 
life and society harp on their pervasive uniformity. There is evidence 
that some Australians themselves agree about distinctive stereotypes 
of the residents of different states, but it is pretty tenuous evidence. 
Bruce Petty purports to capture the different types in a rather 
cryptic cartoon, and people nod in recognition. From a large heap 
of adjectives, first-year psychology students in all states agreed 
pretty closely in selecting commercial, competitive, cosmopolitan, 
and materialistic for New South Wales people, compared, for 
example, with artistic, conservative, and cultured for South Austral-
ians. Upon styles of politics, authors confidently offer judgements 
like this of Donald Home's in 1964: 
For a quarter of a century politics in New South Wales have proceeded 
with a Tammany lack of policy, a matter of deals and pressure groups 
unadorned by rhetoric and of little interest except to the participants. 
Obviously such evidence cannot distinguish New South Wales as 
a polity from other states: we lack any serious essay at 
differentiating the political cultures of the states since the pioneer-
ing effort of S.R. Davis in I960.* 
The following chapters offer some detailed evidence of connec-
tions between the social and political frameworks in New South 
Wales, and occasionally compare governmental practices in that 
and other Australian states. But those are not their main purposes. 
This is primarily an attempt to outline and explain the structure and 
working of politics and administration in the mid-1970s. Explana-
tion requires some reference to the law and some flashback into 
history—at times back to origins. Government is an evolving 
process, and cannot be described at a point of time. Here the story 
continues, subject to one or two exceptions, no later than the end 
of 1976. It deals in turn with the electoral system, the political 
parties, organized non-party groups, the government in parliament 
and its two houses, and public administration, finance, and local 
government—with some words of appraisal at the end. 
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Parliamentary Representation 
and Elections 
In the bicameral structure of the New South Wales parliament 
the Legislative Assembly alone is popularly elected. The Legislative 
Council has never been directly exposed to the popular will, except 
on the question of abolition. Established as a nominee chamber, 
it was reconstituted in 1934 under a system of indirect election, 
described in a later chapter. What follows relates entirely to 
elections for the Legislative Assembly. New South Wales has tried 
a considerable variety of electoral devices, sometimes following 
other Australian examples and sometimes going its own way. 
Changes in the name of reform have more often been designed to 
redress a group grievance or reap a party advantage, or merely to 
fall into fashion, than to meet some abstract canon of representative 
government; similarly, there was little objective appraisal of the 
actual results of different schemes until the past decade or two, 
which have produced a new race of political scientists and party 
organizers. 
THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
The history of the New South Wales franchise is swift and simple 
to relate. At the introduction of responsible government in 1856, 
the vote was confined to adult males with a mild set of property 
or income tests; extra votes were allowed in respect of property 
held in more than one electorate. Manhood suffrage was adopted 
soon after, in 1858. Plural voting was abolished in 1893—an early 
tribute to the presence in parliament of the infant Labor Party. 
In 1902 adult women were given the vote, and the franchise attained 
substantially its present form. All adults of British nationality by 
birth or naturalization are now qualified for enrolment when they 
have resided for six months in Australia, three months in New 
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South Wales, and one month in any particular subdivision of an 
electoral district. "Adults" have included persons aged eighteen to 
twenty years since March 1973, when amending legislation of 1970 
was proclaimed on the Commonwealth's enfranchising the eighteen-
year-olds, permitting the revision of the electoral rolls which were 
common to the Commonwealth and the state. People are 
disqualified if of unsound mind or if convicted and serving a 
sentence of imprisonment for one year or longer.' 
It is one thing to be legally entitled to vote, but another to 
establish that right and another still to be able to exercise it 
conveniently in practice. These matters have been the subject of 
many refinements of the electoral law, especially since the 1890s 
when the modern party system came into being. 
For example, the Labor Party claimed credit, among the con-
cessions wrung from non-Labor governments in the 1890s, for the 
enfranchisement of the police and for reforms in the enrolment 
system. After 1893, enrolment and voting depended on producing 
an "elector's right", itself an emasculated version of an early Labor 
demand. In theory an elector was entitled to a "right" after three 
months' residence in an electoral district; but it was automatically 
cancelled on his moving to a new district and in practice took many 
months to renew. The effect was to disfranchise many nomadic 
workers, such as shearers and seamen, and others who found it 
difficult to comply with the formalities—most of them potential 
Labor voters. In 1896, the qualifying period of residence was 
reduced to one month and electors were allowed to vote in their 
previous electoral district as absentees (see below) in the interim. 
These reforms made it possible for enrolment to be virtually 
continuous, thus rendering redundant the elector's right system, 
which was finally abolished in 1906. 
It was to assist these same classes that Labor supported on its 
first introduction in 1893, and itself enacted in its modern form 
in 1911, the "absent vote", by which electors absent from their 
subdivisions on election day can, upon making a declaration, record 
their vote at any polling place in the state. At the 1913 election, 
when the use of this privilege was first recorded, no fewer than 
25,485 absent votes were cast. In recent elections the number has 
ranged between 160,000 and 250,000. 
The non-Labor party reply to the absent vote was the introduc-
tion in 1918 of the postal vote, under which electors absent from 
the state or otherwise unable to attend at a polling place were 
entitled to apply for a ballot paper before election day, mark it 
in their home or elsewhere, and post it to the returning officer by 
a prescribed time. If the absent vote helped the nomadic but able-
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bodied shearer to vote, the postal vote was calculated to marshal 
the franchises of the sick, the aged or infirm, the traveller, and 
the farmer who lived far from a polling booth. In the case of distant 
residence, the minimum qualification fixed in 1918 was fifteen miles, 
reduced to ten in 1928, and five in 1944. The number of postal 
votes cast in the 1920 election was 2,773, increasing steadily until 
it reached 31,337 in the election of 1947. 
By this time it was common ground between spokesmen of the 
main parties that non-Labor received the lion's share of postal votes 
(Liberal Party officials claimed it was at least two-thirds). Labor 
leaders complained that some of these votes were obtained by party 
organizers exercising undue influence, for example, on old people 
and invalids; in 1944 the Labor government had backed this belief 
by making it an offence to "persuade or induce . . . any person 
to make application for a postal vote", or to influence anyone in 
recording such a vote. In 1949, amid portents of possible defeat 
at the following year's elections, they radically amended this part 
of the law. The postal vote was thenceforth available to only one 
of the former categories of electors, namely those living more than 
five miles from a polling place. No alternative provision was made 
for people engaged in travel. Electors living within five miles of 
a polling place but prevented from attending by illness, infirmity, 
or approaching maternity could now record their votes in the 
presence of an officially appointed "electoral visitor", who would 
take a locked ballot box to their homes for the purpose, accom-
panied by scrutineers if desired. Patients in hospitals and convales-
cent homes could vote at "mobile polling booths" in those institu-
tions where a polling place was appointed. 
At the 1950 general election postal votes numbered 399 and 
electoral visitor votes 7,717, and at subsequent elections the total 
of these two figures continued to fluctuate between just under 8,000 
and just over 9,000 votes, compared to the old postal voting figures 
of around 20,000 in the 1930s and over 27,000 after the residential 
distance qualification was lowered in 1944. Available statistics do 
not permit precise inferences from this change; for example, they 
do not show how many people in the categories deprived of the 
postal vote managed to vote in other ways after 1949, and various 
other factors bedevil comparisons between elections. However, the 
foregoing figures suggest that the 1949 changes precluded many 
thousands of electors from voting, and in 1965 the Electoral 
Commissioner estimated from his post-election check on non-voters 
that about 35,000 of them claimed to have been ill or disabled or 
out of the state at the time of that year's election. This was asserted 
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by the Chief Secretary of the Liberal-Country Party government, 
first placed in power by that election, as he piloted through 
parliament a bill to restore postal voting as it was in 1944 and 
abolish the electoral visitor system as being then redundant.^ There 
were 24,590 postal votes cast in the 1968 general election, and 
38,895 in that of 1976. 
There have long been provisions to enable people who are blind, 
unable to write, or otherwise incapacitated for voting, to instruct 
electoral officers or friends how to mark their ballot paper for them. 
Votes of this type amounted to 13,490 in 1925, but the number 
has not been published for later elections. Since 1928 there has 
also been provision whereby an elector who through error is not 
enrolled or finds that his name is already marked as having voted, 
may in certain circumstances vote after making a declaration that 
he is entitled to vote and has not already done so. The number 
of these "section 106 votes" fluctuates considerably, usually rising 
after a redistribution of electorates. It was 6,757 in 1930, the first 
election when voting was compulsory (and electoral rolls may have 
fallen short of the new demands), but 1,227 in 1962 and 1,462 
in 1971 are more typical of the range in recent years. 
THE OBLIGATION TO VOTE 
The 1928 Amendment Act made voting compulsory, as had already 
been done for Queensland (1915) and the Commonwealth (1924); 
the other states all followed suit by 1942. New South Wales 
parliamentarians showed little interest in the change. The ministers 
in charge of the bill did not bother to justify the relevant clause; 
one or two Labor members made token objections on grounds of 
freedom of conscience; the clause passed both houses on the voices. 
Strictly speaking, people are not compelled to vote, if only 
because that would break the secrecy of the ballot. The penalty 
(a small fine) can only be applied to those who do not obtain a 
ballot paper at a polling booth or by post, and so have their names 
ticked off on the electoral roll. The elector may then discard the 
ballot or return it blank or spoiled without breaking the law, but 
very few do so, as is shown by the low level of "informal voting". 
The most obvious effect of compulsion is upon "turnout", or the 
proportion of enrolled voters who put a ballot paper in the box on 
election day, or send one in by post (remembering that enrolment 
itself was not compulsory until 1921). The highest turnout under 
the voluntary system in New South Wales was 82 per cent in 1927, 
at the election which ended the first administration of J.T. Lang. 
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Before that the best record was 80 per cent in 1874, when there 
was a strenuous contest on the question of fiscal reform. The 
proportion ranged between these high points and a minimum figure 
of 56 per cent in 1920, the year of the first election under 
proportional representation (see below), when electors were thought 
to be deterred by being required to make a statutory declaration 
of their identity before voting, as well as by the complexities of 
marking the ballot paper. The declaration was then abolished and 
the voting system simplified. As a result of this, together with the 
increased tenseness of the party battle, the voting turnout was 
greater in the proportional representation general elections of 1922 
and 1925 than at most previous elections under the single-member 
system. The average turnout at all general elections from 1891 to 
1927 was 67 per cent. 
At the first election (1930) under compulsory voting, the turnout 
rose to 95 per cent, and it has remained in this region since, the 
highest percentage, over 96, being recorded at the 1932 elections 
following the dismissal of J.T. Lang from his second Premiership. 
An important aspect of this change was the levelling up of female 
turnout with that of males. Before 1930 the proportion of women 
voting was generally about two-thirds, compared with nearly three-
quarters of the men, and it fell to a half in 1920, when only 61 
per cent of men voted. Since compulsion was introduced the female 
turnout has remained within one or two percentage points short 
of the male, while since 1938 the absolute numbers of women both 
enrolled and voting have come to exceed those of men, reflecting 
the preponderance of females over males in the population of voting 
age. 
The average total turnout under compulsory voting has been 94 
per cent, which may be compared with New Zealand's average 
European turnout of 91 per cent in the twelve successive general 
elections there up to 1969, without the aid of legal compulsion. 
Does the striking change in New South Wales after 1928 mean 
that compulsion "brought the apathetic, the parasitic, and the venal 
to the poll" as some critics have argued,' while the number of New 
Zealanders in these categories is negligible? One possible clue is 
the rate of informal voting, but it does not go far to support the 
criticism. On New Zealand we can only observe that the informal 
voting rate is indeed negligible, sticking close to one-half of one 
per cent overall at recent elections, under the relatively easy "simple 
majority voting" system. Omitting the three PR elections when the 
rate was unusually high, the New South Wales average rate under 
voluntary voting at elections from the beginning of the century was 
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1.6 per cent. For fifteen elections under compulsory voting the 
average rate is 2.3 per cent—hardly a significant rise. 
Colin Hughes argues that there is virtually no overt complaint 
about compulsory voting in Australia as a whole, and draws on 
an analysis of New South Wales elections in constituencies where 
one of the major political parties had no candidate, to show that 
in only about one-fifth of 136 such contests did more than 10 per 
cent of that party's "normal" supporters apparently vote informally 
in protest, and in only seven of them was the proportion of such 
protest votes more than 20 per cent. On the other hand his sample 
surveys in three Brisbane state electorates in 1963 indicate that 
the proportion of enrolled electors who would not go to the polls 
if not compelled, just over 20 per cent, was not much less than 
it had been under the voluntary system. That was roughly a quarter, 
if we can deduce it from the difference between average turnouts 
under the voluntary and compulsory systems given above. In a 
Gallup Poll, also in 1963, 25 per cent of an Australia-wide sample 
of electors said they thought voting at federal elections should be 
voluntary, as against 73 per cent who favoured compulsion, though 
opinion had moved about 10 per cent away from voluntarism since 
a similar poll twenty years before. This merely suggests the general 
distribution of attitudes about compulsion, rather than what re-
spondents would actually do if voting were voluntary. But it is 
consistent with the preceding survey evidence in indicating that as 
many electors now object to compulsion as formerly refrained from 
voting when they had the option—even if the objectors on principle 
are not all the same people as those who would not bother to go 
to the polls under a voluntary system. 
On one wider point all observers agree: the obligation to vote 
has relieved political parties of an important traditional role—that 
of "getting out the vote", and to that extent reduced the general 
level of political activity and interest. As Hughes says, "the parties 
do not have to produce the volume and intensity of propaganda 
which is necessary to ensure turnout" where voting is optional; nor 
are they involved in the house-to-house canvassing and provision 
of transport which persuade voters to the polls on election day. This 
situation is reflected in exceptionally low levels of party activism 
and expenditure and of citizen involvement even at election times, 
compared with those in other democratic countries. It is, of course! 
debatable whether traditional methods of mobilizing the vote 
amounted to "political education"—except for the party workers. 
It is clear only that in eliminating them, compulsory voting in itself 
has provided no substitute. 
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COUNTING THE VOTES 
New South Wales has tried various methods of counting heads. 
Up to 1910 the system was "first past the post", or simple majority 
voting. In that year it was supplemented by the "second ballot". 
If no candidate received an absolute majority on the first count, 
a second ballot was held between the two candidates with most 
votes. In the 1910 election this happened in three electorates; in 
1913 in twelve; then in 1918 the system was abandoned in favour 
of proportional representation. Under PR there were eight metropol-
itan electorates and one Newcastle electorate returning five mem-
bers each, and fifteen country electorates with three members each. 
Casual vacancies were filled by the late member's party colleague 
who had come next to him in primary preferences at the previous 
election, or if such a candidate was not available, by the nominee 
of the party leader. This system was used for the elections of 1920, 
1922, and 1925. It was unpopular because of the burdens placed 
on voters, the difficulties created by enormous electorates, and "the 
'political cannibalism' it encouraged among members of the same 
and allied parties"." 
In 1926 the Lang Labor government restored the single-member 
system, with the "contingent vote", that is, the option of indicating 
any number of preferences other than the first. Two years later 
the Bavin Nationalist government brought New South Wales into 
line with Commonwealth practice by introducing the system of 
requiring electors to indicate numerical preferences for all can-
didates, on pain of informality of the vote. Since 1969 it has not 
been necessary to mark the last preference. The successful candidate 
is the one who has secured an absolute majority of votes, either 
first preferences outright, or first preferences plus votes transferred 
to him, by excluding in turn candidates with the lowest number 
of first preferences and re-allocating their votes according to the 
next preference indicated. 
As in the case of compulsory voting, there is no sign that New 
South Wales parliaments gave any serious thought to the different 
electoral counting systems they have tried, except in terms of 
imagined party gain or loss. The changes made since 1910 were 
adopted with little debate, and (unlike Tasmania's experiment with 
the Hare-Clark system) none was ever subjected to expert analysis, 
appraisal, and report before or after adoption. The present method 
was justified on its introduction by the simple statements that "the 
corollary of compulsory voting is the compulsory expression of 
preferences", and that electors would be less confused if their state 
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system conformed to that adopted not long before for federal 
elections. 
It has been said in another context that schemes to ensure a final 
absolute majority for every candidate elected represent the answer 
of the non-Labor parties to Labor's rigid and effective pre-selection 
machinery. For parties which may have difficulty, whether individ-
ually or working in alliance, in securing agreement on a single 
candidate, but can rely on a fairly tight exchange of preferences 
between candidates of similar political complexion, such schemes 
reduce the fear of vote-splitting, which can be fatal under the simple 
majority voting system.^ On the other hand they have been accused 
of confusing the voters and weakening the two-party system by 
encouraging splinter groups, mushroom parties, and independent 
candidates. 
Several points must be noted here. L.C. Webb has wisely warned 
against confusing cause and effect. "Obviously laws do influence 
the functioning of parties and their interaction; but over the long 
period it may reasonably be assumed that the party system tends 
to get the electoral system best suited to its needs."' There is no 
evidence that the shape of the party system in New South Wales 
owes anything to its successive electoral systems, but they have 
sometimes affected its operation in the short run. Second, the 
distinction between multi-member and single-member constituency 
systems is at least as important as that between simple majority 
and preferential systems in the sense of systems enabling more than 
one preference to be expressed; among the latter systems, com-
pulsory as against optional expression of extra preferences also 
makes an important difference. Third, the characters of different 
parties, the geographical distribution of their supporters, and their 
relative propensity to act in concert are all important in determining 
the effect of any electoral system on their political fortunes. 
In New South Wales the appearance of a number of mushroom 
"parties" and a rash of independent candidates in the early 1920s 
probably owed more to unsettled post-war conditions than to the 
introduction of proportional representation; the epidemic was over 
before that experiment was abandoned. On the other hand, the 
founders of the Country Party believed they needed PR or 
compulsory preferential voting to get established, and their pressure 
on non-Labor governments was at least partly responsible for the 
adoption of the former in 1918 and the latter in 1928.' But it is 
unlikely that the party required either for its entry into the state 
parliament during that period; other factors (discussed in the next 
section) have been much more important in its electoral success 
Compulsory preferential voting, however, enabled the party to 
ei 
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indulge its antipathy to "machine politics" by eschewing "pre-
selection" and allowing "multiple endorsement" of its parliamentary 
candidates, sometimes in conjunction with the other non-Labor 
party. This policy succeeded to the extent that exchange of 
preferences among candidates of the non-Labor parties proved 
easier to ensure than, for example, among candidates from warring 
Labor factions. The single-member constituency with compulsory 
preferences probably suited the Country Party in New South Wales 
somewhat better than the multi-member system required by PR. 
Whether operated on the first-past-the-post principle or combined 
with preferential voting, the single-member system differs most 
importantly from the multi-member system in its under-representa-
tion of minorities and over-representation of majorities. This is 
another reason why we must look elsewhere besides preferential 
voting for the success of the Country Party in New South Wales 
elections. 
As to the alleged confusion of the electors under preferential 
systems, it has been shown that informal voting in New South 
Wales has not been high except at the first PR election. If the state 
had been chronically plagued with splinter parties and independent 
candidates, the record might have been different. In fact, what is 
essentially a two-party system has prevailed most of the time, and 
the ballot paper has rarely confronted the individual voter with more 
than half a dozen names among which to distribute his preferences. 
Moreover, the party workers outside the polling booth, in one of 
the few chores that remain to them under compulsory voting, are 
(nearly) always ready to help him with the most difficult problem; 
that the ballot does not show the party affiliations of the candidates. 
They offer him their party's "how to vote" cards—rough replicas 
of the ballot paper showing the party affiliations and showing how 
to record an appropriate party vote. The great majority of voters 
follow their preferred party's instructions. 
Finally it may be noted that preferential voting has not produced 
electoral results very different from what simple majority voting 
would have given. G.N. Hawker notes that in the fourteen elections 
from 1927 to 1965, it was necessary to count other than first 
preferences in only 15 per cent of the contested electorates, and 
in only 4 per cent of the total number of seats contested did the 
additional preferences change the result. These counts did not affect 
which party became the government in any of the elections except 
possibly that of 1950, when Labor gained one more than half the 
seats and its elected member for Darlinghurst had trailed on the 
first preference count.* 
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KEEPING THE BALLOT CLEAN 
In any electoral system the possibilities of abuse depend, among 
other things, on the probity of the electoral administration, the 
purity of the electoral rolls, the minimizing of undue influence on 
voters, the secrecy of the ballot and safeguarding of used ballot 
papers, and the possibility of appeal against disputed results. 
The New South Wales system has long been administered by 
the State Electoral Office, a branch of the public service for which, 
until 1928, the Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary's Department, was 
responsible ex officio as Chief Electoral Officer. The 1928 amend-
ment entrusted this responsibility to an Electoral Commissioner, a 
statutory officer who cannot be removed except by resolution of 
both houses of parliament. Until 1949 he had a renewable term 
of seven years; he now holds office until the age of sixty-five. By 
tradition, the Electoral Office operates with the same degree of 
political detachment and impartiality as the rest of the public 
service; elections, which of course require the short-term em-
ployment of large numbers of temporary helpers, are conducted on 
the whole with routine efficiency. 
Perhaps the most difficult task, with a rapidly growing and highly 
mobile population, is to keep the electoral rolls purged and 
completed. Before 1928 the necessary information was collected 
from occupiers of premises annually by the police, and revised in 
each district by a Revision Court consisting of a stipendiary or police 
magistrate; this system was not changed when compulsory enrol-
ment was introduced in 1921. Its relative efficiency seemed proved 
by the fact that the New South Wales rolls at that date already 
included more names than the corresponding rolls of the Com-
monwealth, which had introduced compulsory registration in 1911.' 
The 1928 act provided for the compilation of joint rolls for New 
South Wales and Commonwealth electoral purposes, and qualified 
electors are now expected to apply for enrolment themselves, while 
Commonwealth officers are charged with revising the rolls which 
are the same for federal and state elections. The follow-up of 
apparently defaulting electors under compulsory voting offers some 
help in keeping rolls up to date, and house-to-house canvassing is 
carried out periodically as a further check; at times teams of 
suspicious party workers comb the rolls to cut out dead wood; but 
the electoral office considers it is doing well if rolls are 90 per cent 
accurate at any one time. To the extent that they are inaccurate 
or incomplete at election time, the way is open for abuses such 
as personation, double voting, and "ballot-stuffing", or recording 
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false votes. Such practices have been frequently alleged—for 
example, as a by-product of postal voting (Labor allegations) and 
also of the removal of postal voting (Liberal allegations). The 
secrecy and anonymity of the ballot have made it extremely difficult 
to substantiate these allegations. 
Campaigning in elections is closely regulated by the law. Since 
the 1890s it has forbidden "treating" and less convivial forms of 
undue influence. A blow to the time-honoured Eatanswill type of 
election was the Liquor Amendment Act, 1905, which required 
hotels to be closed during the hours of polling; the prohibition was 
lifted again for elections after 1962. There is no statutory limit 
on candidates' campaign expenses. Under legislation of 1911 all 
voting at a general election takes place on the same day, which 
is now invariably a Saturday and a public holiday from noon. Hours 
of voting were fixed at 8 a.m. to 7 p.m.—extended to 8 p.m. in 
1920. A curious provision of the federal Broadcasting and Television 
Act, dating from 1942 and copied from Canada, prohibits the 
broadcasting or televising of any political "speech or matter" on 
the day of either a state or federal election or the two days preceding 
it. This was intended to protect the elector from undue influence 
on his final voting decision by the use of the most powerful media. 
It was recommended by an all-party committee of the national 
parliament and passed without debate. 
The secret ballot (the "Australian ballot" first introduced in 
Victoria) was adopted in New South Wales in 1858, and secrecy 
as such has been well maintained. J.T. Lang declared in 1944: "The 
ballot box in this State has always been above suspicion; it is secret 
and I want to keep it so."'° He was arguing that the absence of 
the locked ballot box facilitated irregularities in postal voting, and 
this was certainly possible, e.g., by undue influence or tampering 
with the ballot. Absent and "section 106" voting also could lend 
themselves to irregularities, and this has occasionally been alleged, 
but their frequency and extent can only be guessed from evidence 
offered in support of the occasional petition against an election 
result. 
Before 1928 questions on the validity of elections and the 
qualifications of members were subject to final decision by a nine-
member parliamentary Committee of Elections and Qualifications. 
According to Hawker" the committee investigated some seventy 
petitions between 1858 and 1900, most of which came from 
candidates who claimed they had been defeated by foul means. The 
committee sustained less than a third of the objections. Its reports 
exposed some careless returning officers and proved or suggested 
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the existence of some cases of personation and bribery, but no 
consistent malpractice. The record was much the same in the 
present century. The 1928 Amendment Act conferred jurisdiction 
on the Supreme Court of New South Wales as a Court of Disputed 
Returns. The court must report its findings to parliament, but not 
all of its reports have been published. The following samples give 
a fair cross-section of the kinds of questions brought before the 
court. 
There were two petitions after the 1938 election. The first 
resulted in the election of H.B. Turner by a margin of nine votes 
for the blue-ribbon U.A.P. seat of Gordon being declared void 
because formal requirements had not been fully met in a number 
of applications for absent, postal, and section votes. However, 
Turner was re-elected without difficulty at the ensuing by-election. 
The second, by Labor candidate W.F. Sheahan against the election 
of E.S. Solomon in Petersham, was withdrawn after preliminary 
hearing—because, so Sheahan said many years later, he could not 
afford the mounting legal costs.'^ There was a petition against the 
Darlinghurst result in the 1950 general election, alleging various 
forms of double voting, impersonation, and voting for dead or absent 
electors. After a police investigation the utmost claim of counsel 
for the petitioner was that he could produce evidence of 325 illegal 
votes, whereas the majority declared in the election was 732. The 
court dismissed the petition on technical grounds, adding that even 
if petitioner's allegations were proved it could not alter the election 
result, and that this should not be annulled when there were no 
accusations against the successful candidate personally or against 
the honesty or competence of the electoral officials.'^ 
The next case was less interesting in itself than in its sequel. 
In the 1959 election the blue ribbon Country Party seat of Lismore 
was contested by an endorsed party member and a self-styled 
Independent Country Party candidate. After a recount, the former 
was declared elected by two votes, but on the latter's appeal the 
court held the poll void on the ground of errors in the count. At 
the ensuing by-election both the previous candidates were endorsed 
by the Country Party, but a Labor candidate also entered the field 
and won on preferences—a rare blow to the policy of multiple 
endorsement. After the 1965 election a candidate who himself 
polled seventy-six votes in Nepean, an electorate of thirty thousand 
voters, sought to upset the election of the winner in Nepean, and 
of the then Premier and leader of the Opposition, alleging "treat-
ing" by the offer of cars to electors on polling day, and the use 
of posters larger than allowed by the law. This petition was 
dismissed by the court."" 
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After the 1971 general election a defeated Liberal candidate for 
Wollongong initiated a protest petition but died before it could be 
heard; as the law allowed, it was taken up by a voter in the 
electorate, who, however, soon withdrew. The Liberal candidate for 
Campbelltown in the same election, whom the returning officer after 
a recount had declared to be the loser to Labor by twenty-nine 
votes, later told the court he would have won by eight votes had 
the returning officer, who had wrongly initialled sixty-five ballots, 
not ruled them invalid. The court upheld the returning officer's 
ruling and dismissed the petition, finding that a new election need 
not be held since there were also compensatory errors which negated 
the petitioner's claim that the will of the majority had not 
prevailed." The election of R. Freeman (Liberal) for Coogee in 
1973 by a majority of eight votes was later held void on an appeal 
by the unsuccessful Labor candidate, M. Cleary, on grounds of 
irregularities in postal voting procedures which disqualified some 
properly qualified electors. At the resulting by-election in July 1974 
the Labor candidate defeated Freeman with Australia Party 
preferences, winning by fifty-four votes. In October the court 
dismissed Freeman's appeal against this result." 
EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
The electoral system established by 1902 was theoretically that of 
one person one vote, and one vote one value. The second half of 
this phrase has never been strictly true of New South Wales, and 
not a few politicians have declared over the years that they would 
never subscribe to it, even in theory. The "representativeness" of 
the elected chamber depends on the number of seats in relation 
to population; the principles governing their distribution throughout 
the state; arrangements for keeping the distribution up to date; the 
authority responsible for actual redistributions; the political pres-
sures to which this authority is subjected; the geographical distribu-
tion of the supporters of the various parties; and the strategies 
followed by those parties in contesting elections. 
During the nineteenth century different electorates returned a 
different number of members to the Legislative Assembly; the total 
number of seats was increased from time to time—rather more 
slowly than the growth in population—until in the 1890s there were 
141 seats. The Reform Act of 1893 reduced the number to 125, 
all for single-member constituencies. After the transfer of functions 
to the Commonwealth at Federation, it was felt that the state 
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needed fewer legislators, and at a referendum in 1903 the electors 
chose the figure of ninety, the lowest of three alternatives submitted 
to them. This number remained unchanged during the period of 
proportional representation (1918-26)—when seats were grouped 
for electoral purposes into five-member (in Sydney and Newcastle) 
and three-member constituencies—and continued thereafter until 
1949, when it was raised to ninety-four. The increase was modest, 
since population growth, combined with compulsory registration 
after 1921, had between 1904 and 1949 raised the average 
enrolment per electorate from 7,661 to 20,587. The number of seats 
was again increased in 1969 to ninety-six and in 1973 to ninety-
nine, with an average enrolment of 26,890, and still giving New 
South Wales electors more than twice as many representatives in 
the Legislative Assembly as they have in the federal House of 
Representatives. But this representation is not evenly distributed. 
At least from 1893 up to 1927 (except during the PR period 
1918-26) the law required electorate boundaries to be so drawn 
that each member should represent an equal number of electors, 
due allowance being made for community and diversity of interest, 
lines of communication, and physical features, with a fixed 
"marginal allowance" of not more than six hundred either way from 
the state average, extended to twelve hundred in 1926. The original 
intention and the practice throughout was to distribute this margin 
of allowance so as to leave country electorates generally with fewer 
voters (and therefore higher representation) than metropolitan ones. 
But during the earlier part of the present century the difference 
was comparatively small, and even Labor members saw some 
justification for it, on the ground that it alleviated to some extent 
the difficulties of maintaining contact between members and their 
constituents in the sparsely settled rural areas. Their opponents also 
argued that country electors made heavier demands on the services 
of their members, that their problems needed more study and 
attention, and generally that the representatives of "city interests" 
should not be able to outvote in parliament the tribunes of the 
farmers, "the backbone of the nation". 
The inexorable shift of population towards urban and especially 
metropolitan areas continued to erode the number of rural seats 
while its total growth reduced the relative size of the fixed marginal 
allowance, and hence the scope for its manipulation in favour of 
country areas. Under pressure from its own country members the 
Lang government in 1927 introduced the idea of an explicit 
statutory weighting of the country vote." The succeeding govern-
ment, the first Nationalist-Country Party coalition, naturally took 
up the precedent with alacrity, and in 1928 enacted the rurally 
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biased system which still prevails. The state was divided into three 
areas, forty-three seats being allocated to the Sydney Area, five 
to the Newcastle Area and forty-two to the remaining or Country 
Area; an equal distribution of electors was required among these 
seats within each area, with the same twelve hundred margin of 
allowance as before. The steadily increasing over-representation of 
country electors which this produced was temporarily redressed by 
the Labor amending measure of 1949. While increasing the total 
number of seats by four, it reduced the state to two areas for 
distribution purposes: the Sydney Area with forty-eight seats (an 
addition of five) and the Country Area with forty-six, including 
Newcastle whose suburbs gained one new seat. In effect this 
deprived the rural area of two seats, and by merging Newcastle 
with the Country Area it enabled that Labor-voting city to share 
in the higher ratio of members to electors that still remained for 
Country Area electorates. The 1949 act also altered the margin 
of allowance from the fixed figure of twelve hundred to 20 per cent 
of the quota, or average constituency enrolment, either way. 
Demographic change continued to reduce the number of truly rural 
seats and increase the number of seats in urbanizing localities within 
the nominal Country Area. 
In 1969 the Liberal-Country Party" coalition government took 
its turn to secure a more favourable allocation of seats. Its 
amendments to the electoral legislation combined the Sydney Area 
with a surrounding section of the former Country Area, then 
comprising fifteen seats and stretching from Newcastle to 
Wollongong and west to the lower Blue Mountains, to make up 
a new Central Area of sixty-three seats. The Country Area that 
remained was now almost wholly rural, but received two additional 
seats, making a total of thirty-three, and once more shifting the 
balance of representation to the advantage of rural electors and, 
a fortiori, of the coalition parties—especially the Country Party. 
At the same time the allowable variation of enrolment from the 
quota was reduced to 15 per cent. In 1973, under pressure of further 
metropolitan growth, the imbalance was somewhat redressed by the 
statutory addition of three seats to the number in the Central Area, 
bringing the state total to ninety-nine, while the permitted variation 
from quota was restored to 20 per cent. 
The combined effects of demographic trends and of these 
statutory changes are illustrated in table 1: the penalty imposed 
on Sydney and Newcastle voters by the introduction of the "area" 
system in 1928, a handicap steadily increased by urbanization up 
to 1947; the way in which Labor's 1949 amendments gave 
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Newcastle as well as Wollongong the advantage of inclusion in the 
Country Area, but only temporarily alleviated the relative under-
representation of Sydney electors; and the restoration by the 1969 
Liberal-Country Party amendments of heavier rural over-represen-
tation through the inclusion of all three main cities as well as their 
urbanizing hinterland in the enlarged Central Area. With a vote 
in this area now worth only two-thirds of one in the Country Area, 
the system provides a built-in bonus to the Country Party as against 
both the other main parties. This is not to overlook that electoral 
distributions have always been skewed in favour of rural representa-
tion in practice, and at times in the nineteenth century may have 
been more skewed than today. The difference is that the present 
system is more rigid, is embedded in statute, and is overtly 
discriminatory. 
Table 1. Average Number of Electors per Member of Legislative Assembly 
(Number of seats in each area is shown in brackets) 
Election 
Year 
1927 
1930 
1947 
1950 
1968 
1971 
1973 
Sydney 
Area 
16,238(46) 
Metropolitan 
18,580(43) 
25,201(43) 
Metropolitan 
23,331(48) 
28,310(48) 
Newcastle 
Area 
15,769(6) 
Newcastle 
18,933(5) 
25,752(5) 
Wollongong 
Area 
15,364(2) 
Other Seats 
14,923(36) 
Country 
13,402(2) 
16,309(3) 
13,009(40) 
15,168(39) 
Country 
18.484(6) 
22,681(6) 
17,090(3) 
22,308(4) 
Central 
28,878(49) 
29,857(50) 
28,934(4) 
30.659(4) 
29,738(4) 
28,876(4) 
17,228(37) 
21,466(36) 
Former 
Country 
29,955(6) 
27,263(8) 
Country 
Former 
Newcastle 
21,338(1) 
22,354(1) 
Other 
20,190(32) 
21,583(32) 
Total 
Seats 
90 
90 
90 
94 
94 
96 
99 
Sources: Electoral Commissioner's Statistical Returns to 1971; Report on proposed 
redistribution by Electoral Districts Commission, 6 July 1973. 
Note: The electorate of Cessnock, previously included in the same statutory area 
as Newcastle electorates, was retained in the Country Area in 1969 when the other 
Newcastle electorates were included in the Central Area, and is shown in the table 
thereafter as "Former Newcastle". Apart from this, changes in the areas designated 
at the head of each column were relatively minor. Headings in italics show regions 
grouped in each statutory area. 
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Of course average enrolments do not show the full extent of 
variations between vote-values in different electorates. Table 2 
shows the extremes in each statutory area and in the state as a 
whole over a recent decade. At every stage the largest metropolitan 
electorates had nearly twice as many voters as the smallest rural 
ones, while the largest non-metropolitan electorates of 1962 and 
1968 were among the semi-urbanized localities absorbed into the 
Central Area in 1969. 
Table 2. Variations in Size of Electorates 
Category 
Smallest Country 
Largest Country 
Smallest Metropolitan 
Largest Metropolitan 
Smallest Country 
Largest Country 
Smallest Central 
Largest Central 
Electorate Electors Enrolled 
At 1962 Election 
Sturt 
Nepean 
Maroubra 
Blacktown 
15,761 
26,165 
22,962 
30,367 
At 1971 Election 
Temora 
Wollondilly 
Davidson 
The Hills 
17,835 
22,318 
25,866 
33,917 
Electorate Electors Enrolled 
At 1968 Election 
Tenterfield 
Gosford 
Bligh 
The Hills 
18,239 
25,312 
24,220 
32,362 
At 1973 Election 
Barwon 
Wollondilly 
Mt DruiU 
Phillip 
19,008 
25,265 
24,017 
32,977 
Source: Electoral Commissioner's Statistical Returns on the respective elections. 
At the time of redistribution the variations were no doubt within 
the margin of tolerance laid down by the electoral law, but 
population changes and movements call for periodical adjustments 
of individual electorate boundaries if the deviations from the mean 
are to be kept within limits. Such adjustments have been prescribed 
by New South Wales law since 1893, and special redistributions 
have also been made after some of the statutory changes just 
described. From 1918 to 1952 regular redistributions were required 
at intervals not greater than nine years—that is the maximum life 
of three parliaments. In 1952 the Labor government enacted a less 
logical time-limit of five years, resulting in redistribution with their 
accompanying dislocations before four of the next six general 
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elections. In 1969 their successors, deploring the confusion and 
uncertainty caused to electors and members, provided for regular 
distributions in every sixth year, "that is", as the Liberal Chief 
Secretary said, first in 1969 and then "in the middle year of every 
second three-year parliament in future"." The redistribution 
planned for 1969 was held in 1970, but the government suddenly 
held another, under special legislation, before the 1973 election, 
pleading the rapid growth of outer suburban electorates, and the 
recent enfranchisement of some 200,000 eighteen-to-twenty-year-
olds. Thus there was a redistribution before every general election 
under the Liberal-Country government except the last, in 1976. 
GERRYMANDERING? 
This record of legislative tinkering obviously reflects the intense 
practical concern of political parties with electoral machinery, and 
not least with the determination of electoral boundaries, because 
the distribution of classes of voters between electorates so vitally 
affects the winning of seats and small changes can so easily tilt 
the delicate balance. However, the parties have long affected to 
cherish fair representation, perhaps believing it was cherished by 
the voters; since arbitrary discretion is unavoidable in drawing 
electorate boundaries, the politicians have escaped direct responsi-
bility for exercising it by entrusting distributions to some form of 
independent tribunal. In New South Wales for most of the time 
since 1893 this has been a commission of three public servants; 
after 1928 it consisted of the statutory Electoral Commissioner as 
chairman, together with the Government Statistician and Surveyor-
General ex officio. The Labor government in 1949 included in its 
tendentious amendments to the electoral law a provision for the 
Electoral Commissioner to act alone—and he did so in 1950 when 
that government's electoral jitters reached their apogee. Having 
survived that year's election. Labor in 1952 restored a three-man 
tribunal, but on a different basis. Only the Electoral Commissioner 
was to serve ex officio. The government would appoint the others 
ad hoc for each distribution. The chairman must be a judge or 
an ex-judge, and the third member "a person who is registered as 
a surveyor". The possibility of patronage is clear, but there have 
been no changes to the status, powers, or procedures of the Electoral 
Districts Commissioners, who have always had the final statutory 
authority to determine electoral boundaries, after publicly advertis-
ing proposed alterations and giving "due consideration" to written 
objections. 
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There is no evidence to show that Electoral Districts Com-
missioners have not been impartial in their work, other than that 
the electoral system, including redistributions, has tended to operate 
in favour of the party or parties in power from time to time—though 
by no means as blatantly as in some other Australian states. 
Government parties—of both complexions—have tended to win a 
higher proportion of seats than their share of the popular vote 
entitled them to. However, under all single-member-district elec-
toral systems there are noticeable discrepancies between votes cast 
for and seats won by the candidates of different parties. Even where, 
as in New South Wales, the discrepancy occurs systematically in 
one direction, there can be a variety of reasons, of which the 
electoral boundaries are only one. 
For example, there is a tendency for single-member systems to 
reward the winning party in an election with a greater percentage 
of seats than votes. In 1930, Labor's 55 per cent of the total vote 
won it 61 per cent of the seats; in 1932, the 53 per cent of the 
total vote received by the United Australia Party-Country Party 
combination won it 73 per cent of the seats, and this trend continued 
for the non-Labor coalition through the 1930s; Labor's win in 1941 
with 51 per cent of the votes gave the party 60 per cent of the 
seats; in 1962, Labor secured a majority of fourteen with 49 per 
cent of the valid votes. Under the ensuing Liberal-Country Party 
coalition the advantage ran the other way, until 1976 when Labor 
managed to secure a majority of one (two if supported by the only 
Independent) with just under 50 per cent of the votes. 
But other factors contribute to such results. The more seats a 
party contests the lower its seat-vote ratio is likely to be. The 
Country Party in New South Wales—as elsewhere in Australia— 
has always contested a limited number of carefully selected seats, 
thus wasting proportionately fewer votes than the major parties 
which feel bound to contest a large number of virtually hopeless 
seats. Combined with the weighting of the rural vote already 
described, this has resulted in the Country party being consistently 
over-represented in this state, even when the elections as a whole, 
as in 1930 and 1941, were adverse from that party's point of view." 
In 1965, when the non-Labor combination returned to power, the 
Country Party, with 10 per cent of the votes, won 16 per cent of 
the ninety-two contested seats. But the Liberals, though sharing 
in the victory, did not enjoy a similar advantage. With almost four 
times as many votes as the Country Party, they won barely twice 
the number of seats (34 per cent of the contested seats with 40 
per cent of the total vote). 
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A further cause of such discrepancies is the way in which support 
for different parties is distributed among the electorates: seats 
gained by narrow majorities raise the seat-vote ratio; "blue-ribbon" 
seats lower it. Boundary alterations of course affect this distribution, 
but whether they are deliberately calculated to favour one party 
rather than another thereby is easier to guess than to demonstrate. 
In 1962 Joan Rydon sought to compare the "concentration of 
majorities" effect with that of unequal sizes of electorates on 
Labor's results in a number of New South Wales elections. Taking 
into account the putative vote in uncontested seats (based on 
previous results), and allocating votes for minor parties and 
independent candidates among the candidates of major parties (on 
the assumption of an essentially two-party system—Labor versus 
non-Labor), she compared the overall percentage of votes won by 
the "Labor" side with a measure of its "effective vote", to conclude 
that Labor was over-represented by the results of each of the 
general elections from 1950 to 1962, and that it won a majority 
of seats with slightly under half the total votes in 1950. She then 
calculated the effect on Labor representation of inequalities in the 
size of electorates, by taking the difference between its overall 
percentage vote and its average vote in each electorate. Subtracting 
this figure from the total over-representation, the remainder was 
the effect of differential concentration of majorities. The results are 
given in table 3. 
Table 3. "Labor" Percentages of Calculated Total Vote 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
"Effective vote" 
Overall vote 
Labor over-represent-
ation (1-2) 
Over-representation 
due to inequalities 
in electorates 
Over-representation 
due to differential 
concentration of 
majorities (3-4) 
1950 
50.84 
49.93 
0.91 
0.21 
0.70 
1953 
56.82 
55.47 
1.35 
-0.15 
1.50 
1956 
51.54 
50.64 
0.90 
-0.11 
1.01 
1959 
51.40 
50.25 
1.15 
0.08 
1.07 
1962 
54.40 
52.06 
2.34 
0.21 
2.13 
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Rydon summed up her investigation as follows: 
All this suggests that there is substance in the claim of the opposition 
parties that the A.L.P. has an electoral advantage and that they would 
need well over half the votes to win half the seats . . . The A.L.P. has 
been favoured in N.S.W. since at least 1950 and . . . its position in 
1962 was better than in the preceding elections. There can be little doubt 
that the redistribution of 1961 strengthened the position of the A.L.P. 
To what extent movements and growth of population were responsible 
and to what extent there were elements of 'gerrymandering' in the 
changing of electoral boundaries are questions to which there are 
unlikely to be final answers.™ 
On the last point it is not necessary to remain so tentative, 
especially after eleven years of non-Labor government during which 
the bias in the electoral system clearly swung to the opposite side. 
The party spokesmen themselves have never been tentative, regu-
larly complaining, when in opposition, of gerrymandering in various 
forms by their opponents in office. As already shown, some forms 
of electoral manipulation are quite patent. Those responsible have 
made no apology for the substantial weighting of the rural vote. 
No amount of rationalization can disguise the self-interest shown 
by Labor and non-Labor in turn in their amendments to the area 
system and to minor features such as the postal vote. It is the 
shaping of electorate boundaries to party advantage that is most 
difficult to document because of the status and composition of the 
redistribution commissions, but here the circumstantial evidence is 
impressive, even if the modus operandi remains obscure. 
Malcolm Mackerras, a close student of the subject, was already 
able to declare in 1971: "By and large it is true that Labor's 
gerrymanders have been replaced by Liberal gerrymanders".^' He 
gave some examples on that occasion, but in a later publication 
made his conclusions even more explicit: 
The division of the State into areas is determined by Parliament. The 
division of each area into individual seats is determined by supposedly 
impartial commissioners. In fact, however, the commissioners tend to 
favour the party in power. In order to illustrate this let me compare 
the 1962 and 1968 boundaries. In 1962 the boundaries were plainly 
drawn to favour Labor in the following marginal seats: Blacktown, 
Bligh, Concord, Drummoyne, Nepean, Ryde and Wyong. In 1968 the 
boundaries in these seats were plainly drawn in favour of Liberal-CP. 
. . . Under Labor, Broken Hill was divided and half of it was in Cobar 
and half in Sturt. So Labor had two seats with surrounding rural votes 
swamped by the Broken Hill vote. Under Liberal-CP the two Labor 
seats have become one and a very safe Labor seat has been created 
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wasting away the Labor vote. 
[And in 1973] the redistribution gave the Askin government a minor 
strengthening of an already existing gerrymander. It seems to me that 
the boundaries are now as favourable to the Liberal-CP coalition as 
they are ever likely to be. 
In this last remark Mackerras implied that manipulation oper-
ated within limits (though little enough is needed to turn the scale 
in closely contested elections). As he wryly reflected: "It is, I 
suppose, inevitable that boundaries will tend to favour the party 
in power. New South Welshmen can take comfort from the fact 
that gerrymandering in N.S.W. has been mild compared with most 
other states."" 
NOTES 
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amendments to 1973. A summary of relevant legislation is given at the beginning 
of the New South Wales elections section in A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics, 1890-1964, ed. Colin A. Hughes and B.D. Graham 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), and in Hughes's 
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Political Parties 
Political parties are among the relatively durable voluntary associa-
tions which aim to control or influence the doings of government, 
typically through the electoral and policy-forming processes. Where 
substantial proportions of a population have acquired formal rights 
to a say in government, political parties have arisen to organize 
political support on the necessary scale and to crystallize the 
otherwise confused mass of interests and opinions about a relatively 
coherent structure of issues and of political leaders. This is only 
a description, not a definition: it would fit some associations which 
are not called "parties" and miss important features of some which 
are so called; clear-cut analytical distinctions are impossible. We 
are here concerned with the associations to which current usage 
applies this label; we discuss their particular nature more closely 
under "Functions", later in the chapter; some of the bodies with 
overlapping aims and functions will be discussed in the following 
chapter, "Non-party Groups". 
Two general points may be made. As in Britain but unlike those 
in the United States, political parties in Australia are not legally 
incorporated nor are their internal rules controlled by statute or 
enforceable in the courts. Secondly, despite their political im-
portance and their intermediary role, mentioned above, as between 
government and people, the formal membership of Australian 
parties is only a tiny fraction of the electorate—in New South 
Wales not much over 2 per cent for the four main parties in 1972.' 
This chapter describes the development of the present party 
pattern in New South Wales, the tensions between parties of similar 
complexion, the basis and distribution of party support, the 
organizational structure of the main parties, and the ways in which 
they perform their primary functions—selecting and helping can-
didates into parliament, and seeking to influence parliamentary 
policies. 
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ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Modern political parties have usually begun in one of three ways: 
as the political arm of some organized interest group; as the creation 
of a combination of leading citizens, in or outside parliament; or 
by fission of or breakaway from a pre-existing party. In addition, 
a party weakened by faction or electoral failure may be re-
constructed and revivified under a new name, usually through the 
second of the three processes just mentioned. Whatever its origins, 
however, a party once firmly established tends to develop an 
organizational life and autonomy of its own, and any formal ties 
with outside groups may come under considerable strain and 
perhaps be broken altogether. What follows will illustrate all of 
these generalizations. 
In New South Wales the number of enduring political parties 
has always been small—never more than four at a time and that 
only for the life of the Democratic Labor Party from the mid-1950s 
to the mid-1970s. When rival parties have multiplied, this has been 
a short-term response to special circumstances, and such mushroom 
parties have been of little importance except where they resulted 
from splits within the major parties—sometimes leading to the 
formation of a new one. A moment's scanning of the minor parties 
of the past half-century will illustrate this. 
Wars and depression each produced their crop of new or 
breakaway parties. The unsettled period after 1918 also saw the 
experiment with proportional representation. In addition to the 
Communist Party this period produced one lasting new party, the 
Progressives, which evolved into the Country Party. But the 
elections of the period were also contested by many independents, 
as well as by candidates supported by self-styled parties with such 
names as Soldiers and Citizens, Protestant Labour, Majority 
Labour, Young Australia, Democratic, and Socialist; these groups 
managed to win a seat or two between them, then disappeared.^ 
Similarly, in 1929 the split in the National Party at federal level, 
over whether the Commonwealth should vacate the field of in-
dustrial arbitration, led to the formation in New South Wales of 
an Australian People's Party, followed after the 1929 federal 
election by the defection of W.M. Hughes from the Nationalists 
and the absorption of the A.P.P. into his Australian Party, also 
a purely New South Wales organization which disintegrated within 
a year.' The strain of the Second World War soon broke up the 
United Australia Party. After its loss of seats at the federal general 
election of 1940, and of office at that of New South Wales in 1941, 
discontented elements in the party joined with other groups to form 
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early in -1943 a Liberal-Democratic Party and a Commonwealth 
Party. The latter was soon reabsorbed into the New South Wales 
U.A.P., which towards the end of the year clutched at the frail 
straw of a new name—the Democratic Party. The Democrats and 
the Liberal-Democrats survived for another year, on a diet of 
mutual recrimination. 
On the Labor side, the Great Depression precipitated a 
catastrophic conflict between the federal party and the New South 
Wales Branch led by J.T. Lang. From 1931 to 1936, while this 
branch stood expelled from the party by a special federal con-
ference, it retained most Labor support in the state, and the 
federally sponsored rival organization formed a minority Labor 
Party. Then there developed a struggle within the reunited branch 
to end Lang's leadership, by-products of which were, first, the 
"Heffron-Evans" party (1936-39), then the Australian Labor Party 
(Non-Communist), led by the deposed Lang (1940-41, 1943-c. 
1949), then the left-wing Hughes-Evans State Labor Party (1940 
to 1943, when it amalgamated with the Communist Party), and 
finally a Lang Labor remnant which survived until about 1956." 
More lasting was the effect of the Australia-wide Labor schism of 
the 1950s, from which arose the Democratic Labor Party, the only 
other minor party (unless the Country Party is minor) which has 
ever made any significant impact on the electoral struggle. 
There was also, of course, the Communist Party of Australia. 
Founded in Sydney in 1920, the party clung tenaciously to the skirts 
of the labour movement, and approached its 1944 peak of some 
23,000 members throughout Australia during the period 1940 to 
1943 when it was legally proscribed. However, weakened by post-
war disillusion with Stalinism and the cold war and by opposition 
to its influence in trade unions, between 1963 and 1972 the party 
split into three microscopic rival organizations. Communists became 
numerically insignificant, and although contesting some parlia-
mentary seats in New South Wales over the years, they had no 
chance of winning one. This does not mean that the Communist 
movement has been politically negligible. But its impact has been 
indirect—through the leadership of important trade unions, and 
through its utility as a bogy in the electoral battle between the 
main parties. The movement differs, moreover, from the parties 
discussed here, in that it does not accept the basic structure of 
Australian society and government, and does not confine itself to 
the usual lines of political action. Further reference to communism 
will be limited to some of its indirect effects on New South Wales 
politics.* 
Another minority party, the Australia Party, founded in 1969 
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by Sydney businessman Gordon Barton, attracted more votes than 
the D.L.P. in the handful of New South Wales electorates they 
contested in common, but is neglected here because its impact has 
been small and its durability is doubtful. We are left, therefore, 
in order of their founding, with the Australian Labor Party (N.S.W. 
Branch), the Australian Country Party (N.S.W.), the Liberal Party 
of Australia (N.S.W. Branch). Their antecedents are as follows. 
The New South Wales Labor Party was set up in 1891, following 
a direct decision of the trade union movement in 1890, triggered 
off by but not solely due to its experience in the maritime strike 
of that year.' The electoral organization, originally established by 
the N.S.W. Trades and Labour Council, went by the name of Labor 
Electoral Leagues until 1895. Up to that date the infant party was 
rent by a series of complex quarrels over fiscal policy, attempts to 
bind its parliamentary members by a pledge, and relations between 
its various constituent groups. In the more tightly disciplined 
organization that emerged, the term Political Labor Leagues found 
favour until 1918, when all the state organizations adopted the 
uniform title of Branches of the Australian Labor Party. This 
followed the disastrous conscription split of 1916-17, itself only the 
culmination, in New South Wales at least, of another set of 
breaches among the Labor parliamentarians, by then in office, and 
between parliamentary factions and important sections of the 
movement outside. Thereafter the name did not change, but 
conflicts continued and at times led to clear breaks in organization. 
Thus in March 1931 a special federal conference expelled the 
N.S.W. Branch Executive from the party in the course of the long 
conflict over policies and power with J.T. Lang. As the federal body 
set up its own Executive, there were two Labor organizations in 
the state until 1936 when unity was nominally restored by reinstat-
ing Lang's group as the official Executive. But there were three 
further minority Labor parties in New South Wales in the next 
five years, and it took this time and several more federal interven-
tions to end the factional legacy of Langism.' 
The Liberal Party is the latest of a long line of political 
organizations whose common rationale can be succinctly described 
only as "non-Labor". When the Labor Party was formed in the 
1890s there was already a two-party system in New South Wales 
based on a real policy issue—free trade versus protection—which 
also divided the Labor ranks themselves. The advent of Federation 
in 1901 removed the "fiscal issue" from the state political arena; 
a dominant theme in the subsequent realignment of party organiza-
tions was the need for a combination of the employing classes to 
confront the emerging challenge of organized labour in politics. 
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Almost accidentally, this role was assumed by the Liberal Party, 
heir to the Freetraders of previous decades, which remained the 
only effective non-Labor force in parliament until the upheavals 
of 1916-17.* The conscription debacle of those years culminated 
in a transfusion of Labor notables to the non-Labor organizations 
—renamed the National Party—under the continuing Premiership 
of Labor's ex-leader, W.A. Holman. The more complex disaster 
of the Depression not only splintered Labor but also wrecked the 
Nationalists, who in 1931 regrouped as the United Australia Party. 
Like its predecessors, this was essentially an oligarchical organiza-
tion, created and run by small groups of politicians, with funds 
largely provided by a self-elected finance committee of leading 
businessmen, the Consultative Council, which had been formed at 
Holman's suggestion in 1919.' The U.A.P. showed less interstate 
cohesion than the National Party (the new name was adopted only 
at the federal level and in New South Wales and Victoria), and 
its organization in the electorates was even more rudimentary. Like 
its predecessor, the federal U.A.P. took its leader (in this case J.A. 
Lyons) and a number of other prominent members from the 
disintegrating Labor government; however, the harsher Labor 
feuding in New South Wales contributed no recruits to the state 
U.A.P., which found a leader in B.S.B. Stevens, a former head of 
the state Treasury whom Premier Lang had deposed for political 
reasons back in 1925.'° 
In 1943 the U.A.P. was heavily defeated in the federal elections, 
and in New South Wales was split into several groups, with a state 
election due in the following year. At that juncture the Consultative 
Council was replaced by a new body styling itself the Institute of 
Public Affairs (I.P.A.), which at the end of 1943 summoned a 
conference representing some of these groups (the Liberal-Demo-
cratic and Commonwealth Parties), together with the U.A.P. and 
the Country Party, "as a preliminary to the calling of a public 
meeting to form a new political party". The Institute (and similar 
bodies in other states) had observers also at the wider conferences 
at Canberra and Albury in October and December 1944, at which 
R.G. Menzies persuaded the warring non-Labor factions throughout 
the country to reunite in the Liberal Party of Australia. A strong 
federal structure, a widely based electorate organization, democrat-
ic rank-and-file influence on party policy, and autonomy from 
outside financial pressure were the declared tenets of the new party. 
Except for the first, they have been sufficiently realized in practice 
to distinguish the party in these respects from its forerunners. In 
New South Wales the party's provisional Executive, appointed in 
January 1945, was split over an immediate attempt by the Institute 
42 
Political Parties 
of Public Affairs to reassert financial control. But after the first 
State Council was elected in June, it adopted the rule still followed 
today—that donations (over and above membership fees) might 
come from individuals or from firms, but not from external 
organizations such as the I.P.A. nor from trade groups or associa-
tions. The New South Wales Division of the Liberal Party directly 
inherited from the U.A.P.-Democratic Party its members of 
parliament, its paid officers and premises, its parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary leaders, its general policies, and most of its 
ordinary members. Its most important innovations were this new 
approach to party finance and its ordered hierarchy of elected, 
policy-advising and executive committees, modelled closely on that 
of Labor." 
The Country Party, like the Labor Party, began as the political 
arm of organized interests outside parliament. The New South 
Wales Farmers and Settlers' Association (F.S.A.), founded in 1893, 
though heir to a radical small-farmer tradition, had decided before 
the First World War against any alliance with Labor, which was 
identified with various dangers—of agricultural workers being 
brought under the arbitration system, of increased land taxes, of 
the extension of leasehold tenure as against further alienation of 
Crown lands, and above all, of socialism. On the other hand, 
disillusion attended the alternative tactics successively followed by 
the F.S.A. Nothing was gained by the policy, around the turn of 
the century, of supporting small caves of "Country Party" members 
in the state parliament. Worried by the rise of federal protectionist 
tariffs after 1908, drought in 1911-12, and unstable export markets, 
F.S.A. members persuaded their organization to nominate its own 
candidates in 1913—only to see the successful ones sink their 
identity in the Liberal Party. In 1915 the F.S.A. adopted the idea 
of a Progressive Party, proposed two years earlier by G.S. Beeby, 
an ex-Labor Minister who was soon elected its leader. But the party 
proceeded to make wartime truces and election pacts with the 
Liberals and their successors, the Nationalists, who took Beeby into 
their cabinet. 
The end of the war saw additional motives and openings for the 
formation of an independent rural party. The wheat farmers in the 
F.S.A. were anxious to see the continuance on a more efficient basis 
of the wartime compulsory pool schemes; they feared impending 
higher tariffs and opposed the fixing of meat prices in 1918. The 
former Pastoralists' Union, created to combat the 1890 shearers' 
strike, had taken in many small graziers and mixed farmers from 
the tablelands and slopes during the war; had renamed itself the 
Graziers' Association of New South Wales in 1916; was concerned 
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like the F.S.A., about tariffs and meat prices, and about industrial 
disturbances and union gains towards the war's end; and had 
accepted the need to organize for political action. The farmers still 
had no control over their political representatives, and other 
conservatives were alarmed at the infiltration of ex-Labor leaders, 
and Labor ideas and methods, into the National Party. Finally, the 
enactment of proportional representation and preferential voting in 
1918 removed the fear of a rural party disastrously splitting the 
anti-Labor vote. 
Hence at the end of 1919 the Graziers' Association (G.A.) joined 
with the Farmers and Settlers' Association and some of the 
disgruntled urban politicians in reconstituting the Progressive Party 
and securing the election of fifteen members (including four from 
the city) at the 1920 elections. The hankering of, roughly, the urban 
and ex-Nationalist section of these members and the corresponding 
section of the Progressive central council for political alliance with 
the Nationalists caused a split in both bodies in 1922; the seven 
"true blues" who opposed the alliance, with their extra-parlia-
mentary supporters, renamed their organization the Country Party 
of New South Wales in 1925, and contested no metropolitan seats 
after 1922. The divisive effects of the depression crisis upon the 
other main parties in 1930-32 did not extend to the Country Party. 
But this period did produce, especially in New South Wales, a crop 
of new political organizations, notably the All for Australia League 
and the New Guard in the cities, and in the country a revival of 
the New State Movement (which had always been associated in 
informal ways with the Country Party). Now there were four new 
state organizations in different parts of the state; they were soon 
allied in the United Country Movement; after some wild talk of 
regional secession they opted for conventional politics as part of 
the existing party. A new organization, formed in August 1931, 
was called the United Country Party of New South Wales and was 
modelled on that of the Riverina New State Movement.'^ 
The new structure was never effective, and its decline was 
hastened at first by the grassroots apathy resulting from the 
unprecedented political success of the party in the 1930s. By the 
end of that decade it was moribund, as the party's leaders in federal 
and state office increasingly disappointed their supporting groups. 
The state government ignored the report of the Royal Commission 
on New States it had belatedly set up; the apparent power of the 
Country Party in the government caused increasing jealousy and 
ultimately a rift in the parliamentary U.A.P. itself; wheat farmers 
wei'e suffering from a return to low prices; the federal coalition 
government lost public confidence as it bungled and bumbled in 
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the first years of war; and the Labor Party had purged itself of 
Langism and acquired a new image. Heavily defeated at the state 
election in 1941 and the federal election in 1943, the coalition 
partners went their ways—the U.A.P. to oblivion, the Country Party 
to a severe self-appraisal and an organizational revolution. The 
change of name to Australian Country Party (N.S.W.) at a 
conference in Melbourne in December 1943 was only an incident 
in this process;'^ really important was the withdrawal in 1944 of 
a disillusioned Farmers and Settlers' Association from the party 
structure, followed the next year by the Graziers' Association. 
Discontent in the F.S.A. was based partly on the federal coalition 
government's niggardly approach to wheat stabilization in 1938-41, 
followed by a much better deal from Labor in 1943; partly on the 
feeling that the F.S.A. had lost influence within the Country Party 
which it had helped to create; partly on an increasing membership 
in the F.S.A. of farmers with direct Labor sympathies; and partly 
on the feeling that "continued association with a discredited 
opposition party might jeopardise the industrial aims of the 
F.S.A.".'" Considerations weighing with the graziers included the 
party's neglect of the new states problem, the apparent domination 
of the federal and state coalitions by "city interests", and as a last 
straw, the withdrawal of the F.S.A. which left the G.A. politically 
isolated. 
These were serious defections, as the F.S.A. had supplied much 
of the party's organization and local finance, while the G.A. had 
been its main financial support. Some of the party leaders tried 
to pass off the defections as a piece of planned political strategy; 
their real importance was that they forced the party into a radical 
reconstruction of its own organization and methods of money-
raising. Using organizers largely financed by the G.A., it proceeded 
to recruit most members of the two associations to direct party 
membership, and build up its own funds on the bank order 
subscription system. Hence, beginning as the direct instrument of 
organized rural interest groups, the Country Party has become an 
autonomous political organization. However, although this has 
removed the party's organizational dependence and reduced its 
financial dependence, the Graziers' Association has continued to 
support the party with substantial donations. 
After the end of the Second World War, Commonwealth and 
New South Wales Labor governments were embarrassed by increas-
ing trade union militancy and industrial conflict, promoted in part 
by Communist leaders who had gained control of large and 
important unions. In 1945 the state A.L.P. conference established 
as A.L.P. bodies the Industrial Groups, an organization of "cells" 
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of A.L.P. members in the trade unions, whose main object was to 
unseat Communist office-holders by promoting other able can-
didates, supporting their bids for election, opposing "unity tickets", 
discrediting the Communist leaders, and similar tactics. This 
campaign prospered, as the Industrial Groups attracted on the one 
hand a mixed bag of individual idealists and careerists, and on the 
other hand the semi-clandestine participation of the Catholic Social 
Studies Movement which under B.A. Santamaria of Melbourne had 
since 1942 been waging a similar campaign against Communist 
influence in trade unions.'* 
The groups passed far beyond their original function. By 1952 
they had been the principal agent of a sweeping transfer of power, 
not only in the formerly Communist-controlled unions, but in other 
unions, in the A.L.P. State Conference, and in the state Executive 
itself. The state parliamentary leaders of the party maintained a 
benevolent neutrality. In the midst of Labor's longest period of office 
in the state's history, they were not unhappy, perhaps, to be relieved 
in this way of the more militant union pressures for radical 
legislative policies. The "Groupers" never dominated the N.S.W. 
Labor Council (the leading organ of trade unionism in the state). 
Although they gained control of such unions as the Clerks, the 
Ironworkers, and the Australian Railways Union, the majority of 
the state unions remained against them, including the Transport 
Workers, Watersiders, and Engine-drivers. For a brief space 
between 1952 and 1954 T. Dougherty, the redoubtable federal 
secretary of the Australian Workers' Union (then Australia's 
biggest), co-operated with the Groupers and sat on the state A.L.P. 
Executive in that character. 
However, when in October 1954 the federal Labor leader, Dr 
H.V. Evatt, sensationally launched an all-out attack on the whole 
Industrial Group movement as a Catholic conspiracy, Dougherty 
was among the first of the New South Wales union leaders who 
joined Evatt's crusade. In pursuance of this attack, the federal 
A.L.P. Executive took upon itself to "supervise" the New South 
Wales State Conference of 1955; when Conference nevertheless left 
the Groupers in control of the State Executive, the federal body 
ousted it in favour of a "caretaker executive" which in June 1956 
cancelled the State Conference due in that year, thus gaining time 
to consolidate its position. 
But by this time the rift in the party had become irreparable. 
Deposed State Executive members (including the assistant state 
secretary, J.T. Kane) and other Industrial Group supporters left 
the Labor Party to form a new political organization, giving it in 
September 1956 a title ultimately adopted by like-minded break-
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away minorities of the A.L.P. in other states: the Democratic Labor 
Party. Such was the formal origin of the D.L.P. in New South 
Wales, where it lasted for twenty years as a fourth political party, 
though weaker than its counterparts elsewhere in Australia. This 
was partly because it was never supported in this state, as it was 
in others, by the Roman Catholic hierarchy; that in turn was partly 
due to the consistent moderation, even conservatism, of New South 
Wales Labor governments and their policies in the period, com-
bined, perhaps, with the very fact that orthodox Labor had been 
so long and seemed so firmly established in governmental power 
when the New South Wales D.L.P. appeared.'^ 
As some of the foregoing history shows, party developments at 
state and federal levels have often been closely related, just as state 
and federal politics are interdependent. Although our concern is 
primarily with the state, we shall where necessary mention more 
of the most important federal connections." 
Reverting to the general points made at the beginning of this 
section, note the varied origins of New South Wales parties. The 
A.L.P. and the Country Party were deliberately created as the 
political arm and mouthpiece of organized interest groups—the 
trade unions and the farmers and graziers respectively. The first 
Liberal Party represented economic "interests", but these were too 
diverse to permit unified political organization from outside par-
liament. It fell to the state politicians, led by J.H. Carruthers, who 
shared George Reid's alarm at the unleashed "socialist tiger",'* to 
unite protectionists and freetraders, importers and manufacturers, 
bankers and graziers, behind a single "anti-socialist" party, though 
this was achieved rather by attrition of other rival parliamentary 
groups than by "fusion" on the federal model. There was not much 
difference in the way its successor parties, under their various titles, 
were reconstructed from their predecessors' ruins—except for the 
participation of recreant Labor leaders in 1916-17, with its 
introduction of a different, and somewhat tenacious, strand of 
thinking among the interest-orientations of non-Labor. The Demo-
cratic Labor Party was a result of party fission, though its 
composition was not representative of the parent party, and in the 
D.L.P. doctrine seemed to play a much more important role than 
material interests. 
The other important point is that only Labor, of all these parties, 
remained organizationally tied to a specific economic interest group. 
It seems clear that, in the Australian context at least, phrases like 
"the workers' party" and "parties of town and country capital" are 
only a very rough shorthand for what the parties represent, and 
in the sense of direct allegiance to sectional interests are more 
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applicable to the A.L.P. than to the others; clear also that parties 
can survive without dependence on the organizational or financial 
support of specific "syndicates""—and indeed, as the D.L.P. 
showed, with very limited electoral support. In other words, political 
parties, to be fully understood, must be recognized, at least in 
certain aspects, as autonomous social groupings with an inner life 
and characteristic goals of their own, some of which may be 
inconsistent with those of associated economic or class-bound 
interest groups. To illustrate this drive for autonomy, we can look 
at some aspects of party rivalry. To understand how autonomy 
develops, one way is to consider the sources of party support. These 
things are attempted in the next two sections. 
RIVALRY 
Since no organized interest group in New South Wales draws 
support from anything like half the voting population, any political 
party hoping for a parliamentary majority must get the support 
of a combination of interests, large enough to hold out the promise 
of an electoral majority, and not too diverse to follow a single 
political banner. The Country Party, however, deliberately catered 
for a minority group of interests (themselves by no means 
homogeneous); hence it could only hope to share power in coalition 
with another party. Because of the interests it stood for, that party 
could never be Labor; if Labor could command (as it did for most 
of the time after 1910) up to half the votes in New South Wales, 
it followed that every vote the Country Party mustered made it 
harder for any other non-Labor party to gain office alone. Thus 
the "coalition strategy" was—and remains—the only viable course 
for the N.S.W. Country Party, and also the unavoidable though 
distasteful course for the main non-Labor party—unless it could 
absorb or eliminate its awkward rival. 
Absorption had been tried by the founders of the U.A.P. in 1931; 
failing in this the U.A.P. leaders accepted philosophically the 
alliance of the 1930s. Absorption was the firm intention of the 
founders of the Liberal Party in 1945-46, some of whom remem-
bered unhappily how jealousies over Country Party influence in the 
Stevens-Bruxner government had ultimately split the U.A.P. leader-
ship and foreshadowed the long eclipse of non-Labor in New South 
Wales.^° In any case, the Liberal Party founders considered that 
Australia was ripe for a two-party system. They thought the 
Country Party was an anachronism, and they aspired to build a 
"national" political organization representing all sections of the 
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community." So in October 1945 they made the first of a series 
of proposals to amalgamate the two parties—proposals repeated at 
intervals for twelve years, at different times and sometimes m 
combination, offering the Country Party a majority on an 
amalgamated State Executive, the presidency of a joint party, equal 
representation on a State Policy Committee, and even the parlia-
mentary leadership.^^ 
At first this strategy seemed viable. The Country Party had 
shared in the disastrous losses of non-Labor seats in the state 
elections of 1941 and 1944. It had fewer members in parliament 
than ever before (except in its first years) or since. Its funds were 
low. It had just severed formal relations with the farmers' and 
graziers' organizations. Between 1945 and 1947 some influential 
Country Party voices were raised for amalgamation. But a majority 
of the leadership, then and thereafter, refused to sink the separate 
identity of the party. Their organization was intact; they had begun 
a drive for individual members and subscriptions; and they held 
a bastion of loyal electorates on the northern coast and tablelands 
from which to win back lost ground. 
By 1947 the Country Party's state chairman was confident: "The 
Liberal Party has a gigantic and impossible task if it sets out to 
fight both the Labor Party and the Country Party."" In 1948 this 
stand received public support from Sir Bertram Stevens—a 
significant witness: "If the present Country Party were to do 
anything that would cut down its direct influence in Australian 
politics an Independent Country Party would arise overnight."'" By 
1950 the party had increased its representation in the Legislative 
Assembly from ten seats to seventeen. It had twenty thousand 
enrolled members directly recruited, and a steady income. It had 
been "converted . . . from the political wing of the farmers' 
organisations to a formally independent political party with a mass 
base, not greatly dissimilar in structure to the Liberal or Labor 
Parties"." By 1956 the Central Executive, replying to one of the 
Liberals' later merger bids, could be truculent: "The fundamental 
conditions that caused the formation of the Country Party not only 
still exist, but have been intensified."^' The last bid was made in 
September 1957: it was a perfunctory gesture, virtually ignored by 
the Country Party." 
The Country Party's response to the Liberals was always to 
propose electoral co-operation instead of amalgamation. Their 
reasons were clear enough. They saw rural industries as a distinct, 
nationally important but minority interest needing the protection 
of an independent political organization against socialism on the 
one hand and urban industrial interests on the other. Rural 
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electorates were increasingly outnumbered by those in the 
Newcastle-Sydney-Wollongong complex, and except on the north 
coast, even country towns did not fully share the rural ethos. The 
country segment would be swamped in a united Liberal-Country 
party. Besides, it would be foolish for the parliamentary Country 
Party, harmonious and loyal to its leaders, to merge into such an 
unstable, faction-ridden group as the N.S.W. Liberal Party. The 
Liberals should bow to the inevitable: share the non-metropolitan 
electoral territory amicably with the Country Party—including 
territory to be won or won back from Labor—and agree to govern 
in coalition when Labor was defeated. 
The Country Party sought a pact on these lines before every post-
war state election except that of 1962, when the two parties were 
in direct policy conflict over "state aid" and the future of the 
Legislative Council. On some occasions they went further and 
proposed, as in 1954, that the parties should avoid three-cornered 
contests in Labor-held country seats, or at least, as in 1953, that 
the parties should not attack each other's candidates during such 
three-cornered fights. The Liberal extra-parliamentary organization 
treated these overtures coldly, though before the 1947 and 1950 
elections the two parliamentary leaders informally agreed to the 
exchange of preferences in three-cornered contests and to form a 
coalition if victory were won. Then after a freeze in relations during 
most of the 1950s, there was an elaborate official pact for the 1959 
election, the two leaders giving a joint policy speech in their 
respective strongholds, sharing election platforms elsewhere, and 
recommending exchanges of preferences in triangular contests. 
This confused picture, at once of fundamental conflict over the 
very existence of the Country Party and of intermittent co-operation 
in practice, is partly explained by the internal problems of the 
Liberal Party. Its extra-parliamentary organization and leaders 
consistently upheld the logic of amalgamation, to be induced by 
persistent Liberal pressure to win Labor-held (perhaps even Coun-
try Party-held) rural electorates. In this they were supported by 
some Liberals in parliament; but others were lukewarm, while the 
frequently-changing Liberal parliamentary leaders were either 
reluctant to wage this war all out, or—as notably in the case of 
Murray Robson (leader 1954-55)—actively favoured co-operation 
instead. After 1958, when M.F. (later Sir Michael) Bruxner retired 
from the Country Party leadership, relations were improved not only 
by conciliatory attitudes on the part of the parliamentary leaders, 
but also by the Liberal machine apparently resigning itself to co-
existence, at least for the time being. 
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Liberal disunity and self-doubt may account for the party s 
curious electoral strategy in practice. As Katharine West reasons: 
"Basic to the Liberal Party's non-sectional objective in New South 
Wales is the elimination of the Country Party from State rural 
electorates, preferably by amalgamation but if necessary by com-
petition and defeat."^* Once the first amalgamation proposals had 
failed. Liberal leaders announced a policy of contesting country 
seats, and from 1948 would no longer endorse joint Liberal-Country 
Party candidates as they had occasionally done. Yet with one 
possible exception" they never contested a seat held by the Country 
Party, though the Country Party contested one Liberal-held seat 
in 1962 (Oxley, where the sitting Country Party member had 
transferred his allegiance to the Liberals), and two such seats in 
1965 (Albury and Dubbo, which the Liberals had previously won 
from Labor). On two or three occasions both parties contested seats 
held by Independents; and at every general election after the Second 
World War they fought some "three-cornered contests" (so called, 
though frequently including more than three candidates) as well 
as separate campaigns for rural seats held by Labor. Despite the 
endemic squabbling over this strategy, by 1976 the Liberal Party 
held three seats and the Country Party six seats which they had 
won from Labor in the rural area. It is not possible to say whether 
they would have done better by concerting their policy on triangular 
contests or by avoiding them altogether. 
The relationship between the Liberal and Country parties has 
been equivocal because the overriding need to co-operate against 
Labor has partly smothered the underlying rivalry. Between the two 
"Labor" parties, however, there has been nothing but open and 
unremitting war. When the Democratic Labor Party began to 
contest state elections—e.g., the 1957 Wagga Wagga by-election 
when the D.L.P. received 12 per cent of the votes and the A.L.P. 
lost the seat—its executive split over policy for allocating prefer-
ences. By the general election of 1959 the party was agreed on 
the stance since maintained. Its N.S.W. general secretary, J.T. 
Kane, said that its candidates would concentrate on A.L.P. marginal 
seats in the hope of bringing down the Labor government; sup-
porters were asked to give their last preferences to A.L.P. can-
didates except where there was a Communist candidate. From time 
to time at the federal level D.L.P. leaders offered or were even 
begged for electoral co-operation with the A.L.P. But they always 
set unacceptable conditions, and in December 1960 the New South 
Wales Central Council of the D.L.P. resolved "that there should 
be no reconciliation or exchange of preferences while the A.L.P 
outlawed the fight against Communism in the unions, permitted 
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unity tickets [linking A.L.P. and Communist candidates in union 
elections], propagated a Communist-approved foreign policy and 
adhered to a domestic policy based on socialist ideas". 
The D.L.P. ran a steadily increasing number of candidates in 
New South Wales general elections, rising from twenty-five in 1959 
and 1962 to forty-four in 1971 and no fewer than eighty-five in 
1973. Then, following acceptance by its recent federal leader, V.C. 
Gair, of an ambassadorial post from the Whitlam government, the 
party rapidly collapsed. In 1976 only one candidate ran in its name 
at the N.S.W. election. On average the D.L.P. secured between 
5 and 6 per cent of the votes cast in seats it contested for the 
Legislative Assembly, while its modest proportion of the total vote 
increased with the number of candidates it ran. As a comparison, 
at the 1968 election D.L.P. candidates received 2.3 per cent of the 
total vote, whereas Independents secured more than 5 per cent. At 
its apogee in 1973 the N.S.W. D.L.P. vote of just under 6 per cent 
of total valid votes compared with nearly 7 per cent for Independ-
ents and the Australia Party. A different kind of comparison shows 
that while contesting fewer than half of the state seats in New South 
Wales except in 1973, the D.L.P. regularly contested all seats in 
Victorian state elections, and its proportion of the Victorian vote 
was roughly five times that in New South Wales. Again, the D.L.P. 
share of the House of Representatives vote at general elections 
1958-72 (after which it fielded candidates only in Victoria) was 
the lowest in New South Wales of all the states, except in 1966; 
its vote at Senate elections 1958-75 ranged from the lowest up to 
third place among the states. The D.L.P. never won a seat in the 
New South Wales Parliament, except for an accident at the 1973 
election when the Minister for Health, A.H. Jago, member for the 
blue-ribbon Liberal seat of Gordon, at the last moment forgot to 
nominate, leaving the dominantly anti-Labor voters of the area no 
alternative but to elect the D.L.P. candidate—who lasted only the 
one term. 
The relative weakness of the D.L.P. in New South Wales may 
have been due to a number of factors acting in combination. In 
the beginning there was tension between two strands of the 
leadership, one claiming historical continuity with the A.L.P. 
tradition and hankering for eventual reunion, the other believing 
that the A.L.P., its socialist shibboleths and also its special Catholic 
connections were out of touch with modern Australian society. 
Some of the first persuasion were unhappy with the decision to 
unseat the Cahill Labor Government. Their opponents deprecated 
the "sectarian" element in their own party, and opposed its union 
with the "Anti-Communist Labor" parties in other states. This 
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tension only declined after a number of leading adherents of both 
viewpoints had left the party.'" No A.L.P. politician or trade union 
official joined the D.L.P. in New South Wales, no trade union 
affiliated with the party, and there was little support from trade 
unionists generally. The A.L.P. state executive, dominated by the 
Industrial Group element since 1952, was left virtually intact by 
the formation of the D.L.P., not split down the middle as in 
Victoria. While the Victorian split spread to the parliamentary 
A.L.P., bringing down the Labor government then in power, the 
New South Wales Labor government, which had bent a benign eye 
on the industrial groups in their heyday, quietly washed its hands 
of them and their allies when it became clear that their enemies 
had prevailed in the federal organs of the A.L.P.—and it suffered 
no defection from its parliamentary ranks. The potential support 
for the D.L.P. among Catholic, anti-socialist, and ,anti-Communist 
voters was minimized by the aloofness of the Church's senior 
hierarchy in New South Wales, except in the dioceses of Armidale 
and Wagga Wagga. In contrast to their colleagues in Victoria, the 
majority of the New South Wales bishops were said to be "deeply 
committed, politically, to retaining Catholic influence in the broad 
A.L.P. and preventing the growth of a rival Marxist Labor Party"." 
At the annual conference of the party in 1960, D.L.P. Senator Cole 
was still complaining that sections of the New South Wales Catholic 
hierarchy were "neutral on Communism". 
However, the D.L.P. in New South Wales was not too weak to 
wound its rejected parent—at length fatally. Despite the high 
"leakage" of its second-preference votes in this state, every now 
and then they contributed crucially to the defeat of a Labor 
candidate. Triumph, albeit of a negative kind, came at the general 
election of 1965, when the A.L.P. government did at last lose office: 
it would not have done so had its candidates in five strategic 
electorates received the preferences which the D.L.P. had directed 
to the Liberal-Country Party Opposition. This rivalry remained 
irreconcilable. As the 1971 election approached, J.T. Kane, pointing 
out that the State Executive of his party had not yet made a decision 
on preferences, said: "Normally the local branch organizations 
make recommendations on preferences and some might want to give 
preferences to an independent. But the over-riding policy is that 
with Labor in its present condition, they will not go to Labor. Under 
no circumstances will we help the election of a Labor 
Government."" The D.L.P. was virtually defunct when the next 
Labor government was elected, in 1976. 
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The broad alignment of political parties in New South Wales has 
been very stable. A simple two-party system prevailed for twelve 
years after the realignments initiated by Federation. The new 
pattern of one-against-two produced by the Progressive (later 
Country) Party lasted virtually intact for another thirty-five years. 
Then the D.L.P., also an anti-Labor force, added another stable 
element for about twenty years, but does not now seem likely to 
survive." 
Over the whole period governments have generally held office 
with secure majorities. In the eighty-five years from 1891, when 
Labor's entry to parliament began to give durable shape to the 
emerging party system, only five parliaments out of thirty were 
dissolved before running their full term or close to it. Nearly half-
way through the period the regular alternation of parties in office 
—the "swing of the pendulum"—quite suddenly slowed down. Up 
to the fall of the Lang government in 1932, individual Premiers 
had an average term in office of just under two-and-a-half years, 
and the average life of a party in office was just over three years. 
The ensuing forty years saw the average Premier's term jump to 
nearly four-and-a-half years, and were spanned by only three party 
reigns—the nine-year U.A.P.-Country Party coalition of the 1930s, 
Labor's record term of twenty-four years to 1965, and then eleven 
years of continuous Liberal-Country Party rule. 
The corollary of a regular swing of the pendulum is that office 
is shared fairly evenly between the main parties or combinations 
of parties. Thus in the 28 years from 1904 (when Labor first became 
the official Opposition) to the fall of Lang, there were five periods 
of non-Labor rule (including the seven-hour premiership of Sir 
George Fuller in 1921) totalling 15'/2 years, and five periods of 
Labor rule, totalling 12 years. The radical change of pattern since 
that time seems to have outmoded the pendulum metaphor. 
The change is not peculiar to this state in Australia, nor to 
Australia as a whole, as David Butler has shown: 
Three of the last four British elections have defied the unbroken pattern 
of the previous century. . . . Of the [Australian] elections, federal and 
state, in the first thirty years of this century, less than half resulted 
in the same party or coalition winning again; in the last thirty years 
over three-quarters have done so." 
Butler speculated on possible reasons for the change. As to the 
Australian states, he noted that most post-Depression governments, 
Liberal, Country and Labor alike, had been incumbents in prosper-
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ous times; that electoral redistributions had regularly given the 
electoral system "a loading of 2% or 3%, or even more", in favour 
of the government in power; that since uniform income tax was 
introduced in 1942 state governments had been freed from the 
unpopularity of imposing personal taxes; that the 1955 split in the 
A.L.P. had continued to curtail the support for that party; and that 
the outstanding personalities of some party leaders (such as 
Playford in South Australia) might have played a part in the 
longevity of governments. Butler recognized that he was "really 
posing rather than answering the problem", and it awaits more 
definitive explanations for individual states. 
Votes 
Moreover, the change is radical only at the level of continuity of 
party incumbency in office. Underlying both the earlier and later 
patterns is an important fact of political life—that the distribution 
of voting support between the main parties is comparatively stable 
and fairly evenly balanced over long periods of time. A party or 
party combination rarely gains or holds office with an "overwhelm-
ing" majority of votes, and sometimes the loss of quite a small 
percentage of the total votes may suffice to unseat a government. 
Thus the highest percentage of a New South Wales general election 
vote ever won by the non-Labor combination since the Country 
Party first accepted partnership (1926) was 49.8 per cent in 1965 
when it last won office from Labor. Labor's record votes in the 
same period were just over 55 per cent, in 1930 and 1953, unless 
we count the 56.4 per cent secured by "Labor" and "State Labor" 
combined in 1941. That election, which began Labor's longest reign, 
did see the period's record "swing" or "landslide", when the 
U.A.P.-Country Party coalition's vote dropped at least 15 per cent 
(of total valid votes) from its 1938 figure, although it contested 
as many seats. By contrast, that period of Labor rule ended in 1965 
with the comparative whimper of a 5 per cent fall in the party's 
share of total votes—a smaller fluctuation than some of those 
experienced during its unbroken term, but fatal following the steady 
erosion of Labor's support at the preceding three elections. 
Such measures of stability and change in party support have a 
limited application and must be used with care. They do not allow 
for the "support" a major party may have in electorates which at 
a given election it does not contest; for the intervention of minor 
parties in some but not all electorates; for differences in the total 
turnout of voters from election to election; or for the complication 
of inter-election comparisons by redistributions of electoral bound-
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aries. As an alternative, sample survey interviews try to tap a cross-
section of the entire electorate and so to obtain, among other things, 
more complete measures of the actual distribution of party support 
at given times. These efforts also have their drawbacks—for 
example, the reluctance of a proportion of respondents to commit 
themselves in a survey (the "undecideds", "don't knows", and "no 
answers") even though they might feel obliged to vote one way or 
another in an election; and the uncertainty as to how many 
respondents really behave in practice as they say they do in the 
interview—quite apart from the technical problems of securing a 
representative sample, coding and processing the data, and so on. 
In addition, most available material of this kind in Australia is 
taken from nation-wide samples which give reasonably reliable 
breakdowns for the Commonwealth electorate as a whole but make 
close analysis of the individual state components statistically risky. 
Furthermore, in practice the measures of party support obtained 
from survey data indicate that it is rather less stable and de-
terminate than actual voting results would suggest. For example, 
the Australian Gallup Poll survey has for many years polled 
national samples of Australian voters two or three times a year, 
asking how they would vote "if a federal election were held today". 
In the polls since 1960, support for both the A.L.P. and the Liberal-
Country coalition parties occasionally fell below 40 per cent; the 
record high for the Liberal-Country parties was 54 per cent in 
February 1966 and for the A.L.P. was 51 per cent in June 1962. 
Support for the D.L.P. fluctuated between 5 and 10 per cent, but 
in most surveys was around 7 per cent. In May 1965, in the search 
for more direct indications of the stability of party support, a 
national sample was asked: "Looking back at how you've voted at 
Federal elections, would you say you've usually voted ALP, DLP, 
Liberal, Country or something else?" (Australian Gallup Polls No. 
1822). This formulation was calculated to maximize respondents' 
commitment to one party or another (by calling for their voting 
record), and produced the following percentages: 
A.L.P. Lib/C.P. D.L.P. Independent No Answer Never voted 
44 43 4 1 4 4 
N = 1,700 
This seems to underline the notion of a pretty close division of 
electors' allegiance between the two main sets of parties, with the 
D.L.P. enjoying a marginal support which was enough, all the same, 
to keep the A.L.P. out federal office for sixteen years. However, 
when the 1965 respondents were asked how long it was since they 
had voted for a different party, 68 per cent said they had never 
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switched their vote between parties. While this shows a stable core 
of support for the established parties, it also testifies that up to 
a third of the electorate did not believe they had consistently voted 
for a particular party. In conjunction with the records of voting 
intention (and of actual voting) it also shows that the two main 
party groups usually receive at elections upwards of 40 per cent 
of the votes each only by attracting fairly even shares of the votes 
of these potential "swingers". In a sense this makes the stable 
element in party support—large as it is and whatever its composi-
tion—virtually irrelevant for explaining the fluctuating fortunes of 
parties at the polls. 
We can return to this point after examining some results of the 
Australian National University's Political Attitudes Survey 
(P.A.S.) which questioned a nation-wide sample of voters (including 
a common panel on both occasions) in September—October 1967 
and November—December 1969. On each occasion respondents 
were asked not only how they recalled voting at the most recent 
state and federal elections, but also whether, generally speaking, 
they usually thought of themselves as "Liberal", "Labor", "Country 
Party", or "DLP". Just over 91 per cent of the samples claimed 
a "party identification" in these terms; this closely matched the 
proportion of the 1965 Gallup sample, quoted above, who said they 
had "usually" voted for a particular party—though the distribution 
of allegiance between the parties was not identical. As shown in 
table 4, the distribution of "party identification" also changed 
between the 1967 and 1969 surveys, while at federal elections over 
the same period, changes in actual voting support for the main party 
groups were in the same direction but more pronounced. Party 
identification as measured in the Political Attitudes Survey is not 
so clearly related to the survey responses or voting statistics on New 
South Wales state elections (partly, no doubt, because they were 
further in time from the dates of the surveys). Most voters seem 
to "identify" in a fairly stable way with a particular party and this 
primarily in its federal aspect; but identification does not necessarily 
bind them in the polling booth. 
More specifically, the figures in table 4 tally with evidence from 
federal elections throughout the 1960s that New South Wales voters 
were marginally more favourable to the A.L.P. and the Country 
Party, and distinctly less favourable to the D.L.P., than Australian 
voters as a whole—though support for the D.L.P. is clearly 
understated in the survey results, for reasons which Don Aitkin has 
plausibly explained.'- In the second half of the 1960s the A.L.P. 
in New South Wales was receiving the support of just on 40 per 
cent of the voters, the Liberal Party of between 36 and 40 per cent 
57 
Support 
the Country Party of between 9 and 10 per cent, and the D.L.P. 
of about 2 per cent, with other parties attracting up to 5 per cent 
of the votes at elections, but occupying a much less important place 
in voters' minds between elections. But at general elections the votes 
for the two main parties probably included in each case a 
component of up to 5 per cent (of total votes) from voters who 
could not be counted as invariable supporters of those parties, while 
as Aitkin suggested, up to half of the D.L.P. votes represented 
temporary "defections" from other parties, mostly the Liberals. It 
seems clear that having delineated more precisely the relatively 
stable aspects of the structure of party support, psephology must 
now concentrate upon the electoral behaviour of a substantial 
proportion—a quarter to a third—of the electorate whose party 
allegiance is not fixed, if it is to contribute definitively to the 
explanation of actual election results. Probably an appreciable part 
of such explanation must be specific to particular elections and 
cannot be expressed in terms of structural tendencies. 
Seats 
So much for indications of party support as measured by aggregate 
electoral votes and by sampling aggregate opinions. For practical 
political purposes, what matters is the effect of election voting on 
parliamentary seats won by the parties. On this basis the fluctuation 
of fortunes is much greater than when measured by the total votes 
won. At general elections from 1950 to 1968 (with ninety-four seats 
in the Legislative Assembly throughout), the number of seats won 
by the A.L.P. varied between thirty-nine and fifty-seven; by the 
Liberal Party between twenty-two and thirty-six; by the Country 
Party between fourteen and seventeen. Since the minimum in each 
case consisted largely of the "same" seats from election to election, 
the electorates could be crudely classified according to the length 
of time they were held by the same party—and so labelled "blue-
ribbon", "safe", "marginal", and "swinging" or the like. However, 
such classifications must be arbitrary, since the number of classes 
used and the cut-off points between them are matters of subjective 
choice. Their application is limited by boundary redistributions, 
after which many seats may no longer be the "same". And since 
they are based on actual voting figures they suffer from the 
previously mentioned difficulties arising from temporary absences 
or interventions of particular parties in individual contests. In 
addition, of course, any classification may be vitiated in seats where 
the "personal following" of the member for the time being has cut 
across the normal party identification of voters. 
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Some of the difficulties can be surmounted by reducing the issue 
to support for one of the two major party "teams" which alone 
can form a government, assuming that votes for minor parties and 
Independents can be allocated between the two major groups on 
the basis of actual or estimated preferences, and computing the 
resultant two-way distribution of support in each electorate (the 
"two-party preferred vote") as at the most recent general election. 
The supposed pattern of support in uncontested seats is estimated 
from voting in previous elections and other evidence. Malcolm 
Mackerras has applied this method to Commonwealth and New 
South Wales politics, and then classified seats according to the 
"swing" which would be necessary for the incumbent party to lose 
them at the next election—where swing means the difference 
between the party's percentage share of the last two-party preferred 
vote and 49.9 per cent (i.e., taking results to the first decimal place). 
Table 5 is drawn from his "swing table" of New South Wales 
electorates following the 1976 state election and based on the 
redistribution of 1973. Electorates are classified on the criteria 
Mackerras had used for earlier analyses. He defined as "safe" those 
seats which could only change hands on a swing of 10 per cent 
or more; as "fairly safe" those which would be lost by a swing 
of 6 to 9.9 per cent; and as "marginal" those which would be lost 
by a smaller swing. In the table the electorates are also grouped 
into the three categories described in the next paragraph. Maps 
1-3 show the geographical distribution of the electorates after 1 
May 1976 on Mackerras's classification." 
Subject to the changes wrought by redistribution, similar 
classifications to that in table 5 made from time to time would show 
comparatively few variations in the composition of the groups of 
electorates. The superficial continuities are geographic, and under-
lying these are the characteristics of different areas, of which the 
economic seem the most important. Let us divide the state 
electorates into three groups. The first comprises the "metropolitan 
area" of Sydney as it was defined in the electoral law for many 
years before the redistribution of 1970. The second group contains 
electorates in the Newcastle and Bulli-Port Kembia conurbations, 
and in some inland areas such as Broken Hill, Cobar, and Lithgow, 
whose politics have long been influenced by industrial or mining 
activities. The remaining seats may be called "rural" electorates, 
though some of them are dominated by large country towns, and 
by 1970 five had been reached by the edge of Sydney's urban 
sprawl, and (like most of the electorates in the Newcastle and 
Wollongong industrial areas) were included by the 1970 redistribu-
tion in the "Central Area". This group was increased by two in 
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1973. Table 6 shows the number of seats contested and won by 
the main parties in each of these areas at general elections from 
1965 to 1976. We can summarize their history since the Second 
World War. 
Table 4. "Party Identification" and Party Vote: All States and N.S.W. 
(a) Parly Identification of Federal and N.S.W. Samples (Political Attitudes 
Survey) 
Percentages of total samples (TV all states 1967 = 2,054; 1969 = 1,873 
N N.S.W. 1967 = 715; 1969 = 628) 
Voters all states 
Survey 1 1967 
Survey 2 1969 
Movement— 
Voters N.S.W. 
Survey 1 1967 
Survey 2 1969 
Movement— 
A.L.P 
38.6 
42.8 
+ 4.2 
39.7 
42.5 
+ 2.8 
Lib/C.P. 
49.8 
47.0 
-2.8 
49.5 
49.5 
0.0 
D.L.P. 
2.9 
3.1 
+ 0.2 
1.2 
1.0 
-0.2 
Other 
Parties 
0.3 
0.7 
+ 0.4 
0.6 
1.0 
+ 0.4 
All other 
Respondents 
8.4 
6.4 
-2.0 
9.0 
6.0 
-3.0 
(b) Actual Voting in Federal Elections {Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Handbook 1971) 
Percentages of total enrolment (all seats contested) 
Voters all states 
1966 election 
1969 election 
Movement— 
Voters N.S.W. 
1966 election 
1969 election 
Movement— 
(c) Actual Voting in 
A.L.P. 
36.9 
43.5 
+ 6.6 
37.4 
44.1 
+ 6.7 
Lib/C.P. 
46.1 
40.1 
-6.0 
47.1 
40.3 
-6.8 
N.S.W. State Elections 
Percentages of total 
Voters N.S.W. 
1965 election 
1968 election 
Movement— 
enrolment 
A.L.P. 
39.8 
39.5 
-0.3 
D.L.P. 
6.7 
5.6 
-1.1 
4.2 
3.1 
-1.1 
{Source: 
in contested seats 
Lib/C.P. 
45.8 
45.1 
-0.7 
D.L.P. 
1.9 
2.1 
+ 0.2 
Other 
Parties 
2.5 
3.4 
+ 0.9 
3.0 
4.9 
+ 1.9 
Non-Voters 
and Informal 
7.8 
7,4 
-0.4 
8.3 
7.6 
-0.4 
N.S.W. Electoral Returns) 
(2 uncontested 1965) 
Other 
Parties 
4.4 
5.0 
+ 0.6 
Non-Voters 
and Informal 
8.1 
8.3 
+ 0.2 
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Table 5. "Safe", "Fairly Safe", and "Marginal" Seats, 1976 
(In order of their support for the respective party teams) 
Safe Seats 
(swing of 10% or more will lose) 
Labor 
Seat 
Phillip 
Marrickville 
Balmain 
Heffron 
Liverpool 
Fairfield 
Granville 
Mt Druitt 
Rockdale 
Bankstown 
Auburn 
Merrylands 
East Hills 
Blacktown 
Lakemba 
Bass Hill 
Canterbury 
Maroubra 
Wentworthville 
Cessnock 
Broken Hill 
lllawarra 
Wallsend 
Newcastle 
Waratah 
Wollongong 
Lake Macquarie 
Healhcote 
Corrimal 
Charleslown 
% swing req 
to lose 
26.1 
24.4 
24.3 
19.9 
19.7 
19.2 
18.9 
17.4 
16.6 
15.6 
15.4 
15.2 
14.9 
14.8 
14.8 
14.7 
14.4 
14.1 
10.8 
uired 
Liberal-Coun 
Seat 
Metropolitan Sydney 
Industria 
27.1 
26.4 
23.4 
194 
17.8 
17.5 
16.1 
14.5 
13.3 
13.2 
11.7 
Gordon 
Ku-ring-gai 
Mosman 
Northcott 
Davidson 
Lane Cove 
The Hills 
Pittwater 
Eastwood 
Bligh 
Vaucluse 
Willoughby 
Hornsby 
Kirribilli 
-Mining Areas 
% 
(Lib) 
'^  
" 
'•'* 
• " 
" 
*•* 
" 
' • ' 
" 
• " 
" 
" 
• " 
try 
swing required 
to lose 
31.6 
27.8 
20.2 
18.3 
16.5 
16.5 
15.3 
15.3 
14.8 
13.9 
13.7 
13.2 
11.7 
11.2 
Munmorah 
Penrith 
18.6 
14.0 
Rural Areas 
Gloucester 
Oxley 
Temora 
Sturt 
Lismore 
Tenterfield 
Murra\ 
Clarence 
(CP) 
(Lib) 
(CP) 
19.3 
19.3 
19.3 
18.9 
16.9 
16.1 
14.6 
13.8 
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Seat 
Seat 
Woronora 
Drummoyne 
Parramatta 
Waverley 
Kogarah 
Campbelltown 
Burrinjuck 
Peats 
Seat 
Ashfield 
Coogee 
Labor Liberal-Country 
% swing required 
Labor 
to lose Seat 
Dubbo 
Raleigh 
Tamworth 
Upper Hunter 
Hawkesbury 
Byron 
Fairly Safe Seats 
(Swing of 6-9.9% will lose) 
(Lib) 
(CP) 
" 
"' 
(Lib) 
(CP) 
% swing required 
Liberal-Country 
% swing required 
Labor 
to lose Seat 
Metropolitan Sydney 
8.2 Burwood 
7.4 Wakehurst 
7.3 Manly 
7.1 
6.2 
Industrial-Mining Areas 
NIL 
Rural Areas 
9.0 Orange 
8.9 Maitland 
8.8 Wagga Wagga 
Barwon 
Young 
Albury 
Burrendong 
Wollondilly 
Armidale 
Marginal Seats 
(Lib) 
" 
" 
(CP) 
(Lib) 
(CP) 
(Lib) 
(CP) 
(Lib) 
(CP) 
(Swing of 5.9'^ or less will lose) 
% 
to lose 
13.5 
13.4 
12.9 
12.8 
10.9 
10.0 
swing required 
Liberal-Country 
% swing required 
George's River 
Hurstville 
Blue Mountains 
to lose Seat 
Metropolitan Sydney 
5.2 Earlwood 
3.8 Yaralla 
2.9 Miranda 
0.2 Cronulla 
Fuller 
Industrial-Mining Areas 
0.6 
(Lib) 
• " 
'^ 
•• 
% 
to lose 
8.5 
7.9 
7.8 
9.9 
9.9 
8.9 
8.6 
8.5 
8.2 
8.0 
7.7 
6.7 
swing required 
to lose 
4.6 
4,5 
4.1 
3.9 
3.5 
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Seat 
Labor 
% swing required 
to lose Seat 
Liberal-Country 
% swing required 
to lose 
Murrumbidgee 
Castlereagh 
Casino 
Monaro 
Gosford 
3.8 
2.4 
1.7 
1.6 
0.2 
Ri ural Areas 
Goulburn 
Bathurst 
Nepean 
(CP) 
" 
(Lib) 
4.7 
3.,1 
2,4 
Source: Malcolm Mackerras, New South Wales Elections, November 17 1973, May 
I, 1976: Statistical Analysis, Occasional Monograph No. 3 (Department of 
Government, Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales at 
Duntroon, A.C.T., July 1976, mimeo). 
Note: Classification into "safe", etc., according to Mackerras (see Source): into 
"metropolitan", etc., is author's (see text). South Coast seat, held by Independent, 
omitted from "marginal" table. 
Table 6. Seats Contested and Won at General Elections, 1965-76 
(Classified by areas defined in the text) 
Election Date 
/ May 1965 
Contested 
Metropolitan 
Industrial-Mi 
Rural 
Total 
Won 
Metropolitan 
Industrial-Mi 
Rural 
Uncontested 
Total 
24 February 
Contested 
Metropolitan 
ning 
ning 
1968 
Industrial-Mining 
Rural 
Total 
Won 
Metropolitan 
Industrial Mining 
Rural 
A.L.P. 
43 
12 
30 
85 
M 
10 
6 
1 (') 
45 
48 
13 
29 
90 
24 
11 
4 
Lib. 
48 
8 
19 
75 
19 
1 
11 
31 
48 
9 
17 
74 
24 
1 
11 
C P . 
1 
23 
24 
15 
1 
16 
1 
21 
22 
17 
D L P . 
19 
3 
6 
28 
(R) 
0 
27 
3 
12 
42 
Indep. 
etc. 
21 
8 
7 
36 
1 
1 
2 
14 
8 
10 
32 
1 
1 
Total 
Seats 
92 
92 
2 
94 
94 
94 
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Election Date 
Uncontested 
Total 
13 February 
Contested 
Metropolitan 
1971 
Industrial-Mining 
Rural 
Total 
Won 
Metropolitan 
Industrial-Mining 
Rural 
Uncontested 
Total 
17 November 
Contested 
Metropolitan 
1973 
Industrial-Mining 
Rural 
Total 
Won 
Metropolitan 
Industrial-Mining 
Rural 
Uncontested 
Total 
/ May 1976 
Contested 
Metropolitan 
Industrial-Mi 
Rural 
Total 
Won 
Metropolitan 
Industrial-Mi 
Rural 
Uncontested 
Total 
ning 
ning 
A L P 
39 
43 
11 
29 
83 
25 
10 
9 
1 
45 
45 
11 
36 
92 
25 
10 
8 
1 
44 
50 
11 
35 
96 
28 
11 
10 
1 
50 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
Lib. 
36 
49 
10 
15 
74 
24 
8 
32 
47 
5 
20 
72 
24 
10 
34 
50 
9 
17 
76 
2,2 
8 
30 
CP . 
17 
22 
22 
16 
1 
17 
23 
23 
18 
18 
22 
22 
17 
1 
18 
D L P , 
(R) 
(R) 
0 
23 
7 
14 
44 
0 
47 
11 
27 
85 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
Indep. 
etc. 
2 
26 
6 
19 
51 
1 
1 
2 
31 
8 
16 
55 
r I 
2 
23 
2 
10 
35 
1 
1 
Total 
Seats 
94 
94 
94 
2 
96 
98 
98 
1 
99 
97 
97 
2 
99 
Note: Uncontested seats were in Industrial-Mining (1) or Rural (R) area as shown. 
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The Sydney metropolitan area contained about half of the state s 
electorates; forty-eight of ninety-four to 1968, forty-nine of ninety-
six in 1971, fifty of ninety-nine from 1973. From the inception of 
the Liberal Party, between three-fifths and four-fifths of its seats 
were held in this area, mostly in the older-established, predominantly 
middle-class suburbs, with the "safest" seats in the most exclusive 
parts on the North Shore, in the harbour suburbs east of the city, 
and along the northern beaches. On the other hand, the Liberals 
never won more than twenty-four of the metropolitan seats (in 1968, 
1971, and 1973); the A.L.P. never won fewer than twenty-four in 
the period, and reached thirty-three in 1953. Predictably, Labor's 
safest metropolitan seats are in industrial and residential working-
class areas, and in outlying working-class and lower-middle-class 
districts, and its marginal seats, like those of the Liberals, have 
been in suburbs of mixed or rapidly changing composition. 
There were thirteen "industrial-mining" constituencies through-
out the period except in 1947 when there were eleven and from 
1970 when the number was twelve. The A.L.P. won at least eleven 
of these seats at every election. Three of them were won from time 
to time by Independents; the Liberals managed to win Wollongong 
in 1965 and 1968. 
The "rural" seats as here defined numbered thirty-six in 1947, 
then thirty-three until 1970, thirty-five in 1971, and thirty-seven 
from 1973 on. The Country Party always confined its electoral 
efforts to a selected number of these seats, contesting never more 
than two-thirds and consistently winning about half of them. Its 
"territory" has included a solid block of seats on the dairy-farming 
north coast, the grazing and mixed farming northern tableland and 
the wheat-growing north-western slopes—roughly corresponding 
with the proposed new state of New England, long a cherished goal 
of the party. Its remaining seats have extended southward in a band 
embracing the wheat-sheep areas of the central and south-western 
slopes. Aitkin has shown that the Country Party's support is related 
to the proportion of "urban", "township", and "rural" voters in 
an electorate, being weakest in the urban areas and strongest in 
the rural; and subject to this, it is highest in dairy-farming 
electorates, lower in mixed-farming electorates, and lowest in 
grazing electorates—which he attributes largely to the different 
proportions of self-employed and wage-earning voters and their 
respective families in the different areas." 
The Labor Party has regularly contested nearly all the "rural" 
electorates. Before the election of 1947 it held eighteen, or half. 
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of them; the Country Party held twelve; the Liberals held three 
and Independents three. By the 1970s Labor had lost half the rural 
seats it held in 1947. During the 1950s and 1960s Labor's share 
declined as that of the Liberals rose, though the Liberal tally 
reached one-third of the rural seats only in 1965 and 1968. The 
bulk of Labor's decline in the rural areas was due to losing all 
of the half-dozen electorates held in 1947 which contained substan-
tial country towns—Albury, Dubbo, and Wagga Wagga to the 
Liberals; Bathurst, Goulburn, and Orange to the Country Party. 
In the country towns the Liberals appeal to much the same classes 
of voter as the Country Party, and Aitkin has suggested that Labor 
held a number of its country seats in the 1940s and 1950s (e.g., 
Burrinjuck, Castlereagh, Liverpool Plains, Murrumbidgee, Wagga 
Wagga, Young) as a result of personal loyalty built up by the 
members who won them in the big swing of 1941, rather than of 
the economic structure of the electorates.'* By the same token we 
may note Mackerras's warning that in sufficiently favourable 
circumstances Labor could win ''any country seat".'' 
Groups 
The geographical distribution of party voting thus gives a rough 
indication—the only indication to be got from election statistics— 
of how far support is shaped by economic group or "class" 
membership. That this factor is related to party identification for 
most voters in Australia, but is far from decisive for a large 
minority, is amply confirmed by the Political Attitudes Survey 
findings on support for the parties by class and occupation. For 
example, when respondents were divided into six groups according 
to the status of their occupations, the proportion of a group 
expressing support for Labor was certainly lowest among the 
"professionals" at one end of the scale and highest among "unskilled 
workers" at the other end. Certainly also, in the 1967 survey only 
8 per cent of the "professionals" in New South Wales (who 
comprised 8 to 10 per cent of the samples from that state) 
"identified" with the A.L.P.; but no fewer than one-fifth of them 
did so in 1969, while only 56 per cent of the "professional" and 
"semi-professional, manager and owner" groups (together compris-
ing 37 per cent of the sample) said they had voted Liberal-Country 
in the federal election of that year. On the other hand, nearly 30 
per cent of the New South Wales "unskilled workers" (about 16 
per cent of the samples) said on both occasions that they thought 
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of themselves as "Liberal" or "Country Party" supporters, and 
between 25 and 30 per cent of them claimed to have voted 
Liberal-Country at the most recent state and federal elections. By 
the same token, in both waves of the survey in New South Wales 
only 55 to 57 per cent of "semi-skilled workers" (14 to 17 per cent 
of the samples) "identified" with Labor, while the proportion of 
"skilled workers" who either "identified" with or recalled voting 
for the A.L.P. never exceeded one-half. Finally, about 60 per cent 
of the "office and sales clerk" group (who made up roughly 12 per 
cent of the New South Wales samples) claimed to be Liberal-
Country supporters. 
Table 7 gives a broad measure of "party identification" on a 
"class" basis by combining the professionals, semi-professionals, 
etc., and office and sales groups as "non-manual", and the skilled, 
semi-skilled, and unskilled worker groups as "manual".'" As on 
other aspects of political behaviour, the New South Wales re-
spondents did not differ appreciably from the full Australian sample 
in this matter, except that on the whole they were somewhat more 
"class-oriented" in their party allegiance than Australians in 
general, and that the D.L.P. received much less support from every 
occupational group in New South Wales than in the national 
sample. If the Liberal-Country combination are really "the parties 
of town and country capital", and Labor is "the party of the 
working class", it would seem that quite a large portion of each 
interest are unaware of it, or don't care. 
Table 7. Party Identification of N.S.W. Voters by Occupational Status 
(Percentage of each occupational group identifying with main parties—"don't know" 
and "no answer" omitted) 
A L P , Lib/C.P, D.L.P. P"^^'' 
' Parties 
1967 Survey 
Non-manual 
Manual 
1969 Survey 
Non-manual 
Manual 
(N = 316) 
(N = 365) 
(N = 316) 
(N = 287) 
23,7 
54,0 
30,4 
56,8 
65.2 
35.3 
61.7 
35.5 
1.3 
1.4 
0.0 
1.7 
0.3 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
Source: Political Attitudes Survey, Political Science Department, Research School 
of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 
Map 1. Party Distribution of Electorates in Sydney Metropolitan Area after 1976 Election 
Map 2. Party Distribution of Electorates in Central Area (Excluding Sydney) after 1976 Election 
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That astute constitutional lawyer, Harrison Moore, was his-
torically correct when he wrote, half a century ago, that "where 
real political parties have existed in Australia their origin has 
usually been in the desire to promote or to defend some material 
interest, individual or class"."' Nor would Australia be unusual in 
this. In a broad sense, each of the main parties in New South Wales 
today shows a primary loyalty to a particular section of the 
community, though the Liberals would want to except themselves 
from the generalization. But this does not mean that parties are 
merely the instruments of organized interest groups. For one thing, 
the Liberal and Country parties, for different reasons, have had 
to achieve administrative and financial separation from the or-
ganized economic groups that helped to establish and powerfully 
influenced them or their predecessors; while the Labor Party 
machine, without breaking the corresponding nexus, has achieved 
considerable autonomy by organizational means, as is shown below 
in more detail. The D.L.P. has never been formally dependent on 
outside groups. Second, the pattern of electoral support for every 
party cuts across class, sectional, and interest group lines. The 
P.A.S. data suggest, for example, that in the elections of the 1960s 
at least one-fifth of the A.L.P.'s votes came from the "professional, 
manager and owner" groups, while up to half of the Liberal and 
Country parties' supporters were white- and blue-collar employees. 
These patterns impose significant limits on the ability of the parties 
to act as agents for one class or section. 
There are other factors which blur the relation of the parties 
to the "interests". One is the part played by party ideologies. These 
sometimes help to broaden a party's electoral base by straddling 
potentially divergent interests, as the Country Party's ideology of 
"balanced development" against the forces of "big city domination" 
succeeded in attracting the support not only of small farmers, 
farmer-graziers and large graziers, but also of townspeople in the 
rural regions, whose economic interests were not necessarily those 
of the countryside. In other cases, as with the "socialism" of Labor 
and the "liberalism" of the Liberal party, the ideology expresses a 
comprehensive approach to the problems of the whole society and 
inhibits unduly blatant discrimination between particular economic 
interests. In other words, to attract a sufficient range of electoral 
support the parties must appeal to principle and exploit prejudice 
as well as undertake to keep pockets lined. Perhaps the most 
important inhibiting factor, however, is the overt or tacit acceptance, 
by all the parties that matter, of the basic structure of a private-
enterprise-based constitutional democracy in Australia. Their will-
ingness, on the whole, to play the game according to the rules of 
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this system combines with the sobering experience of office to 
produce in practice a way of dealing with specific issues which, while 
undeniably biased toward one kind of interest or another, and— 
consciously or otherwise—towards the dominant interests in the 
system, also includes that elusive consideration, "the public interest" 
—which really means "other interests besides those immediately 
involved". 
Rank-and-file party membership is a form of "support". It bears 
little relationship to the political strength of the parties, either 
absolutely (since it is such a small proportion of the electorate— 
even smaller in New South Wales than in other states) or relatively 
(as table 8 shows); but it may have some effect on party orientation. 
The unreliability of such figures over short periods of time is shown 
by a more recent report to the effect that Liberal Party membership 
had fallen from 42,000 in December 1975, having almost trebled 
during (and perhaps because of) the Whitlam Government, to 
24,500 in March 1977."^ 
Party activists everywhere have higher occupational, social, and 
educational status than voters. In New South Wales, paid-up A.L.P. 
membership is more evenly distributed across the social spectrum 
than the party's electoral support; many members of trade unions 
affiliated with the A.L.P. do not exercise their option to join a party 
branch (and so are not included in table 8)—though of course the 
delegates of these unions preponderate in party congresses. On the 
other hand, most Liberal branches and members are to be found 
in Liberal-held, middle-class electorates; nearer to the centre of the 
party organization, the activists and parliamentarians are "over-
whelmingly middle class . . . preponderantly Protestant and fre-
quently educated in private schools"."^ Members of the D.L.P. and 
Country Party are probably more representative of their respective 
parties' loyal voters. 
Table 8. Main Parties: Financial Branch Membership in N.S.W.*, 1972 
Estimated Percentage of 
Party Total Membership State Electorate* 
A,L,P. 20,000 0.77 
Liberal 15,000 0.58 
Country Party 20,000 0.77 
D.L.P. 4,000 0.15 
* Including A.C.T, 
Source: Lex Watson, "The Party Machines", in Mayer and Nelson, Australian 
Politics: A Third Reader, p. 364. 
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A more significant nexus between "support" and "orientation" 
is provided by party leadership and party finance. The two are 
connected, partly by the parliamentary leaders' personal control of 
separate funds they receive as donations towards electoral campaign 
expenditure (the "slush-funds" of Labor terminology), and partly 
by the relations between party leaders and the "interests" most 
capable of contributing to party expenses. Here we may note F.W. 
Eggleston's generalization, meriting more extended study, that 
"neither the business community nor the pastoralists have ever sent 
any considerable leader into Australian politics"."" It applies more 
to Victoria than to New South Wales, where some important 
business and pastoral leaders have been prominent in the Legislative 
Council and in the extra-parliamentary wings of the non-Labor 
parties, where their connections have undoubtedly been financially 
helpful to the parties. Katharine West writes: 
Business (including primary industry) and the professions have 
provided not only the bulk of Liberal Party funds but also all the 
wielders of power in both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings 
—although the objective characteristic of extra-party interest has never 
proved to be the crucial one in determining the extent of a person's 
power inside the party; nor have the key people in the state divisions 
neatly reflected the quality and scale of the local economic 
environments."^ 
It is certainly notable that the outstanding politicians who 
brought electoral success to the Liberal and Country parties and 
their forerunners were not considerable leaders in the business or 
pastoral community: W.A. Holman (Nationalist leader 1916-20) 
was an ex-Labor premier; B.S.B. Stevens (U.A.P. leader 1932-39) 
made his previous career in the state public service; R.W. Askin 
(Liberal leader 1959-74) had been a Rural Bank employee and 
white-collar union official; and M.F. Bruxner (Progressive and then 
Country Party leader 1922-25, 1932-58) was a grazier hardly 
known beyond Tenterfield when he entered politics. Eggleston's 
generalization, moreover, could be paralleled on the Labor side. The 
most powerful men of the labour and trade union movements were 
active in the Labor Party "machine" and graciously retired to the 
fleshpots of the upper house, but the party's notable parliamentary 
leadership was supplied by men like Holman, a professional 
politician most of his life; J.T. Lang, previously an estate agent; 
W.J. McKell (leader 1939-47) and J.J. Cahill (leader 1952-59)i 
both of whom also made politics their career after a youthful debut 
as junior union officials. Neville Wran, Q.C. (elected December 
1973) had a professional career as an industrial advocate before 
entering politics. In this polity, at least, success in electoral politics 
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does mark men off from those with other pursuits, including even 
machine politics. The result is a familiar form of political conflict 
—loyalty to the party against loyalty to various other things: law 
and order, the parliamentary institution, the oath of office, the 
public interest, and the electorate as a whole. In this conflict the 
parliamentarians are strengthened by their public representative 
role, and immeasurably more when in office by the powers and 
information at the disposal of government. But the "machine" men 
of all parties are strengthened not only by their strategic positions 
in the respective party organizations, but also by their closer 
affinities with the main suppliers of party funds: the business and 
pastoral communities and the bigger and wealthier trade unions. 
These are the dominant sources of financial support because of the 
structure of party finance. 
Finance 
Parties need money to keep up their central offices, to recruit 
members and public support, and above all to fight election 
campaigns. They do not reveal precisely how much they spend on 
these different purposes, or precisely where they get all the money 
from—though the A.L.P. does publish annual accounts and a 
balance sheet for its state headquarters. The following is based on 
the limited information that a few assiduous scholars have managed 
to assemble."' 
Most day-to-day spending is on account of the parties' state 
headquarters in Sydney—in the A.L.P. about half of it goes on 
salaries and related payments to the head office staff, which 
numbers about twenty. The Liberal staff is rather larger; the 
Country Party employs about a dozen; the D.L.P. could only afford 
one or two. The Liberal and Country Party head offices, as a matter 
of policy, also pay for most of the "organizers" who are employed 
to recruit new members and help in election campaigns; the A.L.P. 
must rely largely on unpaid extra labour by union officials for this 
work."' Other substantial central office items include the cost of 
party conferences, maintenance and rates on premises, production 
of party literature, including periodicals for members, and, in the 
case of the Liberal Party, a useful flow of research bulletins and 
other background information on current politics. To go by the 
A.L.P.'s published figures, the total expenditure of a major party's 
state headquarters on these routine items is no greater than the 
annual budget of an average, non-science, university department. 
Yet no party, with the possible exception of the Country Party, 
receives enough from regular revenue sources to meet even this 
expenditure."' 
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These sources are of varied importance in the different parties, 
though in all of them the lion's share of funds goes directly or 
indirectly to the head office. Local branches and sub-branches need 
little money except to fight elections, and rarely raise more than 
they need. 
The Country Party is unique in raising most of its regular revenue 
by bank order subscriptions secured mainly by the efforts of the 
organizers—a system inaugurated in 1928 and strengthened and 
centralized since the withdrawal of the F.S.A. and Graziers' 
Association in 1944. According to Aitkin, in 1970 a membership 
of twenty thousand contributed an average of five dollars each in 
this way. Head Office retained the whole of a member's first year's 
subscription, after which receipts were allocated between head 
office, the state and federal electorate councils, and the local branch 
according to a strict formula protected by the party constitution. 
However, "it still depends on donations from individuals, firms, and 
organizations for some of its revenue, especially that for election 
campaigns", and party leaders express concern at the lack of 
predictability and autonomy this implies."' 
Local branch members of the Labor and Liberal parties pay a 
nominal annual subscription—for example the Liberal rate in 1975 
was $4, or $6.50 for a married couple; this provides between a fifth 
and a quarter of the state parties' regular income. The A.L.P. 
central office has several other regular sources denied to its rivals. 
The most important is fees from affiliated trade unions, accounting 
for about half of normal receipts. In addition, the N.S.W. Branch 
receives about $6,000 a year from its investment in a radio station 
(which also donates free broadcasting time during elections among 
other services), and half as much again from letting office space 
in its own building in Elizabeth Street. Even so it had to finance 
deficits of $42,000 and over $30,000 respectively in 1969 and 1970 
from past accumulated funds. Neither the D.L.P. nor the Liberal 
Party has had corresponding sources of regular income, so both 
must rely heavily on donations even to meet ordinary expenses. 
Except in one or two blue-ribbon electorates. Liberal Party branches 
have never contributed to central office funds—and D.L.P. branches 
were unable to do so. 
Thus Aitkin is justified in remarking that for every party the 
additional and far heavier burden of fighting election campaigns 
means "a recurring financial crisis" to meet which extra income 
must somehow be raised.^^ Moreover, the frequency of Australian 
elections makes the crisis virtually endemic; for example, the 
published accounts of the New South Wales A.L.P. "campaign 
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fund" for the calendar year 1970 showed small payments to round 
off the December 1969 federal election campaign and to start off 
that for the February 1971 state election, and expenditure of over 
$20,000 on the 1970 Senate election and on by-elections. A full 
state election would cost many times this amount. In all parties, 
therefore, "campaign funds" are mostly raised and spent within a 
few months of the elections concerned—and they rarely meet the 
full bills. These have escalated with the steady replacement of 
earlier and cheaper campaign methods such as personal canvassing 
and public meetings by use of the expensive mass media and 
professional publicity agents. This trend has shifted the main 
emphasis of campaigning to the party leaders, and its main financial 
burdens to the head offices. However, the latter expect party organs 
in each electorate to help the local effort of their candidate, which 
may include household visits, local press announcements, distribu-
tion of pamphlets, and meetings. (As mentioned in chapter 2, there 
is no restriction in New South Wales electoral law on either a 
party's or a candidate's campaign expenditure.) For these purposes 
A.L.P. and Liberal Party branches resort to raffles, card parties, 
bazaars, and socials; at the state level the A.L.P. has had some 
success with fund-raising dinners. Though Liberal branches receive 
no assistance from the centre, those in marginal seats, where 
resources are scarce and campaigning most expensive, may seek 
money and other help through "adoption" by a richer, blue-ribbon 
area, under an electorate assistance scheme established in 1950." 
The cost of campaigning still has to be made up for the most 
part, both locally and at the centre, by donations. Party officials 
dislike this because it prevents orderly budgeting. Parliamentarians 
and officials both dislike it because it could subject them to undue 
influence, or appear to do so. If they are to help a party significantly, 
donations must come largely from sources able and willing to 
contribute substantial sums. Labor has such a source to hand in 
the large trade unions which can cap their regular affiliation fees 
by subscribing handsomely to campaign funds—or can withhold 
donations as a sign of displeasure with the party organization." The 
only other possible source of significant support lies in men of 
substance in business and primary industry. Here the connections 
of party leaders in and out of parliament are vital, as also is the 
"image" of the parties. 
In New South Wales, Labor's long and "moderate" reign through 
the 1940s and 1950s earned regular donations from business 
interests, while allegations of Labor's links with the liquor trade 
have been common currency at least since the 1920s." The Country 
Party can still look for donations to the primary organizations which 
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formerly were its financial mainstay, as well as to pastoralists and 
business firms. The D.L.P. sought to raise funds through the "bank 
order" system; in 1966, according to an obviously well-informed 
account, the party was "financed mainly by a highly organized 
system of regular donations from party members, over and above 
their membership fees", and also received a "few donations", for 
example, for television costs, "in large part, from businessmen 
ideologically committed to the DLP".*" The sources of most Liberal 
donations are much the same as those tapped by previous non-Labor 
parties, but having built a fund-raising organization of their own, 
the Liberals cherish their freedom from pressure from outside by 
a self-appointed coterie of fund-gatherers. However, it was said in 
the mid-1960s that the donations available to the New South Wales 
Division were "drastically limited" by the Finance Committee's 
relative failure to recruit men of standing in the Sydney business 
world, by the party's apparent inability to win office in the state 
parliament, by the tendency of influential businessmen to subscribe 
to the then more successful federal party, and by the inclination 
of many firms to "back only the expected winner or at most have 
. . . 'two bob each way' "." A common irritant is the overlapping 
of appeals to the same donors, not only by different parties, but 
by different divisions of the same party. In 1959-60, separate fund-
raising appeals in New South Wales and Victoria by the Liberals' 
Federal Finance Committee were bitterly opposed by the respective 
state finance committees, not only because of the confusion and 
some resistance caused among donors but also because they seemed 
to threaten the autonomy of the state divisions." 
"Who pays the piper calls the tune." A political party is not 
likely to act persistently against the interests of those who support 
it in the most palpable way; and this could be important when the 
party is in office. In practice it may not be so important as it sounds. 
Contributors to each party have many different interests. The 
relationship of these interests to anything government may do is 
often obscure. Once in parliament, members can build up their own 
electoral support and need not be too concerned about offending 
a particular patron here and there. The patrons themselves are fairly 
satisfied if "their men are in", and if their individual contributions 
are recognized in due course in the honours list or by a seat in 
the upper house. In general, the practical advantage they secure 
is easier access to the politicians in time of need, rather than a 
leverage upon decision-making. In addition, as Alan Davies writes: 
Vague talk about the "pressure groups behind the parties" merely 
obscures the fact that most of them have only a very fitful interest in 
influencing the policy of any political party, being perfectly content to 
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deal directly with the administration—whichever party is in office—and, 
in crises, to use one or other of the many more modern and efficient 
means of pressure than intra-party infiltration." 
STRUCTURE 
It has been a commonplace of political science for over half a 
century that even the most "democratically" oriented political 
parties become highly centralized oligarchies in practice, irrespec-
tive of their formal organization, though mainly because of or-
ganizational needs." By their very nature, party organizations in 
parliamentary democracies embody a paradox: whether conceived 
as representing large bodies of citizens or as instruments for 
mobilizing the popular vote for aspiring politicians, they must be 
based on a mass membership; but as their main aim is to influence 
government and if possible control it, on the basis of a more or 
less coherent set of policies and tactics, they cannot afford diffuse 
or irresolute leadership. These structural imperatives are reinforced 
by the facts that direct sharing in political power is a marginal 
interest for most rank-and-file party members but a central concern 
of the small minorities who, for that very reason, achieve control 
of central party organs. Thus even the institutions for democratic 
control become, at most, arenas in which minority factions contend 
for mastery of party policy and power. 
Branch and intermediate levels 
Political party structure in New South Wales reflects these general 
tendencies. In all parties it corresponds with party functions in 
providing for rank-and-file participation in local "branches" 
throughout the state, in maintaining organs at the level of state 
and federal electorates to help get candidates into parliament, and 
in providing committees of various kinds to conduct party business 
at the centre—notably to co-ordinate election campaigns and to 
press the party's policies upon its parliamentary representatives. The 
main structural difference between the parties is that the Liberal 
and Country Party organizations make little pretence at rank-and-
file control of party leadership or policy at state headquarters and 
in parliament; while Labor Party theory requires leaders to follow 
policies adopted in representative party assemblies, and extends this 
even to a Labor government in office. In practice, oligarchy in the 
Labor parties is at least as pronounced as in the others, and A.L.P. 
parliamentarians are held answerable—though not very successfully 
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—to the central organs rather than to the rank and file.*' 
People become party members by joining a local branch and 
paying the subscription—with the equivocal exception of members 
of trade unions affiliated to the A.L.P. who are automatically 
counted as party members to determine a union's representation 
in party bodies, though they may also enrol directly in a branch. 
A.L.P. members are expected in any case to belong to a union if 
eligible. The Liberal Party structure provides for separate Women's 
and Young Liberal branches, as well as for special branches such 
as the City of Sydney branch and the University of Sydney Liberal 
Club. These groups are specifically represented in all higher organs 
of the party, and the women's and youth groups have their own 
distinct state hierarchies. They are active bodies in the areas where 
the party is strong—mainly the metropolis—but sometimes com-
plain that their role extends little beyond the indispensable chores 
of fund-raising and electioneering. The Young Australian Country 
Party (established in New South Wales only in 1964-65) is also 
organized in local branches, with its own state organs and separate 
constitution. The D.L.P. Women's Organising Committee and the 
Young Democratic Labor Association sent two delegates each to 
that party's annual conference. Beyond this the corresponding 
groups have little branch organization and less influence in the 
respective main party bodies. There are periodical Assemblies of 
A.L.P. Youth in Sydney, and a Young Labor Council consisting 
of two delegates from each A.L.P. local branch, which is regarded 
as an advisory body to the state party. The Labor Women's 
Committee and Conference are now represented on the state party 
organs and take part in a federal biennial conference. In different 
degrees, all other parties could share with the Country Party Don 
Aitkin's stricture that "the general status of women within the party 
remains subordinate and menial".*" 
Ordinary branch membership itself affords only humble op-
portunities for serving a party. Branches elect delegates to form 
most of the higher party bodies. In all parties except the Liberal 
Party, branches contribute most of their subscription revenue to the 
central organs through "capitation fees" or their equivalent. They 
originate the hundreds of resolutions on party organization and 
policy that, after varying degrees of sieving by intermediate bodies, 
find their way into the indigestible agenda of plenary conferences. 
In the Country Party the branch as such may nominate parlia-
mentary candidates. Seen from the centre, however, local branches 
exist mainly to assist in the election of party candidates by 
canvassing and distributing propaganda, by manning polling booths, 
and by raising local campaign funds. Branch membership varies 
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greatly in size from many hundreds in some metropolitan areas to 
sometimes less than the dozen or so which is the constitutional 
minimum in the different parties. 
Branch activity varies in intensity with the political party, with 
the situation in the constituency, and with the electoral cycle. Only 
a small proportion of any branch's membership attends branch 
meetings, even in the A.L.P. whose branches are otherwise generally 
enthusiastic enough to meet monthly. The D.L.P.'s branch organiza-
tion in New South Wales has been described as "weak and 
scattered".*' Aitkin says that the conduct of Country Party branches 
"bears only token resemblance to that set out in the Party's 
constitution", with many branches failing to hold the required 
minimum of three meetings a year, and attendance generally poor 
except at election time or when a new parliamentary candidate has 
to be nominated.''- In any party, branch activity is usually weakest 
in electorates where the party either is dominant or has no electoral 
chance at all. Katharine West reported such variation among 
Liberal Party branches in New South Wales, while generalizing 
that "out of the electoral season, the average branch has resembled 
a seaside boarding house in winter"." Nelson and Watson suggest 
that centrally financed campaigns in the mass media are now more 
important to electoral success than traditional branch activity." 
At the intermediate level in all parties are two sets of bodies, 
the state and federal electorate councils (called electorate con-
ferences by the Liberals), each corresponding to a state or federal 
constituency. In general their composition and functions are alike. 
They include delegates elected by and from the party branches in 
the electorate concerned in proportion to their size, together with 
the main branch office-bearers and the appropriate sitting member, 
if any, in the cases of the Liberal and Country parties. The Country 
Party is unique in providing for cross-representation between state 
and federal electorate councils. In the three larger parties these 
bodies play a part in the selection of parliamentary candidates; and 
are also responsible for the general control and co-ordination of 
branches in the electorate (and formation of branches in the Liberal 
case), as well as for the organization and financing of the campaigns 
of the party's endorsed candidates. The Liberal and Country Party 
bodies also sift the resolutions coming up from branches before 
sending on those they approve to the state or federal council as 
appropriate. The D.L.P. electorate councils, on the other hand, were 
constitutionally entrusted only with the conduct of election cam-
paigns within the electorate, and with duties delegated to them by 
the state Central Executive: in practice this level scarcely existed 
in New South Wales, since outside Victoria the D.L.P. rarely had 
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more than one branch in an electorate. 
All parties have experimented with another type of intermediate 
organization, the "regional" or "provincial" conference, as a means 
of giving expression to the interests and enthusiasms of particular 
areas. The A.L.P. began in the 1920s with a single "country 
conference", a concession to its growing country representation 
which was threatening to become a dissident wing of the party in 
reaction to J.T. Lang's leadership. Provision was made later for 
regional conferences representing state electorate councils in an 
area, whose decisions would be subject to ratification by the state 
annual conference. The 1971 constitution provides for regional 
assemblies, now open to "all members of the Party within the 
Region" (rule E.2). The Country Party did not feel the need for 
regional organization until the early 1950s, when the Central 
Council exercised its power to convene provincial conferences "at 
such times and places as it considers desirable in the interests of 
the Party", and comprising members accredited by their branches 
or electorate councils. These occasional conferences only submit 
resolutions on policy to the Central Council; they serve mainly as 
"forums at which party leaders can instruct the faithful"." The 
D.L.P. had a similar provision for regional conferences "as de-
termined by the Central Executive". In the late 1950s the Liberal 
Party launched a scheme for conferences in nine regions of the state, 
altered in 1962-63 to four metropolitan and six country regions; 
in theory this was to keep the central organization continuously 
in contact with special local problems. In 1972 the only surviving 
remnants of this scheme were the regional presidents (elected 
annually by the presidents of branches and state electoral con-
ferences and State Council delegates from each region), who had 
seats ex officio on the State Council and Executive and were still 
empowered to convene regional conventions." 
Central organs 
The objects of the branch and intermediate levels of party organiza-
tion are to establish a widespread base of operations in the 
electorate, from which to elicit new ideas, new members, and 
potential representatives and leaders, and in particular to mobilize 
electoral support for parliamentary candidates. The central state 
organs are supposed to complete a system of communications 
through which members and supporters can systematically influence 
or even direct their parliamentary representatives towards favoured 
policies. In practice, they also help the leadership to unify a party, 
to co-ordinate its forces, and if so disposed, to use it as a vehicle 
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for their own ideas or as a stepping-stone to personal power. 
Certainly there is oligarchical rule in all the New South Wales 
parties, but it is tempered in different ways and degrees by party 
rules and party tradition. To clarify the dynamics of the system, 
we must consider relationships at two levels: the rank-and-file vis-
a-vis the apex of the extra-parliamentary organization, and this 
organisation vis-a-vis the party's representatives in parliament. 
Here a difference appears among the formal organizations. The non-
Labor pattern seems to concentrate power at the top of the extra-
parliamentary organizations, while respecting the autonomy of 
parliamentarians. A.L.P. organization purports to uphold both 
rank-and-file control of the extra-parliamentary machine, and 
machine control of the politicians. The D.L.P. appeared to approve 
the former, but not the latter. How does reality compare with these 
patterns? 
The root of the formal contrast can be seen in the respective 
roles of the party general assemblies. The D.L.P. Annual General 
Conference shared a time-honoured definition with A.L.P. Annual 
Conferences as the party's "supreme ruling authority within the 
State", elected by constituent branches (or, in the A.L.P., electorate 
councils) and affiliated organizations, having the last word on the 
party's constitution, policy, platform, and rules, and electing its 
main executive body. In both "Labor" parties the Conference 
(similarly its A.L.P. successor the State Congress—see below) was, 
in principle, the ultimate battleground and arbiter of conflicting 
internal factions, and the potential arena of rank-and-file revolt. 
The Country Party's Annual General Conference (held in turn at 
different country centres) looks at first sight a little like this. Made 
up of elected delegates from branches (including women's branches) 
and electorate councils in proportion to their size (with state and 
federal Country Party parliamentarians who are not delegates 
entitled to attend without vote), it has power to alter the party 
constitution and "shall lay down the general policy of the Party, 
which it expects its Parliamentary Representatives to follow"—but 
it "shall not attempt to bind its Parliamentary Representatives to 
specific measures" {Constitution ss. 130, 131). Furthermore, as 
Aitkin points out: 
There is . . . no election from Conference to Central Council, and none 
of the party's officers are responsible in any sense to the conference. 
The more important party officers and leaders do not "report" to 
conference: they "address" it. The finances of the party are neither 
revealed to nor discussed in any informed way by conference, and it 
cannot instruct or otherwise influence either the Central Council or the 
Central Executive." 
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The Liberals' annual State Convention is not significant enough to 
have rated any discussion at all in West's authoritative account of 
power in the party. According to Nelson and Watson it is "a large 
debating forum with no formal power".'* It consists mainly of 
delegates elected by branches in proportion to their size, together 
with three delegates elected by the Women's Group, and branch 
officers with all members of the State Executive ex officio. Some 
two thousand delegates attended the 1976 meeting. The Convention 
may discuss matters submitted from the lower levels of the party 
or by the State Council, but it can do no more than "make 
recommendations to the State Council" {Constitution s. 171). 
However it does have the right to elect fifteen of its elective 
delegates to State Council. Let us now consider the central executive 
organs of the parties, beginning with those that have seen least 
change in recent decades. 
The Central Council has always been the governing body of the 
Country Party. In the 1920s and 1930s the dominant elements in 
the Council were the Farmers and Settlers' Association and the 
Graziers' Association, supplying five members each and most of the 
finance; the party's own branches were given five representatives 
in 1927 and eight in 1933, and the presidents of federal electorate 
councils were added in 1939. The state and federal parliamentary 
leaders have been ex officio members since 1928. Following the 
electoral defeat of 1941 and the withdrawal of the producer 
associations in 1944-45, the reconstructed constitution of 1946 
struck a compromise between the claims of the burgeoning 
grassroots organization and the party's traditional respect for 
experience and leadership. Thenceforth the greater part of the 
Central Council (nearly two-thirds in 1972) was formed by the 
chairmen of state and federal electorate councils; two delegates each 
from the state and federal parliamentary parties were added to the 
leaders; the Council itself elected a treasurer and six trustees (the 
latter for overlapping three-year terms), and could co-opt up to five 
additional members (since raised to eight) for their special 
qualifications. Council has subsequently been further enlarged to 
include the Country Party leader in the Legislative Council, and 
in the Senate (if from New South Wales), the immediate past 
chairman, the N.S.W. women's representative on the Federal 
Council, the chairman of the Metropolitan Branch, and the state 
chairman and two other representatives of the Young Australian 
Country Party (N.S.W.). The full membership amounts to over 
sixty, though attendance is usually much less. Central Council has 
in Aitkin's words, "practically every important power within the 
party. . . .its final authority is real and unchallenged".*-'' It elects 
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the state chairman and other principal officers, the N.S.W. repre-
sentatives on the Federal Council, and the Central Executive. It 
employs the party's paid officials, controls finance and all aspects 
of election campaigns, deals with other political parties, interprets 
the constitution and settles disputes, directs organization, publicity, 
and propaganda, and endorses (or withholds endorsement from) 
state and federal parliamentary candidates. 
However, although these powers remain crucial. Central Council 
became less active as its size and business increased, and especially 
after the practice of paying attendance expenses, adopted in 1943, 
substantially increased the cost of meetings. Council now meets 
about four times a year, and the burden of continuous decision-
making has been taken up by the much smaller Central Executive, 
which the constitution defines as the principal officers and state and 
federal parliamentary leaders ex officio, plus at least eight of its 
own members elected by Central Council. In practice an Executive 
of seventeen or eighteen has been elected. Constitutionally the 
Executive only exercises such powers as are delegated by Central 
Council to supervise party activities between Council meetings, and 
its decisions are subject to ratification by the Council. However, 
with the Executive meeting in most months of the year, and with 
the increasing bureaucratization of the party's organization, the 
Executive has inevitably assumed "the leading part in the direction 
of party affairs, while the Council has begun to adopt a subsidiary 
role".™ Ratification of already implemented Executive decisions 
tends to become a formality. The Executive even largely determines 
its own composition, though it has only once run a "ticket" at the 
annual Council meeting. 
These trends lead Aitkin to describe today's Executive as "a self-
perpetuating oligarchy of the party's elders". Exactly the same 
could be said of the A.L.P. State Executive which always ran its 
own ticket for Executive elections—but with implications of intra-
party conflict and discontent that do not hold for the Country Party. 
The high level of internal cohesion and loyalty to the leadership 
in the Country Party is related to a number of factors. Though 
the interests of its supporting groups are by no means identical, 
they are far more homogeneous and limited in scope than those 
the larger parties must cultivate—and because of its permanent 
minority status even when sharing government office, the party's 
leaders never have to reconcile a more complex range of demands. 
The great majority of the Country Party's extra-parliamentary 
leaders and representatives in the Legislative Assembly have 
themselves been farmers or graziers or both, or otherwise connected 
with country town or rural life. Except during the disillusion and 
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doldrums of the early 1940s the party's performance in parliament 
has on the whole satisfied its supporters. Many of them being 
working farmers with no time for "politicking", they have taken 
the leaders for granted and shown remarkable deference to their 
political initiative and judgement. The relationship has been 
reflected in a high degree of continuity of membership in both the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary leadership of the party, and 
this in turn has reinforced party solidarity. The party has had only 
five leaders since 1922; the second, M.F. Bruxner, was leader for 
twenty-nine years; leadership was passed on amicably without 
internecine struggle; the turnover of electorate council chairmen, 
and so of Central Council membership, has been slow, and that 
of the Executive doubly so. As the creators and shapers of the 
central party institutions, the earlier parliamentary leaders min-
imized the chances of rift with the extra-parliamentary organiza-
tion, and indeed Bruxner's leadership was such that party chairmen 
were little more than figure-heads during his regime. However, as 
that regime drew to an end in the 1950s and Bruxner was succeeded 
by less imposing men (Davis Hughes, 1958-59; Charles—later Sir 
Charles—Cutler, 1959-75; Leon Punch, 1975- ), a new gener-
ation came to the fore in the extra-parliamentary organizations; 
they took the post-war representative institutions more seriously 
than their predecessors, sought and obtained more influence on the 
parliamentarians for both Council and Executive, involved these 
bodies more in the electoral and political strategy of the party, and 
converted the chairmanship into a full-time job. Some of the results 
are discussed below. 
According to the constitution of the Liberal Party (N.S.W. 
Division) the State Council is vested with "the management and 
control of the affairs of the Division". Formerly dominated numer-
ically by the delegates from state and federal electorate conferences, 
from 1970 it consisted mainly of delegates from local branches (one 
from each ordinary branch and two from each special branch) in 
addition to the fifteen representatives of the branches (to include 
at least five women) elected by the State Convention; other 
members include the ten regional presidents, seven delegates each 
from the Women's Group and the Youth Council, all members of 
the state parliamentary party, the leader and N.S.W. members of 
the federal parliamentary party, and past presidents. This means 
a great increase, since 1970, in nominal membership—to about nine 
hundred, with a quorum of fifty. The constitution requires the 
enlarged Council to meet at least bi-monthly instead of monthly 
as before, but Council manages to meet every six weeks, with 
average attendances of 150 to 200. The Council annually elects 
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from its own members the state president (who must not be an 
M.P.), office-bearers and other members of the State Executive, 
as well as delegates to the Federal Council, non-parliamentary 
members of the Standing Committee on State Policy (see p. 105), 
and various standing committees. The Council has sole power to 
amend the party's state constitution and determine constitutional 
matters, and the Executive is subject to its "control"; otherwise its 
role is rather vaguely defined as being "principally concerned with" 
general Liberal principles, current political questions, policy recom-
mendations, the state and federal platforms, and organizational 
activity. In practice, its meetings provide an opportunity for 
delegates to question state and federal parliamentary leaders on 
issues of the day, and to deal with resolutions on organization and 
policy, or refer them to one of its standing committees as generally 
happens in the case of important policy questions. Resolutions from 
ordinary branches cannot normally come to Council without being 
sieved as in the Country Party by electorate conferences or other 
party conferences or committees. 
In 1965 Katharine West reported that New South Wales was 
one of the only two states (the other being Western Australia) in 
which the Liberal Party State Council has "regularly been of 
significance in directing the affairs of the extra-parliamentary 
wing"," but that this was confined almost wholly to questions of 
constitutional interpretation and amendment, and of internal party 
organization. Council subcommittees had concerned themselves in 
some detail with legislative policy and had some influence on the 
parliamentary party. By and large Council had delegated extra-
parliamentary decision-making, except in the above-mentioned 
fields, to the State Executive, frequently demanding oral and written 
explanations of Executive actions though invariably accepting them. 
The Executive itself was a body then approaching—and since 
exceeding—forty in number, of whom nearly half were elected by 
State Council, the rest being mostly ex officio representatives of 
the Youth Council, Women's Group, regions, parliamentary parties, 
and, today, of the Federal Executive. The State Executive could 
meet at two- or three-week intervals—now regularly once a month 
—and controlled the party's paid staff, publicity, and the raising 
and spending of money for which it appointed triennally a Finance 
Committee. Even the Executive was already working largely 
through subcommittees, and decisions on short notice had to be 
made in its name by an unofficial "Central Executive" comprising 
leading party officials and parliamentarians. 
In refusing to subject the parliamentary party to any formal 
control by the extra-parliamentary wing, the Liberal organization 
resembled that of the Country Party, though as the next section 
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will show the organization was elaborately designed to integrate 
both wings in the process of policy formation. In practice, as West's 
writings show in detail, the relations between the various organs 
and levels of the party lacked the harmony that marked those of 
the Country Party, at least up to 1965. This appears to have been 
largely due to a mutual interaction between policy and personality 
clashes and the fact that the state parliamentary party spent its 
first twenty years as a relatively ineffectual Opposition. These 
factors in turn were reflected in a rapid turnover of parliamentary 
leaders: R.W.D. Weaver (died November 1945), Alexander Mair 
(resigned March 1946), Vernon Treatt (resigned August 1954 after 
several attempts to depose him), Murray Robson (deposed Septem-
ber 1955), P.H. Morton (deposed July 1959), followed by R.W. 
(later Sir Robert) Askin, who had been deputy leader since 1954. 
Morton was the first of these leaders on cordial terms with the 
extra-parliamentary leadership and the influential secretariat at Ash 
Street, Sydney. Both the latter groups had closer relations with, 
and paid more attention and respect to, the fortunes and leaders 
of the federal party, whose ascendancy in the 1950s invited invidious 
comparison—which was readily forthcoming—with the "permanent 
Opposition" in New South Wales. In retaliation, some of the 
politicians complained of attempted domination by "the Ash Street 
junta"—an epithet also popular at the time among the branches 
which felt cut off from the central decision-making bodies of the 
party. 
The enjoyment of continuous office after 1965 produced greater 
stability for a decade. Askin, as state Premier, remained un-
challenged leader until he stepped down at the end of 1974—but 
was then followed by two leaders in as many years. Among steps 
taken during Askin's Premiership to bring the different levels of 
the party into closer relationship was the substantial enlargement 
of the State Council in 1970 to give the branches direct representa-
tion and to include rank-and-file members of the parliamentary 
parties as well as the leaders. Former bones of contention such as 
electoral strategy, relations with an opinionated and powerfully led 
Country Party, and perfunctory attendance to their duties by 
Liberal parliamentarians, including some of the leaders, were 
buried, ignored, or sweetened by Askin's astute leadership. The 
concern expressed by some elements in the party, and even at times 
by the annual Convention, at the government's apparent per-
missiveness on such issues as pollution, conservation, and illegal 
gambling, was mild compared, say, to the hostility in the 1958 
Convention which passed resolutions opposing recent policies of the 
parliamentary party on a bill of rights, poker machines in clubs. 
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reform of the Legislative Council, and hire-purchase controls. On 
his election as party leader in 1959 Askin immediately sold his small 
business interest; as the victorious 1965 election campaign began 
he told a newspaper correspondent: "I am the 100 per cent 
professional politician with no outside interests".'^ And of course 
—especially after the retirement of Menzies in 1966—the former 
comparisons with the federal parliamentary party were reversed: 
like his Labor predecessor Holman, Askin appeared in the role of 
champion of state rights against the federal "centralizers" in his 
own party (notably John Gorton who as Prime Minister declined 
the N.S.W. Division's invitation to the 1969 State Convention), 
while the federal party's prestige as the exemplar of political success 
diminished to vanishing point. 
By the time of his retirement, however, Askin had become, 
according to opinion polls, the most unpopular Premier in Australia, 
and his colleagues were eager to appoint a successor in good time 
before the 1976 election fell due. Once again the parliamentary 
Liberal Party was divided in its allegiance and faltered in political 
judgement. It passed over the deputy leader, E.A. Willis, for a dark 
horse, T.L. Lewis, only to replace him with Willis after one year. 
Willis then held the election six months before it was due—thinking 
the time opportune—and the composite government lost office on 
May Day 1976. 
After the late 1960s the D.L.P. in New South Wales (like the 
A.L.P. as will be seen) reorganized its central machinery to 
resemble more closely that of the non-Labor parties. In particular 
it created (at least on paper) a State Council to consist of delegates 
representing state electorates, and elected by state electorate 
councils where these existed. The State Council had no power to 
alter the rules or constitution of the party, but it could interpret 
the platform and policy between Annual General Conferences, 
make policy recommendations to the state and federal conferences, 
and even make new state policy by a two-thirds majority. 
On the other hand, the Central Executive of forty-one members 
was whittled down to twenty-one by eliminating the six members 
elected by delegates to General Conference from country branches 
and half of the twenty-eight members elected, along with the seven 
main office-bearers, at the Annual General Conference. This 
streamlined Executive, however, retained its extensive formal and 
actual powers. Between General Conference and State Council 
meetings it could interpret the policy and platform and determine 
all matters affecting the party in accordance with the platform, 
rules, and policy. It appointed the returning officer to conduct all 
selection ballots in the state and administered the pre-selection 
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process, with power to endorse or refuse endorsement, and in 
emergency to select would-be candidates for state and federal 
parliaments. It appointed organizers, had sole control of party 
propaganda and election campaigns, heard and determined dis-
ciplinary charges, and prepared the agenda of General Conference. 
Having thus established a tight A.L.P.-like structure up to the peak 
of the extra-parliamentary organization—one which, perhaps 
pessimistically, made no provision for parliamentary representation 
on any of the governing bodies—the D.L.P. accepted the non-Labor 
principle that its parliamentarians should not be subject to direction 
by that organization. 
The central organs of the A.L.P.'s New South Wales Branch, 
in company with those of the Victorian Branch, were reconstructed 
in 1970-71 following a long-familiar pattern of investigation and 
intervention by the Federal Executive. In 1970 the New South 
Wales Annual Conference, about seven hundred strong, comprised 
delegates from each affiliated trade union in proportion to its 
membership, and delegates from each state electorate council in 
proportion to the financial membership of party branches in the 
electorate. The trade unions were entitled to about 75 per cent of 
the delegates. The State Central Executive included the five 
principal officers and forty other members all elected by Conference, 
and five representatives of the state and federal parliamentary 
parties with limited voting rights. The Executive had "full power 
to determine all matters affecting the party" between conferences. 
Together with Conference's own constitutional supremacy over 
party policy, this made it vital for rival factions within the A.L.P. 
to try to marshal "the numbers" at Conference. In practice, 
majority control of the Executive conferred power over both the 
composition and conduct of the Conference, and so could be self-
perpetuating. 
Control was secured by various means. Conference delegates 
from most affiliated unions were not elected either directly or 
indirectly by the rank and file, but nominated by the unions' officers, 
through whom the factions represented on the Executive were 
therefore able to organize sympathetic Conference delegations." 
The same could be done to a smaller extent on the non-trade union 
side by arranging mass attendance of sympathizers (sometimes 
dubiously enrolled) at crucial branch meetings and elections; the 
dominant faction on the Executive could also suspend or expel 
particularly recalcitrant individuals and even whole branches. At 
Conference itself "tickets" and "bogus tickets", log-rolling and 
whispering campaigns, and ruthless wielding of the procedural rules 
traditionafly helped to sway the all-important election of the 
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incoming Executive, and to confirm the ruling faction's line on 
policy issues.'" 
The perennial protests at these practices (themselves perennial 
in the A.L.P.) nevertheless seemed based not so much upon any 
demonstration that Conference and Executive majorities did not 
reflect the complexion or opinions of the rank-and-file majority as 
upon resentment at the uncompromising cynicism (as critics saw 
it) with which the majority on the Executive enforced their power, 
and more particularly at the failure of all attempts to dislodge them. 
Although the Federal Executive's dismissal of the New South Wales 
Executive in 1956 was supposed to signal the downfall of the 
Industrial Group supporters, and four of them on the Executive 
were expelled from the party, the surviving Group supporters and 
"moderates" made up two-thirds of the federally appointed 
caretaker Executive of that year and formed the basis of the "right-
wing" factions that, with a three-quarters majority or near it on 
the state Executive from 1964, controlled the New South Wales 
Branch continuously from 1956 to the mid-1970s. The only "left-
wingers" elected to the Executive were the handful charitably 
accorded a place on the invariably successful "officers' ticket" 
(whose appeal to Conference delegates, incidentally, was enhanced 
by the obligation to choose the Executive by exhaustive preferential 
ballot). 
As happened in reverse order with the Liberals, relative harmony 
predominated within the State Branch while Labor remained in 
control of the government, but after the party lost state office in 
1965 and as its electoral position continued to decline, in New South 
Wales at least, up to the nadir of Labor's fortunes in the late 1960s, 
so the intra-party tensions came to a head just as the federal leader 
(E.G. Whitlam) was striving to consolidate the party in his run 
for the prime ministership. In the New South Wales party the Left 
opposition groups and individuals had been co-ordinated mainly by 
the "Steering Committee", which had originated as an anti-Grouper 
force in the trade unions and the A.L.P. before "the Split" of 
1955-56. From 1967 on this body stepped up its attacks on the 
right-wing majority in the Executive, linking them with an allegedly 
anti-Communist, anti-Left, pro-D.L.P. group of unionists and others 
organized under the name of the "Labor Forward Committee". 
Confrontation came to a climax at the June 1970 Annual Con-
ference, at which the opposition groups were more crushingly 
defeated than ever; but their complaints were heard by the Federal 
Executive which, already investigating the Victorian Branch on 
charges of domination by the "Socialist Left", was able to 
demonstrate its impartiality by authorizing an inquiry by the federal 
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president, T. Burns, and secretary, M. Young, into right-wing 
domination in New South Wales. 
The reaction of the respective state executives—and the ultimate 
results—echoed the events of the mid-1950s. 
In New South Wales the key officials, John Ducker, the senior vice-
president, and Peter Westerway, the secretary, responded with discretion 
and quiet astuteness; in Victoria, open resistance and flamboyant 
rhetoric were the order of the day. In New South Wales, intervention 
was carried through with the cooperation of the state executive; in 
Victoria, in defiance of the executive. In New South Wales no heads 
rolled; in Victoria the executive was dismissed." 
The image of oligarchy in the New South Wales Branch had not 
changed. Writing of the Industrial Group organizers within the 
State Executive on the eve of the 1955 Conference, J.T. Lang 
observed: 
So Kane and Rooney have been left in their Room 32 positions. They 
will organise the Groupers for the Conference from inside, not from 
outside. They will have access to all the official records, the union lists, 
the branch details and all the vital information on which numbers can 
be regimented or challenges made. . . . Still in the air, is who is going 
to do the actual checking of conference qualifications and credentials. 
Past experience has been that whoever controls the machine, controls 
the Conference." 
Lang was right. At the postponed 1955 Conference the "Groupers" 
won twenty-nine of the thirty-two elective positions on the Ex-
ecutive, despite the federal intervention intended to purge them. 
Reporting to the Federal Executive in November 1970 Tom Burns 
observed: 
Genuine Labor men and women who would not support the N.S.W. 
group called the "Steering Committee" were concerned that the "Labor 
Forward Group" had taken control of the officers and—because the 
officers picked the Executive, control of the Executive and—because the 
Executive controls preselection ballots—the setting up of Branches— 
their boundaries—and the settling of disputes—this group eventually had 
control of the New South Wales Branch." 
The New South Wales officers were able to influence the 
reconstruction of 1970-71 by setting up an internal investigation 
and initiating their own proposals for reform before federal 
intervention was fairly under way; by aligning themselves with the 
more moderate proposals for federal action through their represent-
atives on the Federal Executive; by "co-operative" informal dis-
cussions with federal political leaders; by admitting representatives 
of the Federal Executive and of N.S.W. dissident groups to their 
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internal reform committee; by inviting reorganization proposals 
from party branches and unions; by persuading the Federal 
Executive to take no action on the Burns Report but leave 
reorganization to the State Branch until after the state elections 
in February 1971; and by securing substantial representation on 
the committee then appointed by the Federal Executive to examine 
the state reform group's reorganization proposals. 
These proposals, amended in part by the Federal Executive in 
April 1971, formed the basis of the current structure which makes 
A.L.P. organization in New South Wales much more like that of 
some other state branches and of the non-Labor parties than it was 
before. Instead of the Annual Conference of seven or eight hundred 
delegates there is now a biennial Congress of about a thousand 
delegates—from the affiliated trade unions in proportion to their 
membership, and from state as well as federal electorate councils, 
together with four delegates each from the state and federal 
parliamentary parties, the Labor Women's Committee and the 
Young Labor Council. The most significant change in composition 
was a reduction in affiliated union representation from about 75 
per cent of the total number of delegates to "not less than 60%" 
as against "approximately 40% . . . of other delegates"—a change 
calculated to reduce the predominance of right-wing union dele-
gates, though not enough for the Steering Committee, who sought 
a reduction of the union share to 50 per cent in favour of more 
delegates from federal electorate councils. 
The most notable innovation was the creation of a State Council 
of some five hundred delegates directly elected (like the Congress) 
from affiliated unions, electorate councils, the parliamentary parties 
and the youth and women's groups, and also including the 
Administrative Committee (see below) and fifteen members elected 
by State Congress. Responsible for the general conduct of the 
Branch and the interpretation of party policy between meetings of 
Congress, it was also empowered to make policy decisions in 
emergencies by two-thirds majority vote. Required to meet at least 
once a quarter (now amended in the light of experience to three 
times a year), the Council was seen on the one hand as a smaller 
and more active version of the former Annual Conference to which 
the state officers would have to answer more frequently. On the 
other hand it was intended to assume part of the role of the former 
State Executive, enabling some of the more important policy 
committees to be chosen from the larger and more representative 
body.'* 
The Executive itself was replaced by a smaller Administrative 
Committee, comprising the six party officers, the federal and state 
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parliamentary leaders, and seven representatives of affiliated unions 
and five of electorate councils elected by the biennial Congress. It 
was required to meet fortnightly, in the hope that this still 
representative group could share more of the management responsi-
bility with the party officers similarly elected, and maintain closer 
scrutiny over the latters' administration of Branch affairs. The 
Administrative Committee retained the functions of controlling 
election campaigns and Branch funds and giving effect to Congress 
decisions, but its power to appoint organizers was converted to 
election by the State Council. One other significant change was 
the introduction of proportional representation for the election by 
Congress of the two Federal Executive and six Federal Conference 
delegates from the Branch, and of two state assistant secretaries; 
critics' demands for proportional representation in elections of the 
State Congress and executive bodies were rejected by the Federal 
Executive. 
Despite these structural changes, the realities of power remained 
the same. The new Administrative Committee contained and 
retained a majority of supporters of the former State Executive. 
The principal officers kept their places. From the first meeting of 
the new State Council, most matters were referred to committees 
because the size of the body inhibited policy discussion, while 
delegates concerned at the cost of attendance proposed less frequent 
meetings. At the first State Congress under the new system, in June 
1973, the supporters of the Right filled four of the six officer posts 
and their ticket for the election of Federal Conference delegates 
was easily successful. At the same Congress they secured majority 
approval for a surprise amendment to the Branch rules, transferring 
the selection of N.S.W. Legislative Council and Senate candidates 
from the electoral colleges established during the reorganization in 
1971 (see below) to the State Council in which right-wing control 
was more certain. This aroused bitter protests from left-wing 
members including a federal minister, Tom Uren, who said: "[The 
change] clearly shows that this phoney leadership that prevails in 
the New South Wales Branch is directed against those Senators 
who will not conform to the New South Wales machine."" The 
protests were attributed to the Steering Committee, whom the state 
president, John Ducker, attacked as a "subterranean group which 
was creating disunity and confusion within the party".*" It was not 
long before a spokesman of the Steering Committee was saying that 
"they were determined to seek Federal intervention in the fight 
against the State's ruling right-wing faction"." But that faction still 
ruled at the end of 1976, because it still had majority support within 
the Branch. 
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FUNCTIONS 
Political parties in New South Wales are voluntary associations 
organized to influence what the government does by selecting 
suitable parliamentary candidates to support, fighting elections to 
get them into parliament, formulating agreed policies for them to 
promote, and keeping the parliamentary representatives loyal to the 
party's policy line. These are "functions" in the sense of the primary 
purposes for which people organized the parties in the first place, 
and which for the most part they continue to serve in New South 
Wales. Once established, of course, parties may and do perform 
functions in another sense, for which they may not have been 
primarily designed. They may be seen, for example, as providing 
a ladder to political power for ambitious individuals, supplying jobs 
in the party bureaucracy, promoting the interests of some narrow 
sectional group, propping up or undermining the capitalist system, 
or on the other hand as providing a medium through which ordinary 
citizens can play a practical part in political decision-making, 
educating the public on political issues, or clarifying and simplifying 
the choices before voters at election time. The "purposes" descrip-
tion of party functions is sometimes criticized as a "subjective" 
approach; in fact it has the virtue that purposes can be deduced 
empirically from the statements and actions of party founders and 
leaders. Other "functional" descriptions are usually much more 
subjective, as they merely reflect the personal observations and 
theoretical prejudices of individuals external to the political process. 
And of course, no "approach" to the understanding of political 
parties which focuses on one or two functions (in either sense) can 
claim comprehensive validity as against "alternative models"; this 
illusion of some political theory-mongers prevents them from seeing 
most of the real trees by interposing an imaginary wood." 
Selection of candidates 
Concentrating on the purposive functions of the parties, we can see 
that they interact with one another. Party procedure for selecting 
candidates (often called "pre-selection" in Australia, probably 
because it precedes the voter's choice of M.P. at the election proper 
—cf. "primary elections" in the United States) is intended to avoid 
splitting the party vote and to secure effective representatives for 
the party, but it may also be the means of holding parliamentarians 
to the party line by exacting a pledge of loyalty as a condition 
of electoral endorsement, or by threatening to withhold future 
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endorsement as a sanction for loyalty, or both. At the same time, 
attempts to ensure that parliamentarians follow party policies may 
involve them in serious conflicts of loyalty. Should a private member 
in parliament follow his party's line even if it seems against the 
interests of his constituents, of whom in any case many will be 
supporters of other parties? In case of conflict, which should 
members of a government put first: the views of their own party 
caucus, the behests of the party organization outside parliament, 
or their own view of "the public interest" after taking expert advice? 
The New South Wales political parties have given somewhat 
different answers to these questions. 
It is sometimes said that where almost all members enter 
parliament as the selected candidate of a political party, the 
selection process becomes more important in practice than the 
formal election—especially in safe seats (approaching two-thirds of 
those in the N.S.W. Legislative Assembly) where election of the 
dominant party's candidate is generally assured. This provides an 
argument for greater interest in and more publicity for selections, 
such as the United States primaries receive. However, it does not 
mean that the voter's choice is somehow pre-empted, because it 
does not prevent any other candidate from challenging the parties' 
choice. Nor would it justify the practice, found in some American 
states, of allowing all voters to take part in the selection of any 
party's candidates: that would deny a party's right to its own 
distinctive candidates. Selection is a logical corollary of the party 
system itself, which many have seen as a positive contribution 
towards simplifying and rationalizing the expression of preferences 
among candidates and issues by a mass electorate. The voter who 
wishes to participate more fully in the selection of his representative 
has only to join a political party. 
In New South Wales the state parties select candidates for both 
state houses of parliament and for the New South Wales seats in 
the federal Senate and House of Representatives. The methods and 
selecting bodies vary with the chamber concerned, and also as 
between metropolitan and other electorates in the case of the 
Liberal Party. The special problems of selection for Legislative 
Council elections, which are not by a popular vote, are discussed 
in chapter 5. The general problems are: whether it is to a party's 
advantage, under the prevailing electoral system, to endorse more 
than one candidate per electorate; how to balance the principle of 
rank-and-file choice of popular candidates against the party leaders' 
concern for candidates' "quality" and expertise; and how far sitting 
members can claim a right to re-endorsement at ensuing elections. 
Selection methods range from a rank-and-file ballot of party 
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members in the electorate, through election by committees repre-
senting both the rank and file and the state central bodies, to 
recruitment by the central executive organ. Selection is generally 
enforced by a rule that nominees must be party members in good 
standing, and by a penalty of temporary or permanent explusion 
for a member who stands for election against any candidate 
endorsed by the party." 
Liberal Party candidates for the Senate are chosen by exhaustive 
ballot in a committee comprising the State Executive and one 
representative from each federal electorate conference in the state. 
Candidates for metropolitan seats in the House of Representatives 
and Legislative Assembly are chosen in each electorate by a 
selection committee of fifty: thirty delegates elected by and from 
the federal or state electorate conference concerned, and twenty 
members from the State Executive and/or the State Council, 
elected by the State Executive. Usually about three-quarters of 
the twenty come from the State Council, and the twenty are drawn 
from as many different metropolitan electorates as possible. Selec-
tion committees for state and federal non-metropolitan electorates 
consist wholly of delegates from branches in the electorate in rough 
proportion to their membership. This avoids the extra expense and 
inconvenience of taking State Executive and Council members 
around the country, but it also recognizes the importance of local 
acquaintance with the candidates in rural areas. Since 1956 the 
State Executive has appointed the chairmen of country selection 
committees from its own members; it also has power—not exercised 
for many years—to report to selectors on the qualifications and 
relative merits of the nominees, and to submit additional nominees. 
In both metropolitan and country electorates, the Executive may, 
on the initiative of a federal or state electorate conference, withdraw 
an endorsement already given and select candidates itself in urgent 
or other special circumstances. Nominations must be invited by 
public advertisement, if possible a year before the normal time for 
the next election; nominees have the right to address branches and 
electorate conferences, as well as the selection committee, in support 
of their candidature; and the final selection is made by secret 
exhaustive ballot. Theoretically it is possible for nominees in any 
electorate to canvass the selectors from electorate conferences and 
branches, and for senior party executives to influence the members 
of metropolitan selection committees. The latter possibility has 
given rise from time to time to complaints from disappointed 
candidates about the "dictation" of "swollen-headed party bosses" 
and the "foisting of a hand-picked candidate" by "the Ash Street 
machine". It is hard to substantiate such complaints. In 1961, for 
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example, there was widespread resentment in the party at the 
selection defeat of Professor F.A. Bland, sitting member for the 
federal seat of Warringah, by J.S. Cockle, a State Executive 
member and secretary of the Warringah federal electorate con-
ference, who was supported by a number of Executive members. 
However there was no evidence that the Executive as a whole had 
planned this result.*" 
To the extent, of course, that a party's sitting members are 
automatically re-endorsed, selection applies in practice only in seats 
not held by the party or where a sitting member has retired or 
died. The Liberal Party has always set its face against endorsing 
more than one candidate for any seat (constitution, clause 200), 
with the exception that where no other nominations are received, 
the State Executive may endorse the sitting members for two or 
more seats that have been amalgamated at a redistribution (con-
stitution, clause 213). Until 1959, however, the party also permitted 
a sitting member rejected by a selection committee to oppose the 
selected candidate as an official, though unendorsed. Liberal 
(former clause 201). The effect of this was virtually to guarantee 
selection to sitting members, only three of whom had been rejected 
in New South Wales since the foundation of the party. The removal 
of the clause 201 exemption, following disappointment at the 1959 
state election result and criticism of lethargy and absenteeism 
among Liberal M.P.s, exposed sitting members to the general 
penalty of three years' expulsion for opposing an endorsed party 
candidate (clause 21), and led to an increased number of sitting 
Liberals failing to win re-endorsement in subsequent years.** 
"The Country Party," Aitkin writes, "of the three major Austral-
ian parties, is in practice the most decentralised in its selection of 
candidates."** This is not intended to apply to selection for Senate 
and Legislative Council elections, which is made by the state 
Central Council from nominations by electorate councils and/or 
branches, but to selection for the House of Representatives and 
Legislative Assembly. For these the federal or state electorate 
council, as the case may be, calls for nominations of not more than 
one aspirant from each branch of six months' standing (including 
women's branches), together with a pledge from the nominee to 
run as an A.C.P. (N.S.W.) candidate and accept endorsement from 
no other political party (rule I 55). The electorate council's selection 
(by secret ballot) and endorsement of one or more candidates is 
subject to review and confirmation or veto by Central Council, 
which however rarely intervenes and in the past twenty years has 
merely ratified electorate council endorsements. As in the case of 
the Liberal Party, the primacy of local judgement on candidates 
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in country communities is accepted. In these circumstances, the only 
complaints about the procedure have been not against manipulation 
at the centre as in the Liberal Party but against the occasional 
stacking of a branch (by enrolling new members) in support of a 
candidate for the branch nomination. Aspirants normally address 
the branch meetings and the successful branch nominees in turn 
address the endorsement meeting of the electorate council. 
Again these procedures are, in general, only crucial where an 
additional seat is being contested or a sitting member has retired. 
For established Country Party sitting members, re-endorsement is 
a ritual: the member collects the nominations of as many branches 
as he can, and often the formality of branch nominating meetings 
is by-passed; the electorate council ratifies the nominations sent on 
by branch officers. Only one sitting Country Party member in New 
South Wales (the late J.A. Lawson, M.L.A., in Murray, 1967) has 
ever been refused endorsement by his own electorate council or by 
Central Council, and this was largely accidental. However, on three 
occasions since the Second World War sitting members had to 
contest an election alongside other Country Party candidates under 
the system of multiple endorsement.*^ 
This system reflected the early Country Party's antipathy to 
professionalism in politics and to the idea of party machines 
restricting the voters' choice. It also presupposed that under 
preferential voting, and assuming a right exchange of preferences, 
there was little risk in endorsing two or more candidates, at least 
in large electorates or safe Country Party seats, and possibly some 
advantage if each candidate had a different local appeal. According-
ly the earlier rules provided that an electorate council must endorse 
every branch nominee who satisfied it as to "character, sincerity, 
general qualification and ability" (rule 157). However, from the 
beginning there was a division of opinion in the party between those 
who questioned the proliferation of candidates and the suitability 
of some, and those who opposed any form of selection. In practice. 
Central Council sometimes used persuasion or pressure to induce 
unwanted candidates to withdraw, and by the late 1930s electorate 
councils were selecting more often than not, either by failing to 
call for nominations or by limiting the number of candidates to 
be endorsed. Despite attempts to halt these practices, some unhappy 
electoral experiences in the post-war years finally led to a new rule 
in 1952 (rule 159), confirming that if an electorate council was 
satisfied as to the suitability under rule 157 of more than one branch 
nominee, it must first determine the number of candidates that 
could be safely endorsed and then select candidates to that number. 
Subject to "suitability". Central Council is required to confirm 
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multiple endorsements "whilst preferential voting is in operation" 
(rule 162). The effect of adopting a modified selection rule in 1952 
was a sharp drop in multiple endorsements: there were eight in the 
1950s but only four in the 1960s.** 
Candidate selection has occasioned the hardest feelings and the 
sharpest practice in the Labor Party, partly because it was forged 
as an essential link in the chain of party discipline that was supposed 
to bind errant politicians to the needs and desires of the rank and 
file, and partly, it seems, because aspiring A.L.P. politicians have 
coveted the privileges and perquisites of a parliamentary career 
more ardently than their rivals who could look to the rewards and 
"fringe benefits" of business and professional life. Another source 
of controversy over A.L.P. selections has been the struggle of 
factions for increased influence through stronger representation in 
the parliamentary Labor parties. We have already seen an example 
of this in the 1973 fracas over the method of selecting candidates 
for the Senate and Legislative Council. This had been the New 
South Wales A.L.P.'s only concession to centralism in selections. 
For Senate selections the 1959 State Conference established an 
electoral college consisting of the forty-five State Executive mem-
bers (including later the five parliamentary members without a 
vote), the five officers, and two delegates from each of the forty-
six federal electorate councils in the state. In the 1971 reorganiza-
tion the representation from the old State Executive was replaced 
by fifty members elected from its membership by the new State 
Council. It was this body which the right-wing-controlled Adminis-
trative Committee persuaded the 1973 Congress to supersede in 
favour of selection by the full State Council, where the Committee's 
influence was thought to be stronger. 
For lower house elections the New South Wales party has always 
adhered to the populist principle (now surviving only here and in 
Queensland) whereby the electorate council arranges for selection 
of a single candidate by exhaustive preferential balloting of all party 
branch members in the electorate, after nominees have had an equal 
opportunity of addressing meetings of branches and unions.*' Every 
nominee must pledge himself {a) not to oppose any selected and 
endorsed Labor candidate; {b) to do his utmost, if elected, to carry 
out the principles of the Labor platform; and (c) to vote in 
parliament on "such questions, especially questions affecting the 
fate of a Government", in accordance with majority decisions of 
the parliamentary party, or "caucus". Selection by plebiscite was 
more susceptible to manipulation than less "democratic" methods. 
In the 1920s spurious ballot papers, curious ballot-boxes, and 
crooked vote-counting were all weapons in the struggle between the 
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Australian Workers' Union and other factions for control of the 
parliamentary wing as well as of the State Conference. Rawson 
has argued that nearly all the corrupt practices which in the past 
have disfigured Labor selection ballots have involved the misuse of 
unionists' voting rights.'" Over the years the New South Wales party 
preferred to elaborate its detailed regulation of selection ballots 
rather than abandon rank-and-file selection. After 1948 it insisted 
that voting be confined to branch members residing in the electorate 
who were financial in their union (if any) and had five years' current 
continuity of A.L.P. membership; the present requirement is twelve 
months' current continuity during which they must have attended 
three branch meetings unless living more than three miles from the 
meeting place. 
Even so, there remains a tension between the plebiscitary 
principle and the claims of the central party organs to supervise 
selection, ostensibly in the party's electoral interests but often 
enough in those of the ruling faction. As in the Liberal Party, the 
Administrative Committee (formerly the Central Executive) may 
select candidates in special circumstances, as when an electorate 
council fails to act, a sudden by-election arises, a local nominee 
is not forthcoming, or a ballot is disputed. As in the Country Party, 
all nominees must be centrally endorsed—but in Labor's case, this 
occurs before the nominees go to the selection ballot. It remains 
to add that unless the Administrative Committee has declared them 
unworthy. Labor sitting members are automatically selected if their 
House is dissolved within twelve months after a general election. 
Clearly, the right of endorsement constitutes a powerful hold over 
both state and federal parliamentarians. When the Federal Ex-
ecutive took charge of the state party in June 1956, and guaranteed 
the sitting members re-endorsement should a snap election occur 
before the 1957 State Conference, this was enough to ensure that 
not one politician opened his mouth to oppose or even criticize the 
crushing of the hitherto approved Industrial Group forces and the 
suspension of the state party's right to choose its own Executive. 
The tensions over selection methods in the A.L.P. continue 
unabated. State Executives have used their reserve powers in 
questionable circumstances; encouraged favoured individuals to 
nominate; given them the blessing of party leaders; and canvassed 
support from branch members." Typical of a central viewpoint often 
expressed was the remark in F.H. Campbell's Presidential addrsss 
to the 1959 State Conference: 
The present pre-selection system is our greatest weakness. Persons who 
have the time and the inclination can go out and stack Branches and 
ensure their selection, and they become Labor candidates whether they 
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are suitable or not. This . . . accounts for the mediocrity of some of 
our representatives. 
As Florence Gould notes: "In 1966, when the executive proposed 
to select candidates for twelve crucial state seats, branch members 
raised such a furore that the executive backed down and ballots 
were held as usual."'^ In a similar dispute before the 1968 election, 
the Executive at one point withdrew selection rights from members 
in thirteen state electorates." In 1971 the plebiscite system was 
questioned once again after a bitter contest over the selection for 
the federal seat of Shortland (near Newcastle) on the retirement 
of the sitting member who had held the seat for the A.L.P. for 
twenty years. Allegations of irregularities in the selection ballot led 
to three investigations and finally to cancellation of the ballot by 
the Federal Executive, which decided that State Council should 
select the candidate.'" 
The D.L.P.'s selection methods were in practice the most highly 
centralized of all. This was not for want of "democratic" rules, 
which followed Labor tradition in providing for Senate candidates 
to be chosen by a selection committee consisting of the Central 
Executive and an equal number elected by Annual Conference; and 
for lower house candidates, after endorsement by the Central 
Executive, to be chosen by preferential ballot at a special electoral 
conference (which nominees could address) consisting of branch 
members in the electorate. However, voluntary nominees for D.L.P. 
selection were so scarce that a selection ballot has rarely been held, 
the normal method being that the Central Executive used its reserve 
power to recruit candidates. As in the A.L.P., a sitting member 
would be guaranteed selection provided his House were dissolved 
within a year of the previous election and the Executive had not 
found his conduct unworthy. 
Campaigning 
Selection is the prelude to the election campaign itself, and fighting 
general elections is the function that most fully engages all levels 
of party organization. In some senses it is an intermittent activity. 
Each campaign is separately set in motion by the government's 
announcement of the election date, sometimes at very short notice 
—for example no more than a month in 1971 and 1973. Each is 
separately planned and differently moulded by the leaders, by 
circumstances and issues of the day, and by changing electoral 
techniques. Money has to be raised afresh (often starting with a 
deficit from the previous campaign), and extra party workers 
recruited. Dormant local branches come to life and new branches 
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are formed. Campbell writes: ". . . the parties which contest 
elections bear little resemblance—beyond the name—to those that 
function between elections, whether the comparison be made at a 
central or branch level."'* On the other hand, Aitkin reminds us 
that only three years between 1949 and 1971 were without a federal 
or state election in New South Wales: "their sheer frequency makes 
preparing for elections and fighting them a continuing activity 
within the party."'* Campbell himself quotes a New South Wales 
party organizer early in the 1962 campaign: "for months and 
months now we appear to be either cleaning up the last election 
or starting a new one."" 
Continuity is probably more noticeable at the centre, and 
intermittency at the level of the individual electorate, where (except 
in the D.L.P.) the electorate council or conference is responsible 
for planning, financing and conducting the local campaign, and for 
co-ordinating local branch efforts. At party headquarters, the 
planning period has been getting longer and campaigning becoming 
more professionalized, especially over the past decade as the 
emphasis of electioneering has shifted from the individual candidate 
to the "image" of the party and its leader, and the venue from 
streets and halls to radio and television studios and the pages of 
the daily press. Significantly, for several elections now the main 
parties have shown some misgivings about the impersonality of the 
new methods by arranging informal gatherings of the leaders with 
local groups over tea and sandwiches during their campaign tours, 
and by circulating propaganda leaflets to individual electors— 
though of course these methods only enhance the relative influence 
of the centre. 
As to the content of campaign appeals, conflicting observations 
have been made. On the one hand, there is the fashionable view 
that winning modern elections is not a matter of comparing policies, 
or even of appealing to rational self-interest, but of popularizing 
a brand-name; on this theory, the party machines have entrusted 
the task increasingly to market research experts, advertising agen-
cies, and public relations firms. On the other hand, at each election 
party leaders persist in wooing the voters with veritable cornucopias 
of specific "reforms" and sectional benefits, supplemented on the 
government side by pre-election diversions of public money to long-
awaited projects in marginal constituencies. 
The centripetal tendencies in campaigning have sharpened some 
of the inherent tensions between electorate and central party 
organizations. Rising proportions of central campaign spending 
have been concentrated upon the mass media, and in particular 
upon television, the most expensive of all. This makes it harder than 
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ever for party headquarters to subsidize local campaigns, and also 
raises the relative output of centrally devised publicity which can 
sometimes be more embarrassing than helpful in particular 
localities.'* In the Labor and Liberal parties there has often been, 
from less novel causes, an additional level of tension, between the 
state and federal leaders, preventing the latter from lending their 
weight in the state campaign, and thus advertising disunity within 
the party. Prime Minister Menzies was said to have "had . . . an 
ill-concealed hostility" for the N.S.W. Liberal Party in the 1950s 
and early 1960s," and in so many words to have refused "to 
underwrite their election policies". Their leader in 1962, R.W. 
Askin, when asked if he would invite Menzies to campaign with 
him in the state election of that year, is reported to have replied: 
"Over my dead body!".'"" On the Labor side, corresponding 
hostilities were traditionally notorious, as for example between 
Holman and Hughes, Lang and Scullin, and during the federal 
leaderships of Evatt and Calwell. The latter were allowed only 
formal appearances at New South Wales elections—on the platform 
for the state leader's policy speech—except in 1965 when the state 
A.L.P. leaders turned a blind eye to Calwell's speaking in one 
electorate at the personal invitation of the local Labor candidate. 
On the day the 1976 general election was announced (31 March 
1976), Neville Wran, the state leader, said on the A.B.C. "This 
Day Tonight" programme: "The welcome mat is not out for federal 
Labor politicians in the forthcoming state elections and that 
includes Mr Whitlam." 
But of course the cold-shouldering of federal leaders stemmed 
not only from personal enmity but also from clashes over policy 
(as in 1965 when the Federal Executive refused to approve the 
promises on state aid to private schools which the New South Wales 
leaders, with reason, thought vital to success), and from the 
willingness of both sides to embarrass their state opponents with 
the current shortcomings of their federal counterparts. In 1962 state 
Labor sought to saddle the Liberals with the obloquy attaching to 
the Menzies government's recent credit squeeze; in 1965 state 
Liberal pamphlets asserted that the Renshaw Labor government 
had completely aligned itself with the "discredited and rejected 
Calwell opposition".'"' However, from 1965 state-federal relations 
(which had never been severely strained in the smaller parties) 
improved in both main parties, and at subsequent general elections 
to 1973 and even some by-elections, galaxies of federal Labor and 
Liberal leaders were eagerly welcomed to the hustings by their 
respective state parties. 
As between the parties, and in any one party at different times. 
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campaign management at the centre is shared in varying ways 
between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary leadership and 
party officials. All three groups have necessary parts to play in the 
process: the parliamentary leaders are the public representatives and 
spokesmen of the party; the extra-parliamentary leaders claim a 
say on behalf of the rank and file in framing election policies and 
strategies; the officials must make the basic administrative arrange-
ments and organize the propaganda effort, while they are also 
knowledgeable on strategy and tactics. The various party 
philosophies prescribe somewhat differing relative powers for the 
first two groups, but on this the theory is less important than the 
personal relationships and practicalities of the moment. 
In the Liberal Party, the central campaign committee is an 
unofficial body drawn mainly from the extra-parliamentary party 
to "advise" the leader, while the State Executive decides which 
electorates to contest, subject to the agreement with the Country 
Party not to oppose each other's sitting members, and in particular 
which Labor-held seats shall be contested in competition with the 
Country Party—a subject of bitter dispute with some parliamentary 
leaders during earlier days when the Liberals were in opposition. 
On the other hand, the Liberal leader is free to frame his election 
policy speeches and to decide on forming a coalition government in 
the event of victory. The Country Party, since 1949, has entrusted 
general elections to an ad hoc central campaign committee normally 
consisting of the party chairman, three or four members of the 
Central Executive, and the chairman of each electorate council 
conducting a local campaign. This committee prepares the central 
budget, determines the content and placement of central television, 
press, and radio advertising, and fixes the quota of campaign 
donations to be contributed by electorate councils. In addition, the 
party constitution requires the State Council's consent to the 
parliamentary party entering a coalition, though this is not now 
observed in practice. Aitkin notes: "In the framing of election 
policies, in particular, the parliamentary Leader is his own master, 
even when there is disagreement within the party."'"^ Pre-election 
arrangements between Liberal and Country parties have varied 
greatly in formality, from set meetings between representatives of 
the top party organs to personal understandings between the 
parliamentary leaders; and in scope, generally including agreement 
on "three-cornered contests" for selected Labor-held seats by both 
parties with exchanges of preferences, mutual campaigning support, 
and undertakings to form a coalition government if successful— 
and occasionally providing for a joint policy speech. 
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The strong interest of the extra-parliamentary Liberal and 
Country organizations in these aspects of election strategy is 
probably attributable to the peculiar relationship between these 
parties, and the organizations' fear of excessive fraternization 
between their respective parliamentary representatives. Such prob-
lems do not arise for the other parties, which have no inter-party 
obligations and usually try to contest as many seats as they can 
find candidates to stand for. But they maintain strong extra-
parliamentary control of electioneering for their own reasons. Under 
the A.L.P. constitution, the leader's policy speech is supposed to 
be compiled by the leader and two other officers of caucus, together 
with the president and other party officers, and to be endorsed by 
the Administrative Committee, which subject to delegations to 
electorate councils and branches "shall have charge of election 
campaigns for public office". In fact the Committee, especially 
through its paid officers, contributes actively to the technical 
planning and execution of the campaign. In the absence of a 
parliamentary party the management of D.L.P. electioneering 
remained entirely a matter for the State Council and Executive, 
except that local electorate councils were entitled to allocate 
preferences as they wished within the general policy of putting the 
A.L.P. last. 
Policy-making 
The remaining function assumed by political parties is the form-
ulation of policies with a view to their adoption by governments. 
Every party has some machinery, both parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary, to enable its members to contribute ideas for party 
policy, to investigate policy issues systematically, to establish some 
consensus on which ideas should be adopted by the party, and to 
put some pressure on the parliamentary leaders to have these carried 
out. 
We have noted how party branches send policy recommendations 
to the various state assemblies. The flow of proposals is rendered 
somewhat less indigestible for those bodies by an intermediate 
sorting process, carried out in the Liberal and Country parties by 
their electorate councils and conferences. In the Labor Party some 
sorting was formerly done by policy committees of the Central 
Executive; the 1971 re-organization envisaged a new process of 
sifting by committees of State Council before whom branch 
members and others could appear in support of their proposals. In 
the D.L.P. a similar function was performed by policy committees, 
and in all parties the executive bodies can order and prune the 
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agenda for the large meetings. Of course the party assemblies also 
receive considered proposals directly from their leaders, executives, 
councils, policy committees, and special sections such as the 
women's committees. And many rank-and-file recommendations 
still find their way directly to the conference floor. It is not 
surprising that varying proportions of these agenda are not reached 
by the close of the meeting, nor in the light of what follows that 
many branch members consider their real influence on policy-
making is negligible. 
For systematic investigation of policy questions the parties use 
an array of standing committees on broad subject areas at different 
levels. Each of the parliamentary parties has its own subcommittees 
for this purpose. At the extra-parliamentary level, the A.L.P. State 
Council has a score of standing policy committees, which formulate 
proposals partly from resolutions sent in by branches and other units 
of the party, partly from their own hearings and discussions at 
Council meetings. They bring politicians, trade unionists, branch 
members, and outside experts together and report through State 
Council to the State Congress, thus providing background to policy 
issues and streamlining debate. 
In the Liberal Party, most investigative work on policy matters 
has been done by standing or ad hoc committees of the State 
Council and Executive, using expert advice from the party's 
secretariat, which has long been better equipped than any other 
party's for the purpose, and also from outside the party organiza-
tion. But a crucial role has been allotted to one permanent body, 
the Joint Standing Committee on State Policy, which is chaired 
by the state parliamentary leader or his nominee and includes six 
other members elected annually by and from the parliamentary 
party, the president of the New South Wales Division, and six non-
parliamentary members elected annually by and from the State 
Council. In its heyday this body worked through subcommittees 
which obtained advice from Liberal parliamentarians, members of 
the extra-parliamentary organization, and experts from the public 
service, business, and the professions, and considered proposals from 
individual branch members, from branches, and from the State 
Council and its research subcommittees. In theory, proposals to 
alter the party's state platform must go first to the State Council, 
and the Council (or in cases of urgency the State Executive) then 
adopts or rejects them after obtaining a report from the Joint 
Standing Committee. On proposals for implementing the platform 
the Committee advises the parliamentary party directly, and the 
parliamentary leader is supposed to consult the Committee before 
announcing the party's "fighting policy" from time to time (con-
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sititution, clauses 181-92). 
The Country Party has virtually no permanent research ap-
paratus, and its need for one is reduced by the party's long-standing 
practice of leaving the controversial policy wrangling on specific 
rural industries to the industry organizations concerned. The 
Central Executive and Central Council have set up ad hoc 
committees to investigate particular issues from time to time, 
sometimes at the request of General Conference and sometimes on 
their own initiative, but the practice has been erratic, and the 
committees, lacking administrative support and with members 
scattered over the state, have only occasionally been productive. 
They normally report (when they report at all) in the first place 
to Executive or Council, which have not always sent on their 
findings to Conference. Conference may make recommendations to 
the parliamentary party; in at least one case the Executive and 
Council have used a committee's reports to communicate directly 
with governments and parliamentary parties, by-passing Conference 
altogether. 
The D.L.P. likewise lacked its own investigative machinery. 
Committees on selected policy areas (almost entirely in the federal 
jurisdiction) have been appointed by the General Conference on 
the recommendation of the Central Executive; the State Council 
could appoint its own policy committees, and on their reports or 
on its own initiative make policy recommendations to the annual 
state and federal conferences. In addition. State Council by a two-
thirds majority could itself "make new State policy" (constitution, 
rule 47).'"^ 
When it comes to deciding which ideas will become party policy, 
vital distinctions must be made between the different meanings of 
policy, and between the aspirations embodied in party rules and 
the realities of the power structure within each party. 
RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS 
Broadly speaking, what the extra-parliamentary wings of the parties 
can decide are the lengthy statements of objectives and principles, 
covering the whole range of potential government action in which 
the party is interested, that are embodied in the formal platform. 
If the representatives of the rank and file have a substantial say 
in the content of these documents, it is partly because the party 
constitutions reserve to them this exclusive right, partly because 
they are so extensive that no one can regard them as more than 
a general guide to day-by-day action, and partly because higher 
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organs of the parties have powers to "interpret" or supplement them 
for practical purposes. Even so, the representative bodies are not 
always vigilant enough to prevent crucial influence on the platform 
itself by the party oligarchies. John Edwards claimed of the Labor 
Party: 
In New South Wales, the irrelevance of the party organisations was 
highlighted last conference [1969] when the platform was totally 
transformed, including a replacement of the plank urging the abolition 
of the States with one demanding their retention, almost without debate, 
and even more importantly, without any significant consequences.'"" 
Don Aitkin has told how a committee of two parliamentarians and 
a central councillor within a year secured the Country Party 
Conference's approval in 1961 for a state aid plank despite the 
party's traditional antipathy to the notion.'"* 
But the crucial point is that when an A.L.P. reference book says 
that "only State Congress can make policy", and when the 
respective constitutions affirm that the Country Party General 
Conference "shall lay down the general policy of the Party", that 
the D.L.P. General Conference is "the supreme ruling authority 
within the State", and that the Liberal Party State Council's 
"principal concerns" include "the State Platform", they are saying 
comparatively little about policy in the more immediate sense of 
what the politicians will decide to support or oppose in the next 
session or even in the next parliament. This is not to say that party 
platforms are wanting in detailed proposals for specific measures 
—far from it—but that short-term strategy cannot be decided by 
annual or quarterly assemblies or without reference to the current 
political situation, to administrative exigencies, and to the influence 
of particular groups inside and outside the parties. Hence even in 
the extra-parliamentary wings, immediate policy decisions are often 
made, not merely by executives, "inner executives", and leaders, 
but by informal consultations between influential members of these 
groups and of the parliamentary parties. Within the parliamentary 
wings themselves, by far the greatest influence lies with the 
ministers of the party in power (enormously bolstered by the 
resources of the public service), then with the "shadow ministry" 
of the Opposition party, and then with full caucus meetings of the 
respective parliamentary parties. In part this all reflects the 
complexity and technicality of modern government, which puts the 
ordinary party member in or out of parliament at an additional 
disadvantage—prompting Edwards to say of the A.L.P.: "The real 
power house of policy now is in the offices of the Federal and State 
leaders, their secretaries and bright boys, and the coterie of 
academics they build up around themselves."'"* In sum, the role 
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of democratically engendered platforms is rather to indicate what 
the party's politicians may and may not do than to dictate what 
they shall do. 
This view of the relationship between the parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary wings is accepted in different degrees by the 
different parties—though their divergence in practice has often been 
exaggerated. The expectation that parliamentarians will further 
party policies as enunciated by the party organizations is shown 
by the fact that all parties retain certain ultimate controls, notably 
the power to withhold re-endorsement of sitting members and the 
loyalty pledges in the A.L.P. and D.L.P. In addition, each party 
constitution has general disciplinary provisions which can at least 
in theory be used against recalcitrant politicians. The Liberals' 
constitution requires the parliamentary party and the organization 
"to keep one another informed on all political matters and to co-
operate closely" (clause 180). The State Council can discuss the 
conduct of its members of parliament (clause 144). By a three-
fifths majority it can expel any member from the Division after 
a hearing on due notice—though the possible grounds for expulsion 
are not specified in the constitution (clause 20). The Country Party 
Central Council can expel a member of the party for behaviour 
to the discredit or embarrassment of the party (rule 29). The D.L.P. 
Central Executive can expel a member for any of five specified 
offences, including actions contrary to party principles, violation of 
the pledge, and failure to uphold the D.L.P. platform and policy 
(rule 33). An A.L.P. member can be expelled by his branch for 
similar offences, with a right of appeal first to the local electorate 
council and then to State Council or the Review Tribunal (rule 
A.9 [e] and [f]). (The Tribunal is an innovation of 1971, consisting 
of two elected representatives from the Administrative Committee, 
five from the State Council, and seven from State Congress. Subject 
only to the Congress, it is "the final arbiter on all matters of dispute 
referred to it", including disciplinary action, selection ballots, 
credentialling to State Congress, applications for membership of 
the party, and other matters referred to it by State Council or State 
Congress.) 
In most of the parties, reservations about possible undue influence 
of politicians on party deliberations have been reflected in restric-
tions on their participation, as parliamentarians, in the extra-
parliamentary organs. The Liberals' constitution shows practically 
no such reservations, as it allocates specific places for its parlia-
mentary members on governing bodies at every level except the 
State Convention: the sitting member (if any) on the electorate 
conference; all the party's New South Wales members from the 
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State and federal parliaments, together with the federal leader, on 
the State Council; and representatives of the state parliamentarians, 
including the state leader, on the Joint Standing Committee on 
State Policy. At the other extreme, the D.L.P. constitution reserves 
no such places for parliamentarians. In the Country Party the sitting 
member has a place on his local electorate council, while the State 
Council includes two delegates each from the state and federal 
parliamentary parties and the respective leaders. At the General 
Conference the party's state and federal parliamentarians may 
attend in that capacity, but have no vote unless they are members 
of Central Council or accredited delegates from branches or 
electorate councils. 
In the past decade or so the Labor Party at both state and federal 
levels has admitted its parliamentarians to forms of participation 
in its governing bodies from which they had long been excluded. 
In the pre-1971 New South Wales A.L.P. Executive there were 
five representatives of state and federal Labor parliamentarians, 
who also sat on the electoral college for nominating candidates for 
the Senate, but had limited voting rights in both cases; the 
parliamentarians as such were not represented in the Annual 
Conference or electorate councils. Change was heralded when the 
New South Wales Conference in 1964 altered the constitution to 
allow state Labor parliamentarians to be represented on its delega-
tion to the Federal Conference and Executive, and in 1967 endorsed 
proposals to include the federal and state party leaders in those 
bodies. Since the reorganization of 1970-71 the state and federal 
parliamentary parties have had representatives with full voting 
rights in the State Congress and Council, and the federal and state 
parliamentary leaders have become members of the Administrative 
Committee ex officio. In addition, the former prohibition on 
parliamentarians nominating for officer positions in the State 
Branch has been removed. 
The Labor Party has been traditionally less inclined than all the 
other parties to leave detailed policy implementation to the discre-
tion of the parliamentarians. Though there have been few attempts 
to account for this difference systematically, it can be related in 
part to their different attitudes to radical change. The non-Labor 
groups do not want it, and can the better trust their parlia-
mentarians to work for the limited objectives sought by their 
supporting interests; Labor, at least in theory, does want it: this 
sets a much more difficult task for its politicians and so calls more 
insistently for the spur of party discipline. More tenuously, it can 
be argued that the non-Labor parties are drawn from groups more 
willing to defer to the judgement of those in authority, and the 
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Labor Party, at least on its industrial side, from people habituated 
to "suspicion of the bosses". The history of Labor in parliament 
offers ample grounds for similar suspicion to the party member who 
takes seriously the radical element in its platforms over the years; 
parliament itself has helped to make many a Labor politician 
behave more like "the bosses", and has seen not a few of them 
move to the bosses' side of politics. But the bulk of the movement 
has not taken its radicalism so seriously—with the result, as Ken 
Turner has put it, that the common working relationship between 
the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings "is not so much 
one of subservience and control as one of influence working both 
ways, not always effectively but with each group usually careful 
not to tread on the other's corns. The gulf between the parties in 
this respect is much less than their self-images would lead us to 
expect."'"' 
There is a gulf, or at least a gap, in the formal prescriptions 
of roles and in the party mythologies. The Liberal State Council, 
says its constitution, "shall determine" the Policy Committee's 
proposals to it about the content of the state platform, but the 
Committee may only "advise" the parliamentary party on the 
implementation of the platform. Party authorities have repeatedly 
stressed this relationship. The veteran New South Wales general 
secretary John Carrick (subsequently a Liberal Senator and min-
ister) wrote in 1967: "Liberal policy decisions are finally made by 
the political leader and his Parliamentary Party (whilst influenced 
very substantially by the recommendations of the organisation)." 
A few months later the federal president, J.E. (later Sir John) 
Pagan, reminded the Federal Council: 
If we reach conclusions about federal policy, we send them to the 
Government as recommendations. We don't give orders to the Govern-
ment. We don't make policy for the Government and don't compel the 
Government to carry it out. It is our belief—and always has been— 
that the final responsibility for policy rests with the Government elected 
by, and answerable to, the voters.'"* 
The Country Party constitution says quite specifically that 
"General Conference shall lay down the general policy of the Party, 
which it expects its Parliamentary Representatives to follow, but 
shall not attempt to bind its Parliamentary Representatives to 
specific measures" (rule 130). Again there are authoritative glosses 
on the rule, for example the state chairman's statement to the 1968 
Conference: 
Policy decisions made by this Conference are conveyed to the Parlia-
mentary Leaders for consideration and if politically feasible and 
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practical these are generally implemented. To this extent policymaking 
is the shared responsibility of the Annual Conference and the Parlia-
mentary member."" 
We have noted that the D.L.P. General Conference is described 
as "the supreme ruling authority within the State", that its State 
Council can make new policy under certain circumstances, and that 
its Central Executive has power to interpret the policy and platform 
between Council meetings. The federal constitution of the party 
gives somewhat similar powers to the Federal Conference and 
Executive, with two interesting additions: a provision for settling 
disputes between the federal parliamentary party and Conference 
by a joint meeting under the federal president; and a rule that "the 
Federal Executive shall not instruct Members of Parliament. It 
may, however, draw their attention to the Policy of the Party, and 
any action on the part of the Member which it considers a breach 
thereof (federal rules and constitution, rule 46). There is no 
corresponding provision in the New South Wales constitution, and 
there was never more than a one-man "parliamentary party" here, 
but it can be inferred that the same principles would apply. 
The A.L.P. constitution describes State Congress as "the Su-
preme policy-making and governing body of the Party"; allows 
State Council to interpret policy, to make policy decisions in 
emergencies, and to consider reports from the parliamentary parties; 
and empowers the Administrative Committee, between meetings of 
State Council, to "determine all matters affecting the welfare of 
the Labor Movement". Significantly, the party Year Book says that 
the Administrative Committee "may also state attitudes on policy 
areas of immediate importance, although this is mostly the concern 
of the parliamentary parties"."" Thus there is no prohibition like 
that in the other parties against "direction" of parliamentarians; 
but there also is not, and never has been, any explicit constitutional 
power of direction. 
The sharp contrast so frequently drawn between Labor and the 
other parties in this matter is based on the fact that A.L.P. 
executives and conferences have often purported to "direct" their 
politicians, and on some occasions have used the ultimate sanction 
of expulsion against them. The principle of the party organization's 
control of politicians was implied from the beginning of the party 
(or at least from about 1895) in the candidate's pledge; it was 
invoked wholesale at both federal and state levels during the 
conscription crisis in 1916; and it was expressed in those days in 
extreme forms, such as that politicians must be regarded as "paid 
servants of the party". Rawson writes that "as a principle it has 
never been shaken"; however, like other discriminating observers. 
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he points out that "even the A.L.P. regards the direction of 
members of parliament as something of a last resort" and that "in 
fact the difference between the parties is one of degree".'" Gross 
exaggerations of the difference have been mainly the work of the 
anti-Labor press and of spokesmen of the rival parties seeking to 
exploit it for electoral advantage—an aim of some of the party 
statements quoted above. 
In the first place, the picture of the A.L.P. extra-parliamentary 
"machine" (or, as it is sometimes painted, of the trade union 
"bosses") pitted against "the politicians" underrates the complexity 
of relationships inevitable in any political party. Factions in the 
A.L.P. usually include politicians as well as trade unionists; the 
extra-parliamentary organization works oligarchically in practice 
and rarely expresses a firm "extra-parliamentary consensus", if only 
because that is virtually unattainable on particular issues; the "trade 
union movement" itself is far from monolithic on either political 
or industrial issues; powerful "machine" men and union leaders may 
themselves be members of parliament; and as Turner has shown, 
"what appears to be outside instruction may sometimes rather be 
one faction of Parliamentarians using a tame outside body to 
undermine its opponents within Caucus"."^ 
In the second place, leaders of the Labor machine recognize, as 
clearly as their counterparts in other parties. Turner's point that 
"members of the outside bodies are generally part-timers with other 
preoccupations and less familiarity with most government problems 
than Caucus. They accept that Caucus should decide the ap-
propriate timing and methods to implement the platform.""^ It is 
hard to distinguish their informal definitions of the relationship 
from those already quoted from non-Labor leaders. When Labor 
was in office in New South Wales the state A.L.P. president, F.H. 
Campbell, felt bound to refute some current press rumours by 
saying: 
I want to deny emphatically that the executive wants a preview of any 
legislation introduced by the State Government. The executive ap-
preciates that the Government is a body responsible to the electors and 
we arc not going to interfere with that responsibility . . . . The state 
executive is responsible for seeing that party policy is carried out. Surely 
the executive of any political party is entitled to discuss matters such 
as that with the leader of their parliamentary party."" 
Another state president of long experience, C.T. Oliver, put the 
position rather more strongly than party history warranted when 
he told a State Conference: 
The Parliamentary Party . . . could not under any circumstances be in 
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the position of having to act upon instructions of the Executive, the 
Party Conference or any other body, but in a democratic movement 
we do not even talk about instructions. . . . The resolutions at Party 
Conferences instructing the Parliamentary Labor Party are to be taken 
only as expressions of opinion . . . but it would be a very stupid 
Parliamentary Labor Party that did not listen to the view of the Party 
and seek advice on matters which affect the great mass of the people."* 
In the third place, bitter experience from 1916 to the Second 
World War taught the New South Wales party, at least, that 
attempts to use the formal sanctions against the parliamentarians 
carry risks of splitting the party wide open at all levels, as well 
as of serious electoral damage. As Rawson says, if party policy and 
principles mean anything at all, "there are worse things than 
internal disruption and being in opposition";"* seemingly less 
convinced of this than their Victorian colleagues, the New South 
Wales A.L.P. machine and union officials have avoided any head-
on clash with their politicians throughout the post-war period, 
including the traumatic years of the Split. This was helped by 
continuous "conservative" domination of the machine, but it was 
rewarded by twenty-four years of by no means ineffectual Labor 
government. 
Avoiding head-on clashes did not mean refraining from pressure 
upon the politicians. But in the face of pressure, as in the other 
parties, the politicians generally accepted party representations 
because they agreed with them; they sometimes bowed unwillingly 
to pressure, and just as often they resisted or even ignored it. In 
1953 the Labor government enacted compulsory unionism at the 
request of the Industrial Group-controlled Central Executive; in 
1954, apparently under trade union pressure, it reversed a decision 
to liberalize shopping and petrol trading hours; in 1955 it passed 
a stringent Obscene and Indecent Publications Act, allegedly on 
lines advocated by extremist Catholic elements in the Executive and 
in the parliamentary party itself. But the same government did little 
to enforce compulsory unionism administratively; it ignored resolu-
tions of the 1957 A.L.P. Conference asking it to "reconsider" its 
introduction of a pension for the state Governor and calling for 
implementation of the Labor plank requiring abolition of such 
offices; it delayed action until 1961 on a 1958 Conference "instruc-
tion" to abolish the Legislative Council in accordance with the 
platform; it buried in a parliamentary select committee repeated 
Conference demands for nationalization of coal-mines; in 1958 it 
overrode Executive opposition to the relaxation of post-war rental 
and eviction controls and watered down Conference decisions in its 
legislation for equal pay for women; and so on. 
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There is no lack of evidence of a similar pattern of pressure and 
response in the other parties. Writing of the Liberal Party's period 
in opposition, Katharine West cites fund-raising, selection of 
parliamentary candidates, parliamentary absenteeism, parlia-
mentarians' lack of initiative in policy formulation and indifference 
about gaining government office, and relations with the Country 
Party as issues causing friction between the extra-parliamentary and 
parliamentary wings, while pointing out that here, again, the lines 
were often blurred by divisions within the parliamentary party itself. 
In her view, the Liberal Party in all states was organized on the 
assumption that its two wings would be integrated by strong 
parliamentary leadership, and lacking this in New South Wales, 
"the extra-parliamentary wing has at times exercised much more 
initiative than the Party Constitution implies it should exercise and 
relations between the two wings have been accordingly strained."'" 
As an illustration of differences on policy in that period, the 1958 
Liberal State Convention {a) resolved against the idea of a bill of 
rights and asked that it be dropped from the party platform; {b) 
supported the prohibition of poker machines in clubs; (c) resolved 
that the Legislative Council should be kept un Itered; and {d) urged 
uniform hire-purchase controls—in every case counter to policies 
recently espoused by the parliamentary Liberal Party. At the 1965 
election, when the Liberals gained office, the policy initiative was 
well and truly seized by the parliamentary party in supporting the 
inclusion in Askin's policy speech of promises of state aid to 
independent schools—a highly controversial plank not then in the 
party platform and opposed by the Joint Standing Committe on 
State Policy. However, the policy gained the support of the 
Executive and State Council."* 
On the government benches the Liberal parliamentarians still had 
to face, and out-face, periodic disagreements with the extra-
parliamentary bodies. In these bodies, particularly the Young 
Liberal movement, leaders emerged with more radical attitudes 
than the government on social, industrial, and environmental issues. 
Typical results were the 1971 State Convention's call to halt mining 
and industrial development in the Blue Mountains, the opposition 
of State Council in 1972 and 1973 to the government's proposed 
anti-pornography legislation, and the State Council's support in 
1973 for profit-sharing schemes, participation of employees in 
decisions affecting their working environment, and stronger controls 
on pollution. However, during 1972 and 1973—drawing a lesson 
from the federal party's problems at the time—the Joint Standing 
Committee embarked on a modernization of the state platform for 
the ensuing election campaign—with the prior agreement of the 
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Premier and the active participation of the senior parliamentarians, 
J.C. Maddison and E.A. Willis. 
In the Country Party, also, despite the traditional deference to 
the political judgement of the parliamentary representatives, there 
have in more recent times been tensions between the politicians and 
the organization. Aitkin describes the "sniping from both Council 
and Executive" at the parliamentary leader through the 1960s over 
his reluctance to abolish land tax at a stroke, and the Executive's 
pressure on Country Party members of the state and federal 
governments in the same period over drought relief and other 
matters. His summary of the relationship is what might be expected: 
. . . the conference proposes many courses of action on which the 
parliamentary parties take no action, while the parliamentary parties 
take up as policies many courses of action which the conference has 
not discussed (and which it occasionally disapproves of).'" 
POLICIES 
The patterns of party support and the structure and working of 
the party organizations tell us how far the different parties can be 
identified with particular interest groups and who can effectively 
take part in party decision-making. What matters to the communi-
ty, however, is the substance of party decisions: what kind of society 
do the different parties aspire to create in the long run, what do 
they promise to do about it in the short run, and what do they 
actually do with governmental power when they have it? The term 
policies is applied indifferently to aspirations, promises, and per-
formance; clearly there must be different sets of answers to the 
question: "What are the party policies?" 
Convergence 
The first point to note is that different parties can co-exist in any 
democratic polity—and have frequently done so—without announc-
ing clearly distinguishable aspirations about "the good society" or 
espousing characteristically different principles of social action. In 
such cases they can appeal for electoral support simply on the basis 
of performance or promised performance—for example, by claiming 
to serve the day-to-day needs of electors generally, or of sectional 
or regional groups, as practical problems and grievances arise. Thus 
Premier Askin claimed after his electoral victory in 1965 that "it 
was the first time Opposition parties had defeated a Government 
without a major election issue. The Opposition parties had concen-
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trated on winning the support of numerous small discontented 
groups in the community which were ignored by the previous 
government."'^" In fact neither the 1965 election nor the 
Opposition's tactics were unusual in this respect. 
Second, whether or not the parties espouse distinctive aims and 
principles, governments in office are normally under constraints that 
powerfully militate against distinctive performance. Routine admin-
istrative decisions required by ongoing programmes or the applica-
tion of existing law demand much of ministers' time and energy. 
Legislative sessions are largely occupied with measures proposed 
by public servants to plug legal loopholes or adjust the current 
structure to changing circumstances. At times the second chamber 
can be obstructive. Unforeseen emergencies-^shortages, gluts, 
breakdowns, disputes, depressions, and natural calamities—must be 
met by ad hoc solutions. Six months after winning the 1971 election 
on the two major planks of minimizing inflation and maintaining 
full employment, the New South Wales government saw a 50 per 
cent rise in hospital fees, public transport fare rises of up to 66 
per cent, Sydney land prices at "crisis point", and severe retrench-
ments of labour in the Public Works Department.'^' When it went 
to the polls again in November 1973 the government had not 
fulfilled 1971 election promises to reform the consumer credit laws, 
tighten the controls over second-hand car sales, end the locking-
up of juries, appoint a royal commission on prices, revise the 
Defamation Act, and refund half the water rates paid by ratepayers 
suffering from increased property valuations.'" Such a record is of 
course not peculiar to Liberal-Country governments. Moreover, all 
parties habitually make promises on some subjects—especially in 
the economic sphere, such as inflation and full employment—that 
are inherently beyond a state government's control. Freedom of 
action is also limited by finite resources of money and manpower, 
by financial dependence on the federal government, and by the 
accepted obligation to submit in due course to the electors' 
judgement on performance. 
This leads to a third point, which is that electoral verdicts are 
given by narrow majorities and are not easily predicted. As we have 
seen, most of each party's votes always come from its perennial 
supporters, whose party identification seems to be conditioned only 
vaguely by a sense of class or sectional interest (which might orient 
them towards a partisan view of society) and hardly at all by 
concern about specific policies. A campaigning party must not 
grossly offend its committed supporters. But while they remain 
committed, electoral victory or defeat turns not on their votes but 
on those of the mixed minority of swinging voters, especially those 
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in marginal constituencies. Little is reliably known about the 
determinants of these people's voting decisions, but it is plausibly 
assumed that "the great majority of citizens support the party which 
seems most likely to better their lot",'" and that the attitudes of 
the swingers straddle the political centre. Hence while politicians 
(and political journalists) have little to go on but gossip and 
guesswork in choosing some broad issue or other as the key to an 
election campaign, it is clearly prudent to promise specific benefits 
to voters in marginal electorates and to "discontented groups" of 
all kinds, and to keep well to the middle of the road in any wider 
appeals. 
Thus not only are broadly distinctive long-term objectives struc-
turally unnecessary in a competitive party system, but both the 
exigencies of office and the mechanics of the electoral struggle 
actually put a discount on the differentiation of policies—especially 
at election time. Not surprisingly, election programmes of all the 
New South Wales parties are voluminous, heterogeneous, studded 
with specifics, and—largely consonant with one another. 
In general, the parties tend to avoid issues, however important, 
which divide the groups that support them—as the Country Party 
refrains from setting policies for particular rural industries, and all 
the larger parties have until recently sidestepped such controversial 
subjects as the laws on abortion and homosexuality. But from time 
to time one or other party has seized the nettle, the state has been 
brought into an unprecedented sphere of action such as industrial 
arbitration, the regulation of working hours, or the marketing of 
primary products, and a "new province for law and order" has been 
established once and for all. In the rare examples of this in recent 
times, the parties themselves have not been in conflict but sought 
alike to capitalize on apparent shifts in public opinion. For example, 
by the 1960s leaders in all parties guessed there was sufficient public 
acceptance of a need for state regulation of the extensive but illegal 
practice of off-course betting and for state assistance to the 
impoverished majority of non-government schools. At the 1962 
election Labor promised a royal commission on off-course betting 
if re-elected, and the Liberals undertook to legalize it forthwith 
if they won; by 1964 the inquiry had been held and the Totalisator 
Agency Board established. The very divisive notion of state aid to 
private schools was in none of the party platforms until the Country 
Party adopted it in 1961 and the parliamentary Liberal Party 
gingerly embraced it at the last moment for the 1965 election, with 
N.S.W. Labor held back only by the Federal A.L.P.'s reluctance 
to abandon the party's traditional opposition. By the next election 
the principle was enacted, and though still resented by some groups. 
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it thereafter provided simply another subject for competitive 
electoral bidding by all parties. 
Such bidding forms by far the largest part of all election 
platforms. The promises offer: reduction or repeal of specific taxes 
and charges; new or expanded concessions and benefits for 
strategically selected groups; tightened or loosened regulatory 
controls in currently sensitive categories; improvements in the public 
services—education, health, social welfare, transport, and so on; 
reshuffling of administrative structures and functions and new 
administrative creations (to which parties in opposition are more 
addicted than those in office); the extension of public works around 
the state (not forgetting those in marginal electorates); and more 
administrative and industrial decentralization. Urban problems, 
particularly the scarcity and high cost of building land and housing, 
and pollution and other threats to the urban environment, have 
received increasing attention in recent years. It is indicative, partly 
of the problems of urban drift and rural decline, partly of the 
disproportionate electoral strength of the country voters, and partly 
of the Country Party's success in arguing that country people are 
"different" and have different interests, that for many decades all 
the main parties have produced a "rural policy speech" (delivered 
by the Country Party leader for the coalition partners in recent 
elections), though these largely overlap the main policy speeches 
in content. 
Naturally the promises of a government in office are accompanied 
by extensive recitals of its past "record of achievement", and that 
experience plus the ability to draw on departmental data makes 
them even more extensive, detailed, and "practical". The Askin 
government's policy document for the 1973 general election, in the 
version published as the rural policy speech, ran to sixty-three 
closely printed and bemusing pages.'^" The Opposition must rely 
wholly on policy promises that offer to make existing programmes 
a little more generous (especially on points overlooked or rejected 
by the government), or quite rarely to reverse them. All parties 
try to include "something for everyone", ranging from cheaper 
Crown land releases for home-builders, higher pensions for public 
servants, and lower rail freight rates on wool and wheat, to startling 
trivialities such as a guaranteed 90 per cent return to poker-machine 
players and the abolition of the bus section at Market Street, 
Sydney. Typical items culled at random from the rural policies of 
the different parties at recent elections include: concessions in death 
duties affecting rural landholders (the A.L.P. and D.L.P. would 
abolish all state death duties); abolition of the road maintenance 
and transport co-ordination taxes; increased motor vehicle tax 
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concessions for primary producer vehicles; better rural roads; more 
wheat storage facilities; low-cost housing in country centres; guaran-
teed loans to farmers; more freezing works, dams, and irrigation 
facilities. 
A glance at the policy speeches at the 1973 election will give 
some idea of the practical consensus between them. While the 
generosity of the different nostrums differed in detail and degree, 
all the main parties undertook to make things easier for the would-
be home-owner, to increase state aid to non-government school 
children, to attempt some control of soaring prices, to make the 
state health, education, bus, and railway systems more adequate 
to the growing demands upon them, to establish new ministries for 
consumer affairs and for planning and the environment, to complete 
unfinished urban expressways, to expand research on rural prob-
lems, to promote decentralization by administrative reorganization 
and assistance to industries set up in the country, to develop extra-
metropolitan "growth centres" beginning with the Bathurst-Orange 
area, and to co-operate with the Australian and Victorian govern-
ments in fostering the urban decentralization project at Albury-
Wodonga. 
The degree of consensus is only emphasized if we note the kinds 
of promises not shared by all parties. In 1973 these were most 
prominent in the platform of the A.L.P., which as Opposition felt 
free to propose reducing rail fares by up to 16% per cent and petrol 
prices by two cents a gallon; pegging rating valuations at December 
1971 levels; limiting local rate rises to 15 per cent over three years; 
prescribing lower interest rates on home loans and time-payment 
contracts; imposing a sixty-day price freeze; eliminating restrictive 
trade practices and "restricting monopolies"; building additional 
universities in rural areas; making public hospital wards free; and 
providing workers under state awards with another week's annual 
holiday and a 17'/2 per cent average loading on their annual holiday 
pay-
Labor also promised, in addition to the administrative changes 
already mentioned, to set up the Education Commission it said was 
impracticable when last in office; to extend the jurisdiction of the 
Fair Rents Board; to establish a police academy; to put all anti-
pollution activities under one authority; to bring racing, trotting, 
boxing, and wrestling under control commissions; to create a prices 
justification tribunal and an ombudsman; to amalgamate the forty 
metropolitan municipal councils into about ten; and to restore 
certain appeal functions in the local government sphere to the Land 
and Valuation Court. Labor made about three hundred specific 
promises altogether. The D.L.P. produced an intricate plan to 
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protect union members from stand-downs due to strikes they voted 
against, proposed that Port Kembia and Wollongong should be 
declared a pollution emergency area, and had their own recipes for 
dealing with the land and housing shortage. 
It seems likely that in refusing to duplicate these promises the 
government parties were not so much dissenting from the policies 
on principle as showing a more vivid appreciation of their financial 
and administrative difficulties. The Liberals, however, produced 
other planks of their own which did reflect some deeper differences 
with the A.L.P.—for example "a firm stand against 'industrial 
saboteurs' in the electricity industry", "legislation where necessary 
for a state of emergency to maintain supplies of essential com-
modities and services, and law and order", and "opposition to the 
'one vote, one value' principle" (that is, abolition of the weighting 
of rural votes) which Labor proposed to entrench in the state 
constitution.'" 
The election of 1 May 1976 produced little to change this general 
picture. It seemed to be generally agreed that the first months of 
the Wran Labor government were "surrounded more by an aura 
of steady responsibility than one of reformist zeal", and even the 
leader of the Opposition, Sir Eric Willis, claimed that "many of 
Labor's initiatives are just extensions to, or plain 'steals' from my 
own administration's policies".'^* As usual. Labor had fought the 
election with many promises that implied increased government 
spending, but also committed itself not to introduce a state income 
tax (now permissible under the Canberra government's "new 
federalism" policy—see chapter 6) nor to increase any existing state 
tax. After the election Labor's emphasis switched from spending 
programmes to legislative and administrative measures, few of 
which changed existing courses. Among campaign proposals on 
which the government did embark in its first year was the usual 
crop of new administrative bodies: an Ethnic Affairs Commission, 
an Anti-discrimination Board, a Prices Commission (for basic 
consumer commodities), a Department of Environment (to replace 
the Pollution Control Commission), a Consumer Credit Tribunal, 
a Land Commission to acquire and develop land for resale at "cost 
price" (a genuine innovation in this field), and an Energy Authority 
to co-ordinate the distribution and use of all energy resources in 
the state (and having powers to break strikes reminiscent of 
traditional anti-Labor measures to protect "essential services"). The 
government initiated formal inquiries into the Eastern Suburbs 
Railway, the public service, and the legal profession. It carried 
forward its predecessors' policies of incentives to piecemeal decen-
tralization, developing the "growth centres" at Bathurst-Orange 
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and Albury-Wodonga, pressing for the amalgamation of local 
authorities into fewer units, and re-introducing compulsory voting 
at local elections. 
In a few matters the Wran government showed signs of going 
further than the Opposition would, or even reversed policy, and it 
stepped gingerly into some previously taboo territory. In local 
government it empowered the minister to prescribe maximum 
percentage rate increases in each year, inaugurated a new land 
valuation system, restored some appeal powers to the Land and 
Valuation Court, subjected councils' administrative acts to review 
by the state Ombudsman, and asked the Boundaries Commission 
to investigate the efficiency of Sydney councils with a view to a 
severe reduction in their numbers—incurring the displeasure of the 
local government associations. In public transport, the government 
not only promised another "sweeping reorganization", and increased 
the capital budget by 50 per cent, but also ordered the reduction 
of passenger fares by 20 per cent. It proposed to open the Sydney 
milk market to producers outside the formerly exclusive "milk 
zone". It threatened to seek the electors' approval in mid-1977 for 
the election of the Legislative Council by popular vote. It also 
decided to legalize gambling casinos (without an election mandate), 
and embarked on the controversial process of removing penalties 
for "victimless crime" (though this firmly excluded the legalization 
of marihuana). 
Differentiation 
With competitive offers of similar benefits dominating election 
contests and conflicting offers playing a minor part, the mutual 
detraction thought necessary to such contests takes other, vaguer 
forms. Election propaganda is punctuated with ritual berating and 
ridicule of the other side for its failures and favouritism if in office 
and its disunity and "wildcat schemes" if in opposition. For such 
purposes the federal parties and governments have provided a 
favourite stalking-horse and scapegoat almost from their inception. 
Joan Rydon writes: "There is little indication that voters distinguish 
sharply between federal and State elections or the issues therein. 
Politicians may deliberately intrude one into the other." This is not 
a novel tactic. As Rydon points out, New South Wales Labor 
believed it lost the 1907 election because of its opponents' shrewd 
attacks on the Labor-supported federal government;'" state Labor 
had a close shave in 1950 when federal Labor's bank nationalization 
efforts of 1947 were used against it; it survived in 1953 and 1962 
when it could associate its opponents with the unpopular economic 
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policies of the Menzies government.'^* 
On their side, the non-Labor parties sought in 1956 to exploit 
the growing split in federal Labor, taunted the state A.L.P. in 1965 
over the federal veto on state aid, made bogies of the federal leaders 
Evatt and Calwell, and so on. A press statement foreshadowing the 
Country Party's 1973 election strategy said: "Particular stress will 
be placed on the disastrous results of Labor in office in Canberra 
during the past 10 months"; Premier Askin devoted substantial 
sections of the Liberal 1973 policy speech to attacks on the Whitlam 
government's "attempts . . . to destroy the States by stealth and 
to bring in centralisation of power at Canberra'*, its "abject failure 
. . . to make any headway in dealing with inflation", its "tacit 
encouragement of a 35-hour week" and its "disastrous financial 
policies"; completing the usual pattern of such attacks from either 
side of politics, he declared that "the State Labor Opposition was 
merely a weak echo for the Federal Labor Government".'" 
But whichever party is in power at either level, it is also 
customary for state governments to attribute shortfalls in their own 
performance to federal domination, financial and otherwise. In 1970 
the Askin government leaked to the press a memorandum listing 
instances of Commonwealth interference in state affairs, and 
accusing the federal (Liberal-Country) government of disrupting 
state works programmes and dictating state administrative and 
policy decisions.'^" 
In substance, then, the election programmes of the rival parties 
are largely compatible, and when in office each continues, with few 
exceptions, the middle-of-the-road ameliorative, regulatory, and 
developmental policies of its predecessors and struggles to improve 
the standard of an expanding range of public and social services. 
Yet by itself this picture leaves some nagging questions unanswered. 
If the parties are no more than hawkers of similar wares to a 
common clientele of swinging voters, why has not one of them 
simply outbidden all the others and permanently captured the 
political market? In other words, why has the main party structure 
survived intact for so long? Why have the main rival groups. Labor 
and non-Labor, retained such an even share of the votes despite 
important changes in the composition of the electorate? Why has 
party identification remained so stable and why have the swingers 
continued to swing? No definitive answer can be given to these 
questions (which have also tantalized students of stable party 
systems elsewhere), but they force us to re-examine such differences 
as the parties do show, and this leads back via "interest" to 
"ideology", briefly mentioned in a previous section. 
We have seen how the three main parties in New South Wales 
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were originally created by and designed to protect the interests of 
particular economic groups; this inevitably imparted a certain 
distinctiveness to their original programmes, even if only in the form 
of claiming more income and security for farmers as against 
manufacturers, for employees as against owners, and vice versa. 
However, in their studies of the Country Party Graham and Aitkin 
have argued that mere interest-representation, though an essential 
element of the party's aims, was not enough—not enough to have 
sustained the party through the early years when it was not 
producing tangible legislative results; not enough to have united 
groups with such disparate interests as the different kinds of 
farmers, the graziers, and the country townspeople; not enough to 
explain the party's survival despite its declining electoral base and 
its "remarkable failure to achieve the fundamental results desired 
by its supporters".'^' There was something more—an emotional 
bond that transcended the barriers between rural groups, a set of 
beliefs that justified their demands from the wider society, and a 
durable pattern of ideas that gave them a simplified view of the 
political process and could readily accommodate by re-interpreta-
tion the disappointments of the real world—in short, an ideology. 
The central components of Country Party attitudes, as Aitkin 
shows, are characteristic of ideologies generally, both in their 
psychological elements and in their capacity to survive for a long 
period—in this case sixty years or more—through their flexibility 
and applicability to a wide range of specific circumstances. First 
the adherents and supporters of the party are seen as an in-
dispensable element in the society, "the backbone of the economy", 
thus deserving the central place and special benefits they claim. 
Second, they have a vision of the good life and the good society; 
rural life enshrines the essential virtues and verities, and social 
arrangements should preserve and extend it. Third, there is a sense 
of insecurity, a feeling that the group and its interests are threatened 
by sinister forces—in this case "big city domination", big business 
and the trade unions—thus leading to a critique of existing society 
while promoting solidarity against "the enemy". Now it was 
certainly important to stress this aspect of the Country Party 
because of its common reputation as a party without principle 
concerned purely with promoting a narrow sectional interest. But 
it should also remind us of the role of ideology in the other parties. 
As Aitkin himself points out, "Ideologies are . . . the emotional base 
of modern party systems."'" It is in this sphere of ideology that 
the main differences between the parties are to be sought. For the 
N.S.W. Country Party and D.L.P. it can be deduced only from 
oral and written statements by party leaders and adherents. In the 
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Labor and Liberal parties it is also partly embodied in the formal 
party constitutions and platforms. 
For Labor "the workers", "the toilers by hand and brain" provide 
the faithful three-fourths of the party's adherents and constitute 
the indispensable element of the modern community. The good 
society, as defined in the 1973 State Platform and Policy, is one 
enjoying "social justice and economic security, freedom of speech, 
education, assembly, organisation and religion, . . . the development 
of the human personality protected from arbitrary invasion by the 
State, free election . . . with recognition for the rights of minorities, 
[and] the rule of law . . ."—all to be secured by "democratic 
socialism". Hence the "Objective" of the party is "the democratic 
socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange— 
to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-
social features in those fields". "Democratic socialisation" is 
interpreted, mildly enough, to mean "the utilisation of the economic 
assets of the State in the interests of citizens", and the party "seeks 
to develop socialist policy" in half a dozen conventional ways, 
including "expansion of the public sector of the economy (i) by 
nationalisation where appropriate and necessary; (ii) by the estab-
lishment of government economic enterprises; (iii) by planning of 
economic development". In the party's traditional creed the in-
securities that threaten its adherents include of course the dangers 
of unemployment and poverty associated with the capitalist system 
of ownership, and the enemies mentioned in the Platform include 
"arbitrary authority", "business", "corporate power", "foreign 
control and domination", and "unfair prices, deceitful advertising 
and other exploitative practices". Hence in the party's general 
approach to many areas of policy there is a lack of inhibition about 
government regulation and control and a concern with redressing 
social and economic inequalities. According to the preamble to the 
State Platform and Policy— 
The Labor Party believes in the utilisation of the powers of 
government to maintain full employment, maximum standards of health 
and physical efficiency, to abolish poverty, to clear slums and unhealthy 
environments, to prevent monopolist concentrations of poverty [sic; 
"property"?], to stabilise the economy, and to ensure freedom from 
want.'" 
The distinctive elements of Liberal Party ideology are equally 
familiar. In this case it is "the rural, business and manufactures 
sections of the community on whom the financial well-being of the 
community [as originally of the party] depends". The party shares 
with Labor the social ideals of free speech, assembly, religion. 
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elections, the rule of law, the protection of the individual from 
oppressive government actions, equality of opportunity, and "protec-
tion of consumers against unfair practices". But it also stresses its 
belief in "the economic system of free enterprise", and in 
government's role as being "to provide a framework which en-
courages and reinforces individual responsibility" and to supervise 
and regulate the free enterprise system.'" The bugbears of the 
Liberals and their predecessors have been industrial militancy, the 
menace of communism, especially in the trade union movement, 
"the excesses and extremes of socialism", and "the centralisation 
of authority and power"—especially that in Canberra. Hence, other 
things being equal, the Liberal approach emphasizes freedom of 
choice in preference to official controls, private as against state 
ownership of economic enterprises, and "state rights" rather than 
strong national government. 
The D.L.P. was not based on an economic or regional interest 
group, and never made any attempt to distinguish state from 
national issues in statements of its policy and attitudes. What these 
make clear is that its primary concerns were with problems of 
defence, foreign affairs and migration; that it advocated maximum 
decentralization and the widest diffusion of private property; and 
that it was more passionately anti-communist and anti-socialist than 
the Liberal and Country parties.'^* 
The vitality of these ideologies, matching in form but differing 
in content, may help to account for the continuance of parties whose 
practical programmes fail to differentiate them significantly. The 
ideology provides the party organization with a rationale for its 
determination to survive, and the party followers with a distinctive 
focus for their loyalty. It enables each party to concentrate its 
electoral appeals on utilitarian promises to the same groups of 
unattached and discontented voters, while supplying a rhetoric with 
which to maintain its separate identity and denigrate its rivals. 
Indeed, it seems that only some mechanism of this kind could 
explain the persistence with which the parties have clung to 
shibboleths which, while virtually devoid of practical import, keep 
their opponents supplied with campaign ammunition. 
This persistence amounts almost to masochism in the case of 
Labor and "socialism". The first formal gesture toward socialism 
in the N.S.W. Branch was made in 1897 when Conference adopted 
a wholesale nationalization plank. It was not part of the "Objective" 
or fighting platform and was discarded again in 1905. In 1921 the 
N.S.W. delegates voted against the "Socialisation Objective" 
adopted by Federal Conference and the 1922 State Conference 
refused to adopt it. Under the trauma of the Depression and the 
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siege mentality of J.T. Lang's second government, the 1931 State 
Conference once more embraced as an objective "The Socialisation 
of Industry, Production, Distribution and Exchange", and also, for 
a heady twenty-four hours, actually endorsed (by fifty-seven votes 
to forty-four) a three-year plan to put socialism into effect upon 
the supposedly impending collapse of capitalism. No lover of 
socialism himself, Lang managed to quash the three-year plan 
immediately; the Objective remained on paper until, in response 
to successive federal "clarifications" in the 1950s, it was reduced 
to its present innocuous form, in which "democratic socialism" 
became merely a contingent means ("to the extent necessary") to 
quite different ends—social justice, freedom, the rule of law, and 
so on as quoted above."* When the new State Congress was 
considering the revised party constitution in 1971 it rejected by 494 
votes to 109 an "extreme Left wing" proposal to "harden the 
socialisation plank", moved by a delegate from the Bligh state 
electorate council, who rightly said that the present Objective was 
"full of equivocations" and that the Labor Party was a socialist 
party in name only.'" Yet by retaining the label at all the party 
invites the empty invective that continues to flow from its rivals 
and perhaps to win votes for them. 
In some thirty-four years in government office the N.S.W. Labor 
Party nationalized no significant economic undertaking, and it was 
the McGowen Labor government (1910-13) which abandoned in 
mid-passage its own legislation for a state ironworks and instead 
subsidized the Broken Hill Proprietary Company to venture into 
steel production for the first time. Labor's creations in the public 
enterprise field (which rarely required any "nationalization") were 
squarely in the tradition of, and on the whole less important than, 
state-owned public utilities like the railways, state banking institu-
tions, dockyards, and road passenger transport services established 
over a century or more by non-Labor governments.'" In truth, 
N.S.W. Labor has never been a radical party in the precise sense 
of attacking the roots of society, and even its paper platforms have 
visibly mellowed in recent decades. Its leaders have always been 
political pragmatists par excellence. Reminiscing about the 1930s, 
Lang wrote: 
Those of us who were engaged in active politics, depending upon the 
voles of the people, realised that the average Australian is not worried 
about the ultimate structure of society and its institutions. He is worried 
about how much is in his pay envelope, whether his children are getting 
proper opportunities, his own recreation and the security of his family 
in sickness and old age. , , , There was something beguiling about the 
idea of the workers owning all the factories, dividing up all the 
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production equally and treating everyone on the basis of equality. But 
who was going to run it?'" 
That is indeed the fundamental question which the Australian 
Labor movement has never been willing to face squarely. Compare 
the boast and the warning to the 1959 State Conference of a later 
Labor Premier, J.J. Cahill: 
The success of Labor policy in New South Wales is that alone among 
all the Australian States—and the Commonwealth itself thrown in— 
we are able to keep out of debt and balance our budget. . . . This is 
a free country and nowadays you just can't harpoon the big manufac-
turing whales and tow them into bays of our own choosing. . . .'"" 
And again C.T. Oliver, general secretary of the N.S.W. branch 
of the A.W.U. and state president of the party, to the 1961 
Conference: 
The Labor Party stands for political freedom, it rejects theories of 
revolution and dictatorship, and asserts that these theories have dis-
astrous consequences on the people and do not attain real and lasting 
benefits. 
It is a Party of Reform.'"' 
These last phrases have since been written into a special preamble 
to the State Platform and Policy, itself now a strikingly milder 
document than the State Objective and Platform of the early 1950s. 
Though as voluminous and detailed as ever (fifteen large printed 
pages) it has lost such provocative planks as the nationalization 
of monopolies, the abolition of the Legislative Council, the abolition 
of the office of State Governor, the abolition of State Parliaments, 
the nationalization of mines, and the abolition of the Public Service 
Board, and instead proposes moderate reforms, especially in more 
fashionable fields such as Aborigines, arts and media, consumer 
affairs, sport, and cities. 
So does the current Official State Platform of the Liberal Party. 
Both documents cover an almost identical range of topics. The 
Liberal platform, like that of Labor, recognizes an activist role for 
government in social policy; opposes monopolies and combines 
"where they act against the public interest"; claims that the party 
"in particular . . . represents the interests and valid aspirations of 
trade unionists"; offers "effective legal aid for those in need"; 
promises "constant action to protect the consumer from unfair 
trading practices"; and even blesses "government sponsored en-
terprises" where "necessary for the development of the economy". 
There are signs of a convergence here which, if it continued, could 
have disturbing implications for the dynamics of the party system 
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as pictured above. But the traditional differences are still recog-
nizable. The Liberal document insists, wherever possible, on individ-
ual independence and responsibility, private ownership of land and 
other property, and private enterprise in home building, medical 
practice, health insurance, and the supply of goods and services. 
Labor doctrine tends the other way. 
The element of hypocrisy in such a party system is a temptation 
to cynical judgements, but a moment's reflection shows there is 
much to be said for the way the system works. What it offers the 
electors in practice is not alternative policies, in any profound sense, 
but alternative teams who promise multifarious benefits of a 
practical kind. Party competition makes the electoral bidding keen, 
and gives the winning team an interest in trying to fulfil its promises. 
Because the promises are cumulative in nature, rather than 
conflicting, successive party performances show some continuity and 
consistency (though appraisal of their effectiveness is another 
matter on which chapter 8 will touch). Divergent party ideologies, 
by conserving distinctive party images, help to preserve the parties 
themselves and so to sustain party competition. Their failure to 
produce more sharply divergent programmes contributes to the 
stability of the party system and presumably reflects the stability 
of the social system; this is anathema to the truly radical parties 
and party wings, but evidently not to the great majority of the 
electorate. 
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Non-Party Groups in Politics 
In addition to political parties, which are engaged in politics full-
time, any other individual or group may legitimately be concerned 
with political action and with influencing government in a liberal-
democratic society, provided that certain methods of influence, such 
as force or corruption, are not used. Most people under government 
in New South Wales probably share these assumptions, but they 
raise some complex issues of analysis as well as values. We begin 
with an attempt to distinguish some of the important concepts 
involved, to define the terms used here, and to point out some 
common confusions in discussions of the subject. 
DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS 
Everyone in society has "interests"—in the things he wants to 
do and to have, in what he believes good for himself and for others, 
in satisfying his curiosity and his aesthetic needs. An "interest 
group" is a body of people who share, not their hair colour or blood-
group, but some common interest or interests, and are likely to 
benefit or rejoice, suffer or grieve alike from any event or policy 
which seems to affect those interests: a rise in petrol prices may be 
to the material benefit of oil companies and to the detriment of 
motorists; the ending of national service pleases pacifists and 
disgruntles the chiefs of staff; a change in abortion law may enthuse 
feminists and outrage the Catholic clergy. Interests may be imputed 
to individuals and groups whether they feel them subjectively or 
not: hence the efforts to "raise the consciousness" of the workers 
of the world, or of women, as groups which are seen as oppressed. 
When members of a group are conscious of a common interest, 
they themselves may organize for concerted action to promote or 
defend it; organization may be ad hoc—for a particular occasion 
—or it may result in a more formal, permanent "association". Of 
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course it is always and only individuals who act for themselves or 
for an organized group. In this chapter, group unqualified means 
the members of an "interest group" as above defined. Organized 
group or organization means a group acting in a concerted way, 
and usually the individuals (spokesmen, committees) who purport 
to act for the group. Association, similarly, may be used as 
shorthand for the individuals who act on behalf of these more 
formally organized groups. 
As the above examples show, interests may clash as well as 
coincide: one man's meat is another's poison; more state houses may 
mean fewer schools. Politics consists in the attempts of organized 
groups to influence the actions and attitudes of others—and 
particularly of government—in behalf of their own shared interests. 
Government is the set of institutions specialized for resolving 
conflicts of interests (if necessary by force) and for catering to 
"general interests"—those widely shared in a community, such as 
defence, security of property and the person, or social services. 
In current parlance the term pressure group is used in a variety 
of different senses, and applied to interest groups, associations, or 
even chance assemblies—though not usually to those associations 
that call themselves political parties. This usage of pressure group 
on the one hand blurs a number of important distinctions, yet on 
the other seems to imply that there are groups that specialize in 
applying "pressure" on someone. In fact, organized groups have 
many kinds of objectives—to co-operate for recreation, exchange 
of scientific ideas, propagation of the Gospel, protection of working 
conditions, more orderly marketing, dispensing charity, preserving 
old buildings, eliminating threatening competition—the list is 
endless. As we shall see, most organized groups have a variety of 
such objectives. Group political action, when it occurs, is incidental 
to those objectives. "Pressure" is only one of the ways in which 
groups seek to influence others. Any kind of group may want to 
influence government at some time or other. In short there is no 
particular category of non-party organized group peculiarly en-
gaged in political influence, and none that confines its modes of 
influence to "pressure". Pressure group is either a label without 
an object, or one with too many different objects to be precise. 
Organized groups have figured in politics throughout recorded 
history, but today they are vastly more varied and numerous than 
ever and generally more important in politics. The reasons are 
mostly traceable to the scientific and industrial revolutions. The 
resulting increase in economic and social complexity has been 
matched by the growing diversity of group interests. The ever 
broader scope of governmental intervention and action has multi-
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plied the occasions for interest groups to seek direct political 
influence. From similar basic causes, political decision-making has 
become accessible to a widening range of social strata; and modern 
technology, by enabling people to move and communicate more 
quickly and over greater distances, has enormously improved the 
means of organization and influence. A count in the classified 
telephone directory in 1969 showed no fewer than 2,365 "voluntary 
associations" in Sydney alone, the main categories being sporting 
clubs (700), business and professional (255), benevolent and welfare 
(250), church and religious (245), ex-service and service (208), 
social (160), cultural and educational (86) and youth (65).' Yet 
despite this pervasiveness of organized groups and their inevitable 
political activity, there have been a variety of objections to the 
activity in principle, and also to some of the methods used in 
pursuing it. Let us begin with the former. 
An ancient objection to any pursuit of different group interests 
to the point of political conflict is that this breaks the organic unity 
of the society (or is a symptom of a pathological split, as in the 
"class system under capitalism") and so threatens the stability of 
the state. The objection has always been cherished by oligarchies 
with a class-based or force-based monopoly of political power, 
claiming that under their regime there is a natural harmony of 
interests and that any challenge to their rule is the work of 
subversive "factions". Thus single-party Communist and Fascist 
regimes have claimed that the abolition of classes removed all 
sources of conflict and left themselves as the sole infallible 
expositors of an undivided "national interest". There were some 
affinities with this attitude in the branding of infant Labor parties 
in Australia as unnecessarily divisive advocates of a "sectional 
interest" when the "public interest" could be sufficiently elucidated 
by rational debate among right-minded representative individuals 
(sharing, of course, the preconceptions of the owning and pro-
fessional classes). Something of the same objection to divisive 
factions has carried over into twentieth century condemnations of 
organized groups pressing sectional claims or opinions upon the 
public and the government. The "selfishness" of such claims is 
contrasted with a devotion to the public interest. 
Two principles have made this objection obsolete in liberal-
democratic regimes since the eighteenth century. The first principle 
is that the people in charge of government can be replaced by free 
popular election without undermining the state or staging a 
revolution. The second is that no group in or out of power can 
infallibly define the "public interest"; there is no other public 
interest, in a political sense, but what emerges from the free 
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competition of individuals and organized groups in advancing their 
own ideas and interests. On this view the public interest is best 
served by maximum opportunities for members of all interest groups 
to take part in political debate, elections, and other open processes 
for influencing governments. Of course in known societies it is as 
difficult to secure the necessary conditions for free and equal 
competition in politics as it is in economics: some competing groups 
are wealthier and more articulate than others; some can bring 
disproportionate influence to bear on their rivals or on government; 
clandestine influence, political censorship, and the reticence of 
governments may impair full freedom of communication to the 
detriment of groups with inadequate access to the sources of 
relevant information or to the ears of politicians. That is not an 
argument for eliminating political competition itself. 
Another set of objections to political activity by interest groups 
is related to attempts to distinguish political parties from other 
organized groups. Most parties are seen as being concerned with 
the whole range of public policy and as trying to shape it by seeking 
direct control of the formal powers of government, or at least direct 
representation in the legislature, through open competition at 
popular elections. Other organized groups appear to by-pass this 
"normal" representative process as they struggle directly "to 
influence other groups, the parties, the public service, parliament 
and cabinet, and the voters".^ Moreover, their primary interests and 
objectives are relatively specialized and limited in range; this leads 
some critics to assume that it is somehow illegitimate for such a 
group to take up broader political questions and especially questions 
in which the established political parties claim an interest. 
In chapter 3 we have seen how the Labor and Country parties 
in particular were originally formed by organizations of specific 
interest groups to specialize in the selection and support of 
parliamentary candidates, and in the supervision of parliamentary 
representatives on behalf of the interests concerned. We also noted 
the tendency for these parties to acquire increasing autonomy from 
their originating organizations—culminating in formal dissociation 
in the case of the Country Party—and the similar development 
whereby the Liberal Party sought to sever the connections its 
predecessors had with "finance committees" representing business 
groups. This trend illustrates a more general tension between the 
claims of political parties and other organized groups which finds 
expression in some curious ways. One is the suggestion that their 
roles are mutually exclusive, with parties claiming a sort of 
monopoly of "politics" and "political" action, accompanied by a 
tendency for other organized groups to play up to that view by 
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disclaiming that they are "political" or engaging in "politics" when 
in fact they are merely dissociating themselves, in their political 
actions, from party connections. 
This line of thinking is reminiscent of the earlier denigration of 
"faction" when it leads to the assumption that political activity by 
organized groups other than those that call themselves parties is 
somehow disreputable. When the New State Movement of northern 
New South Wales, disillusioned with the inactivity of the Country 
Party in their cause, "reluctantly" decided to "go political" and 
put up several candidates of their own at the 1968 elections, the 
state chairman of the Country Party expressed "amazement" and 
withdrew all support of the party from the New State Movement.' 
In 1970 the N.S.W. Federation of Parents' and Citizens' Associa-
tions rejected a proposal to field candidates for the Senate on an 
anti-state aid platform after a number of associations threatened 
to withdraw their affiliation, and the state Governor to withdraw 
his patronage, if this was done. Shortly afterwards, an energetic 
campaign by local parent and teacher organizations to publicize 
schooling problems in the George's River by-election was con-
demned by the Country Party Minister for Education and the 
Liberal member for Hurstville as "political interference" and 
"political propaganda", and despite defensive denials by the teach-
ers that they were playing "party politics", the Liberal and D.L.P. 
contestants boycotted their "meet your candidate night"." 
This kind of tension between specific organizations and political 
parties is also reflected in fanciful generalities from both sides, such 
as Menzies's claim that "the Liberal Party is neither backed by nor 
responsive to pressure groups", whereas it is obvious that apart from 
any formal connections, all the parties are informally linked with 
particular groups through shared values, common membership 
(including important interest-group spokesmen among their parlia-
mentary ranks), and financial and organizational support.' 
In the same vein and equally fanciful are the familiar assertions 
that if the representatives of certain organized groups with allegedly 
well-defined concerns, such as churches or trade unions, try to exert 
influence on other issues in the governmental sphere, such as 
Vietnam or conservation, they are illegitimately straying from their 
proper role into politics. Except for the possibility, discussed below, 
that group spokesmen may be exceeding the mandate of their 
constituents, these assertions conflict with the liberal-democratic 
assumption that all members of the polity are entitled to contribute 
to its political decisions on any subjects; they thereby ignore the 
fact that neither political parties nor any other class of organized 
group have in theory or practice any preferential claim to the role 
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of exerting political influence or to particular methods of exerting 
it. 
Indeed, when organized groups seek to influence government 
directly rather than through political parties, it is often a sign, as 
with the New State Movement, that the party is unwilling or unable 
to fulfil its expected role: group organizations are then only 
resuming some of the functions delegated to parties at their 
creation. Further, against the importance parties have acquired by 
competing for direct control of government must be set the relative 
insignificance of their organizational membership compared with 
that of other associations. As we saw in chapter 3, fewer than one 
in forty New South Wales electors are financial members of 
political parties. In 1967, 48 per cent of the sample of the state's 
electors in the A.N.U. Political Attitudes Survey said they belonged 
to at least one voluntary organization (excluding trade unions, 
political parties, and churches), and 26 per cent claimed to belong 
to two or more organizations. Many a single association—for 
example the Public Service Association of New South Wales—has 
more members than any of the political parties in the state. More 
generally, it can be argued that the representative system in large 
modern democracies, even with well-developed party systems, is not 
sufficient in itself to provide adequate channels of group influence 
on government and administration. On this view, organized groups 
perform an essential function in a democratic society—they provide 
the most important practical expression of that political pluralism 
that is supposed to characterize liberal democracy.' 
It is clear that the objections to the general principle of non-
party groups seeking to influence politics and governments are 
relatively superficial, partly self-interested, and basically spurious. 
Part of the problem seems to be that these issues have been half-
consciously confused, thanks to muddled academic terminology, 
with more serious objections to some of the methods employed by 
organized groups in politics. The term pressure group first came 
into use in the United States towards the beginning of the 1930s 
to epitomize what were condemned as the illegitimate tactics of 
some organized groups. The complaint was (and remains) that 
organizations of many kinds—corporations, trade unions, producer 
organizations, even organized criminals—could secure legal im-
munities, tax concessions, government contracts, subsidies, and 
other favours by false propaganda, bribery, and blackmail of public 
officials, campaign contributions with strings attached, and threats 
of boycotts or strikes. Money power, privileged access, secrecy and 
the use of inadmissible inducements and sanctions were the common 
threads running through the indictment. The short title for these 
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techniques of influence was pressure tactics, and for those that used 
them pressure groups.'' 
The nature of some current confusions should now be obvious. 
First, the term pressure, which could be useful for distinguishing 
certain techniques of influence irrespective of their legitimacy, was 
first associated only with "illegitimate" forms of those techniques, 
and so became pejorative to some people. Second, the term later 
developed into a label for all forms of influence, thus confusing 
people's judgements about group political activity as a whole. Third, 
by attaching pressure adjectivally to groups, it was implied that 
addiction to engaging in political "pressure" (in whatever form) 
was an attribute distinguishing some particular class of organized 
group from all other groups. We have already seen the fallacy of 
that idea, and also noted a related muddle: that of reserving the 
label pressure groups for organized groups other than political 
parties, whereas parties have always engaged in the techniques of 
influence that are supposed to distinguish pressure groups. 
In this chapter, then (except where compelled by quotations), 
we shall not use the term pressure groups, holding it to be a non-
category. We have recognized "interest groups", many of which 
are "organized", either ad hoc or in enduring "associations". 
Having discussed the main associations, political parties, in the 
previous chapter, we shall next roughly classify the interests or 
objectives pursued by non-party organized groups, to show how they 
cut across any classification of groups, how confusingly they may 
clash with one another, in what ways some of them give rise to 
political action, and what new objectives have recently become 
prominent. We then offer examples of the many methods of 
"influence" open to organized groups. In another rough 
classification we suggest that influence may be divided into (a) 
"putting views" in various ways to the public, parties or government, 
and {b) "pressure" of various kinds—meaning requests backed by 
quid pro quos or sanctions. Pressure may be open or covert, and 
applied through the electoral or parliamentary process (e.g., by 
mobilizing, or threatening to mobilize, favourable or adverse votes) 
or by corruption or force. Finally we consider whether it is possible 
to identify factors inimical or conducive to effective influence. We 
argue, in short, that what is relevant for political analysis is not 
the categorization of groups but the relations between objectives, 
methods, and effectiveness. 
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A few examples will show the difficulty of categorizing organized 
groups by reference to their interests or objectives—for example 
as "economic groups", "issue groups", "moral groups", and the like. 
Any association may at some times be promoting general long-term 
policies of its own and at other times resisting particular short-term 
proposals of the government. Associations with non-material objec-
tives, such as the churches, also have material interests in real estate 
and in their exemption from local rating. Associations generally 
identified with industrial objectives like the Builders' Labourers' 
Federation use political pressure to preserve historic buildings from 
demolition. The Centennial Park Residents' Association was formed 
specifically to oppose moves for a new sports complex in Moore 
Park (Sydney), both from self-interest and on environmental 
grounds; opposition came also from the long-established and 
differently oriented Campbelltown Chamber of Commerce, who 
urged the material and other advantages of siting the sports centre 
in their own community.* 
Arranged according to broad classes of interests and objectives, 
the following examples illustrate a number of points: the variety 
of motives for organized groups' political activities; the disparate 
kinds of objectives a single organized group may pursue; the 
political interaction of such groups with each other, as well as with 
government; the pursuit of objectives indirectly, e.g., by trying to 
influence appointments; and the variety of different interests 
affected by a single government policy. 
Perhaps the most numerous class of objectives comprises efforts 
to extend or defend the interests, material or otherwise, of an 
organized group's own members. Influence to this end, also, looms 
large among the activities of the most familiar class of organized 
groups—those primarily concerned with their members' material 
interests, particularly in the economic sphere. In the obvious cases 
of trade unions and employer's associations, the use of political 
influence supplements other, more formalized procedures for regu-
lating their interlocking interests—mainly the arbitration system 
and collective bargaining. Both sets of organizations, usually 
through their association with the respective political parties, try 
to influence in their members' behalf the legislation which defines 
their rights under those procedures, and also at times to secure or 
prevent legislation on specific issues which by-passes the procedures 
—for example directly prescribing the maximum working week, 
daily hours of work, and equal pay for the sexes. 
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State Labor cabinet proposals in 1962 to liberalize the statutory 
provisions for long-service leave were strongly attacked in public 
statements by the Retail Traders' Association, the Chamber of 
Manufactures, the Employers' Federation, the Sydney Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Metal Trades Employers' Association, who 
argued not only that this would disadvantage New South Wales 
industry in competition with that in other states, but also that the 
government was violating an understanding that it would consult 
with the industry organizations before making major legislative 
changes.' In 1959 and 1962 the secretary of the Shop Assistants' 
Union led deputations to the Minister for Labour asking the 
government to abolish Saturday morning shopping in Sydney.'" 
Sometimes this kind of objective takes more indirect forms, as when 
during the 1950s leaders of both left-wing and moderate unions, 
ultimately supported by the state secretary of the Australian 
Workers' Union and the N.S.W. Branch of the A.L.P., urged the 
Labor government with petitions and otherwise to appoint as a 
judge on the Industrial Commission of New South Wales, the 
barrister J.B. Sweeney, an alleged party supporter who had also 
appeared for the A.W.U. in a number of important arbitration 
cases." 
A counter example of this last form of influence usage will serve 
to introduce the miscellaneous kinds of member interest promoted 
outside the field of employment conditions. In 1971 there was much 
speculation that the Attorney-General, K.W. McCaw, might be 
dropped from the Liberal-Country cabinet in response to "hostility 
in influential business circles to some of Mr McCaw's Companies 
Act amendments".'^ Defensive reaction to actual or impending 
change, as some examples have already shown, is one of the 
commonest sources of group objectives; it also produces conflict 
between objectives of quite different kinds. Early in 1972 the 
Australian-Owned Advertising Council was formed after months 
of conflict between Australian-owned and foreign-controlled firms 
within the Australian Association of Advertising Agencies. The new 
body hoped to persuade local advertisers and particularly govern-
ment organizations to give their accounts to Australian-owned 
firms.'' Any move to tighten the legislative contrdls over property 
rents and tenant evictions has always aroused protests from such 
bodies as the Home and Property Owners' Association, while 
tenants exemplify that important series of group interests which 
are less effectively organized for defensive political action. 
Opposition proposals in the early 1960s to legalize and tax off-
course betting under suitable controls elicited contrasting reactions 
among organized groups. The Australian Jockey Club, which 
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controlled racecourses, feared this would reduce attendances at the 
races but said they would be mollified "if the race clubs [were] 
given a fair share of the tax". The Paddock Bookmakers' Associa-
tion opposed any scheme providing for betting shops and off-course 
totalisators. The idea was received cautiously by spokesmen for the 
Catholic Church, but deplored by the N.S.W. Council of Churches, 
the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, the N.S.W. Methodist Con-
ference, the Central Methodist Mission, and leaders of the Presby-
terian Church, one of whom said:"Certainly the Government will 
get some easy money, but the price is the moral fibre of the 
nation".'" 
In 1970-71 the "Clutha deal" cut across an even greater range 
of interests. Within a week in November 1970 the Askin govern-
ment, by liberal use of the gag, forced through parliament an act 
incorporating its agreement to allow Clutha Development Pro-
prietary Ltd., an American-owned company, to bring coal for export 
from its mines in the Burragorang Valley by a private railway to 
a dump south of Sydney, thence down the cliff-face to a mile-long 
jetty on one of the most scenic and heavily populated stretches of 
the New South Wales coast. The project was attacked not only 
by the A.L.P. Opposition and its local branches, the N.S.W. Labor 
Council, the Australia Party, and the Communist Party, but also 
by leading lawyers, the Council of Civil Liberties, the press, a dozen 
trade unions, the Sydney Group of the Society for Social Responsi-
bility in Science, the National Trust of Australia (N.S.W.), the 
Anti-Clutha Action Committee (composed largely of Sydney actors, 
artists, and journalists). Ecology Action (an environmental protec-
tion group, as its name implies), and the South Coast Organisation 
Opposing Pollution (SCOOP, another body formed specially for the 
purpose by the Hughes federal electorate council of the A.L.P.). 
As this variety of groups indicates, the grounds for the attack 
included undue secrecy, the selling out of the state's resources to 
foreign interests for a "a mere pittance" in royalties, the sacrifice 
of state railway revenue and of employment for railwaymen and 
transport workers, and potential threats to the environment both 
inland and on the coast. On the other hand one very small union, 
the Colliery Officials' Association, and the Clutha-employed miners 
in one very important and radical union, the Miners' Federation, 
believed the scheme would enhance their employment and earning 
prospects. It was embarrassing both for the Labor Party and the 
Miners' Federation when W. Smart, the latter's president and 
chairman of the Combined Mining Unions Council, strongly 
supported the Clutha Development scheme, saying that while his 
union was all for pollution control, "our interest in this scheme 
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arises from consideration for our own interests".'^ 
It is already clear that organized group members' "own interests" 
are not confined to material interests. Sometimes, of course, it is 
difficult to distinguish between material and non-material interests, 
as is illustrated by the National Roads and Motorists' Association 
(a New South Wales body despite its title). Some of its concerns 
are clearly with material, economic issues: the cost of cars, petrol, 
repairs and insurance, licence fees, petrol tax and how it is spent, 
and so on. Some of its objectives are clearly non-material, such 
as the safety of roads and vehicles, advice and succour for drivers, 
and the improvement of tourist facilities. The N.R.M.A. has urged 
government to establish acceptable standards of exhaust-emission 
—an anti-pollution measure. It has defended what it considered the 
civil rights of members by opposing restricted speed-limits, police 
radar traps for speedsters, random breathalyser tests, and municipal 
councils' closing of residential roads to through traffic. Material and 
non-material interests blend—and clash with other group interests 
—when objectives serve equally the motorist as pleasure-seeker and 
as income-earner, as in some of the above instances. The Association 
has steadily resisted proposals to limit freeways and reduce vehicle 
access to Sydney's central business district; in 1970 it lodged a 
formal objection with the City Council "on behalf of private 
motorists" to the closure of Martin Place to traffic on the ground 
that it would "cause an already acute city traffic problem to get 
worse". The response of Alderman Leo Port highlighted another 
example of an unorganized group interest: "The Council doesn't 
represent motor cars, it represents people . . . The motorists have 
their own strong organisations. In the absence of a pedestrians' 
league we will have to do our best for people on foot"." 
Some organizations have objectives concerning the interests not 
of their own members but of others—other people in cases like the 
Red Cross and fund-raising and charitable societies, other animals 
in cases like the R.S.P.C.A. Their commonest needs for political 
influence relate to the exemption of their revenue and donations 
from taxation, and to improved legislative protection and benefits 
for those they help. Such objectives are not very far from concerns 
for the community at large, including group members themselves. 
We have already seen examples, in the concerns of church and 
environmental groups for moral and physical health respectively. 
This class is very varied, and allotment of particular objectives 
to it must often be subjective. When a group of Sydney lawyers, 
supported by the Council for Civil Liberties, sent a document to 
the Premier and Police Commissioner accusing prison officers of 
brutality at Bathurst gaol in October 1970, and urging an inquiry 
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into prison conditions in the state, they could be seen as acting 
on behalf of the prisoners concerned, of prisoners as a class, or 
of the community's interest in a more effective penal system. (A 
standard example of an attitude to group activity already discussed 
was provided by the Justice Minister's comment that he suspected 
the compilers were "politically motivated"—of which the only 
rational translation would be, as it generally is in such contexts, 
that they were biased against his political party.)" Again an urgent 
appeal by the Far North Coast Law Society to the Minister for 
Justice to appoint more magistrates to reduce delays in petty 
sessions cases in the area could be seen prima facie as a plea for 
local interests, but also as part of a more general agitation to 
expedite the administration of justice throughout the state.'* 
A similar ambiguity applies to the whole controversy over state 
aid to independent schools. The disputants on both sides were 
certainly contending for the maximum possible share of public 
revenue for government and non-government schools respectively. 
But they also appealed, on the one side, to the whole community's 
interest in maintaining the principles of free, compulsory, and 
secular education embodied in the Education Act of 1880, and in 
avoiding the divisiveness, whether on class or sectarian lines, 
allegedly promoted by the independent school system; and on the 
other side, to such general principles as freedom of choice in 
schooling, the entitlement of all to a share of the taxation they 
paid, and the need to maintain even standards across a school 
population which in practice the state system alone could not 
accommodate." In the struggle of the 1960s over religious instruc-
tion in New South Wales state schools the denominational spokes-
men and the N.S.W. Council for Christian Education in Schools 
were in one sense claiming the right to impress their different 
spiritual objectives on the pupils; in a more general sense they were 
arguing that religious indoctrination was an essential part of 
education in a "Christian society". Their opponents, notably the 
N.S.W. Humanist Society and the ad hoc body it organized on 
this issue, the Secular Education Defence Committee, supported by 
the N.S.W. Teachers' Federation, denied on equally general 
grounds that the state system should be used to promote particular 
religious doctrines.'" 
Other objectives are more clearly related to conceptions of a 
"general interest", as defined in each case, of course, by the groups 
concerned. The N.S.W. Bar Council urged the state government 
to reconsider its proposal to abolish trial by jury in obscenity cases, 
on the ground that this would weaken public confidence in the courts 
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and impose an unfair burden on judges and magistrates.^' The 
Proportional Representation Society of N.S.W. counselled that the 
state should adopt the Senate or Tasmanian electoral system." The 
Returned Servicemen's League, primarily concerned with the 
material interests of its own members, also works to strengthen 
national defence, maintain Anzac Day observance, and keep the 
British national anthem in Australia. Examples in this class are 
endless, but one trend must be noticed, because it represents the 
most important recent change in the pattern of organized group 
objectives, and also of organized groups, in New South Wales as 
throughout the world. 
In its most general form, this is a trend towards the organization 
of diffuse interests previously unorganized, such as those of people 
as consumers, as women, as youth, as military conscripts and so 
on. At first sight most of these may appear to be interests of 
particular groups within the community, but the groups in question 
are so important for one reason or another that attention to their 
interests is widely held to be of general social significance. In 
addition, the trend has taken the more specific form of concern 
with issues affecting the community at large but previously neg-
lected by political parties and governments in their unquestioning 
acceptance of economic, demographic, and urban growth. The range 
of issues and resulting objectives corresponds with the main forms 
of growth: conservation of dwindling natural resources, protection 
of indispensable features of the natural and man-made environment, 
population control, and improvement of the quality of urban (and 
rural) life. These causes are too familiar to dwell on; a few examples 
will illustrate their development in this state. 
New South Wales has had its Australian Consumers' Association 
since 1959, its branches of the Women's Liberation Movement since 
December 1969 and the Women's Electoral Lobby since 1972, its 
Campaign Against Moral Persecution (CAMP) since July 1970, 
its Abortion Law Reform Association since 1967, its Committee 
in Defiance of the National Service Act and its Draft Resisters' 
Union in the days of Australian intervention in Vietnam; it has 
its associations to combat racial discrimination, foster the causes 
of Aboriginals, promote family planning, and advocate zero popu-
lation growth: this is but a sample of the organizations in such 
fields." As indicated, most of these appeared at the end of the 1960s 
or after. The same applies to the spate of organizations formed 
to oppose specific encroachments on aspects of the environment 
valued by their members. It would be easy to compile a list of fifty 
or more associations under the broad headings mentioned in the 
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previous paragraph, including at least a score of "resident action 
groups" in Sydney alone, which existed in New South Wales at 
the end of that decade but not at its beginning. In addition, of 
course, a number of the issues were taken up by long standing 
organizations such as the Royal Australian Planning Institute, the 
Institute of Architects, the Australian Institute of Urban Affairs, 
and a number of the trade unions. 
The institutional change noted here can be illustrated by refer-
ence to the Kurnell case. In May 1961 the Labor cabinet overruled 
the objections of the Cumberland County Council and its chief 
planner to the alienation of 163 acres of Crown land for an oil 
refinery on the Kurnell peninsula, noted for its historical associa-
tions. Aboriginal relics, and some rare fauna and flora. At that time 
objections had to come from people like the chairman of the County 
Council, anthropologists and historians, the leaders of the Liberal 
and Country parties, and the M.L.A. for neighbouring Cronulla 
(who as a Liberal must have enjoyed the irony of his remark that 
"the State Government has once again bent over backwards for 
Big Business and the oil companies").^" This can be contrasted with 
the range of groups that rallied a decade later to the anti-Clutha 
cause (the Liberals now playing the villain's role) and on similar 
issues such as rutile mining on the coastal beaches or limestone 
mining in the haunts of bushwalkers and speleologists. 
However, as the last examples partly suggest, despite the number, 
articulateness, and sometimes potency of the groups taking up these 
new issues they are generally quite small, often not representative 
of prevalent opinion (which is slow to adjust to change), and 
sometimes fonder of crusading zeal and direct action than of 
rationality and due process. When the National Parks and Wildlife 
Service proposed to extend the Myall Lakes National Park, and 
the "Myall Lakes Committee" commissioned an environmental 
impact study by the Total Environment Centre (a "watchdog body" 
recently formed by a group of Sydney scientists and conserva-
tionists) which urged the immediate prohibition of beach mining 
in the area, both moves were strongly opposed by local residents 
and the Great Lakes Shire Council, who said their economy needed 
the timber and mineral industries.'* 
Under the personal magnetism of J.B. Mundey, its militant and 
idealistic secretary for a time, the Builders' Labourers' Federation 
unilaterally enforced, by physical threats and withdrawal of labour, 
its self-appointed role as arbiter of urban development in Sydney. 
Espoused by few other trade unions to date, the Federation's 
objectives have included preventing "unnecessary" commercial 
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building at the expense of housing, schools, and the like; champion-
ing local residents threatened by "redevelopment"; and helping 
action groups and planning bodies to preserve open spaces and 
historic buildings. At times these activities have been embarrassing 
even to bodies with similar aims, as when the union's six months' 
ban on the East Rocks scheme cost the Sydney Cove Redevelopment 
Authority some fifty thousand dollars and as when it banned on 
antiquarian grounds the demolition of Pitt Street Congregational 
Church, despite unanimous votes of duly constituted church meet-
ings, including the minister, to replace the building on its valuable 
city block in a search for financial viability.^' 
There are yet other kinds of organized group objective which 
do not easily fit into the foregoing categories. The increase of 
organizational strength by the federation of groups seems to be one. 
Within two or three years after the new resident groups were first 
organized in Sydney they had begun to come together in such 
organizations as CRAG—the Coalition of Resident Action Groups. 
Many of the organizations previously mentioned here are feder-
ations of other associations within the state—though not necessarily 
of all bodies of the same kind: the N.S.W. Council of Churches 
represents only the eight major Protestant churches. Many state 
federations are in turn federated at an interstate or Australia-wide 
level. The appropriate level of organization is of course determined 
by the nature of objectives and the levels at which governmental 
bodies may impinge upon them. 
It also seems possible to distinguish the interests and objectives 
of organized institutions as such from those of their members as 
individuals, though institutional objectives are usually consistent 
with those of at least its leading members. Better pay for 
schoolteachers is unlikely to produce worse schools. The expansion 
of a department's functions generally does little harm to the careers 
of its officials. But most officials also tend to fight for the powers 
and resources of their institution for its own sake. All proposals 
for an ombudsman or other independent body to investigate public 
complaints against the N.S.W. police were firmly resisted by the 
former Commissioner, Norman Allan, who was also able to say 
that this would be equally unacceptable to the Police Officers' 
Association and the Police Association.-' Institutional objectives are 
thus pursued through the political process by spokesmen for 
organizations within the governmental structure itself. Perhaps the 
most prominent and numerous class of these, able to be more active 
politically because of their elective status and separation from the 
central administrative hierarchy, are the local municipal and shire 
153 
Methods 
councils, organized into state-wide associations which advance in 
the media, during elections, and before state and federal politicians 
such objectives as representation of local authorities on all bodies 
administering local services, an increased share for local government 
in state and federal tax revenues, and the right to be consulted 
on proposed changes in local government boundaries and electoral 
systems. 
METHODS 
Methods of exerting political influence are to some extent related 
to the objectives and targets of the effort: it is not very effective 
to ply ministers and government departments with pamphlets, or 
to propose technical amendments to taxation law in a radio 
broadcast. Methods may also be related to the kind of group seeking 
influence: taxpayers, conservationists, and parents cannot organize 
"political strikes", and policemen cannot very well hold mass 
demonstrations. But on the whole, there is little association of 
particular methods with particular groups, objectives, or targets: 
most methods are open to most organized groups, and influence 
may be exerted directly upon policy-makers and administrators, or 
indirectly through public opinion, elections, or the party machines. 
And different methods may be used singly or in combination by 
the same group as can be illustrated from two highly contrasted 
movements, each of which has run practically the whole gamut of 
influence techniques. 
The New State Movement of northern New South Wales has 
survived in varying forms for generations. Its sponsors have mostly 
been conservative in politics—graziers, prominent townspeople, 
Country Party members, local government councillors; its objective 
is positive: the carving of a new state from the north-east quarter 
of New South Wales. Over the years its members have published 
countless leaflets, pamphlets, and even books in the cause. They 
have addressed innumerable private and public meetings, given talks 
and interviews on radio and television and organized conventions, 
rallies, and academic seminars. Partly in this cause they helped to 
form and re-form the Country Party itself. They have employed 
part-time and full-time, honorary and paid organizers, secretaries, 
and directors. They have collected large funds: in 1967 they claimed 
to have raised $12 million in the previous few years—71 per cent 
of it in gifts of ten dollars or less." They have collaborated with 
similar movements in other states, and with many organized groups 
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in their own area. They have taken massive petitions to the state 
parliament, sent deputations to state and federal members and 
ministers including Premiers and Prime Ministers, and even sub-
mitted a case to the Premiers' Conference. They have lobbied all 
the political parties and their candidates before elections, and urged 
voters to support those found favourable to their aims. They have 
secured the appointment of royal commissions on the subject, and 
submitted elaborate evidence to them. In 1967 they managed to 
get an official referendum held in the area, and mounted a full-
scale compaign for a "yes" vote. Unsuccessful in this, they ran their 
own candidates for the state parliament in 1968. 
Resident action groups in the Sydney municipality of Leichhardt 
have arisen only since the mid-1960s. They represented a wide 
spectrum of political attitudes, since they included middle-class 
newcomers to the area, traditional Labor voters, student radicals, 
and members of the extreme Left; their material resources could 
not compare with those of the New State Movement, and their most 
notable early objective was negative in form: to prevent the 
construction of an expressway through their area. But they used 
almost as wide a range of political methods as the New Staters 
—some of them novel as befitted the newer style of group 
organization they represented. They began by unseating the Labor 
majority and gaining control of the local council. They lobbied 
federal and state Labor politicians and won the support of federal 
ministers, academic experts, professional planners and engineers— 
and the Builders' Labourers' Federation. With expert help they 
presented a detailed and well-informed list of questions about the 
planning and financing of the expressway, and challenged the 
Department of Main Roads to answer them. They created a lively 
and well-produced tabloid journal to publicize their views and held 
public marches and demonstrations. In addition, to reinforce their 
impact on public opinion and the authorities, they illegally estab-
lished a children's "adventure playground" on land resumed by the 
Department for the expressway, thus attracting the attention of the 
media by physically dramatizing their resistance.^' 
Between them these examples show most forms of influence 
essayed by organized groups. The more indirect forms attempt to 
secure or modify governmental decisions by re-shaping public 
opinion—with its possible implications for the popularity of the 
party in office. Journals associated with interest groups can con-
tribute in this way: thus the Anglican editorially warned "any 
political party with state aid in its platform that it would be a 
'leaden' plank which would sink the party".'" The ordinary public 
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media can be used: the N.S.W. Council of Churches organized a 
series of radio talks as part of its campaign against state aid," and 
group spokesmen commonly explain their position in "letters to the 
Editor" and press articles and interviews. This is a reminder of the 
ill-defined influence of the press itself—controlled by a handful of 
wealthy interests with one-sided political sympathies but apparently 
wielding only a very tenuous form of power, commanding no 
significant economic bastions yet anxiously scanned and held in 
seemingly disproportionate awe by politicians and their advisers." 
Other written material is multifarious, from leaflets in the letterbox 
and pamphlets in school playgrounds to lengthy submissions before 
select committees of parliament and commissions of inquiry. Mass 
meetings and monster rallies indoors and out, and "demonstrations" 
sedentary, standing, and processional are familiar and not confined 
to particular classes of group." 
Influence through party organizations was discussed in chapter 
3. Direct influence upon political decision-makers is attempted by 
correspondence and by telephone, by memorials and petitions, and 
by deputations, and these also may be addressed to both government 
and other party leaders. We may add more specific illustrations 
to the examples briefly mentioned above. Following the thirteenth 
Conference of the Australian Primary Producers' Union, deputa-
tions were sent to the Premier to complain about "unreasonable 
provisions", from the viewpoint of primary industry, in proposed 
amendments to the Factories and Shops Act; and to the Minister 
for Local Government requesting legislation to allow councils to 
give rating concessions to primary producers.'" When the Country 
Party's Annual Conference adopted a policy of interest-free govern-
ment loans to approved private schools, the N.S.W. Council of 
Churches sent their president, secretary, and senior Anglican clergy 
to protest to the Premier and other prominent Liberals, and to the 
leaders of the Country Party and the Labor Opposition." On the 
day before state Cabinet was expected to approve legislation to 
control pollution, the Local Government Association, at the request 
of the Sydney Harbour and Parramatta River Pollution Committee, 
organized a meeting of forty mayors of metropolitan councils which 
unanimously supported the establishment of a single state authority 
to control all pollution and of a national council to co-ordinate the 
environmental activities of all the states; the decision was im-
mediately telephoned to the Premier's Department."' When residen-
tial development menaced IVi hectares of bushland in the silvertail 
suburb of Hunters Hill, the secretary of the N.S.W. Labor Council 
led a protest deputation to the Minister for Local Government." 
What is common to almost all the methods mentioned so far 
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is that they are ways of "putting views"; with few exceptions they 
do not necessarily involve "putting pressure" in the senses dist-
inguished earlier. An important exception which is a form of 
pressure is the attempt to convince political parties of electoral 
support for group objectives by pre-election questionnaires on their 
policies, and to mobilize votes for party candidates, or to secure 
the election of independent candidates, who purport to favour the 
objectives in question. Sometimes group spokesmen are content with 
publicly commending or chiding the parties: at the 1962 election 
the state secretary of the Primary Producers' Union—noting 
promises to revise freight rates, build new dams, and improve wheat 
storage—said: "The Liberal policy is a hopeful one and I think 
it is capable of being carried out"; but the state president of the 
R.S.L. announced he was unsatisfied with some of the parties' 
attitudes to problems of returned soldiers.'* 
Frequently organized groups try to play off the parties against 
one another. Even so modest a group as the committee formed to 
oppose mining in the Colong Caves area undertook to hold meetings 
and distribute pamphlets in twelve marginal electorates during the 
1971 election campaign, and to ask candidates to state their policy 
on conservation in general and on preservation of the caves in 
particular." A multitude of such pressures accompanies every 
general election and referendum. At the 1961 referendum on 
abolition of the Legislative Council (see chapter 5) there was a 
Citizens' "Vote No" Committee including Liberal parliamentarians 
and representatives of business and employers' organizations, the 
D.L.P., the Constitutional Association of Australia, the N.S.W. 
Constitutional League, and a scarcely visible People's Union."" 
Like the New State Movement, the state aid issue elicited most 
of the electoral forms of pressure. Fearing that the Country Party's 
adoption of a state-aid plank in June 1961 would be infectious at 
the 1962 election, the N.S.W. Council of Churches at once decided 
on a state-wide campaign of opposition, including distribution of 
pamphlets to all clergy of affiliated denominations, suggestions to 
local ministers' fraternals to get in touch with their state M.P.s 
on the issue, and requests to "all Protestant pulpits in New South 
Wales to inform their congregations of the true nature of the various 
proposals on October 29, Reformation Sunday.""' The N.S.W. 
Teachers' Federation issued a public statement at election time 
condemning the idea of state aid and commenting on other points 
in the party policy speeches."- A decade later, when all parties had 
espoused state aid in one form or another, the Council for the 
Defence of Government Schools (D.O.G.S.), formed especially for 
the purpose, was fighting a rearguard action against the policy. 
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including the sponsorship of candidates for a number of seats in 
the state and federal elections from 1969 to 1972. 
The remaining forms of "pressure" are those whose legitimacy 
in a democratic context has been questioned by various critics— 
not always from a disinterested standpoint. Chapter 3 mentioned 
contributions to party finances as potential sources of illegitimate 
group influence. The withholding of funds can be equally potent, 
as a Liberal Party official once explained to the writer: "If they 
give large sums and they withdraw a large sum then you would 
be in trouble. You can afford to offend a lot more little people 
than you can a few large bodies". This was the Liberals' argument 
for banning donations by organized groups; all New South Wales 
parties claim to be free of such pressures, and though rumours recur 
from time to time, they have rarely been documented, at least in 
recent times. When his government was accused of accepting a 
"slush fund" from starting-price bookmakers in connection with 
proposals to legalize off-course betting. Premier Heffron's reply on 
television was quite typical (if typically ungrammatical): "I say 
unreservedly that the Labor Party has not and never will accept 
funds with any strings attached to them"."' 
Like extra-party electoral activity, "direct action" in ever more 
diverse forms is an increasingly common form of political pressure. 
"Sit-downs", "sit-ins", and boycotts are marginal forms of direct 
action, since they cannot often be effective against the legal and 
coercive powers of government, and hence generally constitute little 
more than an irritant calculated to catch public and official 
attention. Such was the Leichhardt "adventure playground" in the 
path of the planned expressway; such are the groups of householders 
standing between the council axemen and the ancient tree, the 
landlord's strongmen and the illegal "squatters", the rutile miner's 
bulldozers and their beloved beach. Sometimes there is a touch of 
the masochistic, as in the case of the Catholic parents in Goulburn 
who closed down their schools for six weeks "to draw attention to 
the extent of the dependence of the State upon the contribution 
which the Catholic schools made to public education"."" 
From time to time some demonstrations have lapsed into more 
or less wayward violence, directed against racialism in sport and 
elsewhere, against rival groups, against capitalists or communists, 
or against defence and other policies in the federal sphere. Direct 
action in industrial disputes between employers and employees— 
strikes and lockouts—may provoke governmental intervention, but 
that is not always its primary purpose. Sometimes industrial action 
is a form of pressure intended to induce government action for 
"industrial purposes"—that is, affecting prices, wages, hours, the 
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conduct of business and so on. That is a familiar field beyond the 
scope of this book. From time to time the withholding of labour 
—"black bans" and more recently "green bans"—has been or-
ganized as a means of influencing public policy on other matters; 
the current issues of pollution and the urban environment have 
brought building workers into a form of political activity previously 
confined mainly to the maritime and coal industries. To some extent 
this reflected personal idiosyncrasy. But it also partly reflected the 
novelty of the issues concerned and the tardiness of established 
institutions—including the political parties—in adjusting to them. 
Possibly something a little more akin to the ultimate form of 
political pressure—open revolt—was latent in the decision of 
Sydney University students in 1972 to declare part of the Union 
building as a "sanctuary for draft resisters", four of whom were 
forthwith barricaded therein with the help of the ubiquitous 
builders' labourers."* But the vote was 562 to 539 in a student body 
of some 17,000: the state was hardly on the brink of revolution. 
EFFECTIVENESS 
What factors determine the effectiveness of political action by 
organized interest groups? Is it related in any general or systematic 
way to the nature of the group, the kinds of objectives pursued, 
the methods of influence adopted, the intensity of "pressure tactics", 
the selection of institutional targets, the nature of the party system, 
or other aspects of the political and social structures? Such are 
the questions that a political scientist might ask, and that a science 
of politics might be expected to answer if the nature of political 
life were amenable to that kind of inquiry. A historian, on the other 
hand, would be content if he could assess the influence on 
government decision-making of even a single example of group 
agitation. The difficulty is a central one in historical (and political) 
explanation. There is not only the problem of access to relevant 
evidence—the files, the departmental recommendations, the un-
recorded conversations and unacknowledged assumptions of the 
decision-makers—but also that of weighing all the other factors 
influencing a decision (or non-decision) besides the activities of the 
organized group concerned: the claims of rival groups, the financial 
considerations, guesses about electoral pay-offs and penalties, 
administrative feasibility, party "policy", the powers and attitudes 
of other government agencies, and so on. 
Inexperienced organizations often have little idea of these com-
plexities themselves and so misjudge their chances of success or 
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the reasons for their failure. Politicians and publicists, on the other 
hand, frequently make confident claims on the subject. Davis 
Hughes of the Country Party asserted that "public outcry" by the 
Primary Producers' Union and others in 1961 had forced the Labor 
government to drop proposed amendments to the Factories and 
Shops Act. A similar outcry by employers' associations and kindred 
groups could be held responsible for the non-enforcement of 
compulsory unionism, enacted by that government in 1953 and 
repealed by it in 1959. The defeat of a clause in a bill intended 
to limit the interest rates which credit unions could charge their 
members was attributed in part to warnings by the Catholic Weekly 
and the Auxiliary Bishop of Canberra-Goulburn, followed by 
interviews approved by Cardinal Gilroy between two priests and 
the leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council. An 
amendment to the Companies Act, sponsored by the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General and passed by the Legislative 
Assembly, was attacked by the Institute of Directors and 
emasculated by eighty-five amendments moved in the Legislative 
Council by members identified in the press as influential company 
directors."'' Sometimes outcomes appear to be ironical, as when after 
all the attacks by parties and organized groups the Clutha 
Development company abandoned its coal-loading scheme, giving 
as its reasons the uncertainty of Japanese coal orders and escalating 
costs in the industry."' Further examples of apparent acceptance 
or rejection of organized group representations on particular issues 
are given elsewhere in this chapter, with conjectures about the 
reasons, but it would be necessary to probe much deeper for 
satisfying explanations."* 
Nevertheless, the difficulty of assessing individual cases does not 
necessarily preclude some general deductions about the conditions 
that hinder or conduce to effective group influence. 
The first obstacle is the normal resistance to particular pleas and 
pressures by government agencies, which if only in sheer self-
defence against the multiplicity of group demands have developed 
a variety of negative responses. The simplest is plain indifference. 
A group of inner-Sydney residents calling themselves the Planning 
for People Campaign complained that they had found only two City 
Council aldermen prepared even to listen to them, and that the 
council had ignored all the resident associations when setting up 
its "City preservation committee" with representation from de-
velopers, the National Trust, the Royal Australian Historical 
Society, and the Labor Council."' 
Another set of responses, often genuine enough, includes ques-
tioning the representativeness of group spokesmen on the issue at 
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stake. This tactic is particularly effective when such questions are 
agitating the group itself; as an example the N.S.W. Council of 
Churches has always been vulnerable in this respect. On its 
campaign against state aid a clergyman named J. Bunyan wrote: 
"I am not sure whom this council represents, or on what authority 
it is undertaking the campaign, but some Anglicans, at least, would 
disagree with its policy". When the Council issued a statement 
about the teaching of philosophy at Sydney University, spokesmen 
for six of the eight member churches said that they had not endorsed 
the statement, and a leading article in the The Presbyterian 
questioned the Council's aims, relevance and image in the communi-
ty, and the extent of its power to speak for the members.*" 
Governments and prospective governments may also appeal over 
the heads of group spokesmen to their own rank and file or to a 
wider range of interests. When Opposition leader Askin's 1962 
proposals for legalized off-course betting met a spate of clerical 
criticism, he said he had expected the opposition of church leaders: 
"We have every respect for their opinion, but we . . . intend to 
give relief to various sections of the community such as local 
government and ratepayers and free transport for children . . . We 
think this would be the best way of raising the money". A day 
or two earlier the Labor Minister for Local Government and 
Highways met representatives of the Central Coast Development 
Association, local Chambers of Commerce, and C.A.S. (Turnpikes) 
Ltd., who wanted the new Sydney-Newcastle highway built along 
the coast by private enterprise. The minister replied that the 
government would build the road themselves on the inland route, 
as "they had to think of the interests of the whole state, not just 
a section. A road along the coast might spoil the natural beauty 
of the area".*' 
A notorious form of governmental response to group influence 
is to play for time by referring the question to a formal inquiry 
(though of course this may often be justified objectively as well). 
At the 1962 election. Premier Heffron's riposte to Askin's policy 
on off-course betting was to promise a royal commission on the 
subject if Labor won.*' A more piquant case followed. Before it 
lost office in 1965 the Labor government referred Teachers' 
Federation demands for a representative education commission to 
the existing controlling body, the Public Service Board, and on its 
advice rejected the demands. The Federation campaigned strongly 
for a commission during the ensuing election, when Askin promised 
in his policy speech to transfer education to a commission on which 
teachers would have equal representation with government appoin-
tees. Late in his first term after winning that election. Premier Askin 
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had "found so many difficulties and conflicts of interest" that he 
"decided to set up an authoritative panel of inquiry" into whether 
there should be a commission. After the 1968 election was over 
the inquiry duly recommended against a commission, whereupon 
the wheel turned full circle and Labor Opposition leader, P.D. Hills, 
advocated the Askin type of education commission and accused the 
government of repudiating the 1965 Liberal promise.*' 
One other case shows a mixture of responses. For decades a 
succession of politicians has been fobbing off the northern New 
State Movement. They queried the extent of its support and good 
faith, and put off as long as they could its requests for royal 
commissions and referendums. No action ever followed the in-
quiries, and after the 1967 referendum (which except in the 
Newcastle industrial area was two to one in favour of a new state) 
the reigning government said no further inquiry would be justified 
"in the absence of any significant demand from the community at 
large".^" 
The nature of a government's response will also depend on the 
strengths and weaknesses of organized groups themselves. Many 
examples have been given of the neutralizing effect of rivalry 
between organizations representing conflicting group interests or 
even claiming to speak for the same interest; disunity among 
farmers' associations, especially up to the late 1940s, is another 
example, as is also the possibility of splits between state and federal 
organs of the same body. The whole question of relations within 
organized groups can only be touched on here, where our main 
concern is with the impact of group organizations on each other 
or on government. Leaders and spokesmen may be pursuing 
personal ambition rather than group interests. Internal unity cannot 
be taken for granted, nor is disunity automatically a disadvantage: 
a "wildcat" strike may gain a political or industrial point where 
union officialdom has failed. In general, of course, "union is 
strength". In its long feud over many issues with the Country Party 
Minister for Education, C.B. (later Sir Charles) Cutler, the N.S.W. 
Teachers' Federation was not helped by its internal divisions over 
what was permissible strategy, whether teachers should strike (as 
they finally did in 1968), and whether member associations could 
flout Federation policy by internal majority vote.** 
Another case shows internal and external clashes of interest 
meshing at different levels in the party and government machine. 
In February 1961 the state executives of the Australasian Society 
of Engineers and the National Union of Railwaymen were accused 
of "breaking union unity" by accepting a wage offer from the 
Railways Commissioner which a score of other unions had rejected. 
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Meetings of A.S.E. members in three railway workshops repudiated 
their executive's decision, while the N.S.W. Labor Council nego-
tiated with the Commissioner, who refused to budge and in 
pursuance of an ultimatum even withdrew his original offer. 
Narrowly rejecting repeated union demands for a general transport 
strike, the Labor Council, with the help of the A.L.P. State 
Executive, now pressed the claims on the Labor government, which 
was in financial straits and, at least in the early stages of the dispute, 
also embarrassed by the possible effects of concessions on forth-
coming by-elections and its referendum on abolition of the Legisla-
tive Council (see chapter 5). At the A.L.P.'s Annual Conference 
in June some union delegates vainly moved that Conference should 
intervene. After many meetings with the Premier and Minister of 
Transport, who insisted that arbitration was the only way out, the 
Labor Council finally agreed to the appointment of a private arbiter, 
who awarded only a portion of the increases claimed. 
Group effectiveness may be hindered in other ways that need no 
elaboration—by paucity of membership, of resources, of organiza-
tional skills, or of knowledge of the government machine. Let us 
turn to some of the ways in which interest groups or their 
organizations have been influential. 
United action by as many relevant organizations as possible is 
an obvious aid to influence. In 1962 the Labor government dropped 
the idea of a toll on part of the Sydney-Newcastle highway after 
vigorous protests by the N.R.M.A., the Chamber of Automotive 
Industries, the Transport Workers' Union, the Royal Automobile 
Club, the Long Distance Road Transport Association, the Master 
Carriers' Association, the Australian Federation of Civil Engineer-
ing Contractors, and government backbenchers who threatened to 
demand a special caucus meeting on the subject.*' In 1972 a 
newspaper editorial noted that the State Planning Authority was 
now "firmly and officially opposed to the idea" of the Moore Park 
sports complex, and added: "Already, thanks to the strong and well-
reasoned opposition [by protesting groups from all walks of life] 
the scheme has little chance of acceptance"." Federation or 
complete union of otherwise competing organizations may be even 
more effective, other things being equal. On the 1961 merger of 
the Farmers and Settlers' Association and the Wheat and Wool-
growers' Association into the United Farmers' and Woolgrowers' 
Association of N.S.W., it was thought—though it remained to be 
proved—that this would "give N.S.W. farmers a concerted voice 
in representations to the State and Federal governments".** 
Previous examples have indicated the importance of close associa-
tion with a major political party, such as farmers' organizations 
163 
Effectiveness 
have with the Country Party, manufacturing and business organiza-
tions have with the Liberals, and the trade unions have with Labor. 
We have also illustrated the advantages of the parliamentary 
(especially Legislative Council) connections of financial, com-
mercial, and manufacturing interests. To give another example: in 
April 1971 a complaint about transport costs by the chairman of 
the Australian Wool Board was immediately taken up—without 
reference to the Premier or the Minister of Transport—by the 
Deputy Premier and leader of the Country Party, who attacked 
his colleagues in general and the railways in particular. Before the 
end of the month the government had promised to reduce wool 
freights.*' 
But perhaps the most important factor is the capacity of some 
organizations to simplify the tasks of government. As Peter Loveday 
has said: 
Governments need consent and co-operation and sometimes information 
and even administrative assistance from them and in turn they relieve 
governments of some of the work of gathering, assessing and classifying 
grievances and demands. Governments like to deal with only one body 
representing a particular interest and they have expected the groups 
to be "responsible" in their demands and negotiations."' 
The main features that seem to qualify an association for such a 
potentially advantageous relationship with government seem to be 
the size and comprehensiveness of its membership, the strength and 
durability of its organization, and its identification with one of the 
major economic interests that are significant for public policy and 
government finance. Although most such associations have sympa-
thetic relations with one or other of the political parties, that is 
less important than their capacity to "aggregate and articulate" 
significant political demands and mediate between government and 
major interest groups, precisely because that capacity is useful to 
governments of any complexion while party connections can be 
wasting assets when the wrong party is in office. This is one reason, 
of course, why many associations (including nearly all white-collar 
and professional unions) fight shy of the label "political" (meaning 
"political-party") and reject party affiliation. The advantages to an 
association and its members of the more permanent relationship 
with government as such are obvious: they can expect to be 
consulted in advance of decisions affecting their interests, they gain 
direct access to official and political decision-makers when they have 
claims or advice to put forward, and their views are generally 
heeded even if not adopted. 
A familiar form of this symbiotic relationship is the "client 
status" some groups enjoy with a corresponding official organization 
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—as farmers with departments of agriculture—under which the 
public servants regulate the relevant activities of the group while 
acting as advocates for their interests within the governmental 
machine. A further development of the relationship is the inclusion 
of group representatives within statutory government bodies with 
advisory or decision-making powers. In New South Wales the 
leaders of the relevant associations are generally consulted, formally 
or informally, when such representatives are being selected for any 
of the numerous bodies of this kind. But most commonly it is the 
interest group, not the association, that is held to be represented, 
and the actual selection is made by ministers or by a vote of group 
(not only association) members. 
Primary industry provides the most numerous examples of 
economic group representation. There are marketing boards for 
eggs, rice, wine grapes, lemons, other citrus fruits, dried fruits, 
tobacco leaf, grain sorghum, barley, oats, oilseeds, and bananas. 
Most of them are constituted under the Marketing of Primary 
Products Act, which provides for a board to be formed upon the 
request of producers after taking a poll of at least three-fifths of 
those entitled to vote, in which at least half of those voting are 
in favour. Many of them have operated since the 1920s. In a typical 
case, such as the Egg Marketing Board (1928), there are seven 
members of whom two are nominated by the government and five 
elected by the producers. There is also a Grain Elevators Board 
to control the bulk handling of wheat, with seven members including 
four representatives of the wheatgrowers. The Dairy Products Board 
determines monthly quotas for sale in the state at the fixed home 
consumption price; in addition to the government members ap-
pointed by the Minister for Agriculture it has six other members 
representing proprietary and co-operative manufacturers and the 
Primary Producers' Union. 
Two bodies with somewhat different functions illustrate the 
recent trend towards recognizing a consumer interest as such. Since 
1965 the Bread Industry Advisory Committee, which advises the 
Minister of Labour and Industry on measures to improve the 
making and distribution of bread and sanitary and production 
improvements in bakehouses, has included two representatives of 
consumers as well as two each of employers and employees. The 
Dairy Industry Authority, established in 1970 to control the quality, 
supply, and distribution of milk and cream throughout New South 
Wales, comprises a chairman and deputy chairman, two represent-
atives of registered dairymen, and a representative of the milk 
consumers." 
Thus representation at important levels of government decision-
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making is not restricted to economic interest groups; nor is it 
confined to decision-making in the economic sphere. Professional 
associations, though powerfully organized, are not large bodies by 
the standards of some of the economic interest groups, but they 
are widely represented on state advisory and policy-making commit-
tees in the fields of public health, industrial safety, design standards, 
scientific and industrial research, and the regulation of professional 
practice itself. Furthermore, some of the interests previously 
unorganized or neglected are increasingly recognized in this way. 
Since 1969 the N.S.W. Aborigines Advisory Council, created to 
advise the minister on policy matters, has comprised the Director 
of Aboriginal Welfare and nine Aboriginals of whom six are 
selected by Aboriginals themselves. In the same year a Consumer 
Affairs Council with corresponding functions was established with 
consumer representation. The Totalizator Agency Board set up in 
1964 to conduct off-course totalizator betting has nine members of 
whom seven are nominated by the various racing clubs. The State 
Pollution Control Commission, dating from 1970, includes repre-
sentatives of the Local Government Association, the Shires Associa-
tion, primary industry, and commercial and conservation interests. 
At first glance institutional status of these kinds must seem in 
all ways a more powerful means of interest-group influence than 
the sporadic—even if sometimes dramatic—efforts at influence from 
outside the government machine that have provided the bulk of the 
examples in this chapter. It may well be that most ad hoc attempts, 
especially by the smaller and more impermanent organizations, to 
promote or prevent some official activity are more effective in 
salving the conscience or self-esteem of group members than in 
achieving their primary aim. Public officials have so many other 
things—and so many other interest groups—to think about. 
But that would be too facile a conclusion. In the first place, it 
can be argued that the "built-in" representatives on public boards 
are mostly engaged in relatively straightforward decisions within 
an established policy. Loveday makes the more general point 
that— 
The major groups have virtually ceased to regard electoral work as an 
effective way of advancing their demands although they may still 
support a candidate in symbolic protest against an action they disap-
prove of, make a statement on the issues of the election or take part 
in referendum campaigns. The main groups have become more in-
terested too in the administration of policies as disputes about them 
have been settled by legislation, and as administrative institutions have 
been set up or given new tasks to perform under it." 
What this means, in many cases, is that the crucial struggle for 
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interest representation has been waged in the past by the more 
painful processes of "putting views" and exerting "pressure". 
Furthermore, the incorporation of group representatives in the 
government structure can be a mixed blessing for the group. The 
representative gains inside knowledge, but the conditions of his 
appointment may sometimes prevent him from disclosing it to the 
group's advantage. He stands for a "group interest", but his very 
admittance to official councils may make him see that interest in 
a different light from his constituents. By joining a statutory board 
he has accepted public responsibilities that can sometimes clash 
with his loyalty to the interests he is supposed to represent. These 
are familiar problems. 
In the second place, the influence of organized groups cannot 
be judged solely by their success on specific occasions. The effect 
of propaganda and electoral activity on public opinion and party 
policies, of lobbying, non-compliance, or industrial intransigence on 
official attitudes, may be cumulative. Changes rejected for years 
by one government may be accepted ultimately by another, 
especially if they seem to be gaining public approval and—like the 
new orientations towards conservation, urban growth, or the status 
of women—are confirmed (or as is often the case, anticipated) by 
scientific, official, and social research and experience. These are 
subtle and complex processes whose connections are not easy to 
trace. They are not simply a question of "pressure" by a class of 
"groups", but coterminous with democratic politics in its broadest 
sense. 
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The Government in Parliament 
The representative parliament is the symbol and instrument of the 
legal identity and autonomy of the state—since 1856 in relation 
to the founding government in Britain, since 1901 in relation to 
the federal government in Australia. From the earlier date the 
parliament was for the most part freed from imperial control, to 
make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of New 
South Wales in all cases whatsoever.' From the later date this 
freedom was formally restricted in the fields expressly assigned by 
the Australian Constitution to the federal parliament, and only to 
the extent that the Constitution assigned powers exclusively to that 
parliament, and that the federal parliament passed laws within the 
field of its "concurrent" powers, when the federal laws would prevail 
over inconsistent state laws. 
The parliament, properly understood, remains politically the most 
significant institution in the state. All the political activities so far 
discussed in this book are ultimately focused on some aspect of 
it: on forming or re-forming, sustaining or restraining, exhorting 
or obstructing a government and an opposition "in" the parliament. 
All the administrative activities to be discussed later are subject 
to legal authorization and political scrutiny in the parliament. It 
makes and changes most of the laws and governmental institutions 
that affect daily life in the state, and provides the most publicized 
arena in which their value can be challenged and their adminis-
tration criticized. 
How effectively the parliament fulfils these functions we shall 
inquire later on. First let us properly understand its nature. It is 
not simply the body of private members, meeting for a couple of 
months of the year, whom many commentators picture as a 
corporate but helpless group confronting a separate and omnipotent 
executive government—the cabinet. 
In the first place, as defined by the Constitution Act 1902, " 'The 
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legislature' means his Majesty the King with the advice and consent 
of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly" (s.3). In this 
formulation the Crown is not only part of the legislature but the 
active and initiating part. Of course the Crown is represented in 
New South Wales by the state Governor and for most practical 
purposes he is merely the instrument of the real executive govern-
ment—the ministry of the day. The ministry itself is in the 
parliament: its members must be members of the Legislative 
Council or Assembly. 
In the second place, a definition which recognizes the executive 
as the active part of the legislature, while the Council and Assembly 
merely provide "advice and consent", truly reflects the long history 
which began in the thirteenth century when the King himself 
created the "mother" parliament at Westminster to legitimize his 
tax-raising and tap the "public opinion" of the day. "His" ministers 
(as they are still called) gradually took over his sovereign power 
in subsequent centuries; parliament as a whole did not. With only 
brief interruptions, the effective ruler has always been the executive 
government, whether in the form of King or Protector or elected 
ministry, and whether advised or influenced by courtiers or mis-
tresses or public servants or political party officials. In Britain there 
was one vital change in the eighteenth century when it was accepted 
that ministries could not hold office without the support of a 
majority of the more representative house of the legislature, and 
another in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when that 
house itself gradually came to represent the whole population. In 
New South Wales both these principles were accepted from the 
first decade of self-government in the 1850s. It makes sense to say 
that according to current conventions the ministry must have 
legislative and therefore popular support. It would make much less 
sense to say that the ministry is (in Bagehot's phrase) a "committee 
of the legislature", as though the legislature as a whole were 
properly the governing body. That provides a mistaken basis on 
which to assess the working of the system at any given time. 
In the third place, quite apart from the fact that cabinet is really 
a part of the legislature, the notion of "parliament" confronting 
"the cabinet" oversimplifies reality. The characteristic relationships 
in and around a legislature like that of New South Wales divide 
it into a number of different and sometimes changing groups. They 
may include the cabinet, the backbenchers of its own party, possibly 
the members of a coalition partner, certainly the Opposition leaders 
and their backbenchers, members of minor parties, and perhaps 
factions within some of the parliamentary parties.^ 
In this chapter we examine the web of powers and relationships 
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both in and between the parliamentary institutions, taken in 
ascending order of their influence today: the Governor, the Legisla-
tive Council, the Legislative Assembly, and the executive govern-
ment, which operates in law as the Executive Council but informally 
and more significantly as the cabinet. 
THE GOVERNOR 
Once the absolute ruler of New South Wales on behalf of the 
British Colonial Office, the Governor is now officially described (in 
the N.S.W. Year Book) as "the local representative of the Crown, 
and . . . titular head of the Government . . .". Thus the office, its 
many nominal duties, and its associated rituals are, for the most 
part, sedulously preserved mementoes of a different age. Yet inertia 
and sentiment, though probably the main preservatives, are not the 
only reasons for its survival. 
Functions 
The Governor's function as a link with, and medium of control by, 
the British government is virtually gone. By law, the Governor's 
assent in the name of the Queen is needed to make New South 
Wales bills into acts; he must still reserve some categories of bills 
for the Queen's personal assent; and she may disallow within two 
years any bill that has received his assent.' By convention the 
Governor's assent is now automatic for bills within his own 
competence; no New South Wales bill has been disallowed in 
Britain since responsible government was granted in 1855; no 
reserved bill has failed to receive the sovereign's assent since 
Federation in 1901. Governors are still appointed by the Queen's 
Commission, on the advice of the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, to an office established and defined by 
royal Letters Patent and subject to Instructions issued in the 
Queen's name, but these links are no longer in any sense a medium 
of British influence on New South Wales government; by the 1930s 
British ministers had ceased to control and even to guide state 
governors in the exercise of their constitutional powers. 
By the end of the Second World War the umbilical tie to Britain 
seemed finally severed, so far as it was personified in the Governor. 
From 1888 onwards Australian colonial governments had secured 
the right to be consulted by the British government on the 
nomination of governors, but despite periodic requests by their 
successors (except Victoria) up to 1926, British governments would 
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not concede to them the right to nominate Australians for the post. 
The Balfour Declaration of 1926, and the practice recognized by 
the 1929-30 Imperial Conference that dominion Governors-General 
were thenceforth appointed on direct advice to the sovereign by 
dominion governments, were held not to apply to the Australian 
states, which continued to receive British Governors appointed on 
the advice of British governments. A breakthrough was not achieved 
until 1946, when the N.S.W. Labor government's recommendation 
was accepted in the appointment of Sir John Northcott as the first 
Australian Governor of this state. Both of his successors have been 
Australians, recommended by a Labor and a non-Labor government 
respectively, though formally still appointed on the advice of British 
ministers." 
Though they have, in Bagehot's phrase, "the right to be 
consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn", there is not 
a great deal of evidence of N.S.W. governors playing the part of 
counsellor and confidant to their ministers to the extent attributed 
to British sovereigns since Victoria's time. This is not too surprising, 
considering that many of the Governors, even in the present 
century, have been military officers (from all three services), and 
that before their appointment few even of the others had first-hand 
political experience anywhere, and none in Australia. Moreover, 
while they remained effective delegates of the imperial government 
they could rarely expect to enjoy the full confidence of local 
politicians. In any case, they could never be viewed by the 
professional politician—especially those to whom, more recently, 
they owed their appointment—in the light in which British ministers 
must regard the hereditary monarch spending a lifetime in her role. 
Governors have always been more ephemeral officials than 
monarchs or politicians. In form they are appointed "during the 
Sovereign's pleasure"; current official sources say "the normal term 
of office" is "in practice . . . 5 years"; in fact only four of the thirty-
two Governors have served within ten months of that norm either 
way, their terms ranging from the two months of Admiral Sir 
Murray Anderson in 1936 to Lachlan Macquarie's twelve years 
(1809-21). Each of the three Australian Governors has served at 
least eight years, and the reappointment of Sir Roden Cutler for 
two years from January 1977 gives him the opportunity to beat 
Macquarie's record term.* 
The Governor does have his share of the Queen's other main 
functions: ceremonial and social, and constitutional. On the political 
significance of the former, judgements must be subjective. The 
Governor and his wife still enjoy the most honorific positions in 
the state, though in the much larger and wealthier community of 
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today it does not appear that Government House retains its colonial 
pre-eminence as an arbiter of manners and high temple of "society". 
An orthodox view would be that the ceremonial and social functions 
are more significant than "mere pageantry", and is well summarized 
by Rose: 
Many aspects of these functions, carried out as they are free from party 
political and factional considerations, have a unifying effect and 
personify the spirit of the State and its people as a whole . . . Whether 
addressing annual general meetings of societies or important community 
gatherings a Governor's remarks and comments, because they are 
disinterested and politically unbiased. . . can make an important con-
tribution to national harmony and understanding. The Governor, . . . 
by his visits to various centres throughout the State, fosters and 
encourages public endeavour and voluntary service and a sense that, 
as the Queen's representative, he is in close and constant contact with 
the people.' 
The former A.L.P. plank proposing abolition of state gov-
ernorships was associated partly with the wider plank on unification 
of the states, and partly with hostility to ornamental and costly 
relics of imperialism. The 1957 A.L.P. State Conference by 344 
votes to 264 asked the Cahill Labor government to "reconsider" 
its decision to introduce a pension when the first Australian 
Governor retired, and also took the opportunity to call on the 
government to carry out the abolition plank. But state politics have 
since seen little of such quasi-republican sentiment. The unification 
and abolition planks have since gone, and on occasions like the 
Address-in-Reply debate on the Governor's speech to parliament. 
Labor members vie with non-Labor (as of course they not uncom-
monly did in the era of British Governors) in tributes to the vice-
regal performance of just such functions as Rose outlines. 
The Governor's constitutional functions are numerous and some 
of them very important, but for the most part they consist in a 
tissue of legal fictions parallel to those surrounding the monarchy 
in Britain. Nominally all powers of state still belong to and are 
exercised by or in the name of the Crown, which may be "advised" 
by various bodies elected or otherwise, though in the last resort 
only the advice of ministers is constitutionally binding. Even the 
legislation of the N.S.W. parliament, some of which purports to 
define or limit the powers of the Crown, is in form enacted by the 
Queen, "by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative 
Council and Legislative Assembly", and the Governor assents to 
bills in her name. On her behalf he also goes through the motions 
(mostly by way of his signature) of performing all the important 
executive functions of government, as allocated to him in his 
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Commission and Instructions, in the Letters Patent constituting his 
office, in United Kingdom and New South Wales statutes (the latter 
by far the richest source quantitatively), and in the Commonwealth 
Constitution. 
The Governor's signature is needed to give legal force to all 
administrative acts that cannot legally be authorized by individual 
ministers or public servants. His more important functions are 
directed to keeping the essential machinery of government in 
operation—in most cases, but not all, by purely formal acts. They 
include the summoning, proroguing, and dissolution of parliament, 
fixing the times and places for its sessions, appointing judges and 
other senior officials of the state, removing and suspending public 
officials (subject to safeguards in some cases), and recommending 
(by his Message) the purposes for which money appropriations are 
sought from parliament. Among the not purely formal functions 
lies his duty to see that there is always a ministry to carry on the 
government of the state. At the opening of each parliamentary 
session the Governor delivers the speech in which the ministry sets 
out its legislative plans for the session. He also appoints Executive 
Councillors (that is, ministers of the Crown) and summons and 
presides at meetings of the Executive Council, normally once a 
week, at each of which it may authorize some hundreds of 
regulations, orders, and proclamations. The Governor's authority 
is needed for making grants of public land and in most cases for 
acquiring land for public purposes; for granting pardons or re-
mission of criminal penalties or releasing habitual criminals on 
licence; for raising various public corporation and local body loans. 
Under the Commonwealth Constitution the Governor issues the 
writs for the election of the state's senators and certifies the state 
parliament's or government's choice of a replacement to fill any 
casual vacancy in their number. Both of the latter powers became 
politically significant in 1975 as possible means to weaken the 
federal Labor government. 
The fiction of virtual omnipotence, of course, is counterbalanced 
as in Britain by the long-established rules of "responsible govern-
ment". These are embodied mainly in conventions, or unwritten 
codes of conduct, which those concerned observe as a matter of 
common sense or habit. Many of them are also assumed or explicitly 
recognized in law or in documents like the Royal Instructions 
(which express a relationship between the Crown and the Governor 
but do not themselves have the force of law). Responsible govern-
ment has two complementary meanings. On the one hand it refers 
to the principle broadly expressed in clause VI of the Instructions 
that "in the execution of the powers and authorities vested in him 
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the Governor shall be guided by the advice of the Executive 
Council". (The Interpretation Act 1897 makes this a legal obliga-
tion as regards powers vested in "the Governor" by statute.) In 
practice the Executive Council's "advice" is normally given at its 
regular meetings, which themselves are purely formal and therefore 
attended only by the Governor as president and the quorum of two 
councillors. Indeed the minister appointed as vice-president of the 
Executive Council can, by presiding himself, relieve the Governor 
of much of the burden of attending the more tedious meetings 
personally. At these meetings the Executive Council formally 
ratifies decisions which have mostly been framed by public servants 
and individual ministers, and which have no legal force without 
the approval of the Council which, in its entirety, is simply the 
ministry in its legal guise.' On the other hand, responsible govern-
ment can be taken to refer to the principle implied in the N.S.W. 
Constitution Act—though not explicitly stated there—that the 
ministry must consist of members of the legislature who have the 
support of a majority in the popularly elected house. 
Nevertheless, responsible government is not a completely self-
sustaining system, in which popular elections automatically produce 
a ministry responsible only to parliament and the people and the 
Governor is no more than a registrar of parliamentary and 
ministerial decisions. There are exceptions to the rule that the 
Governor acts only on advice. The Governor's judgement is 
sometimes needed to ensure that there is a majority government 
in office. And it is even asserted officially in the Year Book section 
on the Governor that "he is guardian of the Constitution and . . . 
[i]n extreme cases his discretion constitutes a safeguard against 
malpractice". These potentialities of the Governor's position are 
loosely called his reserve powers, conveying that they are vaguely 
defined but limited in scope and that except in the last resort he 
uses them autonomously at his peril. There are, indeed, specific 
conventions to follow in most of the small but vital residual areas 
where there may be neither law nor responsible advice to guide 
him, and there is the overriding convention that he must never show 
partiality between the political actors, especially the political 
parties. It has generally been assumed that the sanctions that guard 
the conventions are the probability that a New South Wales 
ministry can secure the recall (no longer an appropriate term) of 
an offending Governor and the possibility that any use of the reserve 
powers which miscarries could endanger the future of the office 
itself. It is not clear how the federal constitutional crisis of 
November 1975 has affected these propositions as they apply in 
a state. 
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The functions never exercised formally "upon advice" are the 
assent to bills, the appointment of ministers, and the prorogation 
and dissolution of parliament: all are legally vested in the Governor 
alone, but are generally exercised informally on the advice of the 
Premier. In modern times the only bills not assented to after passing 
both houses were a number which Governor Sir Philip Game 
considered to have lapsed in May 1932 when he dissolved the 
Legislative Assembly after dismissing the Lang government in very 
unusual circumstances. The bills in question were never presented 
for assent. Normally convention requires automatic assent. Conven-
tion also requires the Governor to appoint ministers to their 
portfolios and to the Executive Council (all ministers—and min-
isters only— receive both appointments), or to dismiss an ordinary 
minister, only on the advice of the Premier. (The resignation or 
dismissal of a Premier ipso facto entails that of the whole ministry.) 
In appointing the Premier himself the Governor usually has, by 
convention, the advice of the outgoing Premier to commission the 
Opposition leader (or some other obvious person), especially if the 
latter has just secured a parliamentary majority either by an 
important vote in the Assembly or by winning a general election. 
In the event of an equivocally divided house, for example where 
two contending forces appear to be equal or none of several seems 
to have a majority, a defeated Premier's advice may prove 
ineffective and the Governor is then entitled, by convention, to seek 
advice where he may—even outside parliament if necessary—and 
to find a potential Premier by his own devices. In practice the 
probability of these contingencies is remote in a developed party 
system where cohesive groupings and their leaders are easily 
identified; New South Wales has not seen a really difficult case 
in the present century, but a good example (and the latest) was 
provided by Lord Wakehurst's choice of Alexander Mair as Premier 
in 1939." 
The Reserve Powers 
The Governor may not only upon occasion have to act without 
advice; he can also reject advice. The Royal Instructions still note 
in clause VI that "if in any case he shall see sufficient cause to 
dissent from the opinion of the [Executive] Council, he may act 
in the exercise of his said powers and authorities in opposition to 
the opinion of the Council, reporting the matter to Us without delay, 
with the reasons for his so acting". The import of clause VI is 
merely that the Governor should inform the British government 
when he acts against ministerial advice. Having no legal force, the 
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Instructions provide no authority for so acting. The authority lies 
in the royal prerogative, and would not be affected if there were 
no such Instruction as in clause VI. Naturally, in the interests of 
responsible government the possible scope of "sufficient cause" has 
been greatly narrowed by usage since the mid-nineteenth century 
when this passage was drafted. Discussion nowadays focuses on two 
possible classes of autonomous action by the Governor: the rejection 
of advice to dissolve parliament, which is simply the most difficult 
aspect of his duty to help the smooth working of the existing system; 
and the use of his powers as "a safeguard against malpractice" 
(the Year Book's phrase) or to guard against the subversion of the 
responsible government system itself. 
If ministers with a majority in the Legislative Assembly ("having 
the confidence of the house") advise the Governor to dissolve it 
before its three-year term expires, he is bound by convention to 
accede, and of course this is the normal prelude to general elections. 
If the government has lost its majority at a general election, by 
convention it normally resigns without waiting for the house to 
meet, and the Governor, on its advice, commissions the leader of 
the group or party that won the election. If the government has 
lost its majority by an adverse vote in the house on a motion of 
major importance, the Governor is not bound to accept its advice. 
For example, if instead of resigning forthwith the defeated Premier 
advises the Governor to dissolve the Assembly so that the electors 
"can decide the issue", the prevailing consensus among constitu-
tional lawyers is that the Governor can refuse a dissolution unless 
he sees no chance of forming an alternative government in the 
existing house. 
Opinions vary as to the considerations which should weigh with 
him if he does see such a chance. It is obviously impossible to lay 
down rules for diagnosing the prospects of creating a new and stable 
majority, or for assessing the claim of any ministry defeated in 
parliament to seek a verdict from the electorate in all the 
circumstances that might arise. Considerations thought to weigh 
against granting a dissolution (if an alternative government can be 
found in the house) have included the failure of the defeated 
government to obtain "supply" (a vote of moneys needed to run 
the administration over the election period and beyond); the absence 
of any important new issue of public policy; the unfair electoral 
advantage said to accrue to a party leader who secures a dissolution; 
the expense of holding an unnecessary election; the recency of the 
previous election (implying that a dissolution should not readily be 
granted in, say, a parliament's first year, or to a government which 
has recently had a dissolution); and even an alleged "principle that 
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Parliament is prima facie entitled to continue in existence for the 
period laid down in the Constitution Acts".' 
There have not been many cases in New South Wales, though 
precision about their number is difficult since some incidents are 
not clear-cut and not all cases are necessarily recorded. Charles 
Cowper was refused a dissolution by Sir William Denison in 1856 
and by Sir John Young in 1866. Sir Hercules Robinson refused 
a dissolution twice to John Robertson and once to Henry Parkes 
in 1877, and once to James Farnell in 1878. Lord Carrington 
refused Robertson a dissolution in 1886, and Earl Beauchamp 
refused one to George Reid in 1899. In December 1921, with the 
Assembly evenly divided and the government dependent on the vote 
of the Speaker (which proved undependable). Sir Walter Davidson 
refused a dissolution to Labor Premier Dooley after his defeat on 
the adjournment, commissioned the Nationalist leader Sir George 
Fuller as Premier, and refused him a dissolution when he had his 
own difficulties with the new Speaker; then on Fuller's resignation 
seven hours after taking office, recalled Dooley who secured a 
dissolution in the following February. The latter action seems to 
illustrate a principle that where a dissolution is refused and an 
alternative government cannot be formed or, if formed, immediately 
seeks dissolution or is defeated in a critical division, the Governor's 
duty is to retain or recall the Premier originally refused and grant 
his request.'" More stable party politics under a different electoral 
system has reduced the likelihood of all such crises nearly to zero; 
even on their few appearances, political controversy over the 
conventions to be applied has been negligible compared with the 
debate in the textbooks. 
According to some commentators the Governor as "guardian of 
the Constitution" may legitimately refuse assent to legislation, 
reject "unconstitutional" advice, and dismiss the ministry or dissolve 
parliament against advice—even the advice of a ministry with a 
parliamentary majority; but as R.D. Lumb says, "the extreme 
circumstances which would justify the exercise of such powers 
cannot be exhaustively enumerated". Lumb sums up his own list 
as being various forms of disregard for "the rule of law", but would 
include a government's subversion of parliamentary supremacy or 
ministerial responsibility, attempting to rule without the support of 
parliament or contrary to its laws (of which a prolonged attempt 
to rule without supply would seem to be an example), and legislating 
to abolish the party system or establish a one-party State. He also 
cites from Forsey a list which he thinks "too wide", but which is 
interesting for its inclusion of a number of matters that have 
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activated some of the Governor's "reserve powers" in New South 
Wales: 
If the Crown were asked to "swamp" the Upper House (in jurisdictions 
where such a power exists), or to assent to some major change in the 
electoral system, . . . abolition of the Upper House, or of the Monarchy, 
prolongation of the life of Parliament otherwise than by general consent, 
a change from private to social ownership of the means of production 
(or vice versa), then it might well insist that any such change should 
first be submitted to the judgement of the electors." 
In 1916 Sir Gerald Strickland withheld assent to a bill to extend 
the life of parliament for one year, passed by Premier Holman's 
minority government with the support of the Opposition, alleging 
that Holman did not have the confidence of the Assembly and 
refusing to "transact business" with him—which Holman regarded 
as a threat of dismissal. In 1925 Sir Dudley de Chair rejected 
several requests by Premier Lang for twenty-five additional appoint-
ments to the nominee Legislative Council, intended to secure a 
majority for a bill to abolish the Council (but in December agreed 
to this). In 1926 de Chair unequivocally rejected Lang's request 
for a further ten appointments—the first attempt at abolition having 
failed. In 1930-31 Sir Philip Game four times refused requests by 
the third Lang ministry for additional appointments to the Legisla-
tive Council (finally agreeing in November 1931 to appoint twenty-
five); in 1932 Game dismissed this ministry, against its advice, when 
it had a parliamentary majority, because he believed, against the 
advice of the Attorney-General, that it was breaching a federal law. 
There have been no further incidents of the kind in the ensuing 
forty years or more, but the federal constitutional crisis of 1975 
must revive interest in basic questions about the Governor's position 
and powers. 
The questions are essentially political ones, though they originate 
in the evolution of constitutional conventions. Has a state Governor 
potentially more discretion in a crisis than other constitutional 
heads? Does this make his position—personally or institutionally 
—stronger or more vulnerable in a crisis? What factors support 
autonomous action by a Governor? What factors are conducive to 
the survival of the Governorship? 
The position of state Governors has become paradoxical. In the 
nineteenth century, British governments oscillated between using 
the Governor as an instrument to protect British policies from brash 
colonial politicians, and punishing him under pressure from those 
same politicians whenever he ran foul of one faction or another 
in his attempts to maintain the constitutional proprieties as he saw 
them. In New South Wales the second trend was clearly dominant 
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in 1916 when in response to Holman's appeals the Colonial Office 
promptly recalled Governor Strickland after instructing him to 
assent to the Legislative Assembly Continuance Bill.'^ This at least 
implied that the Governor could still be held answerable to the 
British government for the way in which he exercised his powers. 
That also could have been the case in 1925 if—as de Chair 
subsequently claimed—Whitehall instructed Governor de Chair to 
give way to Premier Lang's request for twenty-five new appoint-
ments to the Legislative Council, after the Governor had tried for 
three months to fob Lang off with fifteen. In 1926, however, when 
Lang was demanding ten more appointments, L.S. Amery, Con-
servative Secretary of State for the Dominions, met Lang's request 
to override de Chair with the response that "it would not be proper 
for the Secretary of State to issue instructions to the Governor with 
regard to the exercise of his constitutional duties", and that 
"established constitutional principles require that the question 
should be settled between the Governor and the Ministry"." This 
attitude was definitely confirmed in 1931-32, when the Labour 
Dominions Secretary of the day rejected requests by the third Lang 
ministry and the Legislative Assembly to instruct Governor Game 
to accept ministerial advice to appoint more Legislative Councillors; 
the British minister, while securing full reports from Game on the 
developing situation, left him entirely free to pursue his own course 
of action, which culminated in dismissing Lang's government for 
"committing a breach of the law"—although a Dominions Office 
opinion against just such a step was in draft at the moment when 
Game acted. 
The propriety of Game's final step has also been questioned by 
constitutional lawyers, notably H.V. Evatt. Evatt, like the Domin-
ions Office, was concerned less with whether lawbreaking—and how 
much of it—^justifies a dismissal of a majority government than with 
whether the Governor, "whether proficient or not in legal learning, 
is entitled to determine for himself any legal issue which may be 
raised".'" In 1932 the New South Wales government had defaulted 
in its interest payments on the public debt. The Commonwealth 
government, in accordance with the federal-state Financial Agree-
ment of 1927, had paid the interest and sought to recover the money 
from New South Wales by taking direct control of state revenues 
under a Financial Agreements Enforcement Act it passed in 1932. 
Federal Proclamation no. 42 of 1932 under that act purported to 
direct N.S.W. public servants to handle state revenues as instructed 
by the federal Treasurer, but Lang's cabinet ordered its officials 
through a state Treasury Circular to prevent the money falling into 
federal hands. Part of this circular, in Evatt's view, "involved non-
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compliance with a section of the New South Wales Audit Act", 
but Game's explicit reason for dismissing the government was his 
belief that the circular ordered public servants "to commit a direct 
breach of . . . Proclamation No. 42"." 
A majority state government, if it so desired, could probably 
validate any apparent breach of its own parliament's legislation 
except an attempt to by-pass the provisions of the Constitution Act 
governing abolition or alteration of the Legislative Council. It could 
not similarly override a valid federal law, and the events of 1932 
showed that not only the Governor's reserve powers, but also the 
powers of the Commonwealth, could in certain circumstances limit 
responsible government in a state. In this instance it was the 
Governor who invoked the federal "law" and "punished" the state 
government for its "breach". Evatt argues that, as a conflict 
between Commonwealth and state, this was a case in which the 
questions of legality could and should have been referred to the 
ordinary courts. He implies that it was not enough for the Governor 
to claim that, when challenged on the point, Lang "did not admit" 
but also "did not deny" that his ministers were breaking the law. 
Game "might reasonably have insisted upon Mr Lang's calling the 
judicial power into action for the purposes of determining the 
validity of the Commonwealth Proclamation No. 42",'^ or some 
unspecified litigant (presumably the Commonwealth government) 
could have sought an injunction preventing further action under 
the state Treasury circular if it was illegal. As it happened, in April 
1932 the High Court of Australia had upheld the validity of the 
Financial Agreements Enforcement Act in two cases (the "Gar-
nishee cases") brought against the Commonwealth by Lang himself. 
But this did not establish the illegality of the N.S.W. Treasury 
Circular nor the validity or application of Proclamation 42, which 
were not specifically tested in the courts. 
The issue raised by Evatt, of course, is not whether Lang's 
government could or should have escaped dismissal—a question to 
which many other aspects of that complex crisis are relevant—but 
whether the Governor's actual mode of proceeding was legitimate. 
Weeks after the dismissal Game wrote: "I am still wondering if 
I did right." For Evatt, that uncertainty confirmed the thesis of 
his book: "Although no person can confidently assert that Sir P. 
Game was guilty of a breach of constitutional duty, that is mainly 
because the reserve powers have not yet been defined . . ."" 
As to the reserve powers in general, Evatt thought that this lack 
of definition, combined with the non-committal attitudes of Domin-
ions Secretaries in 1926 and 1932, placed a state Governor "in a 
position, relatively at least, of complete irresponsibility. The King 
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himself does not occupy such a position"—a viewpoint echoed by 
Lumb when he wrote that "the State Governor may possess a wider 
sphere of discretionary authority than resides in the Commonwealth 
Governor-General and certainly wider than that inhering in the 
monarch".'* These are not comparisons of legal powers (which in 
this sphere are presumably much the same for the Queen and her 
representatives) but of something much vaguer, namely the possible 
political consequences of the exercise of discretion in different 
circumstances. The precise possibilities are rarely specified—much 
less linked to particular actions—but they must include reprimand 
or recall for a Governor, enforced abdication or worse for the 
monarch, and abolition of the office in either case. 
In this context what might be called the politically viable 
discretions of the Governor-General, on one view, are more circum-
scribed than those of a state governor, apparently because the 
former is appointed and therefore removable on the direct advice 
of Australian ministers, making it appear unthinkable for him to 
use his discretion against their wishes, while the Governor remains 
formally the nominee and agent of British ministers who have 
nevertheless washed their hands of his doings, so that he is left 
in a kind of limbo of unfettered discretion in the area not covered 
by specific conventions. Again, it has been argued that because both 
Governor-General and Governor are short-term appointees, either 
"might be permitted" (or in a more plausible formulation, might 
be able to exercise with impunity) "greater constitutional powers 
'vis-a-vis' his Ministers, than the King in Great Britain", since the 
former "may err and be recalled without his office necessarily 
disappearing or falling into disrepute; not so the monarch"." 
The Canberra crisis of 1975 seems to have blurred such 
distinctions. The Governor-General dismissed his ministry on 
grounds no less controversial than Game's in 1932—and yet he 
avoided the immediate danger of his own recall simply by conceal-
ing his hand and by astute timing. A state Governor might have 
succeeded as well with similar tactics, but surely—whatever British 
government aloofness in 1926 and 1932 may have meant—at no 
less risk of prior removal? And in the longer term have not the 
Governor-General's tactics of 1975, not least by putting in question 
the adequacy of the sanction of recall, thrown both offices into 
jeopardy? On the other hand, although the reigning monarch may 
have less scope for constitutional intervention than her represent-
atives in Australia seem to have, the monarchy itself does seem 
better placed to survive the indiscretions of its incumbents than the 
governorship, federal or state. Meantime, what supports are avail-
able to a state Governor who feels obliged to use any of his reserve 
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powers in a crisis? 
Support by a parliamentary or electoral majority may be 
comforting, if not crucial, after the event, but is quite invalid as 
a prior guide to action if the object is to avoid any hint of political 
calculation by the Governor. Any suggestion that the Governor has 
only to "back the right political horse", and so be "vindicated by 
the verdict of the electors", would confuse the issue of his 
relationship to the doctrine of popular supremacy. Perhaps that 
relationship can be expressed by saying that the Governor's duty 
is to leave political conflicts to be settled by the play of parlia-
mentary and electoral majorities as long as those majorities are 
obtained and measured according to the laws and conventions of 
responsible government. If his help is indispensable to enable a 
changed parliamentary majority to be registered in the structure 
of the ministry, he may reluctantly intervene to help. He is not 
obliged to refer the question to the electors if he cannot get advice 
to do so from a ministry with a parliamentary majority, but even 
then the criterion for his decision is what will keep responsible 
government going with a minimum of fuss and expense, given the 
electors' right to have the last word at intervals not greater than 
three years. 
The stronger prerogatives, such as dismissing ministers or forcing 
a dissolution against advice, may likewise be seen in the modern 
context as instruments that can legitimately be used only where 
the ministry or parliament itself seems bent on abrogating this right 
of the electors. On this view the use of the reserve powers could 
not be justified merely by a Governor's belief that "the ministry 
no longer possesses the confidence of the electorate", or has 
"flagrantly flouted public opinion", to borrow time-worn phrases 
from Alexander.^" The Governor does not merely need to avoid a^ny 
appearance of taking party sides; it is equally important that he 
does not, as it were, appear to "bet" on the electorate's preference 
among the sides. In principle the electoral verdict cannot prove him 
"right" or "wrong". His concern is not to secure the electors' 
support for his own views, but only to ensure, so far as he is able, 
that there can be an electoral verdict at all. The question now is: 
what are the Governor's chances of bringing off any discretionary 
intervention, lacking, as he does, personal command of any adminis-
trative, financial, or coercive apparatus, and presumably confronting 
in a crisis a ministry supported by the popular house of parliament 
and directly in charge of such apparatus? 
The fact is that in New South Wales, except in the case of 
Holman and Strickland, which has puzzled most commentators, the 
Governor's use of his reserve powers has always been accepted. 
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however ungraciously. Colonial acquiescence in the nineteenth 
century might have been expected (though it was not always 
forthcoming in other colonies), but in 1926 the redoubtable Jack 
Lang bowed to Governor de Chair's ruling once the Dominions 
Secretary refused to intervene, and in 1932 the same Lang and 
his ministers went promptly (if not quietly) on the order of Governor 
Game, just as Prime Minister Whitlam did in 1975 on the order 
of Governor-General Kerr. 
Up to 1932 perhaps the strongest support that Governors had, 
apart from their own tact and good judgement, was the politicians' 
respect—for their impartiality and integrity in particular cases, and 
for the long-standing constitutional rights of the Crown in general. 
Other considerations may also have played a part. It is not obvious 
that a ministry wanting to defy a Governor's lawful ruling could 
be sure of the obedience of key state public servants—indeed it 
was one of them who jibbed at the "Treasury Circular" in 1932 
and so precipitated Lang's dismissal.-' Presumably also, a ministry 
must give a second thought, even if the Governor should not, to 
the ultimate electoral repercussions of a clash with a Governor 
acting within his constitutional rights. 
What the 1932 case made obvious, however, was that in certain 
political circumstances the coercive powers of the federal govern-
ment may provide the real sanctions behind a state Governor's 
exercise of the prerogative. Through the greater part of Lang's third 
ministry his most formidable political antagonist was not the 
Governor nor the state Opposition but the government at Canberra 
—especially after the U.A.P. victory in December 1931 when that 
government could fairly be seen as bent on hastening Lang's 
downfall by any means open to it. The available means were 
powerful—and are still more so today: in general, the states' 
dependence on federal financial resources; if the Financial Agree-
ment could be invoked, the sanctions entrenched in s. 105A of the 
Commonwealth Constitution; if "lawbreaking" or "anarchy" could 
be charged, the Commonwealth's monopoly of military force.-^ 
Such contingencies take us well beyond the constitutional role 
of the Governor. On the other hand it seems reasonable to expect 
that a state government with a parliamentary majority—provided 
it acted smartly—could now secure from the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Secretary, not a reprimand for a Governor or a direction 
to him to act in a particular way, but advice to the Queen to recall 
(i.e., dismiss) a Governor accused of using his reserve powers 
arbitrarily or excessively." Such an incident would not necessarily 
threaten the institution of the Governorship itself. Taken together, 
its symbolic, social, and constitutional functions may well commend 
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themselves to another generation or two of politicians as a useful 
adjunct and occasional lubricant to the purely partisan aspects of 
parliamentary party government. Some hints of its usefulness and 
limitations may be gleaned, mutatis mutandis, from those am-
bivalent pages of Bagehot's English Constitution which begin: "The 
best mode of testing what we owe to the Queen is to make a vigorous 
effort of the imagination, and see how we should get on without 
her." After some gloomy reflections on "the early acquired feeble-
ness of hereditary dynasties", he concludes that the "benefits of 
a good monarch are almost invaluable, but the evils of a bad 
monarch are almost irreparable".^" Others set surprising store by 
the custodial aspect of the role. Even Evatt believed that "situations 
may arise in which the exercise of reserve power will be the only 
possible method of giving to the electorate an opportunity of 
preventing some permanent and far-reaching constitutional change 
. . . If given command over the parliamentary position, there is no 
saying to what lengths certain persons may not be prepared to go 
in the exercise of legislative power." After assembling a number 
of similar views, Forsey is more emphatic: "The Crown is more 
than a quaint survival, a social ornament, a symbol, 'an automaton 
with no public will of its own'. It is an absolutely essential part 
of the parliamentary system."" 
We may conclude this section by noting the views of the Victorian 
(non-Labor) government, when it opposed the request of the other 
state governments (all Labor) in 1925 for the appointment of 
Australians as Governors. Writing for the information of the 
Dominions Secretary, Premier John Allan said that on the few but 
important occasions when it was necessary for the Governor to act 
upon his personal discretion it was essential that no suspicion of 
bias should be attached to him and that the opportunities of 
criticism of his actions should be reduced to a minimum. He 
continued: 
This can hardly be secured if persons are appointed, however dis-
tinguished, whose political associations are known and who have probably 
expressed within the State their ideas on public questions. The appoint-
ment by His Majesty of British citizens who have no local associations 
and are neutral on local political issues relieves the State from a number 
of difficult problems which are inherent in any other system." 
In logic this is an objection to the appointment of ex-politicians 
as Governors, rather than to appointing Australians as such. Those 
Australians since appointed as Governors in several states, including 
Victoria, have escaped the objection so far because they have not 
been drawn from political life. However, no charges of partiality 
have been made against any of the four Australian Governors-
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General since 1931 who had previously been politicians—only 
against the one who had been a federal judge and N.S.W. Chief 
Justice! 
Thus the problems feared by the Victorian government in 1925 
do not seem to be inherent in the appointment of Australian 
Governors; on the contrary one might expect local appointees to 
be less liable than British Governors to errors of judgement arising 
from unfamiliarity with the local scene, if not less willing to act 
against ministerial advice. Add to this the improbability of a state 
government's wanting to subvert responsible government or popular 
supremacy, and the institution seems to have a fair expectation of 
survival for some time to come. H.V. Evatt was anxious to facilitate 
this by enshrining in legislation definite rules to guide each exercise 
of the prerogative. Others argue that the variety of situations that 
may call for its exercise is not amenable to rigid rules and prefer 
to see the present flexibility retained. New South Wales Governors 
today may be imagined applying to themselves Bagehot's advice: 
"Probably in most cases the greatest wisdom of a constitutional 
king would show itself in well-considered inaction"." 
THE TWO HOUSES AND THEIR MEMBERS 
The Governor was the sole legislator in New South Wales from 
1788 until 1824, when he was joined by an appointed Legislative 
Council with nominated members and limited powers. The Council 
was made mainly elective after 1842, and ultimately framed the 
Constitution Act which was validated by British legislation in 1855 
and established responsible government and the parliament in its 
present general form. The old Legislative Council was replaced by 
two chambers, the Legislative Council and the Legislative As-
sembly. This bicameral structure, like so many others in the world, 
owed its inspiration to the form which the English parliament had 
taken—quite by accident—centuries before. The predominantly 
conservative politicians who created the New South Wales version 
of Westminster rationalized the form as calculated "to balance the 
'true' and 'permanent interests' of the country against the masses 
represented in the Assembly".^' This section deals with some 
matters that concern both houses. 
EligibiUty and working conditions 
Membership of either house is open to any qualified elector, with 
the proviso that Legislative Councillors must have at least three 
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years' residence in Australia. There are the usual exclusions of 
people with a personal interest in public service contracts other than 
as members of companies, and of holders of pensions or offices of 
profit under the Crown other than in the armed forces or as 
members of the Executive Council. A person may not simultane-
ously be a member of both houses, or of the state and federal 
parliaments. Women became eligible for membership of the As-
sembly in 1918, and of the Council in 1926 when J.T. Lang 
proposed to nominate ten women after the defeat of his first attempt 
to abolish the Council.'' Very few women have stood for the 
Assembly, and only four have been elected, the first in 1925 and 
the latest (a Liberal and then the only woman member) in 1973. 
Two women nominated by Lang sat in the unreformed Council 
between 1931 and 1934; since then ten have been elected, seven 
being members at the end of 1976—four as A.L.P. and three as 
Liberal Party members. 
Payment of members of the Assembly was introduced by the 
Parliamentary Representatives Allowance Act in 1889—nineteen 
years later than in Victoria, the first Australian colony to pay its 
legislators. It began with an annual allowance of three hundred 
pounds, followed by amendments at an average interval of five years 
—three years since the Second World War—which included 
reductions in 1922, 1930, 1931, and 1932. From 1902 to the end 
of 1975 the payments were authorized by the Constitution Act as 
amended by Parliamentary Allowances and Salaries Acts. The 
Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal Act 1975 provided for a 
judge or retired judge to determine each year the remuneration to 
be paid to members from the following 1 January. Payment to 
Legislative Councillors was adopted only in 1948, by adding a new 
section I7G to the Constitution Act. Although the amounts have 
thus long been set by legislation, the increases taken in 1920 were 
made after investigation by a royal commission, and some of the 
later changes followed less formal inquiries in 1956, 1966, and 1971. 
Their reports give details of the other material privileges of 
members, comparisons with other parliaments and occupations, and 
some references (not always reliable) to the history of payment of 
members in New South Wales. This history reflects evolving 
attitudes toward the functions of members generally, the place of 
the Opposition and of political party organization in parliament, 
and the distinctive character of the Legislative Council.'" 
Agitation for payment of Assembly members began in 1861, 
nearly thirty years before it was achieved. The main argument in 
favour was always the "democratic" one that some payment was 
neces.sary to enable people with little or no independent income to 
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serve in parliament and thus to offset "class bias" in representation. 
A supplementary argument was that payment would protect 
members from undue influence by wealthy electors or unprincipled 
ministers. The main counter-argument was that payment would 
turn representatives into professional politicians who would thereby 
lose touch with ordinary community life and whose interests would 
conflict with those of ordinary electors. Financial gain and not 
public service would become the primary motive for seeking 
election, and members would lack the independence of view of the 
man with a separate source of income. As a compromise between 
these views, payment was long regarded—and designated—as 
merely an "allowance" to recoup the member for some of the loss 
and expense incurred in parliamentary service. 
By the 1920s this had become a polite fiction, and allowances 
had reached the magnitude of a salary, based in accordance with 
the Edmunds report (1920) on the estimated expenses of elections, 
attending the house, donating to charities, parliamentary work, 
travel, and maintaining a home. It was agreed that Labor members 
especially could not hold a seat and pursue their kinds of calling 
at the same time; by the next decade Country Party members were 
claiming that this also applied to them. The duties of members were 
expanding with the scope of government and the size of electorates 
—the latter being a notable factor in the period of proportional 
representation. Increasingly it was recognized that maintaining 
personal contact with the electorate and attending to the inquiries 
and grievances of constituents were activities at least as important 
for the private member as helping to frame legislation and "control 
the executive" in the chamber—and that ministers also were not 
exempt from such obligations. In 1956 a separate "electorate 
allowance" for these purposes was recommended in the Wolfenden 
Report and applied to all members, on a graduated scale according 
to the distance of their electorates from parliament—though 
Wolfenden explicitly excluded "electioneering expenses" from his 
calculations, on the ground that "under a true democracy a Member 
should not be advantaged as against a prospective opponent for 
election" (para. 7). Wolfenden consistently referred to the basic 
allowance as a salary, but it was not officially so named until 1966, 
upon the urging of the Matthews Report. 
After the Second World War proposals for increased remunera-
tion, based on rising responsibilities and falling money values, were 
no longer opposed on a party basis, as they had regularly been 
earlier, with the arguments already outlined or the cry that "the 
electors should be consulted first". The year 1965 saw the first move 
by a non-Labor government to initiate increases in members' 
189 
The Two Houses and their Members 
salaries. The press automatically criticized all increases, but the 
parliament had at last accepted E.A. McTiernan's neat turning of 
the gibe against "professional politicians" into the declaration that 
"politics is in every sense of the word a profession"." 
From the beginnings of the parliament, salaries have been 
provided by separate legislation for ministers, with special recog-
nition for the Premier and some other senior ministers. Salaries 
for the Speaker and Chairman of Committees in the Assembly, who 
are elected by members for the duration of a parliament, were 
provided from an early date but not made statutory until 1920. 
(The Assembly also elects for the duration of each session five 
Temporary Chairmen of Committees who do not receive special 
remuneration.) Salaries for party officials in the parliament were 
introduced piecemeal over a long period. A special allowance was 
first provided for the leader of the Opposition in the Assembly in 
1912—the second allowance of the kind (following the Canadian 
House of Commons) among the parliaments of the British 
Commonwealth.'- The Government and Opposition whips, who 
became a regular feature of the Assembly in the 1880s, first received 
an extra allowance in 1932. In 1956 extra salaries were first 
provided for the deputy Premier, the deputy leader of the Opposi-
tion, and the leader of any third party (in practice the Country 
Party) with at least ten members in the Assembly, as long as they 
were not in office. In 1963 the deputy leader and whip of the third 
party were given extra expense allowances on the same condition. 
(The Country Party in the Legislative Council has an unofficial 
whip but he is not recognized by statute nor paid a special 
allowance.) 
Remuneration of Legislative Councillors began late but has been 
notably extended since 1966. Councillors received no money emolu-
ments until the Labor government introduced allowances in 1948, 
and then at a nominal rate on the long-standing assumptions that 
a Member would be free to follow his usual avocation . . . the sitting 
times of the Chamber have been fixed so that there would be the 
minimum interference with Members' private occupations . . . the 
activities of the Council are directed almost exclusively to a review of 
the legislative proposals of the Government, and the Members of the 
Council do not have constituents who are constantly consulting them 
. . . the number of sitting days in the Council have averaged roughly 
55 per cent of the number of sitting days in the Assembly." 
Hence the ordinary Councillor's total emoluments remained little 
more than a quarter of those of an M.L.A. for nearly twenty years, 
although from 1956 Councillors from non-metropolitan areas 
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received a living allowance for each day they attended sittings. In 
1966 the Matthews Report argued that the pay of Councillors had 
been "neglected"—because of uncertainty, Matthews thought, 
about the future of the house (see below)—and that the resulting 
need to attend to their outside interests interfered with their 
parliamentary duties. Comparing Legislative Council work and pay 
with those of other Australian second chambers, and citing evidence 
that some Councillors gave time to constituents from electorates 
represented by members of an opposing party, the report persuaded 
the new Liberal-Country government to raise Councillors' basic 
remuneration to roughly half the Assembly rates, a proportion 
which still obtains. 
The President of the Legislative Council, appointed by the 
Governor-in-Council up to 1933, has since been elected by and from 
its members, and unless they remove him holds office as long as 
he remains a member of the Council. The Council usually elects 
its Chairman of Committees in the first session of each parliament. 
He holds office for the life of the parliament or until the election 
of his successor. The President nominates three Temporary 
Chairmen each session to act in the absence of the Chairman. As 
they do for the corresponding positions in the Assembly, the 
government party or parties will usually supply the President and 
Chairman of Committees in the Council, though new party 
majorities in the Council (both Labor and non-Labor) have often 
allowed existing incumbents of the opposite party to serve out their 
terms and at times even to be re-elected to the offices if still 
available. H.V. (later Sir Harry) Budd became the first Country 
Party President of the Council in 1966. The President and 
Chairman have had respectable allowances since the offices were 
first established, in 1951 the Labor government established an extra 
allowance for "the Member of the Legislative Council who is for 
the time being recognised as the Principal Representative of those 
members of the Legislative Council who are not supporters of the 
Government"—a circumlocution which respected its opponents' 
dogma that the Council was a non-party chamber without any 
Opposition, but nevertheless did not induce their leader at the time. 
Sir Henry Manning, to accept the allowance or the title. In 1966, 
when such scruples had lost all credibility, the title was changed 
to Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council. At the same 
time—also following the Matthews recommendations—differential 
salaries were introduced for the deputy leaders of the government 
and Opposition and the government and Opposition whips in the 
Council." 
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Table 9. Parliamentary Allowances and Salaries (As from 1 January 1976) 
Member Salary 
Electoral 
Allowance 
Expense (Refer 5th 
Allowance Schedule 
Constitution 
Act) 
($p.a.) ($p.a.) (Sp.a.l 
Total 
Remuneration 
($p.a.) 
Special 
Expense 
Allowance 
under Fifth 
Schedule— 
Parts III, 
IV, V, and 
VI 
($p.a,) 
Legislative Assembly: 
Private Member 19,660 
Ministers of the Crown: 
Premier 
Deputy Premier 
Other Ministers 
Holders of Offices: 
Speaker 
Chairman of 
Committees 
Leader of 
Opposition 
Deputy Leader of 
the Opposition 
Leader of other 
Party (not less 
than 10 
Members) 
Deputy Leader of 
other Party (not 
less than 10 
Members) 
Government Whip 
Opposition Whip 
Parliamentary 
Secretary 
Whip—Party not 
less than 10 
Members 
43,900 
39,260 
36,860 
34,400 
24,700 
34,400 
24,700 
24,700 
19,660 
23,000 
23,000 
23,000 
19,660 
~ 4,750-7,100 24,410-26,760 — 
9,830 4,750-7,100 58,480-60,830 3,410 
4,920 4,750-7,100 48,920-51,270 3,410 
4,420 4,750-7,100 46,030-48,380 3,410 
4,420 4,750-7,100 43,570-45,920 — 
2,460 4,750-7,100 31,910-34,260 — 
4,420 4,750-7,100 43,570-45,920 3,410 
2,460 4,750-7,100 31,910-34,260 —-
2,460 4,750-7,100 31,910-34,260 3,410 
1,070 4,750-7,100 25,480-27,830 
1,150 4,750-7,100 28,900-31,250 
1,150 4,750-7,100 28,900-31,250 
1,150 4,750-7,100 28,900-31,250 
1,150 4,750-7,100 25,560-27,910 
Legislative Council: 
Private Member 9,000 3,280 
Ministers of the Crown: 
Leader of the 
Government 39,720 4,420 
Deputy Leader of 
the Government 37,670 4,420 
12,280 
44,140 
42,090 
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Member Salary Expense Allowance 
Electoral 
Allowance 
(Refer 5th 
Schedule 
Constitution 
Act) 
($p.a.) ($p.a.) ($p.a.) 
Total 
Remuneration 
($ p.a.) 
Special 
Expense 
Allowance 
under Fifth 
Schedule— 
Parts III, 
IV, V, and 
VI 
($ p.a.) 
Holders of Offices: 
President 
Chairman of 
Committees 
Leader of the 
Opposition 
Deputy Leader of 
the Opposition 
Whips, Government 
and Opposition 
25,000 
15,000 
19,660 
1 1,000 
9,500 
4,100 
4,030 
4,030 
4,030 
4,030 
29,100 
19,030 
23,690 
15,030 
13.530 
Living away from home allowance: Private Members of the Legislative Council 
living in electoral districts specified in Parts 111, IV, V and VI of the Fifth Schedule 
to the Constitution Act receive a tax-free allowance for each day or part of a day 
they attend a sitting of the Legislative Council, 
Constitution Act 
Fifth Schedule 
Electoral Allowances To Members Of The Legislative Assembly 
Subst, Fifth Schedule Sec 28, 28A, Amended Gazette no. 147 
of 30 November 1973 
Special 
Expenses 
Allowance 
for 
Private 
Members 
Yearly 
Rate of 
Allowance 
Electoral Divisions 
$4,750 Ashfield 
Auburn 
Balmain 
Bankstown 
Bass Hill 
Bligh 
Burwood 
Canterbury 
Coogee 
Davidson 
Drummoyne 
Earlwood 
Part I 
Kirribilli 
Kogarah 
Ku-ring-gai 
Lakemba 
Lane Cove 
Manly 
Maroubra 
Marrickville 
Miranda 
Mosman 
Northcott 
Parramatta 
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Yearly 
Rate of 
Allowance 
Electoral Divisions 
Special 
Expenses 
Allowance 
for 
Private 
Members 
$4,930 
$5,600 
$6,200 
$6,400 
$7,100 
East Hills 
Eastwood 
Fuller 
Georges River 
Gordon 
Granville 
Heffron 
Hurstville 
Blacktown 
Cronulla 
Fairfield 
Hornsby 
Liverpool 
Merrylands 
Campbelltown 
Charlestown 
Corrimal 
Gosford 
Hawkesbury 
Heathcote 
lllawarra 
Lake Macquarie 
Blue Mountains 
Byron 
Cessnock 
Lismore 
Maitland 
Albury 
Armidale 
Bathurst 
Burrendong 
Burrinjuck 
Casino 
Clarence 
Dubbo 
Gloucester 
Barwon 
Broken Hill 
Castlereagh 
Phillip 
Rockdale 
Vaucluse 
Wakehurst 
Waverley 
Willoughby 
Yaralla 
Part II 
Mount Druitt 
Pittwater 
The Hills 
Wentworthville 
Woronora 
Part 111 
Munmorah 
Nepean 
Newcastle 
Peats 
Penrith 
Wallsend 
Waratah 
Wollongong 
Part IV 
Orange 
Oxley 
Wagga Wagga 
Wollondilly 
Part V 
Goulburn 
Monaro 
Raleigh 
South Coast 
Sturt 
Tamworth 
Tenterfield 
Upper Hunter 
Young 
Part VI 
Murray 
Murrumbidgee 
Temora 
$2,275 
$2,840 
$2,840 
$2,840 
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The total emoluments of direct monetary value to members of 
both houses, including also the rail, air, and road travel concessions, 
the telephone, printing, _and postal allowances and the payments 
for sitting on select committees, have increased dramatically in 
range and amount, especially since the 1950s.'' In addition to these 
there is a comprehensive superannuation scheme for ex-members 
and widows of deceased members, inaugurated in a rudimentary 
form for ex-members of the Legislative Assembly in 1946 and 
substantially revised and extended to the Legislative Council in 
1971. By contrast the non-monetary facilities for the work of 
members, including office space, sleeping accommodation, and 
secretarial, research, and library services, have remained inade-
quate, not least because of the failure of members—or of govern-
ments—to face up to the responsibility of replacing an overcrowded 
building complex, which was erected mainly before 1816 as the 
principal surgeon's quarters in the "Rum Hospital", and partly in 
1856 from an iron shed prefabricated in England for use as a church 
in Bendigo. However, excavation for a substantial new building was 
complete at the end of 1976.'^ 
Parliaments, sessions, and sittings 
The "life of a parliament" runs from the date fixed for the return 
of the writs certifying the results of a general election for the 
Legislative Assembly to the "dissolution" of the Assembly, which 
initiates the next general election. The Constitution Act (s. 24) sets 
a limit to this period: it was five years up to 1874 and has been 
three years ever since. In 1950 the Labor government entrenched 
this limit by an amendment prohibiting any extension of the three-
year term of a parliament without the electors' approval at a 
referendum." The meetings of a parliament are grouped into 
sessions, and "prorogation" brings a session to an end and fixes 
a starting date for the next session—in each case for both houses 
together. The Legislative Council, consisting of members with 
overlapping fixed terms, cannot be dissolved; when the Assembly 
is dissolved the Council merely shares in the prior prorogation. 
Parliament must meet within seven days of the date of the return 
of the writs, and no more than twelve months may elapse between 
sessions.'" Subject to these constraints any Premier with a majority 
has important political advantages in the Governor's power of 
deciding when to summon, prorogue, and dissolve parl iament-
including the possibility of proroguing for some time before 
dissolution. The actual practice since the 1930s has been to dissolve 
parliament in its last session without bothering to prorogue. This 
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has generally been done about six or seven weeks before the 
parliament was due to expire by effluxion of time, but on occasion 
dissolution was sought up to six months before expiry or left to 
within a week of the deadline." 
The number of sessions in a parliament has fluctuated less in 
the present century than in the last, when for example Parkes 
claimed a world record for the six sessions of the eleventh 
parliament (1882-85)."° From the 1920s three or four sessions 
became most common, though occasionally they fell to as low as 
one or rose to five, as in the parliament of 1953-56 which included 
a special session opened by the Queen. The first session of a new 
parliament is normally opened by Commissioners. As we have ssen, 
the Electoral Act requires parliament to meet within a week after 
the date of the return of the writs. By Westminster tradition, 
however, the Assembly cannot begin business until members have 
been sworn in and elected a Speaker at the direction of the Crown. 
This direction is normally conveyed to a joint meeting of the two 
houses by leading members of the Legislative Council (usually the 
President, Chairman of Committees, and a minister) whom the 
Governor commissions for the purpose. Once there is a Speaker 
(and assuming no vacancy in the Presidency of the Council) the 
Governor can attend in parliament—which he does in every business 
session—to deliver, also to members of both houses assembled 
together, the Opening Speech outlining the government's pro-
gramme for the session. If an election has produced a new 
government that needs time to prepare its programme, the first 
session of the new parliament may consist of a single sitting for 
the preliminary formalities only. When the existing government has 
been re-elected, it has usually been able to proceed with ordinary 
business in a first session of some weeks' duration. In the first 
business session both houses are concerned with matters of general 
political importance, especially in the debate on the Address-in-
Reply which, in form, expresses the parliament's grateful response 
to the Governor's speech."' 
Most sessions straddle parts of two calendar years and in some 
cases even three. The sessions of 1883-84 and 1969-70-71 lasted 
more than a year, and a dozen others in last century more than 
ten months, but nowadays business sessions run continuously for 
between four and seven months, and the average has been rather 
longer since the 1930s than before. The main, or budget, session 
usually begins in August and runs into November or December, 
continuing in the following year from February to about Easter. 
A session may include one sitting or several, normally continuous 
except for the Christmas recess and for a recently adopted practice 
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of having a break of about one week in five. A sitting of the 
Assembly, starting with Questions, begins at 2.15 p.m. on Tuesdays 
and Wednesdays, ending at about 10.30 p.m., and at 10.30 a.m. 
on Thursdays, ending at about 4.30 p.m. There are no fixed hours 
for ending sittings; there has been a tendency for sittings to run 
later in the day, especially toward the end of a session, and at times 
of pressure they may continue into the small hours, though rarely 
more than half a dozen times a year. A sitting can, however, be 
resumed the next day or even on several days by the Speaker simply 
"leaving the Chair" for the overnight break. In 1935 one sitting 
was continued in this way from 2 to 11 April. The Legislative 
Council, with a less exacting programme of business, normally sits 
at 4.30 p.m. on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, rising by 
about 6.30 p.m., but may sit until after 7.00 p.m. and occasionally 
past midnight. 
There is no necessary relation between the length of sessions and 
the amount of time parliament actually sits: the former has tended 
to increase over the whole history of the parliament while the latter 
has decreased. Hawker notes: "The Colonial Assembly sat two days 
in seven and the Assemblies of 1901-32 about one day in five, but 
the Assemblies of 1932-65 sat less than one day in six"."' There 
has been no noticeable change in that house since then. The 
Legislative Council's sitting days averaged about 60 per cent of 
those of the Assembly before 1901, reaching 67 and 68 per cent 
in two decades. During the present century, as table 10 shows, the 
average up to 1960 was nearer to 50 per cent except in the first 
halcyon years of the reformed Council, but there has been a notable 
rise since 1960. Both houses now sit for rather longer hours on 
average than they did last century."' 
Table 10. Average Annual Number of Sitting Days, Legislative Council and 
Assembly 
5-year period 
1901-05 
1911-15 
1921-25 
1931-35 
1951-55 
1961-65 
1971-74 
Legislative 
Council 
40 
45 
40 
55 
27 
38 
50 
Legislative 
Assembly 
85 
85 
74 
81 
56 
57 
58 
Council days as 
Percentage of 
Assembly Days 
47.1 
52.9 
54,1 
67.9 
48.2 
66.7 
86,2 
Source: Votes and Proceedings of each house, returns summarizing "Business 
of . . , " the house each session. 
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THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
Originally one of the two nominated second chambers in Australia 
(the other surviving in Queensland until 1922), the Legislative 
Council of New South Wales was reconstituted from 23 April 1934 
as an indirectly elected body. The nominee Council was conservative 
in purpose, and generally in political complexion and action. It was 
designed to interpose "a safe, revising, deliberative and conservative 
element between the Lower House and Her Majesty's 
Representative"."" With life tenure, unpaid membership, and a 
variously interpreted convention (occasionally enforced by Gov-
ernors) against wholesale swamping, half a century of nominations 
by middle-class governments produced a house that by the 1890s 
could be trusted to insist on two or more bites at measures to 
liberalize the franchise, steepen income tax, break up pastoral 
holdings for closer settlement, or promote government enterprise 
and social services. However, the Council survived through many 
a wordy threat to its existence, partly because moderate swamping 
from time to time kept it amenable to gradual social change, and 
partly because it never resorted to the disruptive tactic of withhold-
ing supply. Despite its intended purpose of checking "the excesses 
of democracy", it demonstrated the point appreciated by the 
creators of the Victorian Legislative Council in the mid-nineteenth 
century, but hidden from would-be democratizers of the Council 
in the twentieth, that "a nominee Upper House is a much more 
democratic one than an elective one"."^ 
Challenge and reconstruction, 1925-33 
It was natural, nevertheless, that the Labor Party from its begin-
nings should mark down such a chamber for destruction. As 
Hawker shows, "the Council amended the bills of all governments 
but disagreements led to the loss of many more bills when Labor 
was in power", both in 1910-16 and during the 1920s and early 
1930s. The first Labor governments under McGowen and Holman 
lost a number of important measures in the Council, but none of 
these was vital and they made only a moderate number of 
appointments. The Lang administrations made the earliest de-
termined attempts to carry out the party's official policy of abolition. 
In February 1926 Lang was frustrated by the failure of seven Labor 
Councillors (including four of the twenty-five he had appointed two 
months earlier to get a majority) to honour their abolition pledges, 
and by the Governor's refusal to make the additional ten nomi-
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nations Lang now proposed, for the purpose of abolition which had 
not been mentioned in Labor's policy speech at the previous 
election."*' 
To forestall any further attempt of the kind the Bavin Govern-
ment in 1929 added section 7A to the Constitution Act, requiring 
that bills for the abolition of the upper house or altering its 
constitution or powers must be approved by the electors at a 
referendum before being presented for the royal assent, and that 
this provision for a referendum could not itself be repealed or 
amended except by a bill similarly approved at a referendum. The 
National Party was still divided over further legislation to re-
construct the Council itself when Labor regained office in 1930. 
Lang promptly introduced bills to repeal section 7A and abolish 
the Legislative Council, optimistically advised by his law officers 
that he could by-pass the referendum requirement. Members of the 
non-Labor majority in the Council, much better advised by the legal 
luminaries in their own ranks, allowed the bills to pass the Council 
and then blocked them from receiving assent by an action for 
injunction, in which the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the 
High Court of Australia, and ultimately the Privy Council all 
confirmed that section 7A was both valid and well and truly 
"entrenched" (unalterable by the ordinary process of amendment 
in parliament alone). By that time the Lang Government had been 
dismissed."' 
These attacks, and accompanying indications that swamping 
could become more frequent and at some stage fatal, stimulated 
the non-Labor forces to hasten the ingenious reform of the Council 
that was approved by referendum (in accord with s. 7A) in 1933. 
Membership, previously not limited by law, was fixed at sixty, and 
a member's tenure, previously for life, was limited to twelve years, 
one-quarter of the whole number retiring every three years. 
Government nomination of members was replaced by election, by 
members of both houses, sitting separately but voting as a single 
electorate by secret ballot on a system of proportional representa-
tion. Casual vacancies were to be filled by the same electorate by 
a preferential ballot, which was later construed to mean propor-
tional representation when there were two or more vacancies with 
the same remaining term of office."* 
The main objects of the reconstruction were (I) to protect the 
Council from domination at will by the government of the day, 
and (2) to strengthen the Council's powers to resist "extreme" 
legislation from the Assembly, while making it ultimately responsive 
to changes in the party composition of the Assembly. The new 
structure was modelled, with modifications, on the recommendations 
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of the Bryce Committee on House of Lords reform, which had 
sensibly warned that direct election might set up the upper house 
as a duplicate or rival, with an equal mandate to claim financial 
powers and even the power to make and unmake governments. 
Turner says that the size of the new Council was chosen in accord 
with a convention that the upper house should have no more than 
two-thirds of the membership of the lower (though the authority 
for such a convention is dubious), while the indirect method of 
election was calculated to ensure a non-Labor majority in the 
Council for nearly a decade. There is also reason to believe that 
considerations of economy, in that post-Depression period, 
influenced the choice of a Council for which elections would be 
cheap, allowances if ever granted would make a modest total, and 
the expenses of cultivating a popular electorate would be avoided. 
In addition, the very desperation of Lang's financial policies and 
attacks on the Council in 1930-31 provoked his opponents to make 
the new body even stronger than they might otherwise have done."' 
Constitutionally the reformed Council was undoubtedly a much 
stronger body than before 1934, though not as strong as the elected 
Councils in other states.^" Always immune from dissolution, it was 
no longer subject to the threat of swamping. The only statutory 
limitation on the powers of the old Council had been that it could 
not initiate money bills, and this was retained after 1933. The 
Assembly, however, had always asserted the established British 
convention that the second chamber should not substantively amend 
or reject such bills. For its part the Council had never considered 
itself bound by the convention, but had only occasionally tried to 
flout it. Now, thanks to the fears excited by Lang's 1932 Mortgages 
Taxation Bill, the Council was given explicit power to amend or 
reject all money bills, although the Appropriation Bill for the 
ordinary annual services of the government could be sent directly 
to the Governor for assent if the Council rejected it, amended it 
unacceptably, or failed to pass it within a month. 
The substitute for swamping to overcome deadlocks between the 
two houses was the carefully contrived section 5B added to the 
Constitution Act. This purported to enable a government with 
popular support to carry any disputed legislation (excluding only 
Appropriation Bills and including bills for new taxation or for 
abolishing or reforming the Council) over the head of a recalcitrant 
Council by appeal to the referendum. But before this could be done 
there must be a delay of at least nine months, during which there 
should be a free conference between the houses through managers 
and also a joint sitting without a vote—processes which could 
conceivably be prolonged indefinitely under the vague terms of the 
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legislation. In the case of bills affecting the Council itself the 
government would be put to the additional risk and expense of 
holding the referendum on a separate day from a general election. 
On the other hand, applying the deadlock machinery to such bills 
provided a simpler alternative to using s. 7A, which required them 
to pass both houses before submission to a referendum: thus it would 
no longer be necessary to obtain the Council's consent to its own 
abolition. 
Members and their work 
Members of the Legislative Council have always been less repre-
sentative of the average run of citizens than their colleagues in the 
Assembly. The difference was greater in the nineteenth century, 
even though half of all Councillors appointed between 1861 and 
1901, and three-quarters of them in 1895, had previously been 
M.L.A.s. 
The rapid rise in the representation of the commercial middle-classes, 
so notable in the Assembly, was by no means matched in the Council 
and, not surprisingly, the number of working men was virtually nil 
throughout. Until the end of the century men connected with the land, 
most of them pastoralists, and with the professions, especially law and 
medicine, dominated the Council, at least numerically, although there 
was a steady tendency for large manufacturers and merchants to enter 
the Council in increasing numbers." 
Councillors tended to be considerably older than members of the 
Assembly, fewer were born in Australia, and they included more 
Anglicans and fewer Catholics. Some of these differences faded in 
the present century, but gave way to others. Only a handful of 
Labor men were appointed in the first two decades, so that in 1920 
Harrison Moore could still characterize the Councillors as "well-
to-do, sometimes wealthy men, whose property, business or pro-
fession, and not politics, has the first claim on their time and 
attention [and who] have claimed to stand outside the party 
system"." 
Substantial numbers of Labor appointments between 1917 and 
1931 altered the social composition of the Legislative Council and 
ended its pretensions as a non-party house. After the 1934 
reconstruction Labor held a majority in the Council from 1949 to 
1959 and again in 1965-67. But this only left Council membership 
skewed in a different way. In 1961 the house was "dominated by 
union officials, big businessmen and graziers, of whom only a small 
minority had any university or professional training". Turner goes 
on to quote a Liberal Research Bulletin; "Professional, and what 
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Table 11. Proportion of Members of Houses of Parliament in Main Groups of 
Occupations, 1967 
Business 
Professional and semi-professional 
On the land 
White-collar employees 
Trade union and A.L.P. officials 
Other workers 
Not known 
Legislative 
Council 
% 
25.0 
13.3 
15,0 
8.3 
26,7 
10,0 
1.7 
100.0 
Legislative 
Assembly 
% 
18.1 
22.3 
14.9 
22.3 
8,5 
11.8 
2.1 
100.0 
Source: Adapted from Turner, House of Review?, table 9. Note Turner's caution 
(p, 99; see also table 12 below) that only main occupations can be thus classified 
and that interests in agriculture or as directors are understated. 
might be termed 'middle class' representation is almost entirely 
missing . . . As a result the 'House of Review' is lacking experts 
in nearly every field except law."" According to Turner new 
members in the 1960s included fewer graziers or directors and more 
professionally trained people; new Labor members, while still 
typically union or party officials, included people of more senior 
status in the movement. By the end of 1974 the persistence of a 
non-Labor majority in the Legislative Council electorate had raised 
the professional/semi-professional and business groups to 20 and 
30 per cent of the Council respectively and whittled down the group 
of Labor and union officials to 15 per cent. A recent classification 
of occupations given in official Council records (table 12) is 
instructive. 
The evidence suggests that in spite of the changes in social 
composition and the sharp increases in their pay the great bulk 
of Legislative Councillors are still in occupations which bring them 
a separate income while enabling them to take part in the relatively 
undemanding activities of the Council. Mr Justice Matthews 
thought it could "be stated with certainty that membership of the 
Council does not provide a full-time occupation", but he believed 
there was some conflict with their outside interests. The Council 
has generally contained more "backwoodsmen" and silent spectators 
than the Assembly—though it has fewer nowadays than in the past. 
During the nineteenth century there was some justification for 
M.L.A.s' criticisms that "the work of the Council rested upon a 
few; most Councillors did almost nothing or absolutely nothing . . . 
there was always a substantial proportion—between a fifth and a 
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Table 12. Occupations of Legislative Councillors at 26 September 1974 
Occupation 
Company director 
Other business (self-employed proprietors, etc.) 
Professional: 
Barrister, solicitor 
Other (e,g,, dentist. 
Grazier 
Farmer 
Administration Officer 
Rent Advocate 
Company Secretary 
Trade Union Officer 
Boilermaker 
Home duties 
Retired 
Total 
pharmacist) 
Number 
10 
8 
6 
5 
6 
4 
I 
1 
1 
9 
1 
5 
3 
60 
Source: Office of the Legislative Council. 
quarter—who attended only rarely. Between 1860 and 1900, eleven 
members lost their seats . . . because they were absent without leave 
for two consecutive sessions."'" The record of attendance has been 
much better in the present century, and has improved over the 
period since the 1934 reform. But active participation in the 
Council's work has still been left to the few. Compilers of the 
Liberal Research Bulletin calculated that between 1950 and 1956 
eighteen members averaged less than two speeches a year, ten 
averaged less than one, and three did not speak at all; they remarked 
that "a handful of members, mainly those with a professional 
background, make detailed and painstaking analyses of many of 
the bills presented. The majority . . . makes little or no 
contribution."" Turner confirms the continuation of the pattern in 
the 1960s. 
Councillors then are men of substance or men of influence, or 
both. Many of them do not take their legislative duties too seriously. 
Theirs is the more decorous house of the two. It is also the more 
leisurely. And this is all because it is by far the less important. 
It lays no claim to make and unmake governments. No statute calls 
for the ministry to be represented in the Legislative Council, and 
the number has always been kept low—rarely more than the two 
generally appointed in recent decades as the minimum needed to 
share out the work of seeing bills through and explaining and 
defending government policies. These ministers always included the 
Vice-President of the Executive Council who has generally acted 
as representative of the government in the house. The Wran Labor 
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government, after taking office in May 1976, tried to make do with 
only one minister in the Council, while adding one to the Assembly 
complement. An amendment to the Constitution Act (s.38A) as 
part of the reconstruction in 1933 authorized not more than one 
minister from the Assembly at a time, with the Council's consent, 
to sit in Council, explain a bill related to his department and debate 
it without vote; the provision has never been used. The Council's 
use of committees of investigation, whether of bills or of adminis-
trative and policy questions, declined through the present century 
to a low level. Governments of all parties frown on committees as 
devices unduly accommodating to the Opposition and threatening 
to party solidarity. The most important recent creation, the 
Committee on Subordinate Legislation established in 1960, has 
operated spasmodically. The number of bills introduced in the 
Council was never great, and it dropped from 236 in the twenty 
years before reconstruction in 1934 to twenty-nine in the next 
twenty years. Councillors, like Oppositions in the Assembly, regu-
larly protest at the spate of bills that governments send up to them 
near the end of a session. But the difference between the sitting 
periods of the Council and the Assembly suggests that the former 
is much less pressed for time. There is some confirmation of this 
in the fact that the closure has not been used in the Council since 
1902.'^  
Constitutional role and record 
Thus the Legislative Council's constitutional role is, in vital 
respects, secondary and supplementary to that of the Legislative 
Assembly. In 1856 the Sydney Morning Herald declared that the 
Council was not meant to "decide the general policy of the 
country", but could act as a "court of oversight and revision"." 
Manned by people with professional training and experience of 
affairs, representative of the main interests in the colony, free from 
the turmoil of party politics, with more time at its disposal, the 
Council could provide a channel for the introduction of non-party 
legislation, an opportunity for improving the legislative efforts of 
the Assembly, and a forum for critical discussion of the larger 
problems of policy and administration. It could be useful in delaying 
controversial legislation to give affected interests time to get their 
views considered. And so it was for the most part in colonial days. 
"Until the late 1880s at least", writes Hawker, "the Council 
adopted an attitude towards its powers of amending bills that 
enabled New South Wales to avoid the deadlocks between Upper 
and Lower Houses that so troubled the parliamentary history of 
some other colonies". Loveday concluded that the Council "could 
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force weak ministries to revise their bills, especially bills that were 
not considered vital, but it could not establish its own independent 
power of amendment".** 
The functions of legislative amendment, delay, and policy in-
vestigation continued to occupy the Legislative Council for most 
of the time after federation, but the actual work done declined in 
quantity and importance, at least until the 1960s. The Council 
showed no inherent determination to delay legislation for closer 
examination. As in the other house, standing orders could be 
suspended to enable bills to pass all stages in one sitting, and this 
happened regularly, especially during the end-of-session rush. 
Throughout the 1950s the Council dealt with about 30 per cent 
of its bills in a single day each. Its deliberations received little public 
attention, and interest groups aggrieved by legislative proposals 
showed a growing tendency to protest directly to the offending 
government. The Council was most effective on behalf of the 
particular interests represented in it, especially trade unions and 
important rural and business groups." A large proportion of 
legislative amendments nominally made by the Council are actually 
second thoughts on the part of the government. Many amendments 
are purely drafting improvements, or alterations consequent on 
other amendments. Turner gives examples of substantive Council 
amendments that have appeared "useful", including detailed im-
provements reflecting special areas of expertise among Councillors. 
"Clearly", he concludes, "some useful work has been done, though 
much more might have been." He adds that especially since 1959 
the Council has had "a useful record of undramatic 'tidying up' 
. . . Attendance is good, more bills are being amended, more pages 
of Hansard filled, and greater use of committees is being made"."' 
A detailed review of the Council's record in the present century 
shows that even the relatively innocuous activities of supervision, 
delay, and revision fluctuate according to whether the governing 
party controls the Council or not. The development of party 
divisions in the Council has made much more controversial the other 
functions claimed for the second chamber: the protection of the 
community against "extreme" legislation such as severe limitations 
on individual rights and property, and the "safeguarding of 
fundamental institutions" such as the independence of the judiciary, 
regular elections or a free press. It will be remembered that a similar 
role as "guardian of the constitution" has been attributed to the 
Governor—on condition that he remains "above party" and that 
his only sanction is to ensure that a popular election can decide 
the issues in a crisis. Although it may be argued that in the last 
resort Legislative Council guardianship should come to the same 
thing—forcing a dangerous government to an election—the forms 
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of action open to the Council are wider. It can whittle away at 
the important clauses of a government's legislation, block its 
taxation measures (though it cannot hold up supply for more than 
a month), force the Government to a referendum on specific issues 
—in other words frustrate the popularly elected majority in the 
Assembly in matters not serious enough to warrant a general 
election. Attempts to cast the Legislative Council in a guardian 
role raise a two-pronged question: what are the criteria for 
recognizing "extreme" legislation, and what are the qualifications 
of the Council for applying these criteria? 
For much of the nineteenth century the answers were clear cut: 
its founders looked to the Council to "withstand the onslaughts of 
a democratic chamber"—meaning attacks on property, private 
enterprise, and social inequality—and the Council could do this 
because it was "a guarantee for the presence in political life of 
persons of independence and character".^' Toward the end of the 
century the Council's safeguard role was given a new rationale: its 
sole criterion was "the will of the people", and Councillors were 
the best judges of what the people wanted. R.E. O'Connor most 
eloquently put this extraordinary viewpoint. The Council, he told 
his fellow-members— 
has never felt itself bound to regard the vote of the Assembly as 
expressing the popular will. Neither has it ever felt itself bound to regard 
the return of the majority in favour of a particular issue, when there 
may have been half-a-dozen issues which it would be difficult to separate 
from it, as indicating the will of the country. It has always taken upon 
itself to decide and ascertain in the best way it could from all the signs 
and circumstances of the times whether the country really was or was 
not in favour of a particular change.'" 
The ablest twentieth-century apologist for the Council, Sir Henry 
Manning (a descendant of the notable nineteenth-century Legisla-
tive Councillor and Attorney-General, Sir William Manning), 
sometimes reverted to the aristocratic notion of the Council as 
supreme detached arbiter of what menaced fundamental institu-
tions: the Council could support "ordinary legislation" but it would 
be useful as a safeguard only while it resisted the socialism of Labor; 
even if people voted for socialism, it seemed, the Council should 
not accept it. But at other times Manning and the media, echoing 
the familiar rationalizations of a beleaguered House of Lords and 
the Bryce Committee on Lords reform, said that the Council should 
bow to the criterion of a Legislative Assembly election: it should 
"protect the people against the misuse of a temporary majority by 
political leaders", but "provided the Government kept within its 
mandate, so far as the Council was concerned it need expect no 
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destructive opposition"." 
O'Connor had already stated one difficulty of the slippery 
doctrine of the popular mandate. No one could ever say for certain 
which, if any, of the policies of an election-winning party the voters 
really approved, much less which of its legislative measures. 
Another difficulty was that in practice there was nothing to prevent 
the Council flouting the doctrine even in its most elementary form. 
From the nineteenth century onward the Council in fact repeatedly 
resisted important measures foreshadowed in recent election cam-
paigns. In modern times these included Lang's Arbitration Bill and 
other measures in 1931; McKell's Workers' Compensation Bill in 
1941, his Settlement Promotion Tax (Management) Bill and 
Council Reform Bill in 1943, and a number of others. The Council's 
role could hardly be justified by a principle which it could, and 
did, ignore at will. A third difficulty was that the Labor Party never 
even pretended to be bound by the mandate doctrine—at least as 
regards the Council. Labor Councillors confessed allegiance only 
to the party Executive or to Conference, not to the popular will. 
A party house 
This raises the final problem of the Council's role. It lost even a 
formal claim to apply some superior, objective wisdom to the 
democratic or other "excesses" of the Assembly once it became a 
house dominated by party aims and organizations. Non-Labor 
members (other than those in the Country Party) tried to keep up 
the fiction of the Council being a non-party chamber for half a 
century beyond the time when it could reasonably have been 
described as generally anti-Labor. We have noted the refusal of 
Sir Henry Manning in the 1950s to be recognized as the leader 
of an opposition group, much less of a party. Col. H.J.R. Clayton, 
on his election to the Council in 1936, had decided that he should 
cease to be a member of the United Australia Party; after becoming 
Liberal leader in the Council, however, he did accept in 1960 the 
designation and perquisites that had been offered to Manning nine 
years earlier. His successor, A.D. Bridges, kept the cumbersome 
title of "Principal Representative . . . " until his party took office 
in May 1965; the Labor leader, R.R. Downing, held it for another 
year before taking the title "Leader of the Opposition" on 31 March 
1966. 
The Liberals held out against party organization in the Legisla-
tive Council long after Labor and even the Country Party had 
formed disciplined groups there. But this was a forlorn pretence. 
Individual Councillors were members of Liberal Party branches 
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from the time the party was formed. Back in 1951 it was possible 
for Clayton to support Manning's stand by wondering how anyone 
might properly be recognized as "the principal representative of 
motley persons—persons who have no common bond, each of whom 
is free to go his own way".*"" By 1965 some Liberal M.L.C.s were 
publicly insisting that they were part of an organized parliamentary 
Liberal party, and denying their independence." Yet there was still 
formally no official Liberal party there. One Liberal member acted 
as a kind of unofficial whip, but not all members of the party 
acknowledged him. The position of leader of the Liberal Party in 
the Council was not clearly distinguished until 1968, and then 
virtually by accident. When the Liberal-Country coalition took 
office in 1965 A.D. Bridges became leader of the Government in 
the Council and remained unofficial leader of the non-Labor parties 
there. Upon his death in May 1968 there was a stormy leadership 
dispute among the Council Liberals, resulting in the dual role of 
Bridges being divided between J.B.M. (later Sir John) Fuller as 
government leader (the first time this position had gone to a 
Country Party member) and S.L. Eskell as Council leader of the 
Liberal Party. 
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the Council's trans-
formation into a party chamber is to be seen in the history of 
Council elections since 1933. From the beginning the Labor Party 
took seriously the selection of candidates and the organization of 
its vote. Given the small electorate of which every member was 
known, it should be possible both to mobilize and to control the 
votes of loyal party supporters, and this would be necessary both 
at the regular triennial elections on the expiry of fifteen Councillors' 
terms, and at the by-elections on the death or resignation of 
individual Councillors. At one stage a theory was advanced that 
since a member who won a seat at a triennial election commanded 
a party quota of the votes cast for the fifteen successful candidates, 
a casual vacancy in his seat should by convention be filled by 
another nominee of his party or group.'^ In practice a single casual 
vacancy, under the preferential vote-counting system which then 
applies, could be filled at will by the party having a simple majority 
of the members of both houses at the time, whichever party had 
previously held the vacant seat." Though a few Liberal and Country 
Party publicists talked about it, neither side ever consistently 
observed such a convention, except on behalf of its own allies in 
the Council. From 1934 on the non-Labor parties supported their 
own or more usually "unofficial" or "rebel" Labor candidates for 
vacancies in Labor and Independent Labor seats, and the Independ-
ent Labor group from 1959 on reciprocated. The A.L.P. ignored 
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the convention: whenever the party commanded the necessary 
electoral majorities it filled all casual vacancies with Labor men. 
Bitter experience with defections over Legislative Council issues 
stimulated the A.L.P. from the outset to devise ingenious means 
of policing its members' votes despite the strictly enforced secrecy 
of the Legislative Council ballot. As long as a number of candidates 
were nominated (and this was done for the purpose even when only 
one vacancy was to be filled), it was possible to allot each Labor 
parliamentarian a distinctive order in which to mark his preferences 
on the ballot, while ensuring that sufficient preferences would 
ultimately cumulate on the preferred candidate or candidates. This 
enabled the party's scrutineers checking the completed ballot papers 
to identify a defector by spotting missing or deviant preference 
orderings. Defectors were liable to expulsion from the party. In 1950 
the Central Executive refused to endorse for the coming general 
election four Labor M.L.A.s who had allegedly failed to vote the 
party ticket in the Legislative Council election of March 1949: this 
meant expulsion for those of the four who nevertheless stood against 
endorsed Labor candidates. After 1950 the policing system, said 
to have been adopted from the first Council elections in the 1930s, 
was dropped and there were further, unidentified, defections, for 
example in the by-election of May 1959. The system was revived 
in I960 upon the Independent Labor members nominating an 
A.L.P. veteran, T.L. Quinn, for a casual vacancy, rousing fears of 
more voting leakages within the official A.L.P.*'* 
Party selection of candidates is a corollary of organized party 
contests in Legislative Council elections. In the earlier decades of 
the elected Council this was done on the Labor side by the party's 
Central Executive, from nominations submitted by branch mem-
bers. Since 1970 selection has been entrusted to the Legislative 
Council electoral college, consisting of one nominee of each of the 
state electorate councils and fifty members elected by and from the 
A.L.P. State Council. The salary and perquisites of Council 
membership attract large numbers of candidates for selection. Each 
is allowed three minutes to put his case to the electoral college, 
and may distribute his biographical details. The age limit for 
selection is fifty-eight years. The college selects the desired number 
of nominees for the Council election by preferential ballot.''' 
The Country Party has shown the least concern about the loyalty 
of its members when voting in Legislative Council elections, and 
has had the least overt trouble in arranging its selection of 
candidates. In the early years selections were made by the party's 
parliamentarians in both houses. In the mid-1950s the Central 
Council was given the right to approve or refuse proposed nomi-
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nations. Later on each state electorate council was empowered to 
submit a nomination to the Central Council. In practice the state 
chairman and parliamentary leaders informally agree on a can-
didate or team, normally from among the electorate council 
nominations, which is then recommended to Central Council and 
usually accepted without dispute. Even so, there was consternation 
at the April 1973 triennial Council election when the Country Party 
candidate, a strong favourite for the one doubtful seat, was defeated 
because a Country Party parliamentarian voted informally.™ 
Liberal Party moves towards ordered selection of candidates and 
voting were extraordinarily reluctant and tortuous. As early as 
1950, after Labor had first achieved a majority in the Council, the 
Liberal State Executive proposed a system of nominations and 
selection and a disciplined party unit in the second chamber, but 
the parliamentarians rejected the idea. The Liberals' State Council 
amended the party constitution in 1956 to provide for an official 
Liberal Party in the Council "when appropriate, after consultation 
between the state Leader and the organisation". The parlia-
mentarians still refused to co-operate, and throughout this period 
there were disputes over rival nominations for Legislative Council 
elections by different sections of the party—one of the quarrels, 
in 1955, culminating in the replacement of Murray Robson as party 
leader. For the 1957 triennial election there was an effort to 
organize selection by joint meetings of Assembly and Council 
Liberals, and to pledge members to vote for two of those selected; 
but these meetings were boycotted by a number of Liberal 
Legislative Councillors, and there were maverick nominations. 
The first strict Liberal ticket vote was achieved in I960, and by 
1961 there was agreement on a formal procedure in which branch 
nominations and candidates' dossiers were submitted to the parlia-
mentary Liberal Party in the Assembly, who selected the candidates 
by secret ballot. Following complaints by Liberal M.L.C.s at their 
exclusion from this procedure, the system followed from 1963 was 
selection by exhaustive ballot of the Liberals of both houses, after 
interviewing all candidates including retiring M.L.C.s and question-
ing them upon Liberal policies. Policing of the Liberal vote in the 
Council election, however, came only after disturbing defections of 
unknown Liberal supporters, especially one in 1965 which deprived 
the Liberal-Country coalition of its majority in the Council just 
after its long-awaited victory in the Legislative Assembly election. 
In the next two Council by-elections the non-Labor groups won by 
finally moving to the Labor-style "ballot permutation technique" 
of checking on their supporters' votes. The only important subse-
quent change has been the addition to what is now called the 
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Legislative Council Selection Committee of fifteen members of the 
State Executive who are not M.L.C.s. Retiring M.L.C.s seeking 
re-endorsement are not allowed to sit on the Selection Committee. 
Another index to the hardening of party lines in the reformed 
Council is the pattern of voting in divisions. From the outset, as 
we have seen, most Councillors belonged to one political party or 
another, the Labor Councillors being also split during the 1930s 
between the federal and state A.L.P. groups. But crossing the floor 
and abstention from divisions were common practices up to 1941. 
Disagreements between and within the Labor factions were en-
demic, and their ineffectiveness as an Opposition encouraged non-
Labor members to indulge their belief in the non-partisan house 
by autonomous voting and absenteeism. Although there were 
meetings of non-Labor members, their vote was always free: no 
discipline was imposed or pledge exacted. However, as Labor 
increased its representation as a result of its growing numbers in 
the Assembly, and Labor control of the Council began to appear 
a possibility, attendance improved on both sides and party lines 
became more rigid. This process was accelerated after Labor gained 
its Assembly majority in 1941: the party won ten out of forty 
divisions in the Council in the 1941-42 session, partly because there 
was still a tendency for non-Labor members to cross the floor. Labor 
ultimately secured a Council majority in 1949, only to lose it again 
in 1959 by the defection of seven members over its further attempt 
to abolish the Council (see below). Thereafter most of these "Labor 
rebels" voted usually with the Liberal and Country parties and 
helped to inflict the numerous defeats the Labor government 
suffered in the Council during the first half of the 1960s. 
By the early 1970s the main party pattern was fully established, 
and the numbers and solidarity of the Independent Labor group 
had begun to dwindle. There was a government whip (a Liberal 
who acted for all the government supporters) and an Opposition 
whip, both officially recognized and specially paid under statute. 
One Country Party member was unofficially regarded as whip for 
that party. Voting by A.L.P. Councillors was strictly on party lines 
as required by their pledge. The few deviations on the non-Labor 
side all came from the same handful of members: as a result of 
adverse votes by C.J. Cahill (Independent Labor), W.G. Keighley 
(Country Party), and R.C. Packer (Liberal) the government was 
defeated in a division on 5 April 1973; Keighley's and Packer's 
votes caused it to lose three divisions on 28 March 1974; Cahill 
and Packer voted against the government in another division on 
2 October 1974. To concert their parliamentary tactics in the 
Council all party groups were meeting regularly during sessions. 
211 
The Legislative Council 
In the mid-1970s the A.L.P. caucus usually met once a month, and 
the weekly Liberal Party meeting was followed by a combined 
meeting of the government parties. Generally the Country Party 
members met in the room of the government leader in the Council 
(a Country Party minister as already noted) before joining the 
Liberal Party. It is significant of the strength of the Legislative 
Council tradition, however, that joint meetings of the members of 
any party, even Labor, from both houses remain extremely rare. 
Here is clearly a chamber composed and operating on a political 
party basis, dealing with legislation from the other chamber in 
accord with party attitudes and policies, and doing very little else 
except register the drafting afterthoughts of the originating depart-
ments or ministers. So far from being a repository of superior 
wisdom, a safeguard of the Constitution or an enforcer of the 
popular mandate, the Legislative Council is simply an extra, more 
comfortable, and expensive arena in which the normal party battle 
can be continued. When the majority of Councillors support the 
government in office, the Council as such adds little to that battle, 
and can be used to make "helpful amendments and improvements" 
to legislation, and sometimes to protect the special interests 
represented in the house. When the majority of Councillors belong 
to parties opposed to the government, the opposition party has an 
additional and effective means of resisting the government's legisla-
tion or protecting its own, although that party represents only a 
minority of the electorate at the time. Then and only then is the 
Council likely to check "hasty", "extreme", or "subversive" legisla-
tion; but the meaning of these labels will be defined merely by the 
party majority in the Council, and will change with the party 
complexion of that majority. 
One thing may be added. The unique mode of choosing Council 
members ensures that changes in its party complexion not only lag 
well behind the changes in the Legislative Assembly, but also 
faithfully echo them in due course. At the same time the restricted 
constituency for Council elections, while making the house broadly 
representative of party support in the community (albeit at one 
remove of choice as well as of time), saves it from the arrogance 
or futility of a popularly elected second chamber. Within its 
legislative competence the New South Wales Legislative Council 
may in theory hold back the Legislative Assembly to the opinion 
patterns of ten to fifteen years past. When an Assembly majority 
persists beyond that period the Council comes to reflect it and the 
brake is released. If there is any case at all for a brake on popular 
majorities this seems as reasonable a design for it as may be 
expected. 
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The actual behaviour of the Council has been a greatly mod-
erated version of its theoretic potentialities. From the beginning of 
the century the nominated Council treated the legislation of all 
Labor governments much more severely than that of all non-Labor 
governments. The reformed Council was significantly more active 
when it contained an Opposition majority—non-Labor in 1941-48 
and 1959-65, Labor in 1965-67—than when the government party 
controlled both houses—non-Labor in 1934-41, Labor in 1949-59. 
"Active" Councils of both complexions occasionally rejected impor-
tant legislation; the "inactive" Council of the 1950s, virtually 
disused by its Labor masters, was more supine than that of the 
1930s when non-Labor Councillors felt free to make a show of 
independence without greatly inconveniencing the government. A 
second glance at the record, however, brings out two further points: 
the effect of party bias has been much less marked since the 1934 
reform than before (despite the more overt party organization), and 
even in its "hostile" periods the Council's checking of the Assembly 
has not been extensive. Turner's considered conclusion on the period 
to 1961 remained valid after that date: 
. . . the record of the reconstructed Council could hardly be portrayed 
as intransigent, except perhaps towards the McKell Ministry in the 
period 1941-5 . . . Even when Labor was in the minority, the re-
constructed Council's performance . . . was generally restrained and co-
operative compared with its own past record and that of some other 
upper houses in Australia." 
Nevertheless the very ingenuity of the Council's present constitu-
tion has placed both main parties in a dilemma they have so far 
found insoluble. The party complexion of the Council, though not 
necessarily corresponding at any given time with that of the 
Assembly, is ultimately determined by the popular vote; there is 
no longer a built-in bias against one party. But neither party can 
modify the Council's political complexion at will, as it could (within 
the Governor's definition of reasonableness) in the days of swamp-
ing. Hence each side can equally see the Council becoming, from 
time to time and quite ineluctably, either a menace or a bulwark 
to its most cherished legislative projects, according to whether the 
party imagines itself in the government's or the Opposition's seats. 
The only design more directly responsive to a changing majority 
in the popular house (as distinct from the popular electorate) would 
be a return to the nominated chamber, already placed out of court 
on spuriously democratic grounds. It is no wonder that both sides, 
casting desperately about for some escape from this dilemma, have 
arrived at similar illusory prescriptions for reform—although by 
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somewhat different routes—while the Country Party, realistic as 
ever, favours no change. 
End or mend? 
The first Labor government after reconstruction, holding office from 
1941, never shared Lang's conscientious determination to carry out 
the A.L.P. policy of abolishing the Council. Its leaders realized that 
this policy had become virtually unattainable since 1929 and 
politically inexpedient since 1933. The referendum hurdle was 
unavoidable in law and probably insurmountable electorally. Re-
construction guaranteed a solid period of Labor control in the 
Council if it was ever achieved at two or three successive elections 
in the Assembly. But to many A.L.P. members in and out of 
parliament such patience was inconceivable. In 1939 Donald Grant 
left the Council to run for federal parliament with the parting shot 
that Labor control of the Council would require "a Labor majority 
of at least thirty in the Lower House for more than twelve 
consecutive years. Practically, that is just a dream . . ." In 1941 
Lang himself declared, with characteristic extravagance, that "the 
method of election was devised so that it would be impossible for 
Labor ever to get a majority".'^ The A.L.P. did, in fact, secure 
its Council majority in March 1949 (see table 13), but by that 
time the clamour for abolition, aroused from 1941 on by Labor's 
reverses in the Council, and stimulated by factional conflict within 
the party, was gaining volume. 
The government temporized as long as it could. Adopting a time-
honoured manoeuvre for evading demands within the party, in 1943 
it introduced in the Council a bill to substitute popular for indirect 
election, and in 1946 an abolition bill—under circumstances which 
allowed the non-Labor majority in the Council to defeat the bills 
but prevented the use of the deadlock machinery which would have 
sent them to a referendum." By 1952, when the A.L.P. majority 
in the Assembly was precarious, the party had controlled the 
Council for three years, thirteen of the twenty-eight Labor M.L.C.s 
were trade union leaders and eleven were Central Executive 
members or party officers, even the extra-parliamentary organiza-
tion had reason to see the second chamber in a new light. As state 
A.L.P. president J.A. Ferguson, M.L.C. said in March: 
The Labor Party will remain in control of the Legislative Council for 
a period of not less than 10 years, even in the event of a defeat of 
the Labor Government. The Legislative Council could act as a buffer 
against any attempt by the Liberal and Country Parties to destroy Labor 
legislation.'" 
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Table 13. Party Representation in the Legislative Council, 1933-73 
Date 
December 
5 Dec. 
Triennial 
election 
By-elec, 
27 Feb, 
Triennial 
election 
By-elec, 
9 Sep. 
Triennial 
election 
State 
Labor 
1933 
1933 
1937 
1940 
1943 
1946 
1949 
1952 
1955 
1958 
1960 
1961 
1964 
1965 
1967 
1970 
1973 
1976 
48 
17 
16 
Federal Indep. 
Labor Labor 
8 
5 
5 
A.L.P. 
20 
22 
28 
31 
31 
35 
34 
25 
24 
27 
30 
29 
27 
24 
24 
Non-Labor 
— 
— 
1 
1 
0 
U.A.P./ 
Dem./ 
Lib. 
majority 
46 
25 
25 
24 
25 
20 
Labor majority 
0 17 
0 
0 
0 
Non-Labor 
8 
9 
7 
18 
15 
15 
majority 
12 
12 
14 
Labor majority 
6 12 
Non-Labor 
6 
4 
5 
1 
majority 
13 
16 
19 
22 
Country 
Party 
12 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
10 
10 
15 
15 
12 
12 
12 
It 
11 
13 
Indep-
endent 
4 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
118 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
0 (-(-2) 60 
0 (-1-1) 60 
0 60 
Sources: First row (estimated distribution in old Council): S.M.H., 18 December 
1933, Second row to 1955 from newspaper estimates. Thence to 1967 from Records 
of thirty-seventh to fortieth parliaments, prepared in the Office of the Legislative 
Council. Last three rows by courtesy. Clerk of Legislative Council, All figures are 
unofficial estimates. 
Note: Party strengths continuously varied, not only at selected elections shown here, 
but at other by-elections and from sitting members transferring support from group 
to group. 
In 1970 there were two vacancies, in 1973 one, in seats not to be filled at the triennial 
election. 
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In June the State Conference, despite motions for abolition from 
sixty branches, fourteen electorate councils, and a trade union, 
decided by 274 votes to 125 to reverse the traditional Labor policy 
by refusing "to force the matter of abolishing the NSW Legislative 
Council . . ."." Simultaneously Conference changed the party rules 
to prohibit M.L.C.s from nominating for election to the Executive 
and officers' positions. 
Thus A.L.P. attitudes to the Legislative Council were com-
plicated on the one hand by the attractions Council membership 
held for more venal party members and the power this gave to the 
officials who controlled Council nominations, and on the other by 
traditional Labor objections to privilege in general and to the 
Council as a "house of privilege" in particular. As a result party 
policy depended more on the outcome of faction feuding than on 
the rational calculations reflected in the 1952 resolution. After a 
brief eclipse of the second chamber issue by the Industrial Group 
crisis of the mid-1950s the government was confronted with another 
reversal of policy in the 1958 A.L.P. Conference which instructed 
it to take "immediate steps" to abolish the Council. Even then it 
was not until November 1959 that it passed its abolition bill through 
the Assembly, whereupon, in the time-honoured fashion of A.L.P. 
"suicide squads" in the Council, seven Labor M.L.C.s (all pledged 
to support abolition) crossed the floor to help prevent the bill being 
even considered there. (The resolution argued on grounds of 
privilege that such a bill should have originated in the Council.) 
These moves provided the only opportunity taken so far to test the 
efficacy of the deadlock provisions in section 5B of the Constitution 
Act as a further prop to the Council—and they proved weaker than 
expected. 
After the Council had declined to consider the bill on two 
occasions at an interval of more than three months, a free 
conference was summoned but the Council refused to appoint 
representatives. When the government convened a joint sitting, the 
Council majority formally resolved not to attend it, though the 
remaining government M.L.C.s did attend. The Assembly then 
resolved to submit the bill to a referendum. At that point a number 
of Councillors and others sought a court injunction to prevent the 
referendum being held, on the grounds that there had been neither 
a free conference nor a joint sitting (the Council having resolved 
as a body on absence), whereas section 5B required both as essential 
preliminaries to a referendum. Plaintiffs also argued that section 
-'iB was invalid, that a bill for abolition could not validly originate 
in the Assiembly, and that the Council had neither "rejected" nor 
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"failed to pass" the bill in question, since it had not even considered 
it. The N.S.W. Supreme Court did not agree that there had been 
no joint sitting, and also ruled that a free conference was not an 
essential prerequisite to a referendum under section 5B—its omis-
sion would not invalidate legislation enacted under that section. The 
Court also rejected all the other arguments, and was upheld by 
the High Court in refusing special leave to appeal; the plaintiffs 
took the case no further. 
The referendum was held on 29 April 1961 after a thorough 
canvassing of issues relevant and irrelevant. The proposal to abolish 
was rejected by 1,089,193 votes to 802,512, or 57.6 per cent to 
42.4 per cent of the formal votes, with an informal vote of 49,352. 
Thus Labor's most determined attempt to remove the second 
chamber was made at the moment when the Council was potentially 
at its most effective as a "protector of Labor gains". Moreover, 
as Turner points out, though reconstructed in 1934 as a check to 
"Labor extremism" this was the only existing state second chamber 
ever controlled by Labor, and was to be under Labor control for 
more than a third of the period from reconstruction to the end of 
the 1960s. At one stroke the A.L.P. doctrinaires had jettisoned their 
existing majority in the Council and politically entrenched this 
institutional anachronism more firmly than ever before. It is the 
only Australian second chamber. Turner wrote in 1968, "whose 
right to existence has been confirmed by a post-World War II 
referendum", and he added: "Labor has accepted that abolition is 
not now practicable". The only alternative was to reform once again 
or to let well alone. It remains to outline the parties' attitudes to 
that question.'"' 
The Country Party has never wavered in its satisfaction with the 
Legislative Council in its present form. For a brief spell in 1958 
after the A.L.P. Conference had resolved on abolition the party 
leader, Davis Hughes, conceded that if the Labor Opposition in 
the Council rejected policies for which a Liberal-Country govern-
ment had an electoral mandate, that government should take steps 
to make the Council "more representative of the people than it is 
at present", probably elected by adult franchise from multi-member 
constituencies on the lines of the Victorian Legislative Council." 
But once Labor embarked on its abolition course the parliamentary 
Country Party, supported by its State Council, opposed both 
abolition and any referendum on the Legislative Council's future. 
The party leader in 1974, then Deputy Premier in a Liberal-Country 
government, went so far as to say that the coalition would be 
threatened if the Liberals ever pressed for a popularly elected 
Council—and gave a cogent reason for his party's attitude: 
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1 would think that the country areas of the State, regardless of party 
politics, have a stronger representation in the Council than in the 
Assembly. The Council is the protector of country interests and of 
minority country interests, and the Country Party wants to maintain 
that sort of representation." 
The position of the Liberal and Labor parties has been formally 
different from this, but in practice essentially the same. On paper 
both parties have long toyed with reform—Labor since its abortive 
abolition attempt and the Liberals even longer, from the early 1950s 
at least—and for similar reasons: disillusion with the abuses invited 
by the present mode of choosing the Council and a belief that state 
voters would prefer a popular franchise to either abolition or the 
present electoral system. Just as A.L.P. members in the 1950s 
deplored the use of the Council as a field of patronage for party 
bosses, so were leading Liberals shocked from the 1930s onward 
by activities on their own side which "degraded Parliament and 
which caused intrigue, insinuations of corruption and hole-in-the-
corner activities"." 
Liberal hesitations and confusions about abolition or reform in 
the 1950s and 1960s are described in detail by Turner. Their last 
election promise on the subject, back in 1962, was to "establish 
a broad-based committee to examine the subject of reform of the 
Upper House and make recommendations for the Government to 
act upon". By that time a few Liberals (including Kevin Ellis, later 
Speaker) had become abolitionists, but the majority were wedded 
to the Council as a protector of Liberal legislation, and were mainly 
concerned to find a less disreputable mode of electing it. The current 
policy, approved by the Liberal State Council in February 1969, 
favours a Council of forty-eight members with six-year terms, half 
elected at a time by universal suffrage simultaneously with Legisla-
tive Assembly elections. But Liberal Premier Askin admitted in 
1974 that "not all members of the coalition Government subscribe 
to this policy, and in present circumstances it would not be practical 
to seek changes". 
This Liberal policy was virtually identical with one produced at 
about the same time by a state A.L.P. committee, except that the 
latter proposed to keep the number of Councillors at sixty.*" In 1974 
the N.S.W. Labor Party platform provided simply for Council 
reform with election by popular vote; the federal Labor government 
vainly sought this result at a nation-wide referendum to amend the 
Commonwealth Constitution; and the federal A.L.P. platform 
prescribed abolition of all state Legislative Councils, "not to be 
interpreted in such a way as to prevent steps being taken to effect 
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reform of those Parliaments". In that same year N.S.W. (Labor) 
Opposition leader Neville Wran said that "abolition, at this stage 
of public thinking, seems . . . certainly almost impossible", and 
conceded that a Labor opportunity to initiate reform was not in 
sight." Yet during the 1976 election campaign Wran foreshadowed 
an attempt to reform the Council if Labor won office, and if various 
threats he has made as Premier are to be taken seriously there may 
well have been a referendum on popular election of the Council 
by the time this book appears in print. 
What none of the party leaders seems to remember were the most 
important points noted by Turner. The N.S.W. Legislative Council 
might not correspond to "the fully elaborated ideal of the ever-
alert, non-partisan and expert 'watchdog' . . . Perhaps its relative 
lack of pretension is related to its lack of a basis in popular election. 
. . . There is no evidence that any other form of Council could make 
practicable this ideal of a 'strong' second chamber in a modern 
parliamentary government."*^ 
THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
The popularly elected house is the most important part of the 
legislature for publicizing the competition of the parties for electoral 
preferment, for explaining and criticizing the current government's 
policies and administration, for conveying the feelings of electors 
and interest groups to the administration, and for selecting and 
training political leaders. In one aspect the Assembly means its 
individual members and their political activities when not actually 
attending sittings of the house. In its other main aspect the 
Assembly means the legislative chamber and what goes on there 
during parliamentary sittings. We consider first the individual 
members. 
Members and their work 
Like their colleagues in other states New South Wales M.L.A.s 
are more representative of ordinary male citizens than are members 
of the Legislative Council, and much more so than are politicians 
in older countries. We have noted the gross under-representation 
of women in the parliament. Next to them manual workers are the 
most under-represented group, even on the Labor side, where their 
share in membership actually fell from 40 per cent at the turn of 
the century to about 20 per cent in the 1960s. The distribution 
of the occupational groups in the parliament varies considerably 
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from time to time and between the parties. Professional people and 
such white-collar employees as schoolteachers, accountants, public 
servants, and journalists have together formed high proportions of 
all the parliamentary parties, but most prominently in the Liberal 
Party and its predecessors. In the latter parties businessmen have 
outdistanced professional and white-collar workers in recent years 
as the largest single component. The proportion of trade union 
officials among Labor members rose to over 30 per cent in the 
mid-1930s, but has since declined to about half that proportion. 
About half of the Country Party M.L.A.s have been farmers and 
graziers, with the remainder drawn wholly from businessmen and 
the professional and sub-professional groups. The level of formal 
education among members is not greatly above the community 
average, and again varies sharply from party to party. Throughout 
the present century about 30 per cent of members had only primary 
schooling, and about 16 per cent tertiary training of some kind; 
among Labor members the proportions were 50 per cent and l2'/2 
per cent, while the tertiary-trained in the other parties were between 
25 and 20 per cent—but by 1976 the distribution of graduates was 
slightly in Labor's favour. The number of university graduates has 
risen very gradually during the present century from a dozen to 
about twenty, exceeding the number in the Legislative Council since 
the 1950s. At least half of these have always been lawyers. Cabinets 
of either party have almost invariably included a few lawyers, but 
no graduates from other faculties until the 1960s." 
The most prominent prior qualification possessed by M.L.A.s in 
the first half of the century was service on local government 
councils: nearly 25 per cent of the Labor members had such 
experience and over 40 per cent of non-Labor members. Experience 
within the parliament has for most members been briefer than 
might be expected: the "professional" politician is perhaps engaging 
in a full-time, but rarely in a life-time, career. The average total 
service of M.L.A.s between 1856 and 1901 was five years. Between 
1902 and 1965 it was eight and a half years, and more continuous: 
there were only one-fifth as many broken terms as in the nineteenth 
century. The spread in length of service around the average was 
fairly wide. In Hawker's phrase, the majority of members could 
expect at least two or three terms in parliament. About a quarter 
of them had over fifteen years' service; it was from these longer-
serving politicians, many of whom entered parliament at a com-
paratively early age, that cabinet ministers and Premiers tended 
to be drawn."" 
After surveying the work of members for his report on parlia-
mentary salaries, E.S. Wolfenden wrote: 
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Many members of the public without proper information imagine a 
Member's duties are confined to attendances in Parliament. I am 
abundantly satisfied that any Member of the Assembly who properly 
attends to his duties as a Member not only has a full time task, but 
also finds much of what an ordinary man would consider spare time 
at week-ends and other times sadly encroached upon, so that he can 
scarcely call any time his own.'-
There is no mystery about what keeps the member so busy. "His 
constituents tend to regard him as an employment broker, a 'fixer' 
for permits, a man who sees that the Government, whether of his 
own political colour or not, makes improvements to the district."" 
In addition to supporting his party leaders, the private member 
works hard at these roles inside the chamber. A large proportion 
of parliamentary questions are asked on behalf of constituents, 
community associations, party branches, local councils, and the like. 
But for every member—including ministers already harried by the 
burdens of office—the chamber is, as Hawker says, only one place 
in which to represent his constituents. "Local problems [do] not 
wait on parliamentary sessions", and the member must maintain 
constant "extraparliamentary contacts with the bureaucracy, neces-
sary to satisfy the inquiries of his constituents about health, 
education, repatriation benefits, pensions, and a hundred other 
matters"." The member of a state parliament is even more 
preoccupied by such demands than is a federal member, to judge 
from survey indications that the former is more likely to be known 
to ordinary citizens in his electorate than the latter, at least in rural 
and rural-urban areas.** Yet there are also indications that only 
a small number of electors do resort to their member as promoter 
of their schemes or ombudsman for their grievances. Parlia-
mentarians are generally jealous of the latter role especially, and 
it is clearly an appropriate one for them—all the more so when 
their legislative contribution in the chamber has been reduced to 
little more than providing "the numbers" for their party when 
needed in divisions. But the appointment of an official ombudsman 
(see chapter 8) is in part a recognition of the fact that members 
alone can no longer cope with the volume of intermediary work 
required by the complexities of access to a modern bureaucracy.*' 
Government powers affecting private interests provide strong 
motives for trying to influence politicians directly. This can lead 
politicians into temptation—more especially when they are on the 
government side and most especially when they wield the power 
of a minister. Ex-Premier Lang, no doubt from first-hand ex-
perience, vividly described one aspect of the situation: 
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On the outer fringe of politics there have always been the free-booters 
who dart in and out of Ministers' offices. They trade on their friendship 
with Ministers. They brush past Ministerial messengers. They get to 
the stage where they can slap a Minister on the back and call him 
"Bill" or "Charlie". They always know a good thing for the races or trots 
. . . Actually they trade in political influence. Some are just hangers-
on, who pick up a few pounds here and there. They commercialise their 
familiarity. They arrange introductions for people anxious to get the 
Ministerial ear. Others are in a different grade. They offer themselves 
as "fixers". They claim to be able to negotiate deals. Some of the deals 
are perfectly legal. Others are highly dubious. . . . One of the most 
difficult problems confronting any new Minister is how to deal with 
them.'" 
Not all ministers have successfully coped with the problem, and 
attacks on the probity of New South Wales politicians have been 
a recurrent but fluctuating feature of political in-fighting. Some 
have led to the appointment of royal commissions and select 
committees, either by the government under fire or by its vengeful 
successors. There were half a dozen such inquiries between 1880 
and 1900, when M.L.A.s were probably "involved in a larger 
number of affairs of dubious propriety than at any other time". 
There have been a score of similar investigations during the present 
century." In 1881 one Secretary for Lands (E.A. Baker) was found 
to have disbursed funds "under circumstances of concealment and 
false statement"; in 1906 another (W.P. Crick) was held to have 
taken bribes for favourable improvement leases. In 1932 a royal 
commission found that dealings in the preceding twelve months 
between Labor ministers, state Labor Party officials and "tin hare" 
and "fruit machine" (i.e. poker machine) interests had been 
"improper" and in one instance at least "tainted with corruption". 
In 1953 the Secretary for Mines (J.G. Arthur) was held to have 
acted "improperly", though not corruptly, in his dealings with one 
of the free-booters described by Lang. The other inquiries were all 
negative or inconclusive, though one of them led a Minister of 
Agriculture (W.C. Grahame) to resign his portfolio in 1920. 
Baker and Crick were expelled from parliament. Arthur surren-
dered his portfolio on the appointment of the royal commission and 
resigned his Assembly seat when it reported; he was subsequently 
expelled from the A.L.P.'^ Corruption did not figure as a reason 
for any other expulsion of a New South Wales member from either 
house of parliament. The most recent expulsion was that of A.E. 
Armstrong from the Legislative Council on 25 February 1969, as 
the consequence of his evidence and the findings of the judge in 
a civil case. Of the others since 1900, three were for unauthorized 
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absence, four for bankruptcy, three for serious court convictions, 
and one (of R.A. Price, M.L.A., in 1917) for making wanton, 
reckless, and baseless charges of corruption against the Minister 
for Lands. Eight of these cases occurred before 1920, and only 
Armstrong's since 1940. On the face of it, standards of political 
rectitude in the parliament compare favourably with those of 
previous generations. 
What happens within the Assembly chamber can be analysed 
in terms of three sets of relationships which interact intimately with 
one another. These provide the underlying patterns of the sections 
that follow. Taking them in descending order of formality, these 
are first the basic rights and duties of individual members as such. 
They remain autonomous as advocates for their own constituencies, 
and they have framed standing orders, institutions, and traditions 
to regulate their own behaviour in the house—which of course takes 
entirely the form of talking to one another. The rules are directed 
to assuring to all members their fair share of the talking time and 
also a fair and reasonably courteous hearing, and to reconciling 
with these requirements the need to expedite the mass of parlia-
mentary business and to accord the appropriate priorities to its 
various items. In this whole set of relationships the Speaker plays 
a central part. 
In the remaining relationships members resolve themselves into 
groups that largely but not wholly work as teams. Among these 
the government—that is, the ministerial team—is dominant in 
accord with the traditions of the Westminster system. As govern-
ment it faces the whole of the rest of the Assembly in their capacity 
as "private members" and its powers over them include the initiative 
in deciding when and for how long the house will meet, and most 
of the business it will deal with, in what order and at what speed 
—including the programme and content of legislation, which 
occupies by far the bulk of the Assembly's time. But as the 
Constitution Act says (s. 32): "(2) All questions . . . which arise 
in the said Assembly shall be decided by the majority of votes of 
the Members present other than the Speaker, and when the votes 
are equal the Speaker shall have the casting vote." The 
government's power therefore depends on the consistent support of 
a majority of members, and majorities are kept stable by the 
loyalties and sanctions at the disposal of political parties. 
So the third set of relations in the Assembly is between the 
government and opposition parties (and any minority parties that 
may "sit on the cross-benches" to dissociate themselves from the 
official Opposition). Parties both simplify and complicate the power 
structure in the Assembly. They simplify it by causing the life of 
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a government to depend on general election results, rather than on 
changing alignments of Assembly votes; and by making other 
decisions in the chamber such as the passage of legislation almost 
always predictable, thus focusing attention on the remaining aspects 
of its work. Parties complicate the power structure by subjecting 
private members to pressures and sanctions from the party or-
ganizations outside that may conflict with the demands of their 
leaders within the Assembly, who are subject to a wider range of 
pressures—from organized interests and the bureaucracy as well 
as from the party hierarchy. 
The Role of the Speaker 
To speak first of the formal relations, the Assembly's procedures 
and rules of debate were at first closely modelled on House of 
Commons practice. They became independent after the extensive 
improvements and incorporations of existing practice into Standing 
Orders which were adopted in 1894, when the number of Orders 
was quadrupled to over four hundred. Roughly one-third of these 
were further altered up to 1965, mainly to simplify and speed up 
the activities of the house and impose more restrictions on the 
behaviour and speech of members. In 1948 Sir Gilbert Campion, 
retiring Clerk of the House of Commons, expressed the view that 
"New South Wales leads the way in procedure among State 
Legislatures, which is only natural as it takes procedure more 
seriously and has a better official set-up than elsewhere"." Leaving 
till later those special rules designed to regulate group conflict in 
the house, let us note that standards of decorum are generally as 
high today as in previous generations. Perhaps the worst of the 
occasional lapses were in the past. In 1890 the Assembly was 
dubbed "the bear-garden in Macquarie Street". In 1911 the Liberal 
Party Opposition subjected Speaker Henry Willis to sustained 
insult, intimidation, and disorder because he had enabled the Labor 
government to retain office by accepting the Chair. Since then there 
have been comparatively few instances of larrikinism of the kind 
displayed in the joint sitting of the two houses to nominate a federal 
senator to the vacancy created by Senator Lionel Murphy's 
appointment to the High Court.'" 
As did other Australian legislatures, the Assembly rejected, even 
as they were maturing in Britain, the House of Commons conven-
tions that sought to insulate the speakership from political parti-
sanship. These are well known. A new Speaker is chosen by 
agreement between the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposi-
tion. The Speaker avoids all party activity and connections there-
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after. He refrains from election campaigning, as his seat is not 
contested by the main parties at subsequent elections. He takes no 
part in debates or divisions, even in committee or to further the 
interests of his constituency. And as a corollary he is allowed wide 
discretionary powers in his main functions of presiding over debates 
in the house, keeping order, and interpreting Standing Orders for 
this purpose. 
In the New South Wales Assembly the choice of Speaker has 
always been reserved to the prevalent majority. Since 1856 only 
one Speaker has held office longer than ten years, and since 1904 
only one Speaker, in very special circumstances, has retained office 
after a change of government. Candidates for Speaker are normally 
chosen by the respective party caucuses. Generally, the post has 
been treated as a reward for a deserving government supporter, 
occasionally as a means of removing an awkward politician from 
the floor of the house. In the exceptional event of even party 
numbers in the house, governments have managed to stay in office 
by recruiting a member from outside their party: Labor govern-
ments did so with the help of Henry Willis in 1911, H.D. Morton 
in 1913, and Daniel Levy in 1920 and 1922. In nineteenth-century 
elections of a new Speaker there was usually a non-ministerial 
nomination as well as the ministerial one—generally as a way of 
testing factional strengths—but opposition to the re-election of an 
incumbent Speaker was rare. Once the party system was established 
rival nominations occurred only as a gesture of protest against the 
ways of an unpopular Speaker—five times in the twenty-nine 
elections since 1901. At parliamentary elections, however, the 
Speaker's seat has been regularly contested on a party basis. No 
Speaker has yet been unseated in this way, despite the handicap 
that his duties largely preclude a Speaker from active constituency 
work and from promoting his electorate's interests from the floor 
of the house. 
On the whole. Speakers have been expected to have some minimal 
qualifications and experience to suit them for the post, legal skills 
and relevant parliamentary service being considered the most 
appropriate. However, only six of the seventeen Speakers since 1900 
had legal training; only three had previously served as Chairman 
of Committees, and only two as ministers. In Hawker's view, 
moreover, party control and other factors made the twentieth-
century Speakers, taken together, of lesser calibre than their 
colonial predecessors. "Speakers were chosen less often from those 
who had already attained some degree of eminence in the Assembly 
and few Speakers added greatly to their political reputations after 
leaving the Chair"." Hawker draws a distinction between the 
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partisan mode of choosing Speakers and the tradition of impartial 
behaviour, once in the Chair, established by Speakers such as W.M. 
Arnold (1865-75). Members continue to declaim, when electing a 
Speaker, on the necessity for qualities of detachment. But not all 
Speakers have displayed them, and not all members expect them 
to do so. 
As early as the 1870s Anthony Trollope noted a New South 
Wales Speaker speaking from the floor of the house, "not simply 
on the clause under discussion, but with considerable party violence 
on the subject of the Bill at large"." Speakers have been known 
also to debate in committees of the house and to vote with their 
party in divisions of the whole house and its committees, though 
these practices have not been common. Occasions for using the 
Speaker's casting vote have been rarer since party lines were 
clearly drawn. In the earlier period it was cast nearly as often 
against governments as in their favour. Speakers since 1901 have 
been much less independent. Partiality can also show in the 
Speaker's manner of presiding over sittings and his rulings on points 
of order and relevance of debate. Henry Willis (1911-13) was the 
Speaker most bitterly criticized, not only from the circumstances 
of his election but also for his arbitrary and arrogant assertion of 
the Speaker's authority and independence. His conduct in the Chair 
provoked two motions of censure and one of no confidence, and 
a vitriolic valediction when he left it. W.H. Lamb (1947-59) was 
condemned for the opposite tendency, undue subservience to the 
government—notably by voting regularly in committee and house 
divisions and giving his casting vote for a government closure motion 
(when the convention was that on a procedural motion a casting 
vote, if unavoidable, should keep the debate going)—as well as for 
authoritarianism and inconsistent rulings. The Opposition frequent-
ly moved dissent from his rulings and, in addition to contesting 
his re-election as Speaker in 1953 and 1956, sought in 1952, 1953, 
and 1957 (twice) to pass motions of censure calling for his removal. 
One of Lamb's characteristic responses to these attacks was to 
defend himself to the public on a radio news session. After a record 
unbroken period as Speaker he was in fact defeated in the Labor 
caucus for the 1959 nomination by R.S. Maher (1959-65), who 
in turn resigned as Speaker and later from parliament following 
charges of personal misconduct which were later dismissed by the 
courts." 
On balance. Labor members—and Speakers—have paid less lip-
service than those on the other side to the ideal of detachment, 
in this as in other matters. One of them aptly summarized the 
party's attitude after the election of Sir Daniel Levy in 1932: 
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He is as fair and just a Speaker as it is possible to get under our party 
system of Government. Everyone who is not a fool knows that if there 
is any doubt he has to lean to the party he represents." 
Levy's fairness did not enhance his popularity on either side of the 
house. But even-handedness was part of the undisputed distinction 
in the Chair which Levy (1919-21, 1921-25, 1927-30, 1932-37) 
shared with few other speakers in the present century. These clearly 
include Sir Kevin Ellis (1965-73) of whom Premier Askin, with 
the assent of Opposition leader P.D. Hills, said on his retirement: 
In my 24 years in the Parliament, he has easily been the most 
outstanding Speaker. I doubt if any previous Speaker matched his 
capacity, impartiality and tolerance." 
As to capacity, members of the parliamentary staff link Ellis and 
Levy as the nearest approach to a model Speaker in their procedural 
rulings. As to impartiality, both Ellis and his successor, J.A. 
Cameron (1973-76) went so far as to revert to the Commons 
practice of refraining from attending party meetings while Speaker. 
Ellis took part in only two divisions (both of the house) during his 
eight years as Speaker; Cameron also voted in only two divisions, 
both of the house, in his three years in office. 
The Speaker shares with the President of the Legislative Council 
in controlling the internal administration of Parliament House, but 
here also, as Hawker shows in detail. Speakers have lost much of 
their independence from the government of the day since the time 
of Henry Willis. In a purely formal sense the Speaker is the 
representative of the Assembly in its relations with the Governor, 
the Legislative Council, and bodies outside parliament. None of 
these functions, nor the associated prestige of the Speaker's office, 
attaches to the Chairman of Committees of the Whole House (he 
does not chair select committees) who is even less insulated from 
party allegiances than the Speaker. His position was somewhat 
strengthened in 1922 when its tenure was formally changed from 
a session to a parliament, and in 1936 when his long-standing role 
of deputizing for an absent Speaker was extended to include 
supervision of the parliamentary staff on such occasions.'"" The 
practice, adopted in 1894, of the Speaker nominating, for each 
session, a panel of not more than five Temporary Chairmen of 
Committees to act in the Chairman's absence, has provided a 
training ground for most members subsequently elected as Chair-
man. Temporary chairmanships are divided between the govern-
ment and Opposition parties in the ratio of three to two, the Liberals 
taking two positions and the Country Party one in composite 
governments. 
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Legislation and debates 
The government's dominance over private members within the 
chamber includes deciding the programme of the house for each 
session and, indeed, for each sitting day. Formally speaking, these 
matters are determined by the Leader of the House, who is the 
Premier; in practice recent Premiers have delegated this authority 
to another senior minister, who assumes the title for the time 
being.'"' The role of private members is, as suggested by the words 
of the Constitution Act, to "advise and consent"—and their most 
effectual advising is done in the party rooms rather than in the 
chamber. Most business in the house is government business— 
except on alternate Thursdays when, in accordance with Standing 
Order 122A, general business takes precedence over government 
business from 2.15 to 4.15 p.m. General business can be interrupted 
even then under Standing Order 123A. As already indicated, most 
government business is legislation, of which financial legislation 
takes up about a sixth and other legislation at least half of the 
house's meeting time. And most legislation is first introduced in 
the Legislative Assembly. 
Legislation is needed to establish legal codes of conduct, to define 
the legal rights and duties of citizens, to authorize the creation of 
government (and some private) agencies and invest them with 
powers, and to sanction government taxation and spending. The 
varied subject-matter of legislation can best be seen in the lists of 
bills given in the indexes to Hansard volumes, or in the contents 
pages of the annual volumes of statutes, which up to 1940 also 
listed all the acts ever passed by the state's legislatures. The great 
bulk of legislation, correcting, amending, and extending the existing 
law as distinct from initiating new policy, originates in the 
bureaucracy, and much of it is highly technical. For these reasons 
alone private members play little part in framing or altering the 
content of legislation.'"^ Its passage through the house provides the 
occasion for quite different activities: for the government to explain 
and defend its programmes, for the backbenchers to criticize the 
administrative activities of ministers and officials, and for the 
financial affairs of the state and its agencies to be questioned and 
explained. 
Draft legislation in the form of "bills"—and completed legislation 
in the form of "acts"—fall into two distinct but overlapping 
classifications. One divides them into "private bills/acts", which 
define the rights and obligations of a specified person, set of persons, 
or corporation—such as a firm conducting a private railway—and 
"public bills/acts", which are of general application. The other 
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classification distinguishes "private members' bills/acts" from those 
introduced by the government, called "government bills/acts". Both 
private bills and private members' bills have steadily declined in 
importance. The former made up one-seventh of all bills before 
1901, 6.6 per cent of bills in 1901-10, and only 1.1 per cent in 
1951-60; since the 1925-26 session virtually all private bills have 
been introduced in the Legislative Council. Private members' bills 
were relatively numerous in colonial days, making up nearly two-
fifths of the Assembly's bills. Only fourteen were introduced 
between the sessions of 1920 and 1935-36 (half of them in the 
Assembly) and they then became negligible: in 1963 E.D. Darby 
introduced the first private member's bill in the Legislative As-
sembly in twenty-five years; since the 1959-60 session Legislative 
Councillors have attempted to introduce half a dozen private 
members' bills—without success. 
The government nowadays can expect to get its legislation 
through the Assembly substantially in the form in which it is 
introduced. Between 1901 and 1945 the proportion of bills enacted 
into law rose from about 50 per cent to over 90 per cent; by the 
1950s the government was introducing virtually all legislation, and 
hostile amendments were likely to be successful only in a hostile 
Legislative Council.'" 
Legislation is considered in both houses in the time-honoured 
stages: the first reading following the motion for leave to introduce, 
which merely announces the long title of the bill with a brief 
indication of its purposes; the second reading, when its general 
principles and main provisions are expounded and debated; the 
committee stage, when the whole house, under the Chairman of 
Committees instead of the Speaker, passes or amends the bill clause 
by clause; and the generally formal stages of reporting the results 
to the Speaker, and third reading, after which the bill is passed 
to the other chamber. The whole process may be spread over weeks 
or months, or in cases of urgency compressed into a single sitting. 
Financial legislation includes bills authorizing taxation and public 
spending. In the latter case the bills are said to "appropriate" 
money, either from revenue funds for annual current expenditure 
(appropriation bills) or for short-term spending when an appropria-
tion act is not in force (supply bills), or from loan funds, usually 
for capital expenditure. 
Procedure on financial legislation (and on its execution) reflects 
historic assumptions: that the executive may not tax or spend 
without direct parliamentary approval, that the executive must take 
responsibility for initiating all expenditure, and that private mem-
bers will want to insist that public money is spent honestly and 
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well. So—financial legislation must be recommended to the house 
by a "message" from the Governor, and private members may not 
move to increase a vote, only to reduce it. Another traditional ritual 
was that the whole house as a Committee of Supply should debate 
and determine the nature and amount of public spending and as 
a Committee of Ways and Means should authorize the raising of 
the necessary money by taxation and its issue from the public funds. 
These cumbersome and now meaningless procedures were aban-
doned in New South Wales in 1971, when the Standing Orders 
were altered to enable financial bills to be dealt with like ordinary 
public bills. The annual budget statement was thereafter delivered 
as a second-reading speech on the main appropriation bill (S.O.s 
244, 251, 336). In practice, of course, the government has long had 
unfettered control of public taxing and spending, so that financial 
debates are simply the main opportunity for attacking and defend-
ing government policy and administration across the whole range 
of its activities.'"" 
As Hawker shows, parliament became much more efficient at 
passing legislation in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth. 
"It was rare for even half the bills of a session to become Acts 
before 1901, but the proportion of successful bills later rose to 80 
per cent or 90 per cent . . ."'"' This was because the majority of 
private members consented much more readily and regularly to bills 
than they had previously done, and that in turn stemmed mainly 
from the third set of intra-parliamentary relationships we have 
mentioned—those created by the rise of the political party system. 
Although there were Independent members or groups in all 
twentieth century Assemblies except those of 1930 and 1935, their 
numbers were generally very small. Most members were reliable 
party supporters, so that majorities became stable and even with 
a slender majority a government could count on at least a full 
parliamentary term. In other words, governments were no longer 
made and unmade in the Assembly. In the nineteenth century 
twenty of the first twenty-nine ministries fell between elections after 
votes in the house. All but one of the nine ministries defeated at 
the polls, uncertain of the election's probable effect on their 
parliamentary support, waited until parliament reassembled to 
resign or be forced from office by a vote of no confidence. After 
1904, ministries did not have to give up office between elections, 
whilst they resigned forthwith when their party lost a general 
election. 
The two-way relationship between government and private mem-
bers is thus overlaid by a more complex pattern of backbenchers 
of the majority party (or parties) behind the government leaders 
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confronting backbenchers of the minority behind a "shadow cabi-
net", that is. Opposition leaders identified as spokesmen of their 
party in relation to the subject-matter of specified portfolios—a 
practice initiated by the Labor Opposition in the 1930s. The 
minority party in opposition gives plenty of "advice" (some of which 
is accepted) but rarely consents. Thus all proceedings in the two 
houses are now shaped by their party composition—though the fact 
is still unacknowledged in any of their formal procedures or 
records.'"' 
Firm party structures have contrary effects on the working of 
parliament, in some ways simplifying and in other ways complicat-
ing it. We deal first with simplifications. Since party governments 
normally fall only at general elections, time and energy in the 
legislative chambers are no longer consumed in forming and re-
forming factions. Since legislative and other parliamentary decisions 
are generally a foregone conclusion under party rule, time and 
energy are diverted to other activities already mentioned—the 
defence and criticism of government actions and policies in a less 
technical fashion. These trends tend to confirm the historical 
subordination of the legislative chamber to the programmes and 
purposes of the executive. In particular they alter the nature and 
function of parliamentary debate in comparison with periods when 
debate could alter or defeat legislation and sap away a government's 
majority. 
It is not easy, nor very profitable, to compare the standards of 
debate in the Assembly today with those at other times and places, 
though there is ample written evidence of its quality to work upon: 
the N.S.W. parliament first officially recorded its debates in 1879 
—thirty years before the House of Commons appointed its own 
reporters, though relatively late among Australian parliaments. In 
1957 a former principal reporter expressed the view that "par-
liaments are less colourful, and in some ways less lively, than they 
were. . . . Speeches are now much more functional, with the speaker 
trying to pack in as much as he can in a given time. Even in 
invective . . . modern politicians have something to learn."'"' As 
recorded in Hansard, most speeches appear more coherent and more 
grammatical than many an academic textbook, and certainly than 
the words spoken in the house. This is thanks mainly to the editorial 
ministrations of the reporting staff, said to be much appreciated 
by members. In 1949 the Principal Reporter was appropriately 
renamed Editor of Debates. According to Speakers' rulings, mem-
bers may not read their speeches, except by referring to notes, which 
in the case of ministers and the leader of the Opposition may be 
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"copious". In practice modern Speakers have indulged an increasing 
reliance by all members upon written notes—possibly a response 
to the pressures reflected in reductions of the time allowed for 
speeches, in 1964 and again in 1974. 
The main substantive functions of modern debate are to express 
the solidarity of the respective groups in parliament, to advertise 
the party leaders' intentions and achievements to the electors, to 
publicize the Opposition's consternation and contempt at the 
government's ineptitude and self-interest, and to enable the govern-
ment to reply in kind. Debate is also very much an opportunity 
for individual members to impress their respective leaders and to 
record their assiduity on behalf of constituents. The basic objectives 
of all participants are to maintain or improve their own and their 
party's public image with an eye to ensuing elections. Here the 
government is at a distinct advantage, partly because it alone has 
achievements to report and can time its announcements to the best 
effect. Compared with those of a century ago, however, the 
proceedings within the legislative chamber have become little more 
than rituals for members only. The public gallery is—except on 
special occasions—frequented only by sporadic groups of tourists 
and students. Proceedings are not broadcast on radio or television. 
Verbatim press reports of debates are out of the question and 
Hansard is read only by those who create it and a few scholars 
and journalists. Except for the rare dramatic incident, proceedings 
in the chamber receive less media coverage than those in the caucus 
rooms and party organizations, and with reason.'"* 
How Oppositions oppose 
It is typical of the simplification produced by party government that 
the various kinds of Assembly business besides legislation, despite 
the differences between their formal purposes, have nearly all 
become occasions for the one kind of duel between government and 
Opposition. There are some forms of business, such as the presenta-
tion of "petitions" on behalf of aggrieved individuals and groups, 
which are little more than propaganda gestures since no one expects 
them to produce any practical result, and literally nothing is done 
with them after presentation. Other kinds of business can be 
distinguished mainly by the regularity of their occurrence and the 
scope the Assembly's own Standing Orders allow for the associated 
debate. We have mentioned the Governor's Opening Speech near 
the beginning of each session, giving "the reasons for His 
Excellency's calling the Parliament together" (S.O. 18) and initiat-
ing a debate on the Address-in-Reply which can range oyer virtually 
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the whole of the government's activities. The Treasurer's speeches 
on the annual Budget and on other general financial measures offer 
regular opportunities for debate on any subject with implications 
for public finance—which could exclude very little. 
Perhaps the most popular period of business is the forty-five 
minutes early in every sitting when members may address "ques-
tions seeking information", not only to ministers who in practice 
are almost invariably the target, but also if they wish to any other 
member, on "any . . . public matter connected with the business 
of the House, in which such Members may be concerned" (S.O. 
76). Up to the 1890s "question time" was relatively undeveloped 
in New South Wales, but by 1914 questions had largely replaced 
debates on the adjournment and private members' motions (see 
below) as the main means by which members aired the needs and 
grievances of their constituents and supporting interest groups. 
Questions also draw the government's attention to genuine sore 
spots in the body politic or administrative. Many of them, too, are 
scarcely disguised shots in the party battle—the Opposition's 
probes, often making statements in question form, intended to 
embarrass ministers or ferret out error, and the government 
members' "Dorothy Dixers", questions usually pre-arranged (even 
drafted) by ministers to give themselves an opportunity to expatiate 
on some current success or spectacular project. 
Governments do take question time seriously, as was shown on 
26 March 1970 when, with the Opposition's agreement, the Liberal-
Country coalition cancelled question time (and presentation of 
petitions) to prevent a few Liberal backbenchers from pressing their 
demands for government action against "blasphemy and obscenity" 
in student newspapers at Sydney's three universities. But question 
time has not been as effective as it might be, because the trend 
in the present century has been for the great majority of questions 
to be asked without notice, in expectation of an impromptu reply. 
This practice makes severe demands upon ministers and officials 
and may elicit ill-considered, inaccurate, uninformative, or non-
committal answers; moreover Standing Orders since 1964 have 
precluded the valuable cut and thrust of supplementary questions 
(S.O. 79). But a minister is not compelled to answer, and he may 
ask—or the Speaker may order—that a question be put on the 
notice-paper, which means that both question and answer must be 
in writing. In fact the number of questions voluntarily asked upon 
notice has begun to increase again in recent years. 
Another regular occasion for wide-ranging talk is the ordinary 
adjournment motion (usually made by the leader of the house) to 
end the Assembly's sitting each day. While ostensibly debating this 
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motion members can express their opinions on any issue they please. 
But usually there is time for only one speaker, to whom a minister, 
if appropriate, may briefly reply or promise to investigate. There 
is no sustained debate and no substantive motion. Motions of 
censure and no confidence, normally moved by the Opposition 
leader against the government (though Lang as Premier once 
reversed the process in 1931), are not regular occasions, but can 
initiate a more or less comprehensive attack, depending on the terms 
of the motion. In the days of shifting factional allegiance no-
confidence motions were the main means of bringing down a 
government. After the rise of stable parties the Opposition could 
never pass such motions, and whether or not for this reason they 
have steadily become less frequent during the present century and 
are now fairly rare.'"' 
A new form of "grievance" debate was introduced by Standing 
Order 122B in April 1976. On the alternate Thursdays when 
general business has precedence the Speaker proposes as the first 
order of the day "that grievances be noted", whereupon until 4.15 
p.m. any member may for ten minutes raise any matter in which 
he is interested, allowing a debate similar to that which may occur 
on the ordinary motion for adjournment. 
There are various procedures by which private members may 
initiate debate on a single issue. One is to move for a special 
adjournment under Standing Order 49 "for the purpose of discuss-
ing a specific matter of recent occurrence and of sufficient public 
importance to warrant urgent consideration". Provided that the 
Speaker considers the matter falls within the definitions in the 
Standing Order (revised on 1 April 1976) and that five members 
rise in their places to support it, such a motion takes precedence 
(after the disposal of initial formal business) over all other business 
of the day, and debate proceeds forthwith, allowing up to thirty 
minutes to the mover and the minister first speaking and up to ten 
minutes to other members and the mover in reply. There may not 
be more than one such motion on the same day unless the house 
majority agrees, but otherwise the device is fairly readily available 
to an active Opposition, seeing that the Speaker has allowed such 
items as the continuing decline in railway patronage and revenue 
and the lending policy of private insurance companies. 
By contrast the so-called "urgency motion" under Standing 
Order 395, which is formally stronger in that it can be moved 
without notice by any member during question time and can call 
for action, is almost invariably still-born, since its fate is in the 
hands of the (government) majority. It faces three hurdles. The 
house (not just the Speaker) must first agree "that it is a matter 
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of urgent necessity" to consider the motion forthwith—after hearing 
ten-minute statements from the mover and a minister (or leader 
of the Opposition if a government member is the mover). If the 
house does so agree, it then votes on whether to suspend Standing 
Orders to allow the motion to be considered forthwith. If that is 
done the motion itself must then be debated and put. Usually the 
first hurdle is fatal, with the majority voting to deny urgency. 
Finally it is open to private members to move motions for specific 
action on days set apart for other than government business (notably 
"private members' day" on Thursdays). Here again the most an 
Opposition member expects is the chance to air his views; he does 
not hope to elicit any action."" 
Party has thus simplified the usage of question time and other 
procedures for what Opposition leader Murray Robson called in 
1954 "the airing of questions of public concern and misgiving", by 
transforming them largely into occasions for straight-out competi-
tion between government and Opposition for the ears of the electors 
by the none-too-reliable route of the public media. Party has helped 
to simplify some other forms of parliamentary activity virtually out 
of existence. Both houses have traditionally claimed the functions 
of critically sifting policy proposals and possibilities, of investigating 
scandals, mishaps, or community problems with a view to reforming 
legislation, and of scrutinizing the regular operations of the 
administration to check on its probity and economy. The main 
instruments for all these activities have been parliamentary commit-
tees—select or standing committees or committees of the whole. 
Some of this machinery has fallen into disuse; some has not been 
adapted to keep it effective; some has never been effective in New 
South Wales. (In a different category, of course, are the committees 
set up each session under standing or sessional orders for 
parliament's routine housekeeping: the complementary Library 
Committee of each house to formulate policy for the Parliamentary 
Library, the complementary house committees to supervise accom-
modation and domestic services, and independent committees of 
each house to review Standing Orders and to decide which papers 
tabled in parliament deserve printing.) 
The most obvious opportunity for policy sifting is in the detailed 
consideration of bills, which has always been done in committee 
of the whole despite many suggestions—based partly on experience 
in other countries such as Britain and New Zealand—that members 
would become better acquainted with special fields and that bills 
would be more expeditiously dealt with if the committee stage were 
entrusted to small standing committees. In 1956 the Clerk of the 
Assembly recommended against any such change, giving two 
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reasons. The first was that in a relatively small house business is 
not unduly hampered by the fact that every member has the right 
to speak and vote on all clauses and amendments of every bill— 
and it would be a pity if some members were precluded from doing 
so by not being members of the relevant standing committee. The 
Clerk's second reason was that decisions of a small committee would 
not necessarily be the same as that of a full vote in the house.'" 
The Clerk may here have been making a virtue of the inescapable 
fact that neither house in New South Wales would relegate 
important business to committees other than of the whole, because 
none of the party leaders would countenance the risks to rigid party 
discipline and voting entailed in a less formal committee at-
mosphere, and few private members are interested. 
Parliament's main investigating instrument was the ad hoc select 
committee—a complement to the government-appointed royal com-
missions which reached their heyday at the turn of the century. 
Hawker has described in detail the Assembly's orgy of select-
committee-making in the same period, also its shortcomings, its 
value to members, its mixed practical results, and its decline 
"throughout the twentieth century, almost to vanishing point"."^ 
He links the decline of select committees with the growth of the 
party system: 
, . , the personal contacts and influences that select committees 
furthered in a factional system were less valuable when Parliament was 
increasingly divided into two groups opposed in principle and in promise. 
. . . As groups in the Assembly moved gradually towards polarity 
premiers . , . had less need to exercise control over members through 
whatever instruments the House could provide. Party meetings, for 
example, took better care of that. For backbenchers also, party 
organization presented ways to win advancement other than through 
the uncertain and time-consuming work of select committees. Parties, 
as they developed, had other ideas in any case about the uses that 
committees might serve.'" 
This was an allusion to the replacement of select committees 
reporting to the house as a whole by party committees, especially 
on the Opposition side, which began on a regular basis in the 1930s 
to scrutinize government legislation and the operation of the several 
portfolios, reporting to the Opposition leader on possible lines of 
attack. Similar committees of government members were not 
unknown."" However, select committees did not become entirely 
extinct. Since 1965 committees have been appointed to investigate 
drought relief, the state of the timber, building, meat, and other 
industries. Aboriginal welfare, the parliamentary buildings, and the 
pccsibiiity of state government participation in appointments of 
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judges to the High Court of Australia. 
A select committee can investigate "any particular event, person, 
transaction or organisation in as much detail and with as much 
publicity as it thinks fit"—a finding which the New South Wales 
Bar Council in 1971 found disturbing, since "such an inquiry a 
Committee is not equipped to perform". Parliamentarians on a 
committee, the Council noted, are not bound by any code of 
procedure; they are apt to be inexperienced and partial in the 
interrogation of witnesses; the press may exploit their proceedings 
to the detriment of witnesses. Yet persons summoned before a 
committee are statutorily obliged to appear and produce documents; 
witnesses have no right to counsel or to refuse to answer any 
"lawful" question; and legal professional privilege is not recognized. 
Though neither house has taken to itself any general power to 
punish breaches of privilege or contempt (a self-denial unique 
among Australian parliaments), the President or Speaker may 
commit a witness refusing to answer a question to gaol for up to 
a month. The Bar Council recommended improved procedures 
which had not been adopted by 1976."^ 
Apart from what was incidental to the work of select committees. 
Assembly members have made little effort to systematize the 
function of checking administrative powers and operations, or to 
equip themselves with adequate fact-finding machinery for the 
purpose. The growth of administrative law has not provoked them 
to emulate the Legislative Council's Committee of Subordinate 
Legislation, though members can move on the floor of the house 
for the disallowance of those regulations required to be tabled— 
a forlorn gesture, rarely succeeding, especially since about 1950 
when members on the government side ceased to resort to it.'" The 
only effective control device in the parliament's history was the Joint 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, which Henry 
Parkes established in 1888 to report on the desirability and cost 
of all major works proposals. This committee took its work seriously 
and relieved governments of some of the former pressures by private 
members for local roads and bridges. In due course, however, it 
came to reflect party strengths in the parliament, becoming more 
of an instrument of than a watchdog over governments. It was not 
revived after J.T. Lang allowed it to lapse in the Depression year 
of 1932.'" 
The only other statutory committee of the parliament (excepting 
the former elections and qualifications committees) has a more 
ignominious history. Part of the improved system of financial 
procedures and controls established by the Audit Act, 1902, was 
the Public Accounts Committee. This was to be drawn solely from 
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non-ministerial members of the Assembly, and its terms of reference 
were to investigate and report on matters referred to it by ministers, 
the Auditor-General, or Assembly resolution, to report annually on 
any expenditure ministers made without due parliamentary sanction 
or appropriation, and to suggest improvements in public business 
and account-keeping. From the beginning the members were 
nominated by a minister, in the ratio of three from the government 
side to two from the Opposition. No matter for investigation was 
ever referred to the committee, who therefore contented themselves 
with examining the annual list of payments made without prior 
parliamentary authorization during the preceding financial year and 
up to the time of their meeting. In some early years the committee 
protested, for example in 1921 that unauthorized expenditure was 
getting out of hand at one-sixth of total expenditure and that the 
estimates were not in a form that fairly reflected government 
purposes. No one took any notice, and the committee's reports 
contracted to the single stereotyped statement—unvarying to the 
present day—that they had "decided to regard each of the appended 
departmental explanations as satisfactory". 
In 1953 the committee decided that they need only consider 
expenditure remaining unauthorized at the time they met. This 
absolved them from the major part of their task if they met (as 
they generally did at the time) after the passing of the annual 
Appropriation Act—usually in September—which always validated 
retrospectively the unauthorized payments of the previous financial 
year to 30 June. The committee obtained confirmation of their view 
from the Crown Solicitor, who added, however: 
Of course it is desirable for the proper discharge of the Public Accounts 
Committee's duties that the Committee should meet at such time as 
will enable it to inquire into and report upon all, and not merely some, 
of the expenditure made without Parliamentary sanction or appropria-
tion in a particular financial year before the Executive seeks 
Parliament's concurrence in what has been done in that respect.'" 
This view eventually prevailed with the committee, who for the past 
decade has regularly held two meetings, one before the Appropria-
tion Act to consider unauthorized payments in the previous financial 
year, one afterwards to consider similar payments since 30 June. 
Though their formula of exculpation remains unaltered, this prac-
tice at least ensures that the complete list of unauthorized payments 
is published year by year, with the departmental explanations, in 
the committee's reports. 
Although there were always a few members who deprecated it, 
the aversion from committees and committee work of all kinds 
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which set in during the twentieth century suggests that Assembly 
members in general felt increasingly unable or unwilling, or both, 
to attempt any detailed, precise, or technical supervision of govern-
ment policy-making or bureaucratic administration—perhaps grate-
fully resigning these functions to the party leaders. The conclusion 
is supported by the parliament's relative failure to develop its own 
information resources, whether of the conventional kind such as its 
historically valuable library, or in newer forms such as the research 
and reference services which it resolved in 1968 should be, along 
with scholarly publishing, among the principal functions of the 
library. The Parliamentary Librarian has made the point with 
extreme moderation: 
[State] Parliaments are, generally speaking, in their organisation, 
methods and bureaucracy, conservative, and the library services pro-
vided have remained subject to the institutional restraints and traditions 
and reflect the general image of the institution. 
. . . the influence and importance of the Federal back-benchers and 
Opposition as an entity are far greater than in State Parliaments.'" 
"EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE" AND "OUTSIDE CONTROL" 
Although it is clear that the party system and the growth of 
government have profoundly influenced the working of the popular 
house, it is equally clear that few New South Wales citizens, 
including parliamentarians, have concerned themselves greatly 
about the results. There is nothing here comparable to the extensive 
literature and controversy of the past half-century in Britain, for 
example, about "parliamentary reform"—in which Fabian socialists 
and Labour Party people have been prominent. What little polemic 
there has been in New South Wales tended to come—like the 
stereotypes of the Legislative Council as a superior, non-party house 
of review—from the conservative side of politics. 
The polemic has centred on the notion that parliament is, or 
ought to be—perhaps once was—a deliberative assembly of individ-
ual members debating and voting according to their conscience and 
the public interest, and controlling the government. There has been 
talk of "the private member's loss of initiative and independence", 
"the growth of cabinet dictatorship", and executive domination of 
parliamentary proceedings. It is said that parliament cannot—or 
can no longer—restrain an all-powerful government which controls 
not only the bureaucracy but also the tame legislative majority and 
most of the authentic information about the daily work of the 
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administration. A related kind of concern seems partly at variance 
with the first. It refers to "caucus control" and "domination of 
parliament by outside bodies" (rather than the cabinet), and implies 
that government and private members alike have lost their inde-
pendence, as representatives of the general public, to party or-
ganizations that represent only part of the public. 
Such criticisms, directed largely at the results of more ample 
government activity and of Labor party organization, reflect not 
only a fairly obvious conservative bias but often a misconceived 
nostalgia for an imaginary parliament of the past.'^" But they do 
raise some serious questions which are best answered by examining 
what has actually happened, and why. We concentrate first on the 
growth of procedural instruments for government control of busi-
ness in the house, and then on the question of party inroads into 
the representative role of parliamentarians. 
The growth of government control of business and its embodi-
ment in procedural rules were not the result of a regular process 
like the thorough revision of its procedures which the House of 
Commons undertakes every decade or so. The most substantial 
development of the Assembly's Standing Orders occurred between 
1886 and 1894; from 1894 to 1965 about one-third of the Standing 
Orders were amended, mainly in the 1920s with some further 
activity in 1938-40, 1964, 1971, and 1976. The most important 
changes, as Hawker points out, were those which 
simplified and speeded in the activities of the House, but imposed further 
limits on the behaviour and speech of members, . . . The general effect 
of these and related changes was to restrict debate on bills to the second 
reading and Committee stages, and to make it difficult, and usually 
impossible, for a single member or small group of members to delay 
a bill from moving quickly to its next stage by procedural means. . . . 
Time limits were used more extensively after 1901 and by the mid-1960s 
applied to most questions which might be debated.'-' 
Of the other common parliamentary devices for limiting debate, 
the closure or "gag" (motion "that the question be now put") was 
already well acclimatized by the 1920s, and was made more 
stringent in 1928 by the provision that it could be applied whether 
or not a member was speaking. With the support of the 
government's majority it can be applied to debates of all kinds, 
and has been used very freely at times, especially by the McGirr 
and Cahill governments in the 1940s and 1950s respectively. 
The "guillotine" is a motion fixing times in advance for conclud-
ing debate on a question or series of questions, such as specified 
groups of clauses in a bill. Premier Lang introduced the device in 
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1925; later Labor governments dropped it in 1941 and revived it 
again in 1961; since then it has been in regular use, particularly 
for debates on appropriation bills. Because it gives prior notice of 
closure it is more acceptable to members than the gag without 
notice. 
The growth of such restrictions has been common to most modern 
legislatures, and many of them have arisen as much from the 
practical need to ration time fairly in an increasingly busy chamber 
as from the desire of governments to dominate parliamentary 
business. However, in conjunction with the government's other 
controls they can be used to hamstring Opposition parties in their 
roles of criticizing the government and arousing public opinion. On 
one day in 1970, after the house had sat till four in the morning 
to pass sixteen government amendments the Opposition had no time 
to digest, the government proceeded in the afternoon with ten bills, 
including one to reorganize control of the dairy industry and one 
of 450 pages rewriting all legislation governing the Supreme Court. 
The Dairy Industry Bill had reached the Opposition only six days 
before this, and the Supreme Court Bill only two days before.'" 
It is never easy to say how far such episodes, which are not 
uncommon, are the result of accident or design. Recurrent conges-
tions of business are certainly hard to defend while sitting days 
per year are one-quarter below those at the beginning of the 
century. But they are more significant for the handicaps they impose 
on Opposition parties trying to criticize government measures and 
keep the public informed, than for their impact on the private 
member as such. 
The opportunities of the private member in parliament are often 
underrated. If the figures in table 14 are any guide, question time, 
the debate on the Address-in-Reply, and discussion of urgency 
motions, adjournment motions, and private members' motions 
together occupy between a quarter and a third of the Legislative 
Assembly's meeting time, and throughout the twentieth century this 
proportion has not been markedly different from what it was in 
the nineteenth. Moreover, it has usually been about twice the time 
taken up by financial debates which may be regarded as the main 
opportunity for the Opposition's concerted initiatives in attacking 
the government and advancing party views. This leaves a similarly 
stable fraction of about half or more of the Assembly's time for 
business—mainly legislation—on which the government can largely 
define the scope of debate. 
Moreover, private members use their special opportunities mainly 
to ventilate local grievances and prime the parish pump, leaving 
policy questions to other occasions and to the guidance of their 
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Table 14. Legislative Assembly: Percentage Distribution of Time 
(As measured by pages of Hansard) 
Private meiTibers' opportunities: 
Questions 
Speeches on adjournment 
Private members' motions 
Address-in-Reply 
Total 
Opposition Initiative: 
Budget debate 
Committee of Supply-
Total 
Government Initiative: 
Government legislation 
Tax bills 
Ministerial statements 
Total 
Ceremonial, etc. 
1879-80 
I 
11 
17' 
0 
29 
9 
5 
14 
47 
8 
0 
55 
2 
1914 
14 
1 
1 
18 
34 
16 
17 
33 
22 
8 
2 
32 
1 
1950 
18 
3 
6 
0 
27 
6 
7 
13 
57 
1 
1 
59 
1 
1955 
18 
2 
5 
11 
36 
7 
8 
15 
44 
1 
3 
48 
1 
1965 
18 
4 
8 
13 
43 
5 
13 
18 
34 
0 
3 
37 
2 
1975 
14 
6 
15 
9 
44 
10 
— 
10 
42 
2 
0 
44 
2 
1, Includes debates on private members' bills, about 1 per cent, 
2, Abolished 1971, 
parties. As we have seen, most members no longer even try to be 
independent legislators, makers and unmakers of cabinets, or expert 
supervisors and critics of the administrative machine. So far as it 
ever existed, day-to-day parliamentary control over the executive 
and its policies, by way of the latent threat of dismissal, has given 
way to intermittent electoral control. Parliamentary control over 
the administration by way of checks on its efficiency, economy, and 
even probity has been steadily approaching impotence with the 
growth and spread of government activities. The rise of the party 
system has accelerated this trend in two ways. First, Labor parties 
want governments to do and spend more, and so do not share their 
opponents' interest in frugal administration. Second, the idea of 
such control seems idle in face of the rigid majority/minority 
mentality which shrinks from creating parliamentary scrutinizing 
devices and emasculates the few that exist. In these senses cabinet 
domination of parliament is undeniable. 
The second general line of criticism of modern parliamentary 
government alleges "outside control" of both cabinets' and private 
members' policy decisions, and this at two levels. First, what 
members do inside the house (so it goes) is really decided by their 
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own party meetings, or caucuses, held outside the chamber; thus 
what the house does is really determined in practice by a majority 
vote of the government caucus, which is not necessarily a majority 
of the whole house. At the second level (the criticism continues) 
even the party caucuses may be subject to dictation from party 
organs outside the parliament altogether, which can demand the 
implementation of party platforms and policies on pain of various 
sanctions against parliamentarians who fail to toe the party line. 
Such criticisms tend to focus on the Labor Party, whose extra-
parliamentary organs have more overt authority and powers than 
those of the other parties. 
In chapter 3 it was suggested that the relations between the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings of all the main 
parties, though based on different formal rules, are much alike in 
practice, and that none of them can be accurately represented by 
so simple a label as "outside control". Inside parliament, also, there 
are regular meetings of the parliamentarians of every party to 
discuss policy and plan strategy, and although only Labor members 
are pledged in writing to vote in the house as their caucus majority 
decides, in practice all parties display equal voting solidarity on 
the floor of the house. If the non-Labor parties have had more 
members who spoke out of turn, the Labor party has had more 
rebels who backed their dissentient words with their votes. Even 
Independents tend to confine their support in divisions to one party 
or another—and Independents generally do not last very long in 
the N.S.W. parliament. Of the period 1901-70 Hawker wrote: 
Free votes were not favoured by any party, and the last free vote, 
concerning the construction of the Sydney Opera House, was only 
reluctantly allowed to Labor members by the ministry. On the whole, 
the parties were not clearly distinguished by the number or importance 
of voting splits within their ranks . . .'" 
These facts only confirm that important policy decisions are not 
made or changed within the legislative chamber. It is the logic of 
the party battle that the resolution of political issues—so far as 
such issues are resolved in the parliament at all—has been 
transferred from the Assembly chamber to the party rooms, 
particularly those of the government party or parties. This removes 
the process of resolution from direct public scrutiny—though the 
press now reports caucus meetings more fully than Assembly 
debates. But how far do caucus discussions themselves resolve 
important issues? It may be found that their role, like that of the 
extra-parliamentary bodies, is rather to restrain and occasionally 
veto the initiatives of party leaders than to formulate and criticize 
party strategy in the legislature. 
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and "Outside Control" 
When the leaders are in government their authority is greatly 
strengthened by the range of information and advice they command 
from the bureaucracy and organized groups outside. True, even 
ministers can sometimes come to grief if they persistently fail to 
consult their caucus or flout its wishes: this happened to Premier 
Stevens, whom the U.A.P. caucus deposed in 1939, and to the Cahill 
cabinet, whom the Labor caucus forbade to interfere with the 
closing hours of licensed clubs in 1954. Prudent ministries do try 
to keep their colleagues informed at least slightly in advance of 
the Opposition about their legislative programmes. Under both 
Labor and Liberal-Country governments, once cabinet has agreed 
on the draft of a bill the minister in charge submits it to a meeting 
of his parliamentary party for approval before introducing it to 
parliament.'^" The prevailing relationship under Labor was well 
expressed by J.D.B. Miller: "A Labor Cabinet is, in the last 
analysis, the servant of caucus; but it is in a strategic position to 
guide and influence its master."'" A non-Labor government is not 
even in theory the servant of caucus. 
A parliamentary party in opposition has rather more influence 
over its leaders, who are then hardly better informed than the rank-
and-file about the daily operations of government. Indeed, prolonged 
periods in opposition are sufficiently demoralizing to make leaders 
the scapegoats for party failure. After eight years in opposition the 
N.S.W. Liberal parliamentarians discarded three leaders within a 
decade; at about the same interval after losing office in 1965 the 
Labor caucus rejected P.D. Hills in favour of Neville Wran. But 
this is no proof that ordinary parliamentarians are contributing 
more significantly to decision-making in the party rooms than they 
do in the house. After all, what they concert in caucus they must 
then play out in the chamber, and if it be said that private party 
meetings preclude genuine public debate between government and 
Opposition, it must be remembered that the sustained and orderly 
arguing of points was never notable in the house either. 
A traditional view of parliamentary government pictures a 
powerful executive, restrained and guided in the public interest by 
its "responsibility" (on pain of dismissal) to its fellow parlia-
mentarians who debate and vote upon its proposals with reliable 
knowledge of the interests and desires of the electors they represent. 
Whatever the truth of this picture of the past, the reality today 
is much more complex and, as already hinted, the party system 
which simplifies it in some ways contributes to its complexity in 
others. Party organizations contribute indispensably to members' 
knowledge of community demands: in the academic jargon of the 
1960s they help to "aggregate interests", that is, to collect and sort 
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out much more political information and propaganda than individ-
ual members could hope to digest unaided. In this process, because 
the parties are themselves interest-groups, each of them misses or 
distorts some of the information, but party competition stimulates 
them to point out each other's errors and omissions. 
Party organization also strengthens the hand of each group of 
party leaders. As Hawker shows, by 1950 the one-third of Assembly 
members on government and Opposition front benches were deliver-
ing two-thirds of the speeches in the house, as compared with one-
half at the beginning of the century.'" But the separate parlia-
mentary party meetings probably enabled private members to 
impress rank-and-file party and voter views on their respective 
leaders more effectively than if they had been confined to public 
debates in the house. 
By ensuring unassailable majorities party organization was one 
factor among many—including the increased complexity and tech-
nicality of government—which confirmed and strengthened the 
traditional power of the executive in the parliamentary system. But 
social and technological change also tended to offset the decline 
in "parliamentary control" by subjecting the executive to an 
unprecedented range of other restraints: the conventional inertia of 
the enlarged state bureaucracies, the direct scrutiny, criticisms, and 
pressures of innumerable organized interest groups, the vigilance 
of party activists from its own as well as the Opposition side, and 
the persistent probings of the press. Parliament is surviving in a 
new and "partyfied" form, but it has lost any pre-eminence it may 
have had as an institution of democratic defence against over-
mighty rulers. 
Finally, although the party system robbed parliament of the 
function of making and unmaking governments, it did not remove 
its function of developing and selecting political leaders. The extra-
parliamentary organs of the parties may have their chairmen and 
presidents, but the acknowledged leader of every party is its 
parliamentary leader. He is chosen by and from his parliamentary 
colleagues for two main sets of qualifications: his apparent appeal 
as an election-winner, and his experience and skills as a parlia-
mentarian. If he wins elections he has to prove capable of leading 
an effective ministerial team in charge of the state's ongoing 
administration. But both in this capacity and as a party leader he 
will be using a knowledge and mastery of public affairs gained 
mainly as a member of parliament. His ministerial colleagues will 
also have been selected from parliament, either by himself or by 
a party caucus. Ministers of all parties have generally entered office 
with a longer-than-average parliamentary career behind them. A 
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few new members have had the luck to move quickly into the 
ministry, but there is little chance of reaching the top without a 
substantial parliamentary apprenticeship. 
THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT 
The Executive Council, first established in 1825, now derives its 
authority from the Letters Patent constituting the Governorship, 
and is also recognized in the Constitution Act. It comprises all 
serving ministers of the Crown, and only them; by convention they 
resign from the Council on ceasing to be ministers. Formally 
speaking, the Governor appoints Executive Councillors as his 
principal advisers in accordance with his Instructions and with the 
constitutional conventions of responsible government. In New South 
Wales it is these conventions, and not the law, that require ministers 
to be members of parliament; moreover the traditional statutory 
requirement, derived from Britain, that a sitting member must seek 
re-election on appointment as a minister, was repealed in 1906. 
Tacitly recognizing the conventions, the Constitution Act exempts 
ministers from the general disqualification of holders of offices of 
profit under the Crown from sitting in parliament. It also seems 
to assume—what has generally been the case—that the Vice-
President of the Executive Council will be a member of the upper 
house rather than the lower—but there is no law determining the 
distribution of ministers between the two houses.'" 
We have already noted that the normal function of the Executive 
Council is purely to give formal sanction to the more important 
legal instruments of executive government, and that this is done 
at weekly meetings generally attended only by the Governor and 
the minimum of two Executive Councillors stipulated by the 
Instructions. Full meetings of the Executive Council are held as 
a matter of courtesy at the first convenient opportunity after a new 
Governor takes office, and on the last occasion when he presides, 
or when the Queen is able to preside, as during her visit in 1954. 
Otherwise they are rare: in 1931 J.T. Lang called a full meeting 
twice in the same day to reinforce his demands on Governor Game 
for additional appointments to the Legislative Council.'" The 
survival of the Executive Council in its separate form enables the 
executive government to carry out its legal functions without 
imposing tedious routine upon cabinet meetings, where the ministry 
as a whole make their substantive decisions; whether it is still 
needed for that or other purposes is debatable (see note 7 to this 
chapter). 
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The composition of ministries 
Statute law explicitly recognizes the offices of Premier, Deputy 
Premier, Vice-President of the Executive Council, Attorney-Gener-
al, and all the other ministers of the Crown. By convention the 
Governor appoints as Premier a member of the lower house having 
majority support there, and under the modern party system he 
rarely has any difficulty in identifying this person because party 
strengths are clear and parties always have an acknowledged 
leader.'" The Governor thereafter appoints and dismisses ministers 
on the Premier's recommendation. The composition of cabinets, 
therefore, depends on the parties' methods of choosing their leaders 
and of nominating candidates for the ministry. 
Each of the parliamentary parties in each house has generally 
elected its leader in that house, by secret ballot if the position is 
contested, at the beginning of each session or as soon as a vacancy 
occurs. Most aberrations from this convention were by-products of 
Labor's factional struggles in the 1920s. In March 1923 the A.L.P. 
State Executive, under A.W.U. control, expelled Labor Opposition 
leader James Dooley from the party after he had called them "a 
crowd of uncouth crooks and selfish intriguers". The caucus 
majority continued to support Dooley as parliamentary leader and 
refused to recognize the Executive's appointee, J.J.G. McGirr, 
whom the Federal Executive "removed" in April in favour of W.F. 
Dunn. In June the State Conference reinstated Dooley, who made 
way a month later for the caucus to elect J.T. Lang as leader."" 
At the end of 1926 when Labor was in office Peter Loughlin, Deputy 
Premier, failed by one vote in caucus in a challenge to Lang's 
leadership, and the State Executive summoned a special conference 
to resolve the issue. Now in a minority and opposed to Lang, the 
A.W.U. group moved that the election of leader should remain with 
caucus, but the following motion was carried by 274 votes to 4: 
That this conference has confidence in John T. Lang, Premier of New 
South Wales, and hereby confirms him in the leadership of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party for the period of the present parliament; 
and recognising that unity is essential to the success of the carrying 
out of the platform and policy of the Labor Party, the Premier is 
authorised, in the event of circumstances arising which in his opinion 
imperil the unity, to do all things and exercise such powers as he deems 
necessary in the interests of the movement.'" 
A "Unity Conference" in 1927 renewed these powers and reaffirmed 
the principle of conference selection of the A.L.P. parliamentary 
leader, which held to the end of Lang's regime in the party in 1939. 
In 1971 the A.L.P. irritated its own M.L.C.s by ruling that the 
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Labor caucus in the Legislative Assembly alone should thenceforth 
elect the leader and deputy-leader of the party in the Legislative 
Council, and Neville Wran thus became the A.L.P. Council leader 
in February 1972.'" 
The rules for selecting ministers vary from party to party, but 
no Premier at least since 1910 has had an entirely free choice 
excepting, again, J.T. Lang. From its first ministry in 1910 the New 
South Wales A.L.P. followed the party's general practice of electing 
ministers and other parliamentary office-bearers by exhaustive 
ballot in caucus, leaving the Premier to decide the order of seniority 
and the number of portfolios and to allocate them among those 
elected. In May 1927, however, with his tenuous Assembly majority 
threatened by Labor defections and his cabinet refusing to support 
a request for a dissolution, Lang resigned his commission (hence 
the whole government's), was commissioned again, and selected a 
new ministry without the aid of caucus, "eliminating", as he wrote 
later, "those whom I believed to be disloyal".'" He then secured 
the dissolution. In by-passing caucus Lang acted with the authority 
of the 1926 Special Conference resolution—under which he was 
also allowed to choose his own ministers during his 1930-32 term. 
Caucus election of the A.L.P. parliamentary leader was restored 
by the Unity Conference of August 1939 and of ministers from 
the accession of the next Labor government in 1941. 
Non-Labor governments since 1927 have always been coalitions 
in which the Premiers (from the more numerous party—National, 
U.A.P. and Liberal in turn) have had the right to select ministers 
—but only those from their own party. In April 1932 the U.A.P. 
caucus adopted a proposal by R.W.D. Weaver that it elect its own 
ministers in future, but the suddenness of Lang's dismissal the next 
month enabled Premier Stevens to choose them. Stevens was able 
to ignore a 1936 U.A.P. Conference recommendation for elective 
ministries. The N.S.W. parliamentary Liberal Party has always 
adhered to personal selection by the leader, unanimously rejecting 
the opportunity to elect its ministers which Askin offered on 
attaining office in 1965. As conditions of its participation in these 
coalitions the Country Party has regularly secured (in close 
proportion to its share of non-Labor M.L.A.s) one-third of the 
cabinet posts, including the Deputy Premiership, and the right to 
choose its other ministers. These are, in form, elected by the party 
caucus, though in 1968 C.B. Cutler said that "Country Party policy 
was to leave the choice to its Leader and Deputy Leader". This 
seemed to be confirmed in December 1975 when Cutler's successor 
as leader, Leon Punch, was reported to have made controversial 
nominations to replace Cutler and another retiring Country Party 
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minister; the Country Party member for Goulburn called the new 
cabinet a "cow cookies' cartel" and a "dairy farmers' lobby".'" 
These variations from the traditional parliamentary method 
whereby the first minister selects ministries were never very likely, 
at least in New South Wales, to threaten responsible government 
in the ways feared by some early observers. Would caucus election 
"lower the quality" of ministries by selecting merely popular 
members? Hardly, since a prudent Premier choosing his own 
colleagues would take account of much the same factors as influence 
caucus elections: the claims of geographical areas, of left and right 
wings, of members from strategic electorates, and of those with 
substantial caucus followings. After allowing for these considera-
tions, a ministry of sixteen or eighteen people with the necessary 
competence must be virtually self-selecting in a governing party of 
only fifty or so members in the house where most are chosen. Would 
elected ministers be less loyal to the leader or less cohesive as a 
government than a ministry chosen by the Premier? These theo-
retical objections overlooked the common interest of ministers in 
retaining their positions, the importance for this purpose of their 
hanging together in the eyes of the electorate as well as of the party, 
and the pre-eminence of the first minister in modern government. 
In any case, a Labor Premier with an elected ministry would hardly 
be less handicapped than a non-Labor Premier with a third of his 
ministry selected by another party. 
Hawker's history of the parliament confirms this reasoning. Both 
the coalition ministries of the 1920s and 1930s and the Labor 
ministries between 1941 and 1965 produced few unexpected choices 
of ministers. Labor caucus elections were not entirely predictable, 
as in April 1959 when P.D. Hills was included instead of the 
Premier's reported nominee T.P. Murphy, and W.H. Lamb lost the 
speakership by one vote to R.S. Maher who "was on neither the 
Cabinet nor Left-wing 'tickets' ". At that meeting, incidentally, 
caucus rejected a motion to substitute preferential voting for the 
existing form of exhaustive balloting, which the mover, J.W. 
Seiffert, said was deliberately designed to "keep the 'ins' in and 
the 'outs' out", by making it possible for all cabinet ministers and 
office-holders to vote for one another in a solid block."' Whatever 
the means, the influence of the leadership was always palpable. As 
Hawker notes, "caucus was mostly a conservative instrument of 
choice. Especially after 1941, the 'ticket' of a united ministry was 
usually enough to carry the day. No minister was removed from 
his position by the vote of caucus, and the 'rebels' who were elected 
to the ministry were those who had been thought likely to 
succeed"."" 
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Neither caucus election nor separately chosen composite min-
istries impaired the solidarity of cabinets. The individual responsi-
bility of ministers was not enforced by direct parliamentary action, 
though criticisms from inside or outside of parliament occasionally 
led to a resignation when the government agreed, as in the cases 
of W.C. Grahame in 1920 and J.G. Arthur in 1953. But "however 
often members of the opposition decried the incompetence or 
carelessness of a minister, they could not force a government with 
a solid majority to remove him . . . in most cases ministerial 
solidarity overrode criticisms of weaker brethren, and ministers did 
their utmost to preserve that solidarity". Furthermore, very few 
ministers resigned because they did not agree with a decision of 
their colleagues.'^'' What this all means is that the mode of choosing 
ministries is less crucial for their cohesion than the obvious prudence 
of maintaining "collective responsibility"—not because this is a 
received "constitutional convention" but because it is a practical 
condition of electoral survival, especially in Australia, as Aitkin 
found from the A.N.U. survey of political attitudes: 
There can be no doubt that the electorate prizes unity in its parties 
(in fact, we have seen that many respondents would value even greater 
unity within the party system—as in the amalgamation of the non-Labor 
parties or even wider mergers) and that it is alert to any signs of party 
or cabinet /^5unity.'^ * 
The need for solidarity strengthens the position of the Premier. 
As long as he is willing to exercise leadership and able to retain 
the confidence of key sections of his party's organization, he 
remains, as was said of his British counterpart, "the keystone of 
the Cabinet arch". Most New South Wales Premiers have been 
skilled politicians, and a number, such as Parkes, Reid, Holman, 
and Lang, have been able to dominate their cabinets and parliament 
itself. In this Lang reached the limits by reason of his astuteness 
and aggressiveness, mastery of parliamentary tactics, and control 
of the outside party machine. In the 1920s he ruled for some time 
without bothering to call cabinet meetings, and his ministers first 
saw legislation affecting their portfolios when it was introduced into 
parliament or announced in the press. In the 1930s his hand-picked 
ministry contained abject followers like Mark Gosling, Chief 
Secretary, who said in a public speech: "The Cabinet has one leader 
who announces his policy. When he announces it we follow, and 
as soon as he announces it we know where we stand. We do not 
seek to know what he is doing, and are prepared to surrender our 
judgment, if necessary, in advance."'^' 
But any Premier has also the advantage of wide formal powers. 
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As already noted, his resignation automatically carries with it those 
of the other ministers. He not only allocates portfolios among them, 
but determines in detail which statutes shall be administered by 
each minister. He summons cabinet meetings and decides their 
agenda. He determines the legislative programme for each session 
of parliament and he is the chief spokesman of the government 
before the public and before the extra-parliamentary organs of his 
party. He can also decide both the size of the ministry—though 
an increase in size requires legislation and the maximum has in 
fact grown quite gradually—and the order of seniority of its 
members. 
Ministers and portfolios 
The maximum number of ministers is fixed in effect by amendments 
to the Constitution Act fixing the levels and providing a total sum 
for ministerial salaries. (Conceivably the number could be increased 
without an amendment if ministers agreed to take smaller salaries.) 
The maximum has generally been used to the full, so the number 
has remained fairly stable between those amendments. Responsible 
government began in 1856 with a ministry of five members. The 
statutory number increased to ten by the end of the century, and 
remained unchanged until the First World War, though actual 
cabinets were smaller after the transfer of the postmaster-general-
ship to the Commonwealth at Federation and the reduction of 
parliament's size in 1904. Ministries of thirteen prevailed during 
the 1920s, of fifteen during the 1930s and 1940s, and of sixteen 
during the 1950s and 1960s. The present figure of eighteen was 
reached in 1969. 
The Legislative Council has always insisted that some ministers 
should be in that chamber to represent the government there; and 
governments, while accepting the principle, have nearly always kept 
that number to a minimum. During the last century there was only 
one minister in the Council as often as not, and only occasionally 
as many as three. By the mid-1930s two ministers with portfolios 
became the general rule—and with the Vice-President of the 
Executive Council invariably in the second chamber, he was often 
also the leader of the government in that house. From 1965 the 
Liberal-Country Party composite government adopted the conven-
tion of drawing one of these ministers from each of the participating 
parties, and at first the Liberal Party, as senior partner, provided 
the government leader, who was the elected leader of the Liberals 
in the Council. However on the death of this member (A.D. 
Bridges) in 1968 the Country Party minister, J.B.M. (later Sir 
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John) Fuller was appointed Vice-President of the Executive Council 
and government leader in the Legislative Council, reportedly 
because the member elected as Liberal leader there (S.L. Eskell) 
was unacceptable to Country Party M.L.C.s and even to some of 
the senior Liberals. Another Liberal M.L.C. (F.M. Hewitt) became 
the second minister in the Council. We have noted that the Labor 
government from 1976 had only one minister in the Council.'"" 
A minister is a member of the Executive Council (a formal 
appointment) and of cabinet (an informal role which goes with the 
formal appointment). Most ministers also receive separate, formal 
appointments to one or more "ministerial offices", or "portfolios". 
There is no constitutional difficulty in appointing ministers without 
portfolios, and special salaries and allowances have long been 
provided for all ministers whether they have portfolios or not. One 
or more ministers without portfolio, under a great variety of titles 
including Honorary Minister, Assistant Minister, and simply Min-
ister without Portfolio, have figured in most governments through-
out the present century. They were appointed to help "departmen-
tal" ministers (i.e., those with portfolios), to act during the latters' 
absence from the state, and sometimes to provide the second 
ministerial representative in the Legislative Council. Such an 
appointment was occasionally made to neutralize a critical back-
bencher; generally, however, they provided apprenticeships leading 
on to full responsibility for a portfolio. In the first Askin-Cutler 
government two members, J.L. Waddy and G.F. Freudenstein, 
served apprenticeships to this apprenticeship, becoming "parlia-
mentary secretaries" respectively to the Minister for Education and 
the Treasurer in June 1967 (without formal office or a seat in 
cabinet), then receiving appointments as assistant ministers 
(without portfolio but in the Executive Council and cabinet) in 
February 1969, and finally achieving portfolios in March 1971.'"' 
As indicated, a portfolio (the term derives from the folder in 
which British departmental papers used to be carried; those of 
N.S.W. are like leather-mounted diplomas) is in this state not a 
definition of the range of one minister's responsibilities, but a kind 
of formal office of which a minister may hold one, more than one, 
or none at all. Some portfolio titles are quite general—Premier, 
Vice-President of the Executive Council—while others suggest a 
certain range of administrative responsibilities—Treasurer, Child 
Welfare, Conservation, Co-operative Societies, and so on. In fact, 
however, none of these titles carries with it a fixed list of 
responsibilities. It is the Premier who determines the scope of 
portfolios from time to time by assigning the administration of 
particular functions and statutes to the ministers holding each, just 
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as he also allocates duties to ministers without portfolio. Moreover, 
the establishment of a new portfolio does not necessarily herald a 
new function of government; there were hospital and medical 
services in New South Wales for over half a century of responsible 
government before the Health portfolio was created; there was no 
portfolio of Police until 1975. Nor does a function cease with the 
abolition of a portfolio, as is obvious from such examples as 
Railways (ended 1929), Immigration (1959), Transport Finance 
(1968) and Conservation (1975). The only function of a portfolio 
is to give a minister legal authority—the authority to execute legal 
instruments within the fields allocated for the time being to that 
portfolio. It follows that ministers without portfolio have no legal 
powers of this kind. 
A portfolio does not necessarily correspond with a particular 
department or other administrative structure. Even where portfolios 
share the names of departments—as do those of Education, Lands, 
Tourism, Treasury—their responsibilities are not coterminous. 
Some divergences are wide. In 1973 the single portfolio of Educa-
tion covered at least two whole departments—Education and 
Technical Education—while the separate portfolios of Child Wel-
fare and Social Welfare were administered mainly through a single 
department with that composite name.'"' Premiers may change the 
names of portfolios—as from Labour and Industry to Industrial 
Relations (1976)—or combine two into one—as Child Welfare and 
Social Welfare into Youth and Community Services (1973)—or 
split one into two—as with Tourism and Sport (1972)—without 
obvious effects on administrative activity or structure. The reasons 
for establishing, changing, or abolishing portfolios are generally not 
so much administrative as to draw attention to concerns a govern-
ment wishes to emphasize—such as the emergency needs of wartime 
or a fashionable topic like decentralization or the environment— 
or to smooth out personal rivalries in the party or ministry. Such 
tactical considerations explain the short life of some portfolios. 
Usually the portfolio list changes only as part of a major or minor 
reshuffle of responsibilities, and this occurs only on the appointment 
of new ministries or ministers as a result of parliamentary elections, 
deaths, or retirements. On all such occasions the reallocation of 
portfolios between ministers and of specific functions between 
portfolios is more significant than changes in the portfolio list itself, 
which on the whole has been very stable. Five of the six portfolios 
created by I860 survived to the end of 1974. In the twenty years 
to 1974 eleven new portfolios were created (excluding mere changes 
of name), five were abolished (including three of the new eleven), 
and two were merged into one. The arrival of a new party in power 
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is not likely to change the list more dramatically than a change 
of Premier within the same party may do. When Labor gained office 
in 1941 it created only two new portfolios—one being National 
Emergency Services—and left the rest intact; the Liberal-Country 
coalition added only three in 1965. On regaining office in 1976 
Labor abolished or renamed ten portfolios, and restored three 
disused ones (soon reduced to two), but added nothing new. (Of 
Table 15. Dates of First Creation of 1976 Portfolios 
(Using 1976 titles and ignoring temporary suspensions) 
Portfolios 
Created by 
I860 
Treasurer' 
Lands' 
Public 
Works' 
Attorney-
General 
1900 
Mines 1874 
Justice 1880 
Education 
1880 
Primary 
Industries 
1890= 
Industrial 
Relations 
1895= 
1976 Portfolios 
1940 
Vice-
President of 
Executive 
Council 
1908 
Health 1914 
Local 
Government 
1916 
Housing 1919 
Premier 1920 
Deputy 
Premier 
1932 
Transport 
1932 
Youth and 
Community 
Services 
1935' 
Added up to: 
1965 
Conservation 
1944 
Tourism 1946 
Co-operative 
Societies 
1949 
Highways 
1956 
Decentraliza-
tion and 
Develop-
ment 1962 
1976 
Planning & 
Environ-
ment 1971 
Sport and 
Recreation 
1971' 
Energy 1972 
Consumer 
Affairs 
1973 
Ports 1975 
Services 1975 
Water 
Resources 
Jan,1976 
Sources: Hawker, Parliament of New South Wales, Appendix C; Hughes and 
Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964, Cabinet 
and Portfolio lists; N.S.W.P.D. 
Notes: 
1. Called respectively Colonial Treasurer, Secretary for Lands, and Secretary for 
Public Works until modernized by the Ministers of the Crown Act, 1959, The 
historic portfolio of Chief Secretary was abolished in January 1975, restored in 
January 1976, and abolished again in May 1976. 
2, In May 1976 Agriculture was renamed Primary Industries, and Labour and 
Industry was renamed Industrial Relations, 
3. Created as Social Services, renamed Social Welfare in 1944, merged with Child 
Welfare (created 1956) as Youth and Community Services in 1973, and temporarily 
became Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs through 1975. 
4, First called Cultural Activities; absorbed Sport (created 1972) in 1975 as Culture, 
Sport and Recreation; Cultural Activities transferred to Premier's Department in 
1976, 
254 
The Government in ParUament 
course there were some reallocations of functions on each occasion.) 
But when T.L. Lewis succeeded Sir Robert Askin as Liberal 
Premier in January 1975 he abolished two long-standing portfolios 
(Chief Secretary and Conservation), merged two others (Cultural 
Activities and Sport) and created six new ones. Table 15 shows 
the dates of creation of portfolios surviving after August 1976. 
However, though steady, the growth in the number of portfolios 
has outstripped the rise in the number of ministers, roughly 
indicating an accelerating increase in their administrative burdens. 
In the nineteenth century ministers rarely held two portfolios at 
once, except when acting for an absent colleague. By contrast, while 
six of the first McKell ministry of fifteen in 1941 had two or in 
one case three portfolios, and seven of Askin's first ministry of 
sixteen in 1965 had multiple portfolios (three with more than two), 
there were twelve such in the first Lewis ministry of eighteen in 
1975 (see table 16).'"' 
Portfolios are related only in a minor way to the seniority ranking 
of ministers. This attaches to them personally and is formally 
signified by the order in which they are sworn in as Executive 
Councillors. The Premier decides the ranking, but his decisions are 
largely governed by convention and custom—including of course 
his own position always at the head of the list. In a Labor ministry 
the person caucus has elected as deputy parliamentary leader of 
the party will become Deputy Premier and thereafter the Premier 
will be influenced by ministers' standing in caucus as indicated in 
the voting for the ministerial team. In the non-Labor ministries 
since 1965 the top posts after the premiership have been claimed, 
in order, by the leader of the Country Party as Deputy Premier, 
then the Liberal deputy leader in the Assembly, the government 
Table 16. Ministers and Portfolios in Selected Years 
Year 
1900 
1915 
1930 
1945 
1960 
1975 
1976 (Aug) 
With 
Portfolio 
9 
9 
13 
13 
16 
18 
17 
Ministers 
Without 
Portfolio 
1 
— 
1 
2 
— 
--
1 
Total 
10 
9 
14 
15 
16 
18 
18 
Portfolios 
10 
13 
15 
19 
23 
32 
29 
Sources: To 1960 from Hughes and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government 
and Politics, N,S.W. Cabinet Lists; for 1975 and 1976 from N.S.W.P.D. 
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leader in the Legislative Council (a Country Party member from 
1969 as already shown), and the deputy leader of the Country Party 
in the Assembly. 
It has also been the practice under both Labor and non-Labor 
governments that, once established after a new party takes office, 
the seniority list remains nearly rigid throughout that party's 
regime. Cabinet vacancies arise from death, voluntary retirement, 
or displacement from one of the party leadership positions men-
tioned above; in the twenty years to 1975, shared equally between 
a Labor and a non-Labor government, only one minister was 
dismissed or "dropped" by a Premier. In the reshuffle occasioned 
by a vacancy the surviving ministers almost always retain their 
relative ranking, with the juniors of outgoing ministers moving 
upward one step at a time and new appointees coming in at the 
bottom. Exceptions to this rule may arise from a Premier's surprise 
decision (Cahill placed P.D. Hills, on his election to cabinet on the 
death of E.H. Graham in 1957, immediately in the fifth place 
Graham had occupied), or from a caucus election (Renshaw was 
elected Deputy Premier in 1959 from eighth place in the ministry), 
or occasionally from the importance attached to a portfolio (when 
replacing Chaffey whom the Country Party failed to renominate 
in 1968, Askin said he would bring in the new minister Crawford 
as twelfth man in the sixteen-man cabinet because "Agriculture 
was so high in the government's priorities"). More usually, 
portfolios are switched from senior to junior ministers and vice versa 
without any reference to their intrinsic significance. In fact 
Crawford's predecessor in Agriculture had been fifth in the 
ministry; under Labor likewise this portfolio had been held suc-
cessively (in 1957) by the fifth and thirteenth men in cabinet. The 
Health portfolio was held by W.F. Sheahan in fifth or sixth place 
from 1956 to 1965; in the ensuing ten years it remained well in 
the bottom third of the hierarchy. The one notable exception has 
been the Treasury portfolio, uniquely important and taken by most 
Premiers since the early 1930s. 
Cabinet 
"Cabinet", as implied by the original seventeenth-century usage of 
the word in this connection, denotes the ministers meeting informal-
ly in a private room, and this still conveys its essential character-
istics. In New South Wales the cabinet includes all the ministers, 
and there have been no suggestions for a smaller, "inner" cabinet 
within the ministry. The institution is not mentioned in the law 
although the courts may take cognisance of its existence and 
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proceedings.'"" As Rose reminds us, cabinet is "the body which 
initiates, directs, and co-ordinates government policy. It . . . can 
itself do nothing, but can determine everything, its decisions being 
carried out by the Governor-in-Council or by a single Minister, as 
the case may be." There are no limits to what it may discuss, and 
only a few categories of business which, by custom, it must discuss. 
For example the formal schedules of orders, regulations, and the 
like requiring Executive Council approval do not for the most part 
need to go through cabinet first. But no proposal for legislation 
can go to the draftsman (the Parliamentary Counsel), and no draft 
bill can be introduced to parliament, without cabinet authorization 
at both stages. Cabinet also must approve all appointments to full-
time posts on statutory boards and commissions. Unresolved dis-
agreements between two or more ministers can only be settled by 
the Premier or, in the last resort, the cabinet. According to Rose, 
proposals for new or amending legislation supply most of the items 
on cabinet agenda. Besides the subjects mentioned, cabinet may 
consider "any matter which a minister feels is of sufficient public 
importance to warrant consideration by Ministers as a whole, and 
on which he does not wish, individually as a Minister, to take 
responsibility".'"' Cabinets around the world have failed to find a 
tighter formula for agenda-making than this—hence all cabinets 
spend some of their time on matters that might seem relatively 
trivial to observers who are not party politicians. 
New South Wales cabinets of either party have experimented 
with various devices to order and lighten their load of business. 
Cabinet committees, ad hoc or standing, have long been among 
these devices and were freely used by the Askin government, mostly 
for short-term assignments. However, the work of cabinet commit-
tees has never been documented, since as Hawker notes "their 
existence was usually well concealed, not least because opposition 
members were wont to take them as proof that the government 
was worried about something".'"" An exception to this was the new 
system of standing committees announced by Premier Lewis after 
taking office in January 1975. An outcome of the 1974 machinery 
of government review (see chapter 6), this was an attempt to "meet 
an emerging need to secure more co-ordination within related areas 
of government activity", and to deal more effectively with federal 
government activities affecting more than one state department. 
Cabinet business was first to be sieved through one of four 
committees of ministers, dealing respectively with social develop-
ment, justice and consumer affairs, natural resources, and industrial 
resources. These were supplemented by a policy and priorities 
committee comprising the Premier, the Deputy Premier, the new 
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Minister for Federal Affairs, and the chairmen of the four other 
standing committees. In the Premier's words: 
The majority of recommendations emanating from standing committees 
will flow directly to Cabinet and only those involving significant policy 
or priority considerations will be referred through the policies and 
priorities committee. All decisions will continue to be made by Cabinet 
and it is an essential feature of the new scheme that urgent matters 
may still go direct to Cabinet.'"' 
New South Wales has had systematic arrangements for preparing 
and circulating cabinet agendas and supporting papers and record-
ing cabinet decisions since the early 1930s; under Premier Stevens 
they were developed in the Premier's Department, which is essen-
tially a secretariat for the Premier and cabinet. For many years 
after this, however, state governments continued the tradition of 
admitting only ministers to the cabinet room, one of them acting 
as secretary and making notes of decisions. In 1965 the Askin 
government took the next step: thereafter the Under-Secretary 
(permanent head) or Deputy Under-Secretary of the Premier's 
Department has attended all meetings as Secretary to Cabinet. On 
rare occasions other non-ministers—always senior officials such as 
the Under-Secretary of the Treasury or the Commissioner of Police 
—have been invited into cabinet meetings. 
For many decades, at least to the end of 1975, cabinet has met 
regularly on Tuesdays at 10.30 a.m., usually finishing at lunchtime 
but occasionally running into the afternoon. If additional meetings 
are needed this may emerge by consensus from a regular meeting, 
or the Premier will decide. Very occasionally an extra meeting has 
been held on a Thursday morning, and when parliament is in session 
cabinet sometimes meets for extra discussion after dinner. Premiers 
always expect a full attendance. Rarely more than two—at the most 
three—ministers are absent from a meeting, and then only for cause 
shown such as illness or unavoidable travel. If the number of 
absentees seems likely to be greater, it is usual to skip a meeting 
rather than hold it with an inadequate attendance. 
During the 1960s the Labor government experimented with 
holding some cabinet meetings away from Sydney, meeting ten 
times in as many country towns between February 1963 and March 
1965. Its object was no doubt to gain rural support by showing 
an interest in the various localities, and local citizens seized the 
opportunity to invite ministers to civic functions and press their 
claims and needs upon them. But individual ministerial visits could 
have served the same purposes. The cabinet meetings themselves 
were no more accessible to citizens than in Sydney, and it was costly 
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and inconvenient to deal with business far from head office people 
and papers. The Askin government did not continue the practice, 
but the Wran cabinet revived it by meeting in Bathurst in February 
1977. 
A strict schedule is laid down for preparing cabinet business 
(though no such system secures total compliance from busy and 
impatient politicians). The Premier formally summons cabinet by 
notice each Thursday morning, circulating the agenda he has 
approved for the following Tuesday. Papers submitted to a meeting, 
called Cabinet Minutes, must come from a minister, and must arrive 
in the Premier's Department by midday the Wednesday before. The 
Department, where necessary, obtains comments from other min-
isters and attaches them to the minutes, which are circulated with 
the agenda on Thursday. Up to 1965 it was the custom for the 
Premier to determine the priority of Cabinet Minutes submitted 
and select those to be considered at the next cabinet meeting— 
a procedure which resulted in the indefinite postponement of some 
items raised by ministers. Thereafter the Liberal-Country govern-
ment adopted the practice of placing all Minutes submitted by the 
deadline on the next cabinet agenda, to be dealt with at that meeting 
if possible. This avoids the uncertainties of leaving some items in 
indefinite suspension, but has the corresponding drawback that some 
matters may be disposed of without adequate consideration. 
Of course no record is kept of cabinet discussions. The Cabinet 
Secretary records decisions only, on the appropriate file, and where 
necessary his department prepares requests for implementation 
which go to the relevant ministers over the Premier's signature. 
NOTES 
1, Constitution Act, 1902, section 5, The N,S.W. Law Reform Commission 
discussed the surviving imperial limitations on the state's autonomy and the 
extent of its continuing dependence on the United Kingdom parliament and 
laws in a working paper of 1972 which recommended steps to eliminate the 
dependency: Law Reform Commission. Working Paper on Legislative Powers 
(Sydney: N.S.W, Government Printer, 25 February 1972). 
2, Cf Anthony King's paper, "Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations", pres-
ented to the 25th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association of 
the United Kingdom, Oxford, April 1975 (mimeo). 
3, For the benefit of the curious, the (Imperial) Australian States Constitution 
Act, 1907 requires reservation of bills purporting to alter the constitution of 
the state legislature or either of its houses; affecting the salary of the state 
Governor; or required to be reserved by the Royal Instructions to the Governor 
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or by any state statute passed after 1907 (a very rare class). The Instructions 
require reservation of any bill for the dissolution of a marriage, and of bills 
for granting land or money to the Governor, affecting the state's currency, 
potentially inconsistent with British treaty obligations, affecting the rights of 
the sovereign or her subjects outside New South Wales or prejudicing British 
trade or shipping, or containing provisions to which assent has previously been 
refused or which have been disallowed. Nowadays royal assent to a reserved 
bill would presumably be given on the advice of the state's ministers unless, 
perhaps, the Commonwealth government tendered contrary advice. See A.C. 
Castles, "Limitations on the Autonomy of the Australian States", Public Law 
(1962), p. 195. 
4, Formal descriptions of the Governor's role are to be found in the current issue 
of the Official Year Book of New South Wales and in L.J. Rose, The Framework 
of Government in New South Wales (Sydney: N.S.W. Government Printer, 
1972), which is valuable particularly for its up-to-date statements of constitu-
tional law, precedent, and practice (from the point of view of an Official 
Secretary to the Governor of fifteen years' experience), and its reprinting of 
many relevant documents. Of these, the current Letters Patent, Instructions to 
the Governor, and Commission of Appointment are also reproduced in the New 
South Wales Parliamentary Handbook. The constitutional position of state 
governors is also discussed, with further detailed references, by H,R. Anderson, 
"The Constitutional Framework", in The Government of the Australian States, 
ed. S.R. Davis (Melbourne: Longmans, 1960); in chapter 5, "The Constitutional 
Framework", and chapter 6, "The Powers of a Governor", of S. Encel, Cabinet 
Government in Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1962); at 
pp. 70-80 of R.D. Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States, 3rd ed. 
(St, Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1972); and in Jacob 1. Fajgenbaum 
and Peter Hanks, Australian Constitutional Law (Sydney: Butterworths, 1972). 
5, The references to the five-year term of office are respectively from the Official 
Year Book and from Rose, Framework of Government, p. 33. 
6, Rose, Framework of Government, p. 65. 
7, For details of the Governor's constitutional functions and the Executive 
Council's activities see Rose, Framework of Government, pp, 58-72. Geoffrey 
Sawer, in "Councils, Ministers and Cabinets in Australia", Public Law (1956), 
p. 111, remarks that "it would take very little constitutional ingenuity today 
to provide forms of administration such that the Executive Councils could be 
entirely abolished". The same might be said for many of the Governor's routine 
functions, one would suppose, 
8, Cf Don Aitkin, The Colonel: A Political Biography of Sir Michael Bruxner 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969), pp. 208-44. 
9, See Rose, Framework of Government, pp, 43-44; Lumb, Constitutions of the 
Australian States, pp, 11-1% and references there given; Encel, Cabinet 
Government in Australia, chapter 7, "The Prerogative of Dissolution". 
10, Eugene A, Forsey, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British 
Commonwealth (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 263. 
11, Lumb, Constitutions of the Australian States, pp. 78-79, and p, 78 n, 89 citing 
Forsey, Royal Power of Dissolution, p. 270, 
12, Whether this action by a British government at war was influenced by the 
substantive political issues of Labor and Catholic attitudes to conscription in 
Australia is a matter for speculation. See H.V. Evatt, The King and His 
Dominion Governors, 2nd ed, with an introduction by Zelman Cowen (Mel-
bourne: Cheshire, 1967), chapters 17, 19; ibid,, Australian Labour Leader: The 
Story of W.A. Holman and the Labour Movement (Sydney: Angus & 
Robertson, 1940), chapter 58; Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia, pp. 
64-68, 
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15. Ibid., p, 160, n, 2; Governor Game to Premier Lang, 12 May 1932, published 
in S.M.H., 14 May 1932. 
16. Evatt, Dominion Governors, p. 171, 
17. For Game's doubts, see Bethia Foott, Dismissal of a Premier: the Philip Game 
Papers (Sydney: Morgan Publications, 1968), p. 223; for Evatt's conclusion, 
Evatt, Dominion Governors, p. 174. Cf John M. Ward, "The Dismissal of John 
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Sir Philip Game", in Jack Lang, ed. Heather Radi and Peter Spearritt (Sydney: 
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pp. 46, 53. 
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Menzies to Sir P. Game, 3 November 1932, quoted in full in Foott, Dismissal 
of a Premier, pp, 220-21; Evatt, Dominion Governors, chapters 10-12 and pp, 
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defied the authority of the Governor, we would be denying the authority of 
the King." But (somewhat devaluing the previous sentiment) he feared the 
alternatives would be "a clash with the armed forces of the Commonwealth" 
and, in a more fanciful flight, possibly "the arrival of British warships off Sydney 
Heads to shell the city"! (J.T. Lang, The Turbulent Years [Sydney: Alpha 
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Comparative Table, Reference Monograph No. 6, N.S.W. Parliamentary 
Library, 1969, 2nd ed, 1972, 3rd ed. 1975, 4th ed. 1976; Parliamentary 
Pensions in Australia as at January 1967: A Synoptical Chart . . . (Sydney: 
N,S,W. Parliamentary Library, 1967); Parliamentary Pensions in Australia as 
at 1 January 1972: A Comparative Table, No, 10, 1972; and current issue 
of the Commonwealth Year Book. 
31, N.S.W.P.D., 2nd series, vol, 102, p. 1220 (1 October 1925). For public opinion 
on parliamentary salaries, see Henry Mayer, Peter Loveday and Peter West-
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Central Administration 
Parliament and the cabinet are the formal authorities over a large 
and complex structure of government in which thousands of other 
people do the daily work. This includes most of the work of thinking 
out new policies, drafting legislation, enacting regulations, and 
making important decisions, as well as running the trains, digging 
the drains, manning the gaols, and maintaining all the other more 
humdrum state services. The legal powers of the government over 
this vast array of state agencies vary greatly in degree and kind. 
The agencies themselves are formally constituted in many different 
ways—from the courts with their "judicial independence" from the 
executive government, through statutory corporations and bodies 
elected by local citizens or interest groups, where ministers can only 
give general directives or veto specific actions as the law provides, 
to departments, which in principle are subject to the legal authority 
of their ministers in all things from day to day. 
It is necessary at the outset to understand that, whatever the 
original reasons for designing them, these formal diflferences do not 
closely correspond with the degree of control which state govern-
ments actually exert from time to time over different parts of the 
administration. The relationships of type of function with organiza-
tional structure, and of kind of structure with the degree of 
ministerial control, have long since lost any logical pattern. In 
theory, a determined government with a solid parliamentary major-
ity could impose its will on any part of the state governmental 
structure—if necessary by altering any statutes that stood in its 
way. In practice, governments generally accept certain kinds of 
statutory autonomy such as the independence of the judiciary, and 
at the other extreme may not bother to exercise all the detailed 
powers they have over minor agencies such as local government 
councils. On the other hand, when the deficits of a statutory public 
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utility corporation are draining the state budget, or an industrial 
dispute with the corporation's workers is depriving the public of 
train travel or electricity, a government cannot long take refuge 
in any doctrine of "corporate independence", and its determined 
intervention will be politically decisive even where its legal authority 
is incomplete. 
That governments generally stay within the law and do not 
interfere, legally or otherwise, with basic institutions like judicial 
independence and triennial elections, is due partly to a habitual 
acceptance of conventions and traditions and partly to a feeling 
for what the public, or the press, or a conscientious governor, would 
not stand. On the other hand, a lack of public and parliamentary 
interest enables governments to ignore some "constitutional safe-
guards", such as reports of the Auditor-General or the Public 
Accounts Committee on financial recklessness or even irregularity. 
Again, governments can override the normal operating autonomy 
of statutory corporations during emergencies, either because there 
is public clamour or because in the last resort they can take control 
by legislation. But in daily practice the cabinet's authority and 
responsibility for state administration are merely potential or 
intermittent, because a group of eighteen people have no chance 
of maintaining effective supervision over more than a fraction of 
the state's activities at any one time. What they can try to do is 
to keep a constant watch on a few crucial indicators of financial, 
political, and administrative stability and give the rest of their 
attention at a given time to current areas of growth, change, or 
crisis. 
In this chapter we shall review the growth of state government 
functions, the changing administrative structure, the methods of 
staffing and financing it, and the available means of co-ordination 
and control. 
GROWTH OF STATE FUNCTIONS 
As in other Australian states, government in New South Wales is 
growing and spreading. In this connection it may be noted that, 
after the initial handover of defence and external affairs, customs 
and excise, and postal services, very few state functions and their 
associated staffs have been transferred to the federal government. 
Among the more important of these shifts of function were age 
and invalid pensions in 1909-10, income taxation and widows' 
pensions in 1942, government statistical services in 1957, 
matrimonial law in 1961 and, by a gradual transition not arranged 
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by governments, about half of the industrial arbitration business 
in the decades following the First World War. In total these 
transfers would have made a negligible impact on the state 
administrative structure. The dramatic expansion in the Common-
wealth's relative prominence and power among Australian govern-
ments, especially since the Second World War, was due almost 
wholly to other factors. They included the natural growth of the 
Commonwealth's original functions such as defence, external rela-
tions and trade, the administration of territories, and postal and 
telecommunications services. The Commonwealth has originated 
entirely new governmental functions in such fields as the social 
services, employment promotion, civil aviation, and broadcasting 
and television. It has also set up house in fields of "concurrent 
power" where the state still operates, such as railways, savings 
banks, power generation, marketing of primary products, and 
developmental works. It has necessarily expanded its internal 
control and auxiliary activities such as finance, supply, and staffing 
to service its enlarged establishment. And it has used its rapidly 
increasing surplus revenue to subsidize and in part to influence more 
and more the direction of state government activities. As a measure 
of this whole expansion, total Commonwealth government employ-
ment grew by a factor of six between 1939 and 1975 (see table 
23). 
No state administration can match such growth, but state 
employment in New South Wales tripled from 1939 to 1975, though 
the population of the state increased by only three-quarters. Like 
those of the Commonwealth, state functions increased in variety 
as well as in quantity, moving most notably into such new fields 
as regional planning, controlling pollution and conserving the 
"quality of life" aspects of the environment, decentralizing industry 
and population, and helping young people. Aboriginals, and immi-
grant groups to adjust their ways to conventional Australian society. 
Judgements about the relative significance of state functions and 
politics at different times or in comparison with those of the 
Commonwealth must be largely subjective. There are varied but 
related bases of comparison, for instance the effect of the changing 
balance of state-federal powers on the locus of people's primary 
loyalties, the relative amount of public interest in the politics at 
each governmental level, and the intrinsic importance of each 
government's functions for the public good. 
In the early 1970s it seemed reasonable for a political correspon-
dent to write: 
The truth is that the State political performances are looking very 
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provincial lately, overshadowed as they have been by the Whitlam 
Government. 
The initiatives in so many former State fields have switched to Canberra 
—education, housing, company law, price fixing, urban planning, water 
and sewerage and public transport financing, not to mention 
decentralisation.' 
This was true for those years, as to the "initiatives". But they were 
shortlived, and in any case we have noted that few state functions 
have really been switched to Canberra: all those mentioned in the 
quotation remain state administrative responsibilities. As Hawker 
points out, the New South Wales Hansard itself— 
contained more statements about the declining status of Macquarie 
Street than a dozen other sources, and that was not always because 
the powers of the State Parliament really had fallen away . . . Reference 
to Carruthers in 1904-07, Lang in the 1920s and 1930s and the various 
results of the Labor split in 1955 are sufficient to indicate that the 
history of politics in Australia is the history of State-based systems and 
loyalties.-
The notion, again, that ordinary people have lost interest in state 
politics can be illustrated by Aitkin's remark that M.F. Bruxner 
resented— 
the way in which his own parliament seemed to have become a legislative 
backwater in which nothing of primary importance occurred, or could 
occur. He had entered parliament at a time when ordinary New South 
Welshmen looked first to Macquarie Street when politics was news; 
when he left it, forty-two years later, Macquarie Street was a sideshow 
in the great carnival of Australian politics . . . away from the big ring 
and the attention of the crowds.^ 
This may have been how Bruxner felt, but the most cursory 
reference to the Sydney and national newspapers, not only in the 
times of Lang or the Split, but for example a decade later when 
the New South Wales Speaker was on trial, and at any time in 
the decade after that under the headings of pollution control, 
freeway construction, Sydney's public transport problems and traffic 
laws, illegal gambling in clubs, corruption in the police force, prison 
administration, school buildings and teachers, and indeed state 
elections and by-elections, would dispel any illusion that state 
government and politics could no longer capture public interest or 
dominate the headlines. 
It is true that state election issues include parochial matters like 
the location of a city bus section or the provision of a parking station 
at the Opera House. When a former Country Party minister wanted 
to praise his government's legislation for its "particular emphasis 
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on the freedom of the individual", his examples were: allowing 
movies to be shown on Sundays; extension of permissible trading 
hours for shops and petrol stations; requiring industrial awards, on 
application, to allow sick leave rights to cumulate for at least three 
years; measures for consumer protection; permission for the broad-
casting of "pre-post" betting information; allocation of additional 
trotting dates; extension of time for clubs to pay poker machine 
licence tax; rationalization of the conduct of raffles; and a substan-
tial increase in penalties for cruelty to animals!" There is no doubt 
that all of these matters could fall within the functions of an English 
county council—a favourite comparison among denigrators of state 
government. But they are minor aspects of the general truth that 
"on the more detailed aspects of law and government affecting 
directly the daily life of the ordinary citizen . . . the States are 
far more prominent than the Commonwealth".^ In at least two 
broad fields the state government's activities transcend anything a 
county council might do. It administers most of the common law 
regulating personal security and property rights, and makes and 
applies most of the criminal, commercial, industrial, and social 
statute law affecting the economic and moral relations between 
citizens. Secondly, the state government is directly responsible for 
long-term economic development: it initiates, plans, and carries out 
most of the detailed programmes for extending harbours and 
highways, encouraging industrial development, building dams and 
controlling floods, providing power and light, conserving soil and 
forests, and training scientists and technicians." 
A more detailed view of the range of state functions can be had 
from classified lists, of which a number have been compiled for 
different states.' The following classification of New South Wales 
government functions is based on that "adopted by the Treasurer 
in the Public Accounts".* It covers only the functions carried out 
by staffs employed under the Public Service Act, but the distribu-
tion of staff between its main headings, as shown in the Public 
Service Board's Annual Reports since 1958-59, provides one 
consistent measure of changes in the relative importance of these 
groups of functions. Table 17 gives the distribution in selected years. 
Main functions of public service staffs 
General administration: services to parliament and to government 
departments and authorities generally—(i) general administrative 
and financial services including collection of revenue and State 
Lotteries; (ii) printing and stores services. 
Maintenance of law. order, and public safety; administration of 
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Table 17. Functional Distribution of Staff under Public Service Act at 30 June 
(Excluding school-teachers under Education Department) 
Function 
General administration 
Law, order, public safety 
Regulation of trade and 
industry 
Education 
Encouragement of science. 
art, and research 
Promotion of public health. 
recreation, and 
environment 
Social amelioration 
Development and 
maintenance of state 
resources 
Local government 
Totals 
1960 
No. 
3,124 
3,675 
500 
6,856 
406 
5,099 
2,963 
7,169 
490 
30,282 
% 
10,3 
12.1 
1.7 
22.6 
1.3 
16.8 
9.8 
23.7 
1.7 
100.0 
1965 
No. 
3,756 
4,808 
581 
10,024 
561 
7,474 
3,723 
8,888 
591 
9< 
9.3 
11.9 
1.4 
24.8 
1.4 
18.5 
9.2 
22.0 
1.5 
40,406 100.0 
1970 
No. 
4,249 
6,355 
622 
14,364 
634 
10,166 
4,070 
10,966 
846 
% 
8.1 
12,2 
1.2 
27.5 
1.2 
19.4 
7.8 
21.0 
1.6 
52,272 100.0 
1975 
No. 
4,638 
9,203 
2,029 
25,362 
1,232 
12,319 
4,927 
11,884 
869 
72,463 
% 
6.4 
12.7 
2.8 
35.0 
1.7 
17.0 
6.8 
16.4 
1.2 
100.0 
Source: Annual Reports of New South Wales Public Service Board, "Staffing 
Statistics". As schoolteachers are not shown in the original tables after 1970, the 
figures have been made roughly comparable by omitting those for the Educational 
Division in the Education Department throughout. The numbers in each function 
in 1975 were not published; they are estimated here from the published percentages 
and the public service total. 
justice, including magistrates and court staff; custodial services— 
prisons and homes for delinquent children; legal and registration 
services; maintenance of safety standards; civil defence and emer-
gency services. 
Regulation of trade and industry; maintenance of standards for 
industry and commerce; determination and enforcement of condi-
tions of employment; rent control. 
Education; agricultural, technical, "advanced" education; adminis-
tration of education and technical education. 
Encouragement of science, art, and research; services by the 
museums, the Library of New South Wales, the Art Gallery, and 
the Observatory. 
Promotion of public health, recreation, and environment; care of 
the sick and mentally afflicted; the preservation and promotion of 
the health of mothers and children and the community generally; 
the maintenance of Botanic Gardens and recreational facilities; 
administrative and medical services for public health and child 
welfare. 
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Social amelioration; care and welfare services for the destitute, the 
aged, neglected children, state wards, and Aborigines; provision of 
housing; workers' compensation, legal aid, and government insur-
ance services; youth guidance. 
Development and maintenance of state resources; services to 
primary industry and development and conservation of natural 
resources in connection with agriculture, mining, forestry, conserva-
tion, fisheries, and land settlement; design, construction, and 
maintenance of public works; operation of the N.S.W. Engineering 
and Shipbuilding Undertaking, the State Brickworks, and tourist 
activities. 
Local government; administration of local government and provision 
of valuing services. 
Table 17 shows that, of a total public service staff which more 
than doubled in the fifteen years to 1975, the number administering 
the education services (after excluding primary and secondary 
teachers) rose from under a quarter to over a third, accounting 
for much the greatest functional increase. After education the 
promotion of public health, recreation, and the environment, 
economic development, and the administration of law and order 
remained the state's most important functional activities (in terms 
of staff engaged), while social services and general administration, 
and development services themselves, though expanding absolutely 
like all other functions, commanded a falling share of public service 
manpower. 
Comparable figures are not so readily available for changes in 
the number of state employees outside the Public Service Act, but 
they have long been much more numerous. In 1975, when public 
service staff numbered 72,000, there were about 37,000 primary 
and secondary schoolteachers, and some 144,000 other state em-
ployees, three-quarters of them working in a small group of large 
enterprises including the state railway, road and harbour transport 
services, the Maritime Services Board, which co-ordinates port and 
navigation services and regulates intra-state shipping, and the 
authority that builds and maintains main roads. Other important 
state government activities whose employees are outside the public 
service include electricity generation and distribution, banking 
services, water supply and sewerage, water conservation and irriga-
tion, the marketing of primary products, the police force, and 
ambulance services. The total staff employed in non-public service 
agencies rose by about one-quarter in the twenty years to 1975 
(excluding the teachers transferred to this category in 1971—see 
below). 
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CHANGING ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
From types of activity we turn to patterns of organization: the kinds 
of administrative units and their relationships. A classification of 
units would be helpful in showing how different structures are 
matched to the needs of different functions. A complete picture 
would include the lines of authority and communication, within and 
between units, which allocate resources of money and manpower 
and condition each unit's decisions and actions. Such a picture 
would not only clarify the general nature of each agency's role and 
of its relations with other parts of the structure, but could also be 
"an indispensable tool for anyone seeking to review the State's 
machinery of government".' 
Here we approach the problem of structure by first discussing 
the central concept of the "ministerial department" and its actual 
place in New South Wales administration, then describing some 
of the other important organizational forms and their rationale, or 
lack of it. 
Ministerial departments 
The notion of the ministerial department is central because it is 
the administrative form which most logically expresses the ideal 
of representative, "responsible" parliamentary government which 
took shape in Britain (and in New South Wales) in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. One of its two main elements was 
the drawing of a clear distinction between the appointed non-
political officials and the elected political executive. The other was 
the rule, as Earl Grey called it in 1858, "which requires that all 
holders of permanent office must be subordinate to some minister 
responsible to parliament, since it is obvious that, without it, the 
first principle of our system of government—the control of all 
branches of the administration by parliament—would be 
abandoned."'" 
The rule was carried out by gathering the appointed, non-political 
officials into departments, each under a single permanent head, 
responsible directly to an elected minister. The department was, 
as it were, merely the extension of the minister's official personality 
—a multiplication of his secretarial staff. It had no separate legal 
identity of its own. It was simply an arm of the Crown. All relevant 
legal powers and duties belonged, under the royal prerogative or 
an act of parliament, to the minister, and in performing their official 
duties the public servants were merely exercising his powers or 
helping him to do so. This is why the minister alone was held 
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answerable to parliament for all departmental acts. He was 
expected to answer questions about them, and to take the blame 
(in the last resort, resign) when things went wrong, as he took the 
credit when they went well. As J.S. Mill put it, an unbroken chain 
of responsibility should run from the official through the minister 
to the legislature and thence to the electorate at large." 
In the later Victorian era this arrangement became a paradigm 
for the conduct of British public administration. But the 
government's functions were never wholly administrative. The 
application of the law by way of judicial process remained with 
judges and magistrates for whose work ministers were not held 
directly responsible. Also some government functions were dele-
gated by statute to locally elected authorities over whom ministers 
held only negative—financial and veto-like—powers. Moreover, 
administration by boards and other non-ministerial agencies was 
never entirely eliminated, and swelled again beyond all previous 
proportions with the expanding range of government activity in the 
twentieth century. 
It seems likely that the ministerial department was never a 
dominant form in the administration of the Australian colonies that 
became states in 1901. By the time "ministers" first appeared here, 
with the achievement of responsible government in the 1850s, there 
was already a rank growth of offices, departments, and adminis-
trative boards, and of senior officials with legal status and powers 
in their own right. Not all of this agglomeration was ever brought 
into firmly integrated departmental units unequivocally controlled 
by responsible ministers in parliament. Even the notion of the 
ministerial department itself may not have been so clearly visualized 
here as in Britain. And we have certainly seen the same proliferation 
this century of organizational forms that do not tally with that 
notion. In fact, the units semi-officially labelled as ministerial 
departments in New South Wales are greatly outnumbered and 
largely overshadowed by agencies of other kinds, and account for 
only about one-fifth of the state's public employees. 
Official documents are not sophisticated about such distinctions. 
Most available conspectuses of the state's administrative apparatus 
consist of more or less incomplete lists of units, in some cases 
indicating an undefined "association" between a group of agencies 
and a particular minister or department. It was one of the N.S.W. 
Public Service Board's research staff who wrote, after describing 
the Commonwealth government's Directory; "Although it is not 
much more than a catalogue, few States even approach this 
standard of bookkeeping. The telephone book is often the only 
complete record of State Government agencies." This certainly 
278 
Central Administration 
applies to New South Wales, whose Departmental Telephone 
Directory can be recommended for that purpose.'^ 
There is now available, however, a semi-official listing of about 
eighty of the most important New South Wales bodies on a more 
systematic basis, loosely modelled on Roger Wettenhall's two-way 
classification of Tasmanian government agencies published some 
years ago. Wettenhall later reported that his categories could "be 
made to fit the New South Wales structure"; his "circular", or 
"dartboard", model of the Tasmanian administrative system was 
indeed used in the Public Service Board in the early stages of a 
review of New South Wales machinery of government, but the 
categories employed were mainly different. The officer largely 
responsible claims they are couched in "a terminology which reflects 
the language actually used by politicians and public servants in the 
State", and are based on a dual principle for grouping agencies, 
namely the relative degree of control enjoyed by ministers and the 
state's strong Public Service Board. As in Wettenhall's scheme the 
central category is the "ministerial department", "the classic 
department of government, based on the traditions of Whitehall, 
with a form of organisation centred upon the needs of the Minister". 
Next comes a category of "sub-departments", each regarded for 
most purposes as an ordinary department of government with its 
own permanent head. However they are not as closely linked with 
the minister as ministerial departments, though their staffs are 
equally under Public Service Board control, and the permanent head 
often has statutory powers in his own right or is a coUegial body 
with corporate status. In "semi-autonomous departments", the third 
category, the head, though reporting directly to a minister and 
controlling an administrative and clerical staff employed under the 
Public Service Act, enjoys a certain amount of operational freedom 
and considerable autonomy in recruiting and managing his non-
clerical employees. The final category, "government instrument-
alities", comprises organizations wholly outside the constraints of 
the Public Service Act and in some cases also outside direct 
Treasury control, reporting to a minister but in practice tending 
to operate "with considerable independence from Cabinet"." 
This attempt at a realistic classificatory scheme is gallant, and 
so is the effort to fit some of the state agencies into it. It is the 
only authoritative published guide we have. But even that modest 
effort makes the scheme look Procrustean, simply from the intract-
ability of the reality. It shows up the lack of coherence and 
consistency in the apparatus of government, the confusion of lines 
of authority and communication, the lack of correspondence be-
tween forms, functions, powers, statuses, and terminology. The 
279 
Changing Administrative Structure 
classification has since been modified and updated, within the same 
basic scheme, in the Public Service Board's own working chart of 
the "New South Wales Structure of Government", and the follow-
ing discussion takes account of the changes this has made to the 
"dartboard" model. Here is the list of ministerial departments as 
at December 1976: 
Premier's Department Department of Agriculture 
Treasury Department Ministry of Transport and 
Department of Local Highways 
Government Department of Services 
Department of Tourism Mines Department 
Department of the Attorney- Department of Decentralization 
General and of Justice and Development 
Department of Public Works Ministry of Housing 
Ministry of Education Department of Youth and 
Department of Labour and Community Services 
Industry Department of Sport and 
Department of Consumer Recreation 
Affairs Department of Lands 
Source: Figure 2, the "dartboard" model of New South Wales Government 
Administration, 1975, and supporting text in Power and Nelson, Regional Adminis-
trator, pp, 17-31. Readers of that volume should not be misled by the paragraph 
introducing the figure, which alludes to "the beginning of 1974", and also says there 
were at the date of the figure "twenty Ministerial portfolios" before listing thirty-
two by name (cf. tables 15 and 16 above). Amended from "Structure of 
Government" chart, 1976. 
The list partly reveals, partly conceals, departures from the 
ministerial department paradigm outlined above. As will be shown 
later, it indirectly embraces a number of statutory authorities, 
though the Health Commission and the Planning and Environment 
Commission, shown as ministerial departments in the "dartboard" 
model, are now more logically classified as semi-autonomous 
departments. The list also mentions three "ministries", deserving 
immediate comment. 
The Ministry of Education was originally established in August 
1969 "as a separate department of the Public Service . . . to provide 
co-ordinated and consistent advice to the Minister . . . over the 
whole range of education services".'" It was thus a small secretariat 
placed over the large former ministerial departments of Education 
and Technical Education—much on the lines adopted at the outset 
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of responsible government on the recommendation of Colonial 
Secretary Deas Thomson.'^ The education departments were now 
described in the Public Service Board's office as sub-departments; 
in that sense they appeared to be subordinated to the new 
ministerial department. But their continuing permanent heads 
retained direct access to the (same) minister in respect of their 
departments' activities. Moreover, the Ministry itself in time 
acquired direct administrative responsibility for the Adult Migra-
tion Service and the State Conservatorium of Music. 
The two other ministries in the list also began as small offices 
to co-ordinate advice and provide secretarial services to their 
ministers. Of these, the Ministry of Transport and Highways served 
in 1975 a minister responsible for three substantially autonomous 
statutory bodies—the Public Transport Commission (running the 
state railways, buses and ferries), the Commissioner for Motor 
Transport (administering the vehicle licensing and traffic laws), and 
the Commissioner for Main Roads (mainly construction and 
maintenance)—which by definition, on earlier criteria, could not 
themselves be ministerial departments. The Ministry of Housing 
and Co-operative Societies advised its minister on the operations 
of one large statutory corporation, the Housing Commission, and 
one small department—called the Registry of Friendly and Co-
operative Societies. 
There was a fourth ministry, of Consumer Affairs, in the 
"dartboard" model. It was established early in 1974, in the way 
the list indicates, not as a ministerial department, but "as a separate 
entity within the Department"—of Labour and Industry. It com-
prised the former Consumer Affairs Bureau, the Weights and 
Measures Office, and the Prices Branch and policed various 
consumer protection laws. It was logical to convert it into a 
department. 
In practice, then, a ministry can be a separate department or 
a separate entity within a department, and it can be a secretarial, 
policy-advising, co-ordinating, or directly administering or regu-
latory agency, or a combination of these.'' 
The next point to note is that many agencies called departments 
are not ministerial departments. They are to be found in all of the 
"dartboard" categories: the Departments of Motor Transport and 
Main Roads (in fact statutory corporations) among the government 
instrumentalities, the Departments of Education and Police among 
the semi-autonomous group, and several among the sub-depart-
ments. 
The latter group is in fact heterogeneous and was not well named 
in the "dartboard" model. Most of the sub-departments are 
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administratively self-contained and physically separated, and their 
heads are as likely as not to have direct access to a minister— 
whether they are permanent heads or statutory commissions. Hence 
they do not operate in practice as part of a ministerial department, 
as the group name implies. Some agencies placed in this class, 
notably the Auditor-General's Department and the Public Service 
Board, were originally given statutory status deliberately intended 
to remove them from the sphere of ministerial responsibility and 
to make them independent of all departments. Wettenhall calls 
them "departmental offices"." Others are difficult to distinguish by 
any outward mark from those classed as ministerial departments. 
In the latest Board document the group is simply called "Other 
Departments". 
So far as the Public Service Board is officially concerned, a "state 
government department for the purpose of personnel administration 
. . . tends to be [sic] a group of officers reporting (directly or 
indirectly) to a common departmental head"—where "departmental 
head" is synonymous with "permanent head", the official charged 
by the Public Service Act and Regulations with final responsibilities 
over any group of officers or employees under that Act, subject only 
to the Board and the minister. According to a routine office memo 
issued by the Board there were fifty-six such heads in November 
1976. They included the Auditor-General, the Director of State 
Emergency Services, the Under-Secretary, Department of the 
Attorney-General and of Justice and the Chief Executive Officer 
of the Magistrates' Courts Administration of the same Department, 
the Director-General of Education and the Under-Secretary, Min-
istry of Education, the Western Lands Commissioner and the 
Under-Secretary of the Lands Department, and also such people 
as the Chairmen of the Health and Housing Commissions and the 
Workers' Compensation Commission (a judge)—though not the 
Commissioner of Police and no member of the Public Service Board. 
In short, the list of government departments, each under an 
autonomous permanent head at least for personnel administration, 
included all the ministerial departments together with most of the 
sub-departments and all the semi-autonomous departments named 
in early drafts of the "dartboard" model." 
A list of fifty-six co-ordinate state government departments which 
places bodies like the Treasury and the Premier's Department 
alongside the State Lotteries and Stamp Duties Offices and several 
statutory authorities may be somewhat startling to anyone apt to 
think that New South Wales had a more integrated administrative 
structure than, say. South Australia or Tasmania. But it brings 
home the difference between "the language actually used by 
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politicians and public servants" and the formulae of administrative 
theorists, just as does the "dartboard" model when it joins such 
incongruous items as the State Dockyard, the Department of 
Education, the Meat Industry Authority, and the Police Depart-
ment as the only members of the category of "semi-autonomous 
departments", and sprinkles statutory corporations through all its 
other three categories. 
One practical question may be whether nearly sixty departments, 
plus another score or so of important government instrumentalities 
whose heads probably have direct access to ministers, imposes an 
excessive "span of control" upon a ministry of eighteen." With an 
average of four agencies per minister, many of them rarely needing 
ministerial attention because of their relatively routine functions, 
there may not be such a problem of integration as appears at first 
sight. Incidentally, according to the December 1976 classification, 
three of the ministers with portfolios (those for Planning and 
Environment, Health, and Conservation) did not have a ministerial 
department. 
We must now note as a preface to what follows that the most 
rationalized system of ministerial departments could not meet all 
of the needs of modern government. There is a non sequitur in 
Earl Grey's assumption that parliamentary control of all branches 
of the administration requires every holder of permanent office to 
be subordinate to some minister. We have already seen that this 
does not apply to those most firmly tenured of office-holders, the 
judges. Responsible ministerial government cannot pervade the 
whole of parliamentary government. Successive cabinets, legislating 
in parliament, have found many reasons for excluding aspects of 
the governmental process partly or wholly from daily control by 
the ministers that succeeded them. Parliament's control in these 
cases was at first left in the more tenuous form of boundaries to 
administrative powers and action set by the terms of its statutes, 
sometimes reinforced by mandatory official reporting and occasion-
ally by an investigatory role for a parliamentary committee. Thus 
administrative forms other than ministerial departments consisted 
in particular powers and institutions created by statute (sometimes 
by executive order under authority of a statute), and either 
modifying, limiting, or excluding direct daily control by responsible 
ministers—always remembering that some ministerial departments 
themselves have been created by statute (though this is not 
necessary if they are to operate strictly as their name implies). 
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Non-ministerial organization: aims and forms 
We have already mentioned in passing a most important class of 
such patterns: modifications to ministerial authority even within 
ministerial departments. It is the Public Service Board, not the 
departmental minister, who appoint, transfer, promote, and dis-
cipline a department's staff and fix its size, composition, and 
organization. Permanent heads also have powers over their staff 
under the Public Service Act, and as we have seen these powers 
have been extended to the heads of many sub-departments, such 
as the Government Insurance Office, the Registrar-General's De-
partment, the Electricity Authority, and the National Parks and 
Wildlife Service.-" Staff members handling public money follow 
procedures laid down by the Audit Act and Treasury Regulations, 
not by the minister. More important still are the public duties and 
discretions vested by statute in designated senior officials within 
some of the sub-departments—the Electoral Commissioner, the 
Public Trustee, the Registrar-General—and many others, though 
these officials may be subordinated to a minister in other aspects 
of their work. An interesting historical example comes from the 
former Department of Public Health, itself described as "an 
administrative hybrid exhibiting characteristics both of ministerial 
department and statutory authority": 
This arrangement arose through the divided responsibilities of the 
Director-General of Public Health, as the Chief Medical Officer came 
to be called in 1913, He was responsible to a minister through the 
permanent head of the department; yet in his capacity as President of 
the Board of Health he had independent duties which were prescribed 
by statute.'' 
Beyond this point the picture of departures from ministerial 
responsibility becomes kaleidoscopic, and the patterns of rela-
tionship of "non-ministerial" agencies to ministerial departments 
and ministers become unmanageably complex. What we can do is 
to list the various reasons given from time to time to justify 
modifications of the responsible government model, and to sum-
marize the main forms these modifications have taken. We shall 
find no consistent correspondence between the motives and the 
forms—and as we have said, many of the agencies are survivals 
from the period before responsible government and have never been 
deliberately integrated with that system. 
One important aim has been to impose checks on the executive 
of the day in the interests of parliamentary control or of adminis-
trative standards. The Auditor-General reports to parliament on 
whether ministers, their departments, and other agencies have 
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raised, kept, and spent public moneys within the amounts and the 
rules laid down by parliament. The Public Service Board was 
created in 1895 to substitute merit for ministerial patronage in 
staffing the public service. 
A second aim has been to supplement the judicial functions of 
the law courts with a variety of tribunals in which internal 
departmental expertise could be associated with external pro-
fessional or technical knowledge. Thus the conduct of certain trades 
and professions is regulated by the Medical Board, the Dental 
Board, the Architects' Board, the Nurses' Registration Board, and 
so on. The issue of licences and the exercise of a variety of statutory 
rights are controlled by such bodies as the Licensing Courts (for 
hotels and clubs), the Health Commission (for sale of poisons), the 
Maritime Services Board (for use of moorings), the Workers' 
Compensation Commission, the Industrial Commission, local Land 
Boards, and many others. (But also many kinds of licences are 
issued by officials in ordinary ministerial departments, and whereas 
the Pharmacy Board is incorporated by statute the Medical Board 
is not.) 
A reason for setting up non-ministerial agencies which overlaps 
the last one is to represent relevant interests, experience, and 
expertise on bodies responsible for administration or for policy 
advice to ministers. Local government councils have been repre-
sented on planning commissions and electricity supply undertakings, 
farmers on marketing boards. Aboriginals on welfare bodies. The 
Development Corporation of N.S.W. was set up by statute in 1966 
to advise the Minister for Decentralization on economic and 
industrial development, decentralization of industry, and the dis-
tribution of population. It comprised representatives of metropolitan 
and country manufacturing, commercial, industrial, and academic 
interests, and a senior official from the Treasury. Like many of the 
statutory bodies already mentioned, it received research and secre-
tarial services from departmental staff.^ ^ 
One of the most familiar sets of arguments for non-ministerial 
status has arisen from government operation of commercial, in-
dustrial, and transport enterprises. Practical considerations dictated 
their incorporation as legal entities with power to own property and 
to sue and be sued, "free of the cumbrous restrictions and 
immunities of Crown Law" (Spann). Political considerations 
pointed to operation on "business" criteria, by boards of directors 
insulated from "ministerial interference". However, many other 
kinds of state agency, including individual officials such as the 
Public Trustee, have also been legally incorporated, and a 1966 
statute went to the limit of contradiction and actually incorporated 
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a minister!" By contrast, the State Brickworks and State Dockyard, 
though they are business enterprises established by statute, are not 
incorporated, and operate under direct ministerial control. 
The other most familiar argument is that scientific research 
institutions and universities, even when established and financed by 
government as are all those in New South Wales, should be immune 
from partisan political influence and therefore incorporated as 
independent statutory authorities. 
Some of the methods of diluting ministerial authority have 
already been mentioned: giving statutory powers and duties to 
officials and bringing outside representatives on to public author-
ities. Others include statutory powers and functions for the public 
authority, protected tenure for authority members, multiple mem-
bership to bolster their sense of independence and cancel out biased 
loyalties, and the authority's statutory right to control its own staff 
and funds. 
In fact these devices have rarely been applied wholeheartedly or 
consistently in New South Wales. A public business undertaking 
may have power to hire and fire its staff, but not to fix its own 
fees and charges. It may have to request annual appropriations in 
the budget to supplement its revenue or cover its debt charges or 
deficits. And apart from its control over such direct payments, the 
Cabinet, through the Treasury— 
exercises a watchfulness over the actions of statutory authorities for 
their bearing upon the general State finances. Thus the Treasury may 
interest itself in the rating and price charging practice of public 
enterprises; as the budget making authority it determines allocations 
of loan funds to them for capital purposes; it is vitally concerned as 
to their ability to recoup State general revenues for the portion of public 
debt invested in them, and proposals for subsidising their operations 
may create a need for Treasury investigation of their financial alTairs.-'' 
Further, the Auditor-General reviews the accounts of all public 
corporations except the general local government authorities, and 
approves the form in which they submit their accounts. Yet the 
Public Service Board and the Treasury between them, or perhaps 
the Treasury alone, could make the Auditor-General himself 
ineffectual, because they control his staff and its salaries. Many 
statutory authorities are potentially at the mercy of the minister 
whose department supplies their clerical staff. Some merely advise 
a minister, or need his approval for important decisions: discontinu-
ing a rail service, raising public loans, making by-laws especially 
if imposing rates or charges, and disposing of public land. 
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Illusions of non-ministerial organization 
In some senses even the theory behind the non-ministerial agencies 
is illusory, so far as it implies parliamentary control without 
ministerial control. The theory assumes that these agencies are 
mostly the creation of parliament; that they draw their powers 
thence and not from ministers; that they act on their own initiative 
within those powers; that their members' tenure is independent of 
ministerial will; and that their written reports, not ministers, explain 
and defend their activities to parliament. Each of these assumptions 
is vulnerable. It is ministers who decide what kinds of agencies 
parliament will create and what powers they will have; with 
majority party support, ministers can get parliament to transform 
agencies, emasculate their powers, and place them under various 
kinds of ministerial veto or direction. As for statutory security of 
tenure, this can largely be offset by the fact that the great majority 
of statutory office-holders are inevitably appointed by the Governor 
—that is, by the cabinet or one of its ministers. Even the exceptions 
are only partial: the governing bodies of universities and producer 
marketing boards are partly elected by interested groups, but they 
also contain some members appointed by government, usually the 
chairman in the latter case. 
Not being subject to the Public Service Act, statutory appoint-
ments are the main form of patronage left to ministers, and this 
can be a vital political resource. The first Lang government 
appointed an Independent M.L.A. to the Meat Board, and the first 
Askin government appointed an ex-Labor minister Agent-General 
in London, in each case hoping to bolster a slender majority by 
winning the vacated seat. In general it is easier for non-Labor 
governments, even if appointing sympathizers to administrative 
commissions, to select proteges who have some claim to independent 
expertise or public standing. Criticisms of their appointments are 
infrequent and rather desperate. Labor members accused the Askin 
government of not appointing Catholic judges, at a time when it 
had appointed at least two and when the proportion of Catholic 
judges on the N.S.W. bench exceeded that denomination's propor-
tion of the community. The Labor Opposition leader questioned 
the same government's appointment of a top Commonwealth public 
servant to chair the Public Transport Commission because he had 
once figured in a minor kleptomania charge (which was dismissed) 
when under personal stress.'" 
Labor jobbery appears relatively blatant because its defeated or 
tired politicians, ageing party and trade union officials, ex-private 
secretaries and political hacks stand in greater need of patronage 
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and can rarely claim relevant qualifications. Between 1941 and 1965 
such people found dozens of comfortable berths on statutory bodies 
from important state commissions to local water and hospital 
boards. In 1952 an ailing ex-Premier, once a pharmacist by 
profession, was appointed chairman of the Maritime Services Board. 
In 1960 the president of the state A.L.P., a veteran machine 
politician, was made chairman of the State Electricity Authority. 
And so on. There was even some uneasiness on the subject within 
the party. The federal president said in 1970: "Concern is expressed 
by Party members at the handing out of jobs for the boys on boards, 
committees, in the Upper House, State seats, and Federal seats by 
the Officers who completely dominate the Executive."^' 
Once appointed, the office-holder may cease to be beholden to 
the government of the day if he has guaranteed tenure for a 
substantial term of years or until retirement, and a salary "per-
manently appropriated" (see below). In a few exceptional cases, 
such as the judges, the Auditor-General, and the Public Service 
Board, the government cannot remove such an official even for 
"misbehaviour or incompetence" without a resolution of both houses 
of parliament. But a government with party majorities in both 
houses may not have much difficulty in achieving this." 
The idea that parliament can "control" statutory authorities 
without the aid of ministers is a tenuous one. Such authorities 
cannot appear in parliament to explain or defend their acts and 
policies, except by way of the virtually unused procedure of 
summons to the bar of a house. Parliament votes—and can therefore 
withhold—appropriations of money for many authorities, but 
ministers frame appropriation bills and their majority passes them. 
Many other authorities have some revenue of their own. Parliament 
has some power to review or disallow regulations and orders made 
by these authorities—if the ministerial majority wants to use it. 
Parliament may debate their reports, but some authorities do not 
report to parliament, reports are often up to several years out of 
date, all reports after the event are too late for "control"and most 
parliamentarians show little interest in them. In New South Wales 
there are no parliamentary committees taking a sustained interest 
in state industrial or public utility undertakings or in any other 
statutory bodies. Paradoxically, parliament probably comes nearest 
to controlling these bodies by the same method it applies to 
departments: asking questions of ministers. In theory ministers 
would answer questions only on matters for which they accepted 
"responsibility"—in this case, matters on which they had defined 
powers over the authority concerned. In practice ministers tend to 
draw this line where they wish—but they err on the generous side. 
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and the N.S.W. Premier told the Legislative Assembly a few years 
ago that "any government organisation must be prepared at any 
time to give an explanation if a question is raised from either side 
of the House, or by a minister".'* 
Statutory agencies, therefore, are not a part of government 
beyond the control or responsibility of ministers, but a part in which 
ministers have chosen to alter the forms and degrees of their control 
and responsibility. Their motives for doing so have ranged from 
the principled considerations already listed, through a desire to 
avoid unpopular responsibilities, to a recognition of the limits to 
their personal span of daily control. Indeed, creating new com-
missions and reshuffling old ones have grown steadily more popular 
as administrative and political panaceas throughout the past 
century. The state has organized in this way such services as rail 
transport, harbour facilities, and highway building, supplies of 
water and electricity, metropolitan sewerage and drainage, forest 
management, water conservation and irrigation, and industrial 
arbitration. New departures since the Great Depression include 
attempts to rationalize electricity supply and public transport 
services; provision of low-cost housing; the spread of "county 
councils"—a device first used in 1919 to enable joint action by 
neighbouring local bodies to clear rivers of noxious weeds, but 
showing its greatest growth since the Second World War—for 
providing water, power, buses and other utility services; and 
allowing Crown employees to appeal to a quasi-judicial tribunal 
against promotion and disciplinary decisions by state employing 
authorities. 
From time to time, most notably under the Labor administration 
beginning in 1910, there have been experiments in socialized 
production and commerce rivalled only by those of Queensland." 
Those which failed or were destroyed by unsympathetic govern-
ments included deep-sea trawling, sawmills, timber yards, lime 
works, joinery works, bread manufacture, metal quarries, pipe 
making, building and construction, and a savings bank. Those which 
survived or were revived include brickworks, shipbuilding and 
general engineering (in jeopardy at time of writing), coalmines, the 
government insurance office, and the Rural Bank. 
Since the Second World War non-ministerial forms of man-
agement have been applied to yet other fields of state activity: large-
scale urban planning, at first through county councils for the main 
coastal conurbations and after their failure through a State 
Planning Authority (1963) which proved unsatisfactory for different 
reasons; running Sydney harbour ferries (1951); running Sydney's 
new farm produce markets (1968); planning the comprehensive 
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redevelopment of the historic shores of Sydney Cove (1968); co-
ordination of metropolitan waste disposal (1971); the control of 
atmospheric and water pollution (1971); and the integrated man-
agement of all state health and hospital services (1973).'" Between 
1970 and 1975, in a well-meaning process punctuated by inept 
experiments and inter-agency and inter-ministerial wrangles, the 
government gradually moved to a single Planning and Environment 
Commission, superseding the much-criticized State Planning Au-
thority, and integrating with the authority's land-use planning 
functions some of the environment protection powers of the Health 
Commission and the State Pollution Control Commission. However, 
the latter continued, in the new minister's words, as "an independ-
ent, community-based body", with stronger powers but a decen-
tralized organization. In 1974 a new Ministry of Planning and 
Environment replaced the short-lived ministerial department of 
Environment Control and took over the remaining functions of the 
defunct State Planning Authority. 
In multiplying statutory corporations, especially those in techni-
cal, politically awkward, or controversial fields, governments have 
increasingly favoured the collegiate form, sometimes apparently 
assuming that the top technocrats from different disciplines in an 
agency should all share directly in central management—as in the 
Health Commission, sometimes to transfer responsibility to repre-
sentatives of "relevant" interests, sometimes combining the two 
ideas. The interests may include the clients or even the staff of 
the agency itself, other government bodies with related functions, 
producers or business groups, local councils, or simply "concerned 
citizens". 
This trend can verge on the irresponsible. In noting, for example, 
that "partly to abate any political pressures the current New South 
Wales government has given interest groups an influence in the 
making of pollution control policies", Dan Coward warns that while 
this may bring expert knowledge to bear, it may also confer undue 
power on the very interests that those policies were designed to 
regulate. The Pollution Control Commission also illustrates how 
unwieldy such bodies can be. Composed solely of twelve part-time 
members, it includes ex officio heads of selected government 
agencies, and ministerial nominees from the Local Government and 
Shires Associations, "primary industry", "commerce", and "con-
servation". The commission's "technical advisory committee" com-
prised no fewer than sixteen members, representing various govern-
ment organizations, other statutory authorities, the local govern-
ment health inspectors, and other professional and technical groups. 
Such hydra-headed bodies are liable to be the negation of adminis-
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trative despatch and of accountability to the community as a whole. 
It is not surprising, then, that both Labor and non-Labor 
governments over the second half of this century have been steadily 
withdrawing with one hand much of the autonomy they had 
conferred on statutory bodies with the other. As a leader-writer 
noticed somewhat belatedly, "the thrust of State Government policy 
in recent years has been to bring statutory authorities under direct 
ministerial control"." The usual formula, actually well established 
by the 1950s, has been to insert in the statute a requirement that 
"in the exercise and discharge of its powers, authorities, duties and 
functions, the Commission shall be subject in all respects to the 
control and direction of the Minister". 
For example, the major statutory bodies set up in the 1970s to 
co-ordinate waste disposal and pollution control were all put under 
ministerial direction, and this was extended to other authorities 
operating in the same field. In 1972 the Sydney and Newcastle 
water and sewerage boards, after half a century of statutory 
autonomy, were subjected to direct control by the Minister for 
Works, while the number of ministerial nominees on the boards 
was increased at the expense of the number nominated by the local 
government associations. Announcing the change, the Premier 
significantly remarked that because of tremendous increases in their 
responsibilities and range of activities, their direct relationship to 
a very broad range of ratepayers, and the amount of public money 
they spent, the boards "should have some accountability to 
parliament"." In 1974 the Maritime Services Board, independent 
since its foundation in 1936, became practically the last agency of 
its kind to be brought under direct political control, partly because 
of its alleged failures of planning and management in Sydney 
Harbour and Botany Bay. Again the announcement, this time by 
the Minister for Public Works, was significant: 
At the time the board was constituted, the view was held that 
statutory authorities should be free as far as possible to conduct their 
affairs in their own ways. 
There has been considerable change of attitude in this regard over 
the years, and it has been general policy of the present Government 
that statutory authorities be expressed to be responsible to the direction 
or control of the minister of the Crown, who in turn is responsible to 
answer for their conduct in Parliament." 
So much for the theory of an independent statutory corporation 
insulated from the vagaries of "political interference"; the passage 
quoted reads superficially more like the nineteenth-century theory 
of the ministerial department. Indeed, in some ways ministerial 
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responsibility for a statutory body is not necessarily a liability to 
it, as T.H. Kewley has pointed out." However, the "ministerial 
control and direction" formula still leaves statutory commissions 
more leeway in practice than a ministerial department can expect. 
For one thing, the head and spokesman of a department is always 
the minister, but a statutory body is headed by its own commissioner 
(or commissioners). This head can put the body's view in public, 
as the chairman of the Housing Commission, for example, has done 
by press and radio interviews and letters to editors, urging more 
active government policies to house low income earners and 
claiming full responsibility for deciding state housing construction 
programmes." A statutory body can thus take the initiative in 
framing policy and putting it into action, whereas ministerial powers 
of control and direction are latent, intermittent in operation, and 
exercised from outside the organization. In most spheres, in 
practice, they are seldom applied. Ministers are hard-pressed to 
cope with their daily departmental and political duties. Some of 
the larger statutory bodies such as the Main Roads Department, 
the Electricity Commission, and the Metropolitan Water Sewerage 
and Drainage Board have become powerful autonomous elements 
in determining urban growth and politics: 
As a major construction agency and large-scale employer the [Water] 
Board has a significant impact on the direction and rate of urban 
development and, as the provider of sewers, on the quality of the city's 
physical environment. For these reasons the Board is a major and 
powerful agency within the public bureaucracy that governs Sydney." 
Decentralization and regionalism 
So far we have been discussing administrative structure mainly in 
terms of legal status and authority. It also has a territorial aspect 
which may or may not be recognized in the authority structure. 
Historically, New South Wales administration reflected the geo-
graphical concentration of population, industry, and political power 
in the Sydney metropolis. Of course many kinds of governrnent 
services must by their nature be dispersed—agricultural research 
and extension, afforestation, land and mining matters, law courts, 
licensing of various kinds, local health and welfare, power reticula-
tion, police and public works, schooling, and water conservation. 
But the physical spread of activities was generally not matched by 
delegation of decision-making authority from central head offices. 
Locally elected municipal and shire councils were given corporate 
status and statutory powers of their own, but these also remained 
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subject to specified controls from the centre. In terms of decision-
making authority. New South Wales government through most of 
its history was as highly centralized as Australian state governments 
generally. 
From the earlier decades of the present century onward this 
metropolitan orientation of interests, outlooks and power provoked 
political reactions, notably the new state movements—but with little 
immediate result. From the 1930s, however, two streams of thought 
ran more strongly: the belief that metropolitan congestion and its 
by-products were for many too high a price to pay for the 
advantages of metropolitan living, and the notion that government 
decisions ought to be made closer to the citizens they affected. 
The most recent and most elaborate proposal for arresting the 
concentration of population and industry in the large metropolitan 
centres is the idea of the "growth centre", but so far it has had 
a negligible effect on the structure of state administration. In 
chapter 1 we noted the futility of the earlier policy of offering minor 
inducements to move urban industries to country towns. From the 
mid-1950s on, first the Labor and then the Liberal-Country 
government laid out some tens of millions of dollars in loans, 
subsidies, railway freight rebates, tax concessions, and other incen-
tives to the growth of manufacturing in rural areas. The net impact 
on the drift of population was virtually invisible. In the light of 
this experience the N.S.W. Development Corporation (described 
above) recommended in 1969 a policy of "selective decentraliza-
tion" to a handful of large country centres, based on investments 
of public and private capital far exceeding the earlier grants from 
the Country Industries Assistance Fund, and requiring the transfer 
to the selected areas of a great many government and private 
enterprises and their employees, as well as the development of new 
activities there." 
Rather naturally in view of the apparent discrimination and local 
political pressures entailed by any such policy, the government took 
a long time to accept it and longer still to choose the first growth 
area, at Bathurst-Orange. This was in October 1972, and a year 
later they agreed with the Victorian and Commonwealth govern-
ments to develop Albury-Wodonga jointly as a major centre. The 
next two years were devoted to planning and acquiring some land. 
By mid-1976 the net effect of these projects on administrative 
decentralization was the removal of one small office, the Central 
Mapping Authority, to Bathurst. 
Meantime, for thirty years or more the majority of government 
agencies had been spreading their "presence" ever more widely 
through the smaller centres of the state, in accord with a govern-
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ment and Public Service Board "policy of decentralisation of 
administration and facilities for the general public".'* The process 
was predominantly one of physical dispersal. For example, when 
a department plants in a country town a new agricultural research 
station, works or stores depot, or prison or child welfare home, the 
general public there may benefit by way of more jobs and business, 
but are not getting more government services for themselves nor 
a greater share in decision-making. Another form of decentraliza-
tion has substantially increased local services to the public, namely 
the multiplication in country areas of technical colleges and 
"centres", of vocational guidance offices, of branches of the 
Government Insurance and Public Trust Offices, of mental health 
community centres, chest clinics, agricultural extension stations, 
and the like. A parallel spread of petty sessions, stamp duties, 
Valuer-General's, and similar offices has given the local public 
easier access to the authorities that regulate and tax them. These 
developments, likewise, do not necessarily bring decision-making 
closer to the citizen since they do not automatically eliminate 
uniform state-wide rules or the need to refer hard cases to a head 
office in Sydney. 
Recognizing this, the Public Service Board has encouraged 
another trend: 
Side by side with the maximum delegation to each office, a system has 
been sought that would transfer a large measure of administration 
including a reasonable degree of responsibility for decision-making from 
the head offices of departments to a reasonable number of regions or 
zones, each more or less homogeneous in nature, while still reasonably 
large in area and diverse in interests." 
Thus since the 1930s, but much accelerated since 1950, a process 
of setting up regional or district offices with delegations on specified 
subjects has developed in Education, Housing, Child Welfare, 
Public Health, the Hospitals Commission, Agriculture, Public 
Works, the Valuer-General's Department, the Soil Conservation 
Service, and other agencies. Educational administration illustrates 
the main features of the process. Its decentralization began before 
the war with the establishment of an area office in Newcastle. This 
was suspended in 1941, but in 1948 the experiment was resumed 
in Wagga Wagga, and gradually extended to most parts of the state, 
including the metropolis where eventually five areas were set up. 
Delegations of authority to Area Directors were also increased 
piecemeal, beginning with aspects of personnel management 
affecting teachers and maintenance of departmental property, 
moving on to stores and equipment, finance, and communications 
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with the public. Delegations varied with what were thought to be 
the different needs of each local Area."" 
One of the inside accounts of the area education system also 
illustrates the difficulty of assessing the significance of decentraliza-
tion in particular cases. Here an Area Director sets out a lengthy 
and impressive list of area office activities and responsibilities. But 
he then goes on to argue that "New South Wales has not introduced 
. . . a decentralised system distinct from the highly centralised 
systems of other states . . . ", that "we have . . . a 'system of 
distributed administration' rather than a system of decentralised 
administration", and that "the proper function of area adminis-
tration of education is to be found in the expression at local level 
of policies determined at Head Office". He then suggests that "some 
of our country areas are far too large", that "there are too many 
matters which must still be referred to Head Office for decision" 
(giving many examples), that communications with Head Office 
need an overhaul, and that there should be more secondary 
inspectors among the areas."' Similarly, while the Public Service 
Board's Annual Reports devote a regular section to departmental 
steps toward decentralization, there are responsible officials who 
question whether any department or agency has taken serious steps 
to devolve "real decision-making" to extra-metropolitan centres, as 
distinct from merely spreading offices geographically. The 
judgement of what is "real decision-making" remains a subjective 
matter. 
In any case, district or area decentralization, even if accompanied 
by substantial devolution of decision-making, contributes primarily 
to more flexible and less congested internal administration, and by 
itself is only a first step towards more responsiveness to varying 
local demands and greater citizen access to decision-making. A 
further step was taken in 1975 with the appointment of eighty-
three senior officers, in as many country centres, as Local Co-
ordinators of State Administration, to ensure liaison, economical 
distribution of resources, and appropriate priorities from time to 
time between all state government organizations in the area, and 
through an information service to facilitate the public's dealings 
with the various organizations.'' 
Meanwhile the Liberal-Country government, under Country 
Party pressure, had launched a more ambitious attempt to promote 
decentralized development by resuscitating the moribund experi-
ment in "regionalism" which their Labor predecessors had initiated 
in the 1940s. By 1946 the latter, encouraged by a nation-wide policy 
of the federal Labor government, had divided New South Wales 
into twenty regions (excluding the Sydney metropolitan area), each 
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with a government-appointed Regional Development Committee 
(R.D.C.) representing local government bodies, local branches of 
state departments, and local businessmen."' The announced object 
of the R.D.C.S was consistent with Country Party survival strategy: 
to advise government on ways of developing each region so as to 
maximize its population. They were to begin by surveying the 
resources of the region and writing a development plan."" Many of 
them did these things, but having virtually no staff of their own, 
no executive powers, and no political influence, they were thereafter 
ignored by successive governments and by state departments which 
paid no heed to the regional boundaries in pursuing their own 
separate decentralization plans. Amazingly, the R.D.C.s lingered 
on for a generation, holding annual conferences, writing more 
reports and recommending purely miscellaneous measures such as 
repeal of land tax on rural properties, reduction of probate duties 
and country telephone charges, and abolition of taxes on intra-state 
road transport. 
Dissatisfaction with the R.D.C.s in the new Department of 
Decentralization and Development, and a sense of frustration within 
the committees themselves, led the Askin government in 1967 to 
set up an Interdepartmental Committee on Regional Reorganisa-
tion, chaired by the Director of the Department and also represent-
ing the Department of Local Government, the Treasury, the State 
Planning Authority, and the Public Service Board. In September 
1969 the Committee recommended adoption of a set of eight larger 
regions (including a "metropolitan" region embracing Newcastle, 
Sydney, and Wollongong and their hinterlands), and the re-
placement of R.D.C.s by Regional Advisory Councils (R.A.C.s) of 
twenty-one members, up to seven representing state instrumen-
talities in the area concerned with regional planning and develop-
ment, the remainder to be appointed in equal numbers from local 
councils, commerce, industry, and educational and research institu-
tions. The committee also recommended that except where expressly 
exempted all departments and authorities should be required to 
adopt the proposed regions for administrative and developmental 
purposes. 
After adding a ninth region by splitting the proposed Riverina 
region into two, the government adopted these proposals in July 
1971, and in March 1972 passed the Regional Organization Act 
to enforce them. The units and boundaries eventually adopted 
followed those established by the Commonwealth Bureau of Census 
and Statistics for purposes of the 1971 Census, producing eight 
rural regions, two "regional districts" (Hunter and lllawarra) as 
part of the metropolitan region, centred upon Newcastle and 
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Wollongong respectively, with the Sydney and Outer Sydney sub-
regions completing the ninth region."^ Departments under the Public 
Service Board's jurisdiction, which for thirty years had been allowed 
to decentralize haphazardly using incongruent boundaries, reported 
that they would have no difficulty in conforming to the new regional 
boundaries despite the existing disparities. In 1972 and 1973 
R.A.C.s were set up in the eight rural regions and District Advisory 
Councils in Hunter and lllawarra. Salaried executive officers were 
appointed to seven of the rural R.A.C.s and to the two D.A.C.s. 
The primary functions of the councils are: 
• to maintain up-to-date data on natural and economic resources 
and carry out surveys and research; 
• to furnish informed regional advice in respect of public works 
and services; and 
• to provide a forum for the co-ordination on a rural basis of 
State administrative and development services and for citizen 
participation in regional planning and development."^ 
It remains to be seen whether the new arrangements will develop 
more effectively than those they replaced. Regional and District 
Advisory Councils have the same kinds of functions and centrally 
chosen members as their predecessors and the same lack of powers 
and resources at their disposal. The regions have been doubled in 
average area, but there is no convincing evidence that they match 
any better the actual patterns of communication and interests, if 
only because many of these patterns are not coterminous in area 
or boundaries. 
Indeed, the experience of the post-war regions and committees 
throws considerable doubt on the concept of region itself. The 
interests that non-public service committee members tried to 
promote were not those of "the region" as a whole, but of the 
smaller urban centres as against the larger ones, or the regional 
capital as against the rest."' Many of the non-governmental, as well 
as governmental, interests in different parts of a region had closer 
links with Sydney or Newcastle than with each other. It was much 
easier to identify an important extra-metropolitan urban centre— 
the large town in which many government agencies had local offices 
—than to prove that this was the centre of a recognizable "region" 
with determinate boundaries and a pervasive "community of 
interest". In 1972-73 it was easy—in some cases a matter of 
indifference—for some government agencies, such as the Education 
Departments, the Health and Electricity Commissions, the Police, 
Motor Transport and Valuer-General's Departments, to accept the 
new common boundaries often embracing very large and diverse 
areas, because their work was relatively homogeneous and affected 
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people alike, irrespective of their place of residence. For others, such 
as the Housing and Forestry Commissions, Agriculture, Lands, and 
Mines Departments, and the Grain Elevators Board, those bound-
aries were often meaningless or even disruptive, and for geographi-
cal and technical reasons (for example that grain-growing areas 
bear little relation to the regional pattern or that boundaries based 
on human settlement tend to cut through the middle of forested 
areas) were likely to remain so. It appears that many of the senior 
regional officers were beginning to identify themselves with the rural 
periphery rather than the metropolitan centre, but for them the 
"periphery" itself was a substantial country town—their adminis-
trative seat and social home—not an inchoate region. 
From 1972 to 1975, of course, "regionalism" was a slogan to 
legitimate the federal Labor government's efforts to promote its 
social amelioration and urban development policies by by-passing 
reluctant state governments in favour of local bodies, official and 
unofficial. These schemes resembled state regionalization pro-
grammes in using regional organizations to articulate local pro-
posals and demands, while retaining all important discretions—and 
financial allocations—in central government hands. The several 
federal policies produced overlapping and differently constituted 
regional organizations in the important rural towns, in addition to 
those of the state, thus threatening to produce, as John Power has 
remarked, an "administrative landscape . . . increasingly crowded 
with governmental actors". But the federal politicians showed no 
greater inclination than those of the state to see these, in Power's 
words, as "way-stations on the road to fully fledged regional 
government". And he found it "hard to visualize any Australian 
State government creating elected regional assemblies, serviced by 
their own administrators, and with powers of revenue raising and 
resource allocation among a wide range of functions".** 
At most, the current developments seem to be aimed at a 
sufficient devolution of power to the regions to enable their residents 
to secure some differentiation of centrally determined government 
services in their own area if they want it. The R.A.C.s are seen 
as the main channel of such local influence, supplemented by a more 
direct nexus in some fields. To take the case of education again, 
the former Areas outside Sydney are being increased in number 
and renamed to match the new regions adopted by the government, 
while there has been a steady shift in emphasis over a longer period 
"from a school-centred approach to a community-centred 
approach"."' In 1974, following extensive official inquiry and 
consultation of interests, a panel representative of official, parent, 
teacher, and academic groups proposed increases in the functions 
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of specialist staff at Area (to be called Regional) Offices, and 
recommended the establishment, with local consent, of school 
boards including principals, representatives elected by the teachers, 
and members elected by the local community. Under these proposals 
Regional Offices will acquire authority to vary school teaching 
establishments, recruit and classify teachers, appoint, transfer, and 
promote teachers within the region, and foster community use of 
school facilities out of teaching hours. School boards would manage 
school property and finances and advise the Regional Director on 
new works and proposed alterations; would be represented on 
committees recommending appointment of principals; would employ 
casual staff; and would advise on the total education programmes 
of their schools.*" 
Yet in spite of Education's unique effort to enact the spirit of 
the new regionalism, its activities were not closely integrated with 
the Regional Advisory Council system, nor were those of the other 
government services where the consultation of local citizen opinion 
might be thought to be most important: 
. . . of the eight non-metropolitan RACs and the two District Councils 
(Hunter and lllawarra) in the Metropolitan Region 9, . . . the Depart-
ments of Main Roads and Lands are represented on all ten; Public 
Works and Agriculture on eight; and the Water Conservation and 
Irrigation Commission and other similar water boards on seven. The 
RACs are evidently to be strongly concerned with questions of land 
use and transportation. The Human Resources sector appeared surpris-
ingly under-represented, as Health has members on five Councils; Child 
Welfare and Social Welfare on two; and Education on only one.*' 
Administrative change 
The experiments with regionalism are a reminder that adminis-
trative structure is never static. Regionalization is one of the 
occasional attempts at far-reaching structural change, but minor 
reorganizations, as in any large administrative system, go on 
constantly in one part of the system or another: every year the 
reports of the Public Service Board and independent corporations 
list dozens of them. Automatic data processing (ADP) provides an 
example (remembering that novel functions are especially subject 
to organizational trial and error). 
In 1963 the Public Service Board established in its own office 
an ADP Division and as part of its activities opened an Automatic 
Data Processing Centre and provided training programmes in the 
use of ADP methods for administrative work, mathematical com-
puting, network analysis, and so on. In mid-1966, judging that "the 
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work of the Centre had progressed beyond the developmental 
stage", the Board transferred its ADP Division to the Treasury 
where it became the ADP Services Bureau, responsible for develop-
ing standards and conventions for computer processing, assistance 
to departments in the implementation of ADP, and the operation 
of a centralized computer service. The Public Service Board 
continued to control the extension of ADP into new fields and to 
arrange in-service training for ADP staff—but within a year the 
Treasury's Bureau was itself conducting on-the-job training courses. 
Following a survey of public service computer requirements in 1972 
the Board engaged a firm of business consultants to advise on future 
ADP policy. As a result, the Board decided that the Treasury ADP 
Service Bureau should henceforth operate solely as a processing 
centre, and that it would itself resume control of developmental 
projects, technical evaluation of new equipment, and the training 
of ADP staff, this time within its Management Systems Review 
Division. By the end of 1974 it had set up an ADP Implementation 
Service Group to enable ADP experts from many departments to 
work together in its own office, and also established an ADP Post-
Implementation Review Unit to check whether existing installations 
of computer processing had proved themselves more appropriate 
than "manual" methods (and found that several had not done so). 
Then in 1975 the ADP Services Bureau was transferred from the 
Treasury to the new Department of Services as a result of the 
Machinery of Government Review, to which we now turn." 
The perennial piecemeal adjustments of parts of the organization 
to changing needs and techniques, and the daunting difficulty of 
reviewing the whole administrative structure together in any depth, 
are sufficient explanations (some would say justifications) of the 
rarity of deliberate attempts to bring about comprehensive changes. 
Those of the past concentrated mostly on control of recruitment 
and management of staff, and reflected the nature of politicians' 
sporadic concern with the apparatus of government: in the 1880s 
and 1890s with "retrenchment and reform", and during the First 
World War with "economy and efficiency".'^' Then there was a gap 
of half a century until the 1970s which saw important changes in 
the control of the teaching services after decades of pressure from 
the teachers' unions (see below). 
There followed an unprecedented operation: the Machinery of 
Government Review, the first wholesale examination of the state's 
administrative organization. Back in 1968 some of the Public 
Service Board's research staff had begun a study of "N.S.W. 
government functions and public service structure", but had quickly 
concluded that "radical overhaul of the structure of the Service 
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is not a realistic expectation", and " 'incidental fixing' is all we 
have a right to expect".*" Five years later a cabinet subcommittee 
did recommend a comprehensive review, spurred by a combination 
of motives. The challenge of the Whitlam government's initiatives 
in Canberra had created "something of an identity crisis in state 
government" which called for a thorough stocktaking. The idea, 
according to Acting Premier Sir Charles Cutler, "had been given 
impetus by the present tight financial situation". At the same time, 
ministers were anxious to prepare a fresh "image" for whichever 
of their number would succeed Sir Robert Askin when he retired 
from the Premiership at the end of 1974." 
As announced early in July 1974, the aims of the inquiry were 
to consider whether any existing functions of the state government 
could be eliminated, whether the current machinery for carrying 
out the functions was the most appropriate, whether any rearrange-
ment or rationalization of services would achieve better utilization 
of resources, and where greater economies could be effected in 
government spending. Claims that the ensuing operation was in a 
number of ways unique among the many recent inquiries into 
government administration justify a summary account here. The 
basic differences lay in the reappraisal of departmental oranization 
in relation to "objectives" (rather than to a priori "principles"), 
by a numerous body including people with direct authority to 
inaugurate changes, leading to unusually prompt findings and 
action.*'' 
The focus was not to be, as in most other inquiries, upon the 
"inputs" to the administrative "black box"—staff recruitment, 
promotion and training, and efficiency devices—an approach be-
lieved to assume that if these inputs conformed to received 
theoretical canons, performance must improve. Instead, attention 
was concentrated upon the "output" side—upon what government 
agencies were doing, how well they were doing it, and whether they 
should be doing it at all. Of course this pragmatic approach meant 
also that unlike, for example, the 1974-76 Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration, the review would not be 
canvassing possible innovations or modifications in the conventional 
principles and practices of public service control, tenure, relations 
with ministers and the public, or employee rights and obligations. 
The review of the whole range of state government activities was 
entrusted to eight "study groups", each headed by an appropriate 
minister of the Crown, and including about eight senior public 
servants and at least one prominent executive from private en-
terprise (serving in an honorary capacity). As required, the groups 
made their first reports within two months, to a cabinet subcommit-
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tee of four senior ministers set up for the purpose. The Public 
Service Board (which was represented on all study groups) estab-
lished a Machinery of Government Unit to help the cabinet 
subcommittee in considering the recommendations, and where these 
called for further investigation rather than immediate action, the 
Board arranged for key people throughout the government service 
to serve on some fifty ad hoc studies. At the end of 1975 twenty 
of these studies were still in progress and the cabinet subcommittee 
was still meeting regularly. The eight study groups included all 
departmental permanent heads and sixteen managers of government 
instrumentalities. Meetings of the cabinet subcommitttee were 
attended by the chairman of the Public Service Board, the Under-
Secretary of the Treasury and the Deputy Under-Secretary of the 
Premier's Department. In all, some two hundred senior public 
servants and fifty top business executives were engaged in the 
various investigations. The direct participation of ministers, and 
especially the fact that ministers on the subcommittee were in 
charge of the departments where most changes were recommended, 
meant that proposals could often be implemented immediately. 
These arrangements also meant that the inquiry, unlike most of 
its kind, did not "stop at the door of the Cabinet room". One of 
its major outcomes was the reform outlined at the end of chapter 
5—the result of an examination of the system recently adopted in 
the province of Ontario—whereby much cabinet business was pre-
digested by ministerial standing committees, including one specially 
concerned with checking the interrelations of major policies and 
priorities. Another outcome was a wholesale reallocation of respon-
sibilities among ministers and their portfolios when T.L. Lewis took 
office in January 1975: only two of the eighteen ministers were 
unaffected, and as we saw in chapter 5 there were substantial 
changes in the portfolio list itself. 
Behind these adjustments, however, lay the more numerous, more 
far-reaching and more lasting structural changes to the adminis-
trative system which cabinet or its subcommittee had approved. By 
the first two-month deadline after July 1974 the ministerial study 
groups had submitted over two hundred recommendations—half of 
them for the amalgamation, regrouping, transfer, or dropping of 
functions, the other half for further "consideration". By January 
1975 the government was able to eliminate four departments or 
authorities, establish three new ones, and reorganize twenty-two 
others (though it postponed two or three of the big items); by the 
end of the year forty-nine agencies had been revamped." 
The prime objects of these operations were "the effecting of 
economies and the pruning of dead wood". As a government 
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spokesman said to a journalist, "You wouldn't hold an inquiry like 
this unless you intended to prune." Yet curiously, of the initial one 
hundred recommendations for action, thirty-eight were to transfer 
functions to a more appropriate department or minister, and only 
seventeen to reduce or eliminate an existing function. Hence the 
work appeared mainly to be an elaborate exercise in "bureau-
shuffling" whose result, in Gleeson's view, was merely "to improve 
control by establishing a more logical division of authority, responsi-
bility and accountability. Costs might be saved in the long run".'* 
Even that view could be over-sanguine. Recommendations such as 
"increase use of private firms" for government printing, "State 
Brickworks to be disposed of , "reduce business activities of the 
Public Trust Office", smack of political rather than administrative 
calculation, and hold no obvious prospect of money savings for the 
taxpayer or the consuming public. Decisions to move the Explosives 
Branch from the Mines Department to Labour and Industry, or 
the Land Titles Office from the Registrar-General's Department 
to Lands, or to absorb the Prickly Pear Destruction Commission 
from Lands into Agriculture, could be quickly recommended and 
adopted because they look logical on paper. But again it is not 
obvious that they would make any perceptible difference to co-
ordination or accountability, especially if there were no physical 
merging of offices. On the other hand, physical reshuffling of staff 
and alterations to premises to match the organizational changes 
would raise substantial costs to be offset against any gains in 
efficiency. 
But there was more to the review operations than this. Among 
other things, they established standing systems of government-wide 
administrative appraisal. As early as September 1974, for instance, 
the ministerial subcommittee secured cabinet approval for asking 
each department, sub-department and statutory body to prepare a 
so-called corporate plan, setting out in respect of the next three, 
six, and ten years the organization's intended objectives, the means 
required to achieve them, and the constraints likely to affect their 
attainment. The first plans, submitted by the end of 1974, ran the 
gauntlet of the cabinet subcommittee, the Public Service Board, 
and the heads of the other departments and authorities in the 
subject-field of the relevant cabinet standing committee. Revised 
corporate plans were to be sent to the standing committees by 
March 1976, and the process could clearly be up-dated in future 
years. Among advantages claimed for this process were: better 
understanding of each other's objectives by the heads of organiza-
tions in related fields, with the opportunity to eliminate overlapping; 
exchange of ideas on the value or urgency of particular projects; 
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mutual criticism of proposed measures to achieve related objectives; 
and better information for government policy planning." 
Another administrative legacy of the review was the introduction 
of a programme for the periodical "management audit" of all 
departments and agencies—that is, evaluation of their performance, 
especially that of their senior managers, and detection of adminis-
trative problems likely to arise. The idea of management audit was 
familiar enough, but on this occasion it formed part of a more 
significant development. The Public Service Board, already a more 
influential force in New South Wales government than might 
appear from its direct control of only one-quarter of the state's 
employees, was given responsibility for conducting the management 
audits, and also for reviewing all future "corporate plans", for co-
ordinating management training, and for transferring or retrenching 
redundant staff—and these responsibilities were extended "beyond 
the Public Service proper, to the whole field of State Government 
employment"."* 
STAFFING, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT 
The changes mentioned above, along with its central role in the 
conduct of the machinery of government review, further enhanced 
the already unique status of the N.S.W. Public Service Board, long 
the most powerful and probably the most effective body of its kind 
in Australia. 
The Public Service Board 
Building upon Victoria's pioneering legislation of 1883, the 1895 
Royal Commission on the Civil Service of New South Wales 
recommended centralized, independent statutory board control of 
recruitment to the service, of the classification, salaries, working 
conditions and discipline, and also of the establishments, organiza-
tion, efficiency, and co-ordination of departments. These elements 
were embodied in the Public Service Act of 1895. Its re-enactment 
in 1902, with comparatively few substantial amendments since, 
remains the basic public service statute today. 
The act conferred wide powers on a full-time Board of three 
members. The first appointees were "vigorous almost to the point 
of ruthlessness . . . in coping with . . . such matters as the abolition 
of political patronage, the elimination of the unfit, the reduction 
of the Service to limits required for efficiency, the destruction of 
the fetish of seniority, and the selection of competent juniors for 
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training and advancement to the important positions. . . . "'' A 
Royal Commissioner (Mason Allard) wrote this in 1918, to contrast 
the situation he had been asked to examine, in which he found a 
weak Board made weaker, he thought, by a seven-year term of office 
which laid members open to political pressures toward the end of 
their term. Appointment till age sixty-five was adopted on his 
recommendation in 1919, confirming a security of tenure under 
which Board members' salaries were already fixed by statute in a 
"permanent appropriation", and members were removable (apart 
from .some routine disqualifications) only by resolution of both 
houses of parliament, and then only for misbehaviour or incom-
petence. A 1955 amendment, recognizing that schoolteachers com-
prised some 40 per cent of the whole public service, provided for 
a fourth member of the Board who must have been an officer trained 
as an educationist and directly concerned with teaching or educa-
tional administration. This member was not to be the nominee or 
representative of any organization, and the change only consolidated 
the previous practice, of many years' standing, of appointing one 
educationist to the three-man Board. 
The Board's ascendancy rests partly upon its statutory independ-
ence, upon the calibre and confidence of its members, and upon 
the support of successive ministries. The 1919 amendments to the 
Public Service Act encouraged strong leadership not only by giving 
the chairman an additional casting vote in Board meetings, but also 
by authorizing him to override all the other members if still differing 
from them on any decision after a day's breathing-space and a 
second meeting. Subsequent governments came to accept the spirit 
of these changes, and their appointments of chairmen helped to re-
create a tradition of active initiative and intervention by the Board, 
which became firmly established during the long and sometimes 
controversial reign of W.C. Wurth (chairman, 1939-60). The Board 
was willing to use its wide powers to the full in developing its 
functions as it saw them and did not shirk the awkward responsi-
bilities and conflicts this sometimes entailed, especially in the realm 
of industrial relations. In turn, ministers came to rely on the Board 
chairmen as their principal advisers on the wider needs and 
problems of government administration, alongside and occasionally 
in preference to their permanent heads. Ministerial backing, espe-
cially that of Premiers which was usually forthcoming, strengthened 
the Board's hand in its dealings with departments, statutory 
authorities, and employee organizations. 
Underlying these factors, however, and reinforced by them, is 
the unique scope of the Board's statutory powers, dating from 1895. 
Although the Governor (in Council) is the formal authority for 
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making all public appointments, there can be no appointment from 
outside or promotion from within to any position under the Public 
Service Act without a certificate or recommendation from the 
Board, and these provisions apply to the Special Division, which 
comprises the leading departmental and authority heads, in the 
same way as to the rest of the service. Regulation 30 under the 
act prescribes that "[t]he Permanent Head of each Department 
shall be responsible to the Board for the discipline, efficiency, and 
economic administration of the Department . . . " (emphasis 
added). Regulation 32 requires the permanent head to submit to 
the Board annually "a detailed report on the efficiency, economy, 
discipline and general working of his Department", and lists at 
length the subjects and statistical returns this must include. The 
Board is responsible for discipline throughout the service; it can 
suspend from duty any officer, including a permanent head, who 
appears to have breached discipline or is on charge in a court (for 
other than a traffic offence). 
In conducting disciplinary inquiries or investigations into de-
partmental administration each Board member has, under section 
10 of the act, the powers and immunities of a royal commissioner. 
Section 9 requires the Board to "ensure the establishment and 
continuance of a proper standard of efficiency and economy in the 
Public Service", and section 20 empowers it to make regulations, 
not only for the classification, grading and promotion of staff, but 
also for "the specification and assignment of work, duties and 
offices". Section 52 requires all proposals by a minister or per-
manent head for any new disposition of officers or rearrangement 
of work to be referred to the Board "for consideration and action", 
so long as this does not restrict "the ordinary and necessary 
departmental authority of such Minister or permanent head . . . 
with respect to the direction and control of officers and work". The 
Board itself is required to make an annual report "on the condition 
and efficiency of the Public Service" to the Governor (not to any 
minister) for presentation to parliament. 
The Board's leading role is acknowledged in the departments. 
In the early 1960s it established a regular practice of convening 
conferences of permanent heads at least once each year, to review 
urgent administrative problems and the latest developments in 
management; these became an annual two-day residential con-
ference from 1972 on. A significant contribution to the Board's 
vitality and influence is the circulation of staff between its own oflice 
and responsible positions in departments, and not infrequently back 
on to the Board itself. Senior members of the Board's inspectorate, 
for example, were appointed as Under-Secretary of the Health 
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Department in 1961-62, as Assistant Director (Administration) in 
Public Works and President of the Board of Fire Commissioners, 
both in 1965, and as Assistant Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary's 
Department, in 1968. A member of the Board was appointed Under-
Secretary of the Premier's Department from the beginning of 1977. 
Before his first appointment as a Board member in 1936 Wallace 
Wurth's career had lain in the departments of Justice and of Labour 
and Industry. His successor. Sir John Goodsell (chairman, 1960-71) 
had spent eight years as a Board inspector and senior inspector 
in mid-career, sandwiched between earlier periods in the Public 
Works, Local Government, and Chief Secretary's Departments, and 
later periods as Under-Secretary of the Treasury and President of 
the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board. The next 
chairman. Sir Harold Dickinson (1971- ) had begun his career 
in the Lands Department, had been Secretary to the Board, a senior 
inspector, and then a chief executive officer of the Prince Henry 
Hospital before returning as a Board member in 1963. Another 
member in 1976 had previously been a deputy chief inspector in 
the Board's office and then spent two years as Assistant Director 
of Technical Education before his appointment to the Board in 
1971. A third member was Assistant Under-Secretary of the 
Treasury at the time of his appointment. 
These interchanges of men and experience add authority to the 
Board's interventions in service organization. Spann notes: "It has 
often had a large say in decisions to reorganise departments and 
reallocate functions and is generally consulted by government on 
such matters. It is also regularly consulted on the staffing implica-
tions of new legislation."" The Board's firm acceptance of its 
management role is typified by this extract from an annual report: 
The Board has the statutory responsibility of maintaining proper 
standards of efficiency and economy in the Public Service. Methods 
employed during the year to ensure this included: 
• personal inspection of and contact with departments; 
• constant liaison between Board inspectors and Departmental officers; 
• administrative research and the further development of Automatic 
Data Processing; 
• extensive use of O. & M. techniques; 
• the employment of outside consultants; and 
• the encouragement of the acquisition and use of modern office 
equipment." 
The first of these methods recalls the initial admonition of 1895, 
still in the Public Service Act but at first sight bizarre in the 1970s, 
that "the Board shall, as far as practicable, personally inspect each 
department, and investigate the efficiency, economy and general 
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working . . . and may, for such purpose, examine the permanent 
head . . . " and other witnesses (s. 9[1]; emphasis added). In fact, 
from 1955 Board members revived the practice of personally visiting 
departments and institutions under their jurisdiction. They made 
weekly visits to five major departments to deal with files directly, 
saving time and correspondence. They also supplemented the 
supervisory work of their staff by personally inspecting, in most 
years, over a hundred departments, branches, and institutions in 
the metropolitan area and a declining number in the country, 
averaging between 150 and 200 in the 1960s but dropping from 
fifty or so to something over thirty during the 1970s. 
To promote "efficiency" the Board must, as Spann has said, be 
an innovator as well as a regulator. We have seen how the Board 
took the lead in exploring computerization for the public service 
in the early 1960s, and continued to experiment with procedures 
for getting effective use of this facility and for critically evaluating 
its actual contributions. By the middle 1950s some of the Board's 
staff were well acquainted with the literature of what the British 
had christened Organization and Methods, and were formed into 
a Methods Division; it had a staff of some twenty-five by 1971 and 
in the following year was renamed the Management Systems 
Review Division, to register its more complex structure and 
functions. The Public Works Department set up in 1961 the first 
departmental O & M unit in any state, and by 1971 twenty New 
South Wales departments had them.^" 
The same point is illustrated by the Board's long-standing interest 
in research—partly connected with the fact that Australia's first 
Professor of Public Administration, F.A. Bland, spent his earlier 
career in the Board's office and maintained close connections with 
it thereafter. The interest was formalized in 1964 by the estab-
lishment of an Administrative Research Committee drawn from 
Sydney's universities—supplemented later by short-term members 
from commerce and industry. The unit was soon incorporated in 
a new Consultant and Research Division to include advice on ADP 
policy and applications, operations research and network analysis, 
special administrative and economic investigations, and adaptation 
of new administrative techniques. The Division's projects, listed 
from time to time in the annual reports of the Board, have included: 
• possibilities of identifying officers with potential for higher 
administrative work; 
• reorganization of the state's health services; 
• changing employment patterns and future staff requirements 
in the service; 
• review of the restrictions on public comment by public servants 
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(see below); 
• ethical and legal issues in outside part-time employment of 
public servants; 
• review of the basic assumptions behind the seventy-year-old 
system of grade examinations (see below); and 
• the role of the Board itself as a central personnel authority, 
in the light of recent overseas inquiries. 
In 1973 the Board inaugurated two post-graduate scholarships for 
research in selected areas of organization behaviour. 
The career public service: recruitment 
For purposes of classification and recruitment of staff the public 
service under the act, like other Australian services for the past 
half-century or more, is broken into divisions: the Special Division, 
comprising under-secretaries and directors-general of the major 
ministerial departments and commissions; Professional, for jobs 
requiring "special skill or technical knowledge, usually acquired 
only in some profession or occupation different from the ordinary 
routine of the Civil Service" (s. 23); Administrative and Clerical, 
which is self-explanatory but does not contain all senior adminis-
trative positions some of which remain in the Professional Division; 
Educational, for teachers and lecturers employed in various depart-
ments and institutions; and General, which includes routine white-
collar workers, tradesmen, and unskilled manual workers. Table 18 
gives a recent breakdown of public service numbers by divisions. 
There is little logic or utility today in a divisional structure of this 
kind, as the N.S.W. Public Service Board testified in 1969 when 
one employee association asked for an additional division or, 
alternatively, the abolition of all divisions: 
In the board's experience, the present arbitrary classification of the 
Service into five Divisions is quite a handicap in the administration of 
the Service and is the cause of frequent differences between individual 
employees and groups of employees. . . . 
The Board expressed the view that if any change is to be made it 
should be in the direction of providing divisions identified by numbers 
as in the Commonwealth Service. [!] 
Subsequently the associations advised that they were opposed to the 
proposed change. . . . 
. . . Despite the opposition of the associations the Board, in the 
interests of improved administration, favours the abolition of the present 
divisional structure. 
However, the anachronistic divisions remained intact at the end of 
1976." 
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Table 18. Employment under the Public Service 
(Permanent and Temporary, as at 30 June) 
1955 
Special 13 
Professional 2,983 
Administrative and Clerical' 8,289 
General 12,577 
Educational- 17,727 
Totals 41,589 
Staffing, Organization 
and Management 
Act, by Divisions 
I960 
14 
3,493 
9,235 
16,140 
21,609 
50,491 
1965 
17 
4,923 
9,903 
23,910 
28,844 
67,597 
1970 
17 
6,570 
10,192 
33,318 
34,772 
84,869 
1975 
17 
8,982 
13,093 
47,259 
3,112 
72,463 
Source: Public Service Board Annual Reports, Appendix, Summary of Employees, 
Notes: 
1, The present title of this division was substituted for the original title of Clerical 
Division by an amendment of the act in 1963, 
2, From I January 1971 most teaching staff in the Education Department ceased 
to be employed under the Public Service Act (see below). 
Until the past decade the public service exhibited overwhelmingly 
the character established by the 1895 Public Service Act—of a 
closed career structure, based on recruitment from below by 
competitive examination and step-by-step promotion from within, 
very largely on grounds of seniority. This generalization is explained 
and where necessary qualified in what follows. 
The act has always required separate examinations to be held 
for entry to the Professional, Administrative and Clerical, and 
Educational Divisions, but waived examinations for entry to the 
General Division, while assuming that Special Division vacancies 
would normally be filled by internal promotions (ss. 28, 29). "In 
this State there is one level of recruitment," wrote a Public Service 
Board member in 1965. He was referring to the school-leaving 
public examinations, namely from 1965 the School Certificate 
examination following four years' secondary schooling, or where the 
recruit was expected to acquire a professional qualification, as in 
the Professional and Educational Divisions, from 1967 the Higher 
School Certificate examination after six years at secondary school. 
Applicants were appointed in order of merit from these examina-
tions (supplemented during some periods by internal literacy and 
numeracy tests). Most recruits for professional work thereupon 
received a cadetship or scholarship to a university or other tertiary 
institution and were accepted with full professional status on 
completion of the course." 
Consistently with the notion of career service, the act treats 
appointments at higher levels from outside (lateral recruitment) as 
exceptional and requiring special safeguards. Such an appointment 
can only be initiated by the Public Service Board, a permanent head 
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or a minister, and is subject to the usual six months' probation. 
The Board must certify that the appointment is required, and 
normally "that there is no person in the Public Service fit or 
qualified and available for such appointment", and that the 
proposed appointee has topped a competitive examination or an 
examination is dispensable for the particular appointment (ss. 34, 
35). In very special cases, and then only to a division other than 
the Administrative and Clerical, the cabinet may authorize an 
outside appointment without examination or probation, on the 
Board's recommendation and after a Board report (which must be 
laid before parliament) on whether there is anyone in the service 
"capable of filling and available for the position" (s. 36)—which, 
as can be seen, leaves some discretion with the cabinet. (Note the 
subtle distinctions between these two provisions for lateral re-
cruitment.) 
Faithful adherence to these provisions over decades produced an 
inbred service, but one of better than average quality so long as 
adequate numbers of school leavers of that quality sought public 
employment. But after the Second World War several different 
trends called in question the established recruitment methods. 
During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s the quality of the 
clerical-administrative intake, in particular, dropped markedly 
below that of the 1930s, as a special study showed in 1956. The 
reasons included the relatively smaller numbers of school leavers 
owing to the low birthrates during the Depression; the heavy 
demand from other avenues of employment in the post-war re-
construction period; and the Commonwealth Scholarship scheme 
which was the first of a number of new inducements that attracted 
increasing proportions of school leavers to go on to higher education 
before seeking a job. The Board was forced to take recruits from 
lower in the order of merit lists, and to recruit to a greater extent 
from the more junior school leaving examination. It also greatly 
increased the proportion of girls and women recruited to the Clerical 
Division—getting government approval in 1968 to remove the 
traditional bar to permanent employment of married women. In 
addition it was necessary to institute some extra in-service tuition 
and tests because too many of the recruits "could not spell, they 
could not write simple English, and they could not calculate at a 
reasonable speed"." Furthermore the Board began to seek clerical 
and professional staff from overseas, though their numbers in-
creased slowly at first. 
From the beginning of the 1960s to the early 1970s the Board 
reported adequate numbers of junior recruits at satisfactory stan-
dards; indeed from 1974 it proposed to recruit to the Administrative 
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and Clerical Division only from the Higher School Certificate. But 
it remained concerned at the proportion of the best school leavers 
who now proceeded to tertiary education and at the continuing 
difficulty of meeting demands for professional staff. It was also 
confronted with a new problem: a growing wastage rate which had 
soon vitiated the assumptions of a stable career service (see table 
19). The combination of these factors impelled the Board to resort 
to various forms of lateral recruitment to remedy the now obvious 
deficiencies of recruitment from below. 
Table 19. Public Service: Percentage Losses of Entrants by Voluntary Separation 
in the Ten Years to 1974 
After 1 year 
3 years 
6 years 
10 years 
Administrative 
Clerical 
M 
% 
37 
60 
80 
90 
and 
Division 
F 
% 
36 
79 
95 
98 
Professional 
Division 
M-l-F 
% 
13 
40 
70 
84 
Source: N,S,W, Public Service Board. 
From 1961 the Board had been employing a number of under-
graduate students part-time with a view to attracting some to join 
permanently on completing their courses. At the beginning of 1967 
it began actively to recruit university graduates and qualified 
accountants to the Administrative and Clerical Division, encourag-
ing them "to seek generalist careers in administration rather than 
specialise in the field of their academic training". By 1975 it was 
receiving 320 applications for fifty positions as graduate clerk.** In 
1969 the direct recruitment of graduates was extended to the 
Professional Division, and by 1974 the Board was proposing to cease 
recruiting professional trainees at the school leaving level from 1975 
except when there was an established need to supplement graduate 
recruitment. 
By that time lateral recruitment had long been extended to higher 
levels of the public service—to fill the gaping gaps left by high 
staff turnover which affected the graduate intake as much as any 
other; also to make up for the weakened recruitment of the 1950s, 
and simply to tap available supplies of talent wherever they might 
be found. For example, the Board had begun recruiting clerks in 
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considerable numbers at a level one to three years beyond the first 
eleven-year stretch of the automatic incremental salary range (see 
below). It was now bringing substantial numbers of qualified staff 
(for example, teachers) from abroad. And encouraged by the 
Liberal-Country Party government after 1965 it had adopted the 
practice of publicly advertising, for competition from inside and 
outside the service, all statutory positions and a considerable 
number of permanent head and other senior positions. In the 
Education Department, for example, it became customary to 
advertise all positions of School Inspector rank and above, including 
those of Area Superintendent. Since appeals by serving officers 
against lateral appointments lay only to the Board, they were 
negligible in numbers.*' 
Promotion and Appeals 
The Public Service Board in the post-war years was apt to play 
down the importance of seniority in the New South Wales 
promotion system by quoting the relevant section 49 of the act. 
This section provided that a vacancy could be filled either by 
appointing an officer of the same department, "regard being had 
to the relative seniority and fitness respectively of the officers" of 
the department, or by appointing an officer of another department, 
"on the ground of seniority combined with fitness", with the 
stipulation that "[i]n all cases seniority shall be subordinated to 
considerations of special fitness". By regulation 49 under the act, 
relative seniority lay with the officer on the higher salary, or in 
the higher grade if their salaries overlapped, or with the greater 
length of service on the same salary—or with the older of two 
officers whose careers had been identical. Thus promotion to a 
higher salary increased an officer's seniority, and could enable him 
to leap-frog another officer in seniority. However, section 49 also 
required promotions to be "so far as practicable" from the same 
grade or the next grade down—thus restricting rapid advancement. 
Still, the Board suggested that promotion was predominantly by 
merit, publishing figures from 1956/57 to 1960/61 to show that 
the proportion of all promotions in each year (other than of teachers 
who had their own system) which were not made in the order of 
seniority was running between 51 and 64 per cent. The Annual 
Reports no longer included comparable figures after 1960/61, 
although one of the Board's officers claimed in 1968 that, according 
to the record, two-thirds of all promotions were then being made 
"out of seniority order" (see n. 71). 
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However, on the evidence of the officials themselves such statistics 
were misleading. As Board member H.F. Heath put it, section 49 
made it appear that "the Board considers everybody and appoints 
the best man. However it does not quite mean this". Under 
regulation 56 the service had been divided (yet further confusing 
the term) into well over five hundred smallish groups to be 
"regarded as departments" for purposes of section 49. Relative 
seniority was considered to apply only within each of these groups: 
. . . in actual practice, when people are considered for appointment, the 
senior [within the regulation 56 "department"] gets the job unless 
somebody junior to him has special fitness. We do not throw open 
positions throughout the service as, for example, is done in the 
Commonwealth Service. This means that seniority rules and the way 
in which seniority is acquired becomes of great importance. The Board 
prides itself on the fact that it does not promote the senior man if it 
thinks the junior has greater fitness for the job, but it has to look at 
people in seniority lists in turn and convince itself that someone should 
be superseded. This is something different from selecting without 
restrictions.™ 
Three years later a Board inspector, while holding it "not fair to 
say that a strict seniority system operates in New South Wales", 
explained that many officers, content at the top of their grade, did 
not seek further promotion but allowed themselves to be outstripped 
by more junior officers—"and this would technically be promotion 
out of seniority order for everyone who passed them". He went on: 
For the officer qualified by examination for promotion to the higher 
series of grades, seniority still matters . . . It is not equitable, because 
the rewards of the seniority system are not distributed evenly from one 
department to another; and it is not efficient, because seniority is no 
guarantee of ability." 
Seniority was also protected by other, progressively stronger, 
measures. Section 49A of the act, inserted in 1929, required the 
Board to set up a promotions committee whenever it received a 
recommendation "for the promotion to a permanent position in a 
department of an officer other than the officer of that department 
who is next in order of seniority for such promotion"—provided 
the salary was not above a fairly low limit. The committee must 
comprise the permanent head or his nominee, an officers' represent-
ative, and a third officer nominated by the other two, and was to 
report to the Board on the claims of any officers proposed to be 
passed over. The Board must consider the report, and if requested 
also interview the officers' representative, before deciding the 
promotion. Under section 19 of the act an officer could also appeal 
to the Public Service Board itself against any Board decision 
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affecting his salary, seniority, or classification—and until 1944 this 
remained the only form of appeal against promotions for officers 
above the statutory salary limit in section 49A. 
However, since that low limit was never amended to take account 
of falling money values, section 49A eventually ceased to be 
mandatory for most levels of appointment, and the Public Service 
Board reserved promotions committees for recommendations to 
positions within the lowest two grades of the Administrative and 
Clerical Division. Meanwhile the Crown Employees Appeal Board 
Act of 1944 had established a new tribunal, chaired by a judge 
and including representatives of employer and staff sides, which 
covered all government employees including public servants and 
could hear appeals against any decision adversely affecting their 
seniority—and also against disciplinary actions proposed by an 
employing authority. Hearings of the Appeal Board had to be in 
public, legal representation was allowed, and proceedings inevitably 
became legalistic and protracted. The Appeal Board could finally 
determine appeals against public service promotions, except to 
positions in the Special Division or carrying a salary prescribed from 
time to time (at a fairly high level). 
Curiously the Public Service Board in the 1950s, while repeatedly 
recording with apparent pride that a majority of promotions were 
made out of seniority order and so primarily on merit, nevertheless 
favoured the retention of the seniority criterion for promotions. In 
1959, when the Prime Minister's Committee of Inquiry into 
Commonwealth Public Service Recruitment urged the abandon-
ment of the seniority criterion in the federal service, the N.S.W. 
Board hastened to report that it "completely disagreed". It argued 
that an officer who by passing inside or outside examinations had 
been able— 
to maintain his status relative to other officers, or, in other words, to 
attain certain "seniority", should at least receive some consideration for 
further promotion; otherwise the Public Service ceases in any real sense 
to be a career service . . . If seniority is not even relevant, then claims 
of officers next in line need be given no consideration whatever as long 
as a claim of "relative efikiency" is raised on behalf of any officer 
appointed to fill a vacancy. 
This would do more harm than good. The Board believed that 
"relative seniority and fitness", with seniority subordinated to 
fitness, recognized "the essential considerations (and their relative 
importance) that should be taken into account in determining 
promotions in any career service"." The Board's case was that in 
the New South Wales public service seniority did not depend upon 
mere length of service, but was attained as a direct result of 
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promotion which was itself conditioned by passing examination 
barriers or attaining prescribed qualifications. In such a system 
promotion by seniority may often, even generally, be also promotion 
by merit: the two criteria are not necessarily incompatible. 
However, within little more than a decade the Board—or rather 
a successor Board of wholly different members—abandoned every 
one of these arguments to take a diametrically opposite stand. They 
may have been influenced by the fact (already noted) that the notion 
of "career service" was becoming increasingly unreal, and they were 
certainly losing enthusiasm for the time-honoured shibboleth of 
"fitness by examinations" (see below). But what triggered drastic 
change was the operation of the Crown Employees Appeal Board. 
Even in the 1950s the Public Service Board was complaining that 
the new appeals legislation gave "a new emphasis to the importance 
of seniority in promotion"," producing a tendency for the less 
efficient person to be promoted. The Board described how the 
system deterred senior officers from recommending promotion on 
grounds of special fitness, since on appeal they would have to defend 
their judgement of individual officers in open court by sworn 
evidence and under cross-examination by counsel for their own 
junior officers. For twenty years the Public Service Board continued 
to criticize these features, and generally "the unnecessarily formal 
and costly procedures" of the Crown Employees Appeal Board and 
the disruptive delays of anything up to fifteen months between a 
decision to promote and the final determination of an appeal. 
Although these were real disabilities, their total effect may not 
have been nearly as costly as, say, the Commonwealth Service 
appeals system. The latter could produce hundreds—sometimes 
thousands—of appeals against a single promotion, and required the 
full-time attention of three-man Appeals Committees all around the 
continent. With the ground of appeal restricted to seniority within 
a narrow group and closer knowledge of officers in a compact 
service, the New South Wales system had a relatively modest 
burden of appeals to cope with. This is suggested, at least, by table 
20. It covers the only years for which sufficiently relevant statistics 
were published; even so, the available appeals figures include 
appeals against all personnel decisions, not merely those on promo-
tions—thus strengthening the point made here. 
On 30 April 1971 the Appeal Board itself precipitated the 
termination of its jurisdiction over public service promotions by 
upholding a challenge to the validity of regulation 56, which 
established the artificial "departments" on which the whole public 
service seniority system was based. After the Public Service Board 
and the staff associations had failed to agree on new legislation 
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to regulate seniority and promotions, the government appointed a 
Panel of Inquiry on these subjects, chaired by Sir Philip Baxter, 
former head of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, and 
including the immediate past chairman of the Public Service Board 
and the current president of the Public Service Association. 
Table 20. Public Service: Appealable Promotions and Total Personnel Appeals, 
1956-57 to 1960-61 
(Excluding Educational Division) 
Year Promotions 
Not in 
Seniority 
Order 
Appeals against all P.S. Board Decisions, 
Including Promotions 
To Public Service Board 
Total Allowed or Board's 
Decision Varied 
To Crown Employees Appeal 
Board 
Total Allowed or Board's 
Heard' Decision Varied 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
432 
645 
717 
858 
800 
60 
49 
58 
35 
24 
13 
25 
18 
5 
4 
82 
50 
14 
63 
32 
3 
6 
2 
2 
12 
Source: N,S,W, Public Service Board, Annual Reports. 
Note: 
1. Figures shown are net of appeals withdrawn before hearing and appeals 
withdrawn at the hearing or struck out for want of jurisdiction or some other reason. 
Appeals originally lodged number three to four times those fully heard. 
In its comprehensive submission to the Panel the Public Service 
Board argued that the history of the Appeal Board had shown the 
unworkability of section 49 of the Public Service Act in which 
"special fitness" was not defined: the tribunal had often declared 
that a proposed appointee was more competent and better fitted 
for the position than the appellant, but found in the appellant's 
favour on the ground that there was not "enough" of this superiority 
to "outweigh" the latter's seniority. After repeating the other 
complaints already mentioned, the Board's submission noted that 
New South Wales now had the only public service in Australia 
where "efficiency" was not the primary criterion for promotion, and 
recommended that it should be the sole criterion. If seniority were 
retained as a criterion, it should only be considered in cases of equal 
efficiency, and should be redefined as total length of service, to be 
compared on a service-wide basis, not within restricted departments 
or sections only. Promotions committees and examination barriers 
to promotion should be abolished. Appeals against proposed promo-
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tions in the public service should lie to a separate tribunal instead 
of the Crown Employees Appeal Board; "superior efficiency" should 
be the only ground of appeal; appeal should be open only to 
applicants for a vacancy if it was published in the official circular, 
and if not so published only to officers in the department concerned; 
and for this purpose department should be redefined to mean each 
organization which had a recognized permanent head—then num-
bering fifty-two—instead of the 540-odd groups prescribed in the 
invalidated regulation 56.'" 
In its report the Panel of Inquiry moved in the general direction 
of these submissions, but not quite as far; and most of its 
recommendations were embodied in amending legislation at the end 
of 1974." This made "efficiency" the primary criterion of promo-
tion, and defined it as the possession of qualifications, determined 
by the Public Service Board in respect of the vacant office, for the 
discharge of the duties of that office; aptitude for the discharge 
of those duties; and merit, diligence, and good conduct (new section 
49 [1] in the Public Service Act, borrowing time-worn phrases from 
other Australian legislation). Seniority was retained as a secondary 
criterion: an officer passed over could appeal against another's 
promotion on the ground of greater efficiency, or of equal efficiency 
plus greater seniority, or both. Seniority was still to be determined 
by comparative salary, but was now to be compared on a service-
wide basis, except in the case of a vacancy not advertised in the 
Public Service Board Notices or a newspaper, when as suggested 
in the Board's submission to the Panel only officers in the same 
"administrative unit" (the act's term) could appeal. Soon after-
wards the Board declared fifty-one such units. An equally important 
change was the removal of public service promotions appeals from 
the Crown Employees Appeal Board (which now retained only 
disciplinary appeals in the public service). As regards positions up 
to the maximum of grade 10 (Administrative and Clerical Division), 
appeals would now lie with ad hoc Promotions Appeal Tribunals, 
each with a chairman and employer and employee members and 
a discretion to restrict representation of the parties by advocates, 
in the hope of avoiding the technical and "adversary" atmosphere 
of the Crown Employees Appeal Board. For positions above grade 
10 appeals still lay with the Public Service Board under section 
19 of the Public Service Act. 
It remained to be seen whether these changes had driven "the 
final nail . . . into seniority's coffin". The officer who was secretary 
to the Panel of Inquiry commented later on the difficulties 
remaining in the new definition of "superior efficiency" which could 
tempt promoting authorities to fall back on the "old and usually 
comfortable habits and thought patterns" of relying on seniority. 
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He also noted the retention of references to "seniority within 
groups", and the new power conferred on the Public Service Board 
to create "administrative units" merely by declaration and publica-
tion, whereas regulation 56 could only be amended by another 
regulation which must be laid before both houses of parliament. 
A main motivation for regulation 56 was apparently to restrict the 
number of potential appellants against promotion decisions. If that 
motivation emerges again, one can expect a proliferation of adminis-
trative units. But if the new concept of efficiency is used properly, this 
need not happen. 
On the other hand, it appeared open to the Board under the new 
legislation to determine that fitness for promotion to a higher office 
later on, or the brevity of an officer's remaining service before 
retirement, could be legitimately considered in promotions to 
particular vacancies; and it seemed that staff report forms and 
reports of the Personnel Assessment Centre (see below) could 
readily be used in evidence in appeal hearings. These latter 
implications of the legislation as drafted seemed to be the ironical 
result of union opposition to the Panel's recommendations, which 
would have hedged the proposals with safeguards more favourable 
to appellants.'*• 
Examinations and staff development 
One of the most striking reversals of long-standing policy expressed 
in the Public Service Board's submission to the promotions inquiry 
was the proposal to abandon examination barriers to promotion. 
An outstanding feature of the New South Wales staffing system 
inaugurated by the 1895 Public Service Act was an almost Chinese 
faith in written examinations, not merely as objective recruitment 
selectors but also as a means to self-development in the service 
career. In a provision foreshadowed in the Victorian legislation of 
1883, the act required the Professional and the Administrative and 
Clerical Divisions to be broken into "higher and lower grades" (s. 
48), with the proviso that no one could be promoted from the lower 
to the higher grades in either Division without passing an examina-
tion prescribed and if necessary administered by the Public Service 
Board (s. 50). 
The Board inaugurated its own "higher grades examinations" in 
1903 and conducted them until 1966, from time to time varying 
and extending their content to match the growing diversity of 
service requirements. The higher grades examinations for the 
Administrative and Clerical Division, with a broad syllabus in social 
sciences and administration, especially after 1938, were conducted 
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under regulation 122. A greater variety of examinations for 
promotion to higher grades in the Professional Division, and mostly 
technical and specialized in subject-matter, were held or prescribed 
under regulation 126 and others. In addition to these examinations 
required by the act, the Board soon developed a range of internal 
examination barriers at more junior levels, concentrating on utili-
tarian clerical and technical subjects, the best known in the 
Administrative and Clerical Division being those held under regu-
lations 116 and 119. Up to the end of the 1930s the Board seemed 
to regard the passing of examinations, by and large, as both the 
necessary and the sufficient means of staff development apart from 
experience on the job. "The Board's constant endeavour", it 
repeatedly wrote in similar terms to this, "has been to base not 
only entrance to but also promotion in the Clerical and Professional 
Divisions (the Divisions which comprise most of the administrative 
officers of the Service) upon the possession of educational 
qualifications."" 
The only other pre-war effort of the Board was to arrange at 
times for some instruction, relevant to its examinations, to be offered 
for officers who chose to take advantage of it. Early in this century 
the Board stimulated the University of Sydney and the Workers' 
Educational Association to provide courses it thought appropriate 
for public servants. After raising the standard of the higher grades 
examinations in the Clerical Division in 1938, it arranged with the 
Sydney University Extension Board for university teachers to offer 
a course of lectures on the subject-matter of the new syllabus. This 
was suspended by the war, and after the war a different approach 
gradually evolved from two other early measures: the acceptance 
of other examination qualifications as exemptions from the Board's 
examinations in whole or part for purposes of section 50, and the 
use of "cadetships" and "traineeships"—beginning early in the 
century as an aid to professional recruitment and put on an 
extended and regular footing from the late 1930s—under which 
recruits obtained tertiary qualifications at public expense and thus 
became eligible for promotion to the higher grades. 
In 1962, prompted partly by the impending change in school 
leaving examinations under the Wyndham Scheme, the Board 
deputed one of its members to chair its Examinations Committee 
in an exhaustive review of the whole public service examination 
system. On the question of promotion examinations, the Committee 
reported that the junior clerical examination under regulation 116 
could be passed by cramming, was of little practical value, and 
should be replaced by a one-year course of oral or correspondence 
training in English expression and in the basic office and elementary 
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accounting skills of a clerical officer, with a terminal examination, 
all to be conducted on behalf of the Board by the Department of 
Technical Education. The Committee recommended that the regu-
lation 119 examination be retained, but redesigned "to test technical 
knowledge in various work situations rather than general knowledge 
and suitability for administrative posts". As to the higher grades 
barrier, the Committee noted that although most senior adminis-
trators were drawn from the Administrative and Clerical Division, 
the regulation 122 examination, partly as a result of the constant 
pressure of departments and staff associations, had fallen well below 
the intellectual standards of the qualifications then generally 
attained by professional officers—while on the other hand, although 
professional officers could also reach high administrative posts, their 
qualifications were specialized and they received no formal adminis-
trative training. The Committee recommended that a university 
degree, diploma, or equivalent qualification recognized by the Board 
should become the sole educational condition for promotion to the 
higher grades, and that training courses be organized for specialist 
professional officers in line for administrative posts. 
The Public Service Board accepted the main recommendations, 
which did not mean abandoning the fetish of examinations but 
rather that the Board could dispense with most of its own 
examinations because so many now existed or could be arranged 
in other institutions, and that the Board should do more to help 
officers pass examinations. The Department of Technical Education 
began in 1965 the new course, culminating in its own examination, 
for compliance with regulation 116. In 1966 a new and more 
"practical" syllabus came into force for the Board's own regulation 
119 examination, and a preparatory course for this was also 
organized, like the regulation 116 course, through oral classes in 
the city and by correspondence for country candidates. The internal 
higher grades examinations under regulation 122 were discontinued 
—except for a few categories such as probation officers, parole 
officers, and court reporters—so that after 1966 the higher grades 
barrier for most officers in the Administrative and Clerical Division 
became any of a prescribed list of tertiary qualifications—with the 
addition, however, of a single in-service paper on Departmental 
Procedure. Except for this paper, internal examinations were wholly 
eliminated after 1972. In the Professional Division the Board cut 
down the number of in-service progression examinations for non-
graduate officers after 1966, and for such officers tackling the higher 
grades barrier began to approve an expanding range of courses and 
examinations developed mostly in the Department of Technical 
Education. These provisions, however, remained closely oriented to 
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the narrowly specialized technical requirements of specific occupa-
tions in the Professional Division, and did little for the adminis-
trative training of professional officers. 
In the Administrative and Clerical Division the trend established 
after 1964 continued inexorably. By 1969, after noting high wastage 
rates from the respective new courses and low pass rates in the 
examinations, the Board had decided to discontinue the regulation 
116 course immediately and the regulation 119 course in 1972, both 
in favour of the relevant parts of a new four-year Certificate Course 
in Public Administration for non-matriculated officers introduced 
by the Department of Technical Education at the Board's request. 
As the first overt sign of the radically new approach toward which 
the Board had really been tending, it repealed regulation 119 as 
from 30 April 1973, thus eliminating that particular examination 
barrier altogether. The higher grades bar was more difficult to 
remove, being statutory—and to improve, because of the interest 
of staff associations in keeping it narrowly occupational in scope 
and mediocre in standard. 
In announcing its intention to end the main internal higher grades 
examination in the Administrative and Clerical Division in 1966, 
the Board had been expansive and optimistic: 
With the growth of tertiary education and the development of 
advanced training in special fields such as management and adminis-
tration, the Board felt that, in a modern Public Service, officers aspiring 
to senior administrative posts should possess qualifications comparable 
to those expected of people doing similar work outside the Service. They 
should be people whose education, personality and judgment were such 
that they would find acceptance among leaders in the community." 
These sentiments were not reflected in the Board's higher grades 
prescriptions in ensuing years, which discarded the insistence on 
a broad education at graduate level first adumbrated as early as 
1915 and tentatively activated as long ago as 1938. Just as, in the 
Professional Division, typical qualifications accepted for the higher 
grades were College of Advanced Education Certificate courses in 
Cartography (for cartographers) and Valuation of Real Estate (for 
valuers), so in the Administrative and Clerical Division clerks could 
qualify by passing courses of similar standard in Welfare Work, 
or Travel and Tourism. For the same purpose designated parts of 
a university degree course were accepted. In 1974 the internal 
examination paper in Departmental Procedure was dropped." 
Clearly, the idea of a broad formal education attested by exacting 
examinations as a prime preparation for higher general adminis-
trati.ve work was no longer taken seriously. In 1972 a committee 
appointed by the Board had recommended the abolition of grade 
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examinations as a barrier to progression within the Administrative 
and Clerical Division. The first outcome was the repeal of regulation 
119, but the question of regulation 122 was then caught up in the 
inquiry on promotions and seniority. In its submission to the Panel 
of Inquiry the Board argued that "actual performance on the job 
can be a better basis of assessment than general examination 
requirements"; that "replacement of existing Service-wide examina-
tion requirements will permit a more individual approach to staff 
training and staff development"; that the existing system of 
examination barriers to further progression tended to inhibit 
recruitment from outside the service; that no other Australian public 
service had a similar system and "grade examinations do not have 
a good image"; and that in some higher grade positions "experience, 
rather than academic attainments, is the essential". The Board 
recommended that section 48 of the Public Service Act be replaced 
by a provision enabling it to prescribe examination or other 
qualifications for "any specified position or class of position".*" 
The Panel, however, did not agree, but stuck to the traditional 
New South Wales dogma that "the passing of examinations and 
the possession of some basic academic attainment is a useful 
additional measure to have in assessing an officer's potential to 
advance into the higher grades". They proposed merely that the 
dividing line between lower and higher grades be no longer (as it 
had been since 1949) defined by reference to the current basic wage; 
that the Board need no longer keep a register of officers qualified 
for the higher grades; and that clear statutory authority should be 
given for the Board's already long-established practice of prescrib-
ing external examinations as qualifications. These proposals, and 
not the Board's, were embodied in the amending legislation of 
1974.*' 
Meanwhile the Public Service Board had been pursuing its 
alternative approaches to staff development, some of them begun 
much earlier than 1964. Some were merely extensions of the 
traditional incentives to acquire higher education. From the 1940s 
the Board granted part-time "study leave" (time off in working 
hours) for officers to attend tertiary courses. From 1955 on, in 
addition to the cadetships and traineeships already mentioned, the 
Board awarded competitive "scholarships for part-time studies" to 
selected officers—numbering about fifty a year for the first ten years 
and more than a hundred annually thereafter. In 1975 these were 
replaced by the non-competitive "study assistance grant scheme", 
under which the Board reimbursed compulsory fees to all permanent 
officers successfully completing a full stage of an approved course. 
In 1964 Public Service Board Fellowships were established, to 
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enable two officers a year to undertake formal or informal post-
graduate studies in Australia or abroad. From the founding of the 
Australian Administrative Staff College at Mt Eliza, Victoria, in 
1957, officers were sent to each of its sessions. 
The need for specially designed training, particularly in clerical 
and administrative work, and for officers to specialize in staff 
development, was not recognized until after the Second World War. 
A part-time counsellor, advising officers on appropriate courses, 
methods of study and career planning, was available in the Board's 
office from 1950. The position became full-time in 1973/74, when 
the counsellor conducted some six hundred interviews in the twelve 
months. Departments began to appoint Personnel Officers in the 
early 1950s and Training Officers in the 1960s. Both categories soon 
associated in regular meetings, later bringing in colleagues from 
statutory authorities to co-ordinate their work, exchange ideas, and 
widen their knowledge. While departments developed induction 
courses and training for their special needs, the Public Service 
Board concentrated on service-wide training courses. These have 
included: "orientation courses for junior recruits on broad problems 
of the structure and working of public administration; the training 
programme for graduate clerks; and courses in dictation techniques, 
effective reading, instruction methods, public relations, staff report-
ing; tutorials for some of the remaining in-service examinations".*^ 
The next approach was to organize concentrated residential 
conferences and courses for officers aspiring to or holding senior 
executive responsibilities. In the late 1950s courses in management 
and supervision for senior officers within departments were in-
augurated with the help of the School of Management in the 
Department of Technical Education, and developed into residential 
courses by the Board's own Staff Development Centre after 1974. 
More ambitiously, the first Administrative Staff Course, including 
officers from eight statutory corporations as well as from the public 
service, was held in 1958 at the University of New South Wales, 
where Board chairman Wallace Wurth was Chancellor, and the 
Board's Inspector for Personnel and Training, S.C. Derwent, 
became first Director of the Institute of Administration, founded 
1961, which organized many courses thereafter with public service 
participation. 
The following figures give some indication of the scope of these 
training activities. In 1974/75 over 100 public servants attended 
residential courses at the Institute of Administration, about 1,760 
attended management courses conducted by the Public Service 
Board, and four went to courses at the Australian Administrative 
Staff College. Some 560 officers attended a seminar series in Sydney 
324 
Central Administration 
and Newcastle conducted jointly by the Board and the Royal 
Institute of Public Administration. About 3,500 officers and employ-
ees received leave for part-time studies and 98 were on full-time 
study leave during the year. Two Public Service Board Fellowships 
were awarded for study tours of nearly three months each abroad. 
There were 338 trainee recruits almost all on full-time courses, and 
538 officers holding part-time scholarships. The public service was 
certainly not disdaining the "input" aspect of the administrative 
process.*' 
Two further steps were necessary to enable all this effort to 
contribute more effectively to the "output" of the service, and these 
were taken only at the end of the 1960s. One was to co-ordinate 
the different training provisions into a planned progression for 
individual officers; the other was to select in a systematic way the 
officers likely to put administrative training to the best use in more 
senior positions. Clearly the two steps were complementary. 
After a five-year experiment beginning in 1961, the Public 
Service Board gradually introduced from July 1967 a scheme of 
staff assessment, reporting, and guidance, although by agreement 
with the Public Service Association not using the staff report form 
(SR2) as a definitive criterion for promotion or as evidence in 
promotion appeals. The system was an "open" one, in that the 
officer saw and, if he wished, could comment on the report, and 
in every case was then accorded an "appraisal and guidance 
interview". The main objects were to help departments to allocate 
duties, set performance standards, stimulate job training, improve 
the quality of supervision, regularly assess an officer's efficiency and 
suitability for higher work, and advise him on career development. 
The Public Service Board cautiously extended the scheme upwards 
from the lowest grades of the Administrative and Clerical and 
Professional Divisions. 
In 1968 a study by the Administrative Research Unit pointed 
to the need for a centre designed to assess the potential of officers 
for higher administrative work, and the Unit conducted a trial 
assessment programme. At the end of 1970 the Board opened a 
Personnel Assessment Centre where volunteers were appraised, 
after three days of interviews, tests, and practical exercises, by an 
Executive Selection Panel and a proportion of them recommended 
for an executive development programme planned to suit individual 
requirements. In 1972/73 the Board's training organization was 
modified by the creation of a Staff Development Branch, and 
departmental training officers and committees were renamed to 
match. The new policy on in-service training was published as The 
Development of Human Resources in the New South Wales Public 
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Service (N.S.W. Government Printer, 1974). 
At this point the Board's tentative experiment with staff reporting 
received a fillip from the majority of the Panel of Inquiry into 
Promotion and Seniority. They reported that efficiency could "only 
be measured with any real precision and fairness by the regular, 
methodical and trained evaluation of an officer's work performance 
over a period of time by a number of superior officers or by in 
depth testing or both". They commended the staff reporting system 
as "the basis of a workable and accurate aid in the measurement 
of efficiency" which should be further improved and extended, and 
recommended that reports be systematically consulted in the 
promotion process and available for regular use in the new appeals 
machinery they were proposing.*" Encouraged by this, the Public 
Service Board approved the introduction throughout the service, still 
on an "open" basis, of formal staff reports on officers in grades 
5 to 10 of the Administrative and Clerical Division, beginning in 
1975. A revised appraisal form for grades below grade 5 was 
introduced in 1976. The central purpose of the scheme was to assist 
departments in identifying officers both for staff development and 
for filling senior promotion positions as vacancies occurred. 
As for the Personnel Assessment Centre, the Panel of Inquiry 
{Majority Report, p. 13) thought that its reports should not be 
available to selection committees or to recommending officers in 
departments, but should be used by the Public Service Board in 
making promotion decisions and considered as a matter of course 
by the promotions appeals tribunals they proposed. The Centre itself 
went into recess at the end of 1974 "to facilitate a complete review 
of its philosophy, procedures and place in the Service", and resumed 
work in May 1976 under revised guidelines as part of the Staff 
Development Division.** 
There remains to mention the arrangement begun in 1972 for 
senior public servants to change places for some months with 
executives from private industry, reporting after their return with 
suggestions derived from their experience. The scheme was soon 
extended on the public service side from the Board's office to 
departments, and on the other side from private companies to other 
state services and Commonwealth and state statutory authorities. 
Fixing wages and conditions 
Turning to public service wages and working conditions, the basis 
for any orderly arrangement is a classification, and the N.S.W. 
Public Service Act shows the usual Australian ambivalence between 
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"position classification" and "personal classification", with the 
latter in the ascendant. The act charges the Public Service Board 
at one point with classifying "the officers . . . in the . . . five 
Divisions" (s.26A), at another point with "the classification of the 
work" and "the grading of officers", at another with determining 
"the grades and salaries of officers" (s. 20). Essentially, 
classification comprises three steps; first, laying out a ladder of 
salary levels, or salary ranges with incremental steps within them 
(in New South Wales most ranges are called "grades"); second, 
assigning positions to the various grades; third, placing individual 
officers in appropriate positions and grades by recruitment, promo-
tion or "reclassification". Below the specifically graded classes of 
positions in New South Wales, in the two white-collar divisions, 
is a basic scale of salaries within which officers progress by 
automatic annual increments (presently for fourteen years in the 
Administrative and Clerical Division).*'' 
At the turn of the century the Board had complete and final 
control of these matters. From 1910 it shared the responsibility with 
"departmental boards" including the relevant departmental and 
branch head. An amendment in 1919 required the grades and 
salaries of officers to be reviewed at regular two-year intervals either 
by the Board or by "salaries committees" (including an employee 
representative after 1922) subject to final determination by the 
Board (s. 14A); in practice the work of salaries committees was 
superseded by the development of awards and agreements prescrib-
ing new classifications as described below. In 1919 the Board's 
powers were qualified by legislation giving the state industrial 
arbitration tribunal jurisdiction to make awards on wages, salaries, 
and overtime rates for all but the most senior public servants on 
the application of an employee organization or of the Board itself. 
An amendment of this legislation in 1968 extended the Industrial 
Commission's jurisdiction to cover various forms of leave and 
allowances in the public service. In 1922 the Public Service Act 
was amended to enable the Board to make agreements with 
employee organizations "as to salaries, fees, allowances and grades" 
(s. 14B), which would be binding on all employees in the relevant 
group (whether belonging to the association or not) and not subject 
to appeal. 
The Public Service Board retains exclusive control of other 
working conditions under the Public Service Act. But of course the 
wages and conditions of the numerous classes of tradesmen and 
unskilled workers in government employment outside the Public 
Service Act are mostly determined by state or federal arbitration 
awards which also cover non-government employees in the same 
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occupations. A 1958 amendment to the N.S.W. Industrial Arbi-
tration Act established the principle of equal pay with that of men 
for women employed on similar work, and the Board by gradual 
extensions brought the principle to full application throughout the 
public service by the end of 1974.*' 
The salaries of the great bulk of white-collar public servants— 
administrative, clerical, and professional—have long been fixed by 
the agreements between the Board and the various staff associations. 
The agreements have had a stated term of two or three years, and 
until the 1960s they usually ran their full term, to be replaced by 
revised agreements reached after detailed negotiations. Where 
agreement could not be reached, one or other of the parties sought 
and obtained an award from the Industrial Commission. Since the 
late 1950s this process has been increasingly complicated by the 
impact of monetary inflation, by greater militancy on the part of 
some employee organizations, and by the unprecedented impact of 
wage movements and determinations at the federal level and in 
other states upon collective bargaining and pay fixation in New 
South Wales. 
These changes began with the use of the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Commission's variations of Metal Trades and Pro-
fessional Engineers' awards as yardsticks for union claims in the 
state employment arena, and with the decisions of state arbitration 
authorities to accept these yardsticks in making awards for state 
public servants. The accelerating decline in the value of money 
wages spurred unions to apply more frequently for the review of 
agreements and awards before their expiry date, arguing that 
increases achieved elsewhere should "flow on" to their own groups 
in leap-frog fashion—often with understandably scant regard for 
the relevance of the comparisons. These pressures continued even 
after the state Industrial Commission and the Public Service Board 
took to automatically varying certain awards and agreements during 
their currency in the light of federal arbitration decisions in 
"margins" and "national wage" cases, and of Commonwealth public 
service salary increases for what had become key groups such as 
the professional engineers. 
The state Public Service Board fought a losing battle against 
these trends in its role as employing agency for the state and in 
the attempt to retain some control over relativities within its own 
jurisdiction. In its Annual Reports of recent years the Board has 
lamented that "the determination of salaries and wages is no longer 
under the control of individual wage fixing authorities", though it 
was heartened when the state Industrial Commission promptly 
adopted the principles of wage indexation introduced by the 
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Commonwealth Commission in April 1975. The Board announced 
that it would entertain no claims outside the "guidelines" of 
"changes in work value" and "catch up of community movements". 
Meantime the developments mentioned had greatly complicated 
the public service wage-fixing process. In the decade or so from 
the early 1960s the average annual number of formal negotiating 
conferences on wage matters between the Board's office and the 
unions roughly doubled (from about seventy). This was a result 
partly of the more frequent calls for review of existing rates, partly 
of hardening attitudes on both sides of the table. Some of the 
associations began for the first time to resort to industrial action 
in support of wage demands. Negotiations were more frequently 
protracted or deadlocked than in the past. Either party, and 
sometimes both, might then apply to the Industrial Commission for 
an award—and it became more common also for either side to refer 
"industrial disputes" to the Commission's machinery for a decision. 
(A section on industrial disputes first appeared in the Board's 
Annual Reports in 1966 and took up substantial space from 1969 
on.) 
The Board's power to "determine" salaries and wages under 
section 14A now came into active use for two quite different 
purposes: to grant, in effect, an interim increase to a group where 
negotiations were dragging on or broken off; and to apply flow-
on increases granted by other authorities where such precedents had 
been established. The fact that a dispute or an award application 
was before the Industrial Commission did not, however, preclude 
the continuance of direct negotiations between the Board's officers 
and a union: it became, in a sense, part of the bargaining process 
and in the end did not greatly reduce the predominance of section 
14B agreements among the methods of wage-fixing. In 1976 they 
still covered some 90 per cent of public service salaries. Table 21 
illustrates some of these trends. 
Table 21. Forms of Salary Fixation in the Public Service 
(Year ended 30 June) 
I960 1965 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Agreements signed (s. 14B) 59 92 
Determinations by Public 
Service Board (s, 14A) — 
Awards made by Industrial 
Commission — 4 
Source: N,S,W, Public Service Board Annual Reports. 
57 
16 
6 
77 
26 
49 
89 
5 
136 
133 
16 
86 
106 
13 
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Industrial relations and politics 
Industrial relations in the public service are in some ways simplified 
by the dominance of a very few large employee organizations among 
the white-collar staff. These are the Public Service Association of 
New South Wales, the New South Wales Teachers' Federation, 
and the New South Wales Public Service Professional Officers' 
Association. Together with some fifteen smaller unions with mem-
bers in state government employ (such as engineers, school inspec-
tors, nurses, and firemen) these bodies have been associated since 
1968 as the Combined Public Service Unions of N.S.W. This 
enables them at bi-monthly meetings (two delegates from each 
union) to exchange views and information and to make joint 
representations to government on matters of common interest such 
as pay and allowances, superannuation, promotions and appeals 
machinery, the standard of office accommodation, and leave entitle-
ments. During general election campaigns, too, the Combined 
Unions have been able to canvass and publicize through the news 
media the views of party leaders on issues of interest to the 150,000 
public employees in their combined membership. There is also an 
Australian Public Service Federation representing only the Public 
Service Association and its equivalents in other state public services. 
The Public Service Association (P.S.A.) was founded in 1899. 
Its membership rose from about eight thousand in 1950 to some 
thirty-seven thousand full members and six thousand associate 
members (drawn from retired public servants) in 1976. The 
members are organized in four divisions, composed respectively of 
those in the Professional, Administrative and Clerical, and General 
Divisions of the public service, and in the government agencies 
outside the public service. Membership is open to state employees 
of the Crown in New South Wales, including Special Division 
officers in the public service and members of statutory authorities 
—both the latter groups being classed in the Professional Division 
of the Association. Each division has its own council which can 
negotiate, seek an award, and otherwise act for its own members, 
subject in some matters to the Central Council of the Association; 
there is also a Women's Council with its own committee of 
management. The Association has a substantial central office with 
a paid staff of over fifty people, including a small research unit 
and a number of arbitration officers specializing in the work of the 
various divisions. The P.S.A.'s monthly journal is Red Tape, with 
a circulation of over forty thousand. 
The Professional Officers' Association (P.O.A.), founded in 1915, 
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is a much smaller body, with a stable membership of something 
over three thousand largely in government instrumentalities outside 
the ambit of the Public Service Act. The Association has a staff 
of less than half a dozen, and obviously caters for some of the same 
groups as does the P.S.A. Its monthly journal is On Service. 
Unions of New South Wales schoolteachers began with the 
Teachers' Institute in 1895. In 1919 two groups of these bodies 
formed the Teachers' Federation, which now includes a complex 
variety of organizations with a total of over thirty-five thousand 
members and publishes its journal, Education, twice monthly. All 
affiliated associations are represented on the Federation's Council, 
which negotiates separate salary agreements for some of them, such 
as the Technical Teachers' Association, the Teachers' College 
Lecturers' Association, and the Research and Guidance Officers' 
Association. 
These three main associations have established links with wider 
non-public service industrial organizations—in most cases during 
the 1970s. All are now affiliated with the Labor Council of New 
South Wales—the peak organization of trade unions in the state. 
The P.S.A. and the Teachers' Federation are affiliated with the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (A.C.T.U.). The P.O.A.'s first 
full-time general secretary, appointed in the late 1950s, helped to 
found and administer the Australian Council of Salaried and 
Professional Associations (A.C.S.P.A.) and persuaded the P.O.A. 
to affiliate with it in 1970. The Teachers' Federation is also a 
member of A.C.S.P.A. These affiliations enable the state public 
service unions to be represented at National Wage Case and other 
important arbitration hearings and give them more political 
influence than they could otherwise wield. 
The main associations share the Public Service Board's view that 
industrial relations in the public service have sharpened over the 
past decade, reflecting inflationary pressures and other changes in 
economic conditions, more militant attitudes within the unions, and 
the Board's resistance in the interests of the public purse. The 
aptness of this latter phrase depends partly, of course, upon the 
point of view. The Board of today has inherited procedures intended 
to emphasize its dual role as employer and wage-determining 
tribunal. Wage "negotiations" are opened at formal sessions in 
which union representatives "appear", standing, "before the 
Board", to state their case or hear the Board's proposals. At these 
hearings the Board does not discuss or bargain; it rarely reveals 
the criteria behind its own proposals, acknowledges precedents, or 
debates the union's reasoning. Rarely, also, does the Board modify 
its formal offer more than once, after which, if agreement has not 
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been reached, it allows informal negotiation to proceed between its 
own senior inspectors and the union officials. This account is drawn 
from a study which characterizes the Board's "general attitude 
towards public servants and their representatives" as "in the main, 
. . . reminiscent of the system of management prevalent in 
nineteenth-century England".** 
According to the same author, union officials believe that the 
Board's freedom of manoeuvre is limited by available funds as 
determined by the Treasury, but the Board claims to consider only 
work-value, comparative wage justice, and occasionally the supply 
of particular classes of staff, and says it is "the responsibility of 
the Treasury and the Government to provide the necessary funds 
[for wage increases] and the Board's only obligation in this regard 
is to give the Treasury adequate notification and warning of its 
increased commitments"."' Whichever is true, pressures of recent 
years have inevitably imposed on the Board the more defensive 
posture of a body under siege. In these circumstances, a claim which 
no doubt expressed a genuine long-term policy had a somewhat 
lugubrious ring in 1974: 
The Board has maintained a level of salaries for its officers consistent 
with its principle that the N.S.W. Public Service salaries should not 
be the pacesetters but be comparable wth those being paid in the non-
Government sector and other Government sectors as appropriate.'"' 
But the Board clearly welcomes being able to report that "having 
regard to the industrial climate, the extent of disputation within 
the Public Service has been limited",'" and as it said to its most 
"difficult" union adversary, it "regards reference to the Industrial 
Commission as a matter of last resort and accepts the obligation 
to endeavour to settle all matters by direct negotiation . . . ".'' 
This was an allusion to the Teachers' Federation, which has set 
the pace among the white-collar unions in militancy and the 
strategy of confrontation—perhaps inevitably in an occupation 
which, despite massive expansions in government budget allocations 
over two decades, has felt the heaviest of the pressures arising from 
post-war population growth and social expectations. Grievances of 
the organized schoolteachers have covered not only salary claims 
but relief duties for absent colleagues, class sizes, "non-professional 
duties", transfers of teachers, and preference to union members. 
At the end of 1976 strikes remained illegal in the New South 
Wales public service (Industrial Arbitration Act, s.99) and were 
forbidden by the Teachers' Federation's own constitution. But from 
1968 on "industrial action" became relatively common—though 
generally by "direction" of the Federation's Council and therefore 
with varying degrees of solidarity on the members' part. When the 
332 
Central Administration 
Council ignored an order of the Industrial Commission in com-
pulsory conference and persuaded a large number of members not 
to report for work on 1 October 1968, the Commission fined the 
Federation four hundred dollars for engaging in an illegal strike. 
In July 1969 after the Commission had threatened to deregister 
the Federation if it went ahead with a one-day stoppage proposed 
by the Council, the teachers in mass meetings vetoed the strike 
proposal. In 1970 some teachers stopped marking examination 
papers to further a pay claim then before the Commission, but 
resumed next day when the Commission refused to continue 
hearings while the stoppage continued. The Public Service Board 
applied to the Commission for deregistration of the Federation over 
another dispute in 1972, but relented after the Federation gave 
"satisfactory assurances as to its future conduct". Nevertheless the 
Council called another strike in support of pay claims in September 
1974, forcing the Board to apply for an award from the Commission 
which among other things, as it turned out, granted "absolute 
preference" to Federation members at the point of employment. 
On the Board's recommendation the government legislated to 
obviate the disruption this rule caused to aspects of educational 
administration, whereupon the Federation called another strike on 
25 March 1975 and threatened to continue stoppages if the 
legislation was not repealed. This recital is given to illustrate the 
changed atmosphere since 1965, without attempting to judge the 
merits of the issues. 
The other main associations have been much more reluctant to 
emulate "industrial unionism". The Professional Officers' Associa-
tion remains the most orthodox. Its relations with the Public Service 
Board have remained almost always smooth and co-operative. The 
P.O.A. has rarely sought awards from the Industrial Commission 
in preference to agreements with the Board—though an award it 
obtained in June 1975 for Scientific Officers in the Health 
Commission had important implications for all other scientific staff 
and related classifications. The first industrial action by P.O.A. 
members occurred in 1974: survey draftsmen in the Registrar-
General's Office threatened a stop-work meeting after waiting six 
months for the Board to deal with a claim—and secured a 
favourable hearing, thus probably encouraging others to follow suit. 
The Public Service Association has occupied an intermediate 
position in the mildly leftward tendency of the associations. Its 
relations with government employing authorities have not been 
uniformly smooth, nor yet tense and hostile. Its executive officials 
continue their informal monthly meetings with the chairman and 
deputy chairman of the Public Service Board—not to conduct 
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specific negotiations but to maintain liaison with the body they 
regard as setting the general standard for salaries and working 
conditions throughout state government employment. The Associa-
tion does not want direct representation on the Board, regarding 
such arrangements, on others' experience, as self-defeating. The 
P.S.A. has also been opposed to the Teachers' Federation demand 
for a separate Education Commission to control their employment 
(see below) as this could split P.S.A. members in the education 
services under two separate employing authorities. Traditionally the 
P.S.A. officials have not been willing to recommend or "order" 
strikes or other direct action, but have supported the rank and file 
when they took such initiatives. 
On the other hand, the Association claims credit for the Labor 
government's creating in 1944 the Crown Employees Appeal Board 
—long a principal P.S.A. objective—and regularly seeks to 
influence governments and parliamentarians on employment issues 
and legislation, as when after organizing mass meetings of members 
it secured the withdrawal and amendment of the original 1974 bill 
to alter the promotions appeal system (though with equivocal results 
as suggested above). Over the past decade the Association (like 
other unions and the Board itself) has been much readier than 
before to break off negotiation and declare a "dispute" before the 
Industrial Commission. The hearing is by a single judge who can 
give a ruling within existing awards and agreements or recommend 
a change in conditions to the Public Service Board. Since 1968 
various groups, notably prison officers but also including some 
professional officers, have taken to holding stop-work meetings or 
going on strike, sometimes in spite of bans by arbitration judges. 
In 1971 the P.S.A. members deleted from their constitution the 
rule (still formally intact in the other two associations) forbidding 
participation in "any strike [or] anything in the nature of a strike 
within the meaning of the Industrial Arbitration Act . . . ". At 
about the same time a dispute over pay for plant diseases inspectors 
provided the first occasion on which the Public Service Board 
applied to the Commission for a strike penalty against the Public 
Service Association. 
As already indicated, the associations do not hesitate to make 
representations to ministers and other politicians on behalf of their 
members. The Teachers' Federation has on occasion sought govern-
ment intervention in disputes over conditions; the government has 
made the only legal response open to it, namely using the right 
of the Minister for Labour and Industry, if he thinks it is in the 
public interest, to refer a salaries dispute to the Industrial Com-
mission "in Court session". 
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None of the associations is affiliated with any political party— 
their constitutions prohibit this and only in the Teachers' Federation 
has there been any serious pressure to change the rule. It follows 
that the associations do not advise their members how to vote at 
parliamentary or local government elections, although during the 
1965 general election campaign there was a crisis in the P.S.A. 
when the executive by a small majority dissociated itself publicly 
and by letter to the Premier from a declaration by its Adminis-
trative and Clerical Division (representing one-third of P.S.A. 
membership) that the government would forfeit the confidence of 
the division if it did not immediately intervene in the division's 
current salaries deadlock with the Public Service Board." 
The prevalent opinion in the P.S.A. and P.O.A., at least, appears 
to be that quite apart from the principle of party neutrality in the 
public service, it is in the interest of government employees not 
to antagonize any one of the political parties in a lasting way. But 
of course this does not mean that the associations are politically 
inactive at election times. Through their own journals and through 
public meetings, newspaper display advertisements, and other media 
they try to give maximum publicity to association views and to 
replies elicited from the political leaders on government employment 
issues of the day. Much of this activity is concerted in the name 
of the Combined Public Service Unions of N.S.W., which has also 
organized meetings and publicity during federal election campaigns 
on matters such as income tax levels. 
The political rights of individual public servants follow an 
orthodox Australian pattern. They may not "publicly comment 
upon the administration of any Department of the State" (regu-
lation 17[a] ), and they are aware that the Whitlam government's 
repeal of the corresponding Commonwealth Service regulation has 
made little practical difference in the light of accompanying 
warnings against "misconduct" issued by the Commonwealth Public 
Service Board. Under the state Constitution (Public Service) 
Amendment Act, 1916, all New South Wales government employ-
ees have had since that year the right to special leave (without 
pay) to contest Legislative Assembly elections without being 
required to resign unless elected. (As shown in chapter 2, no one 
holding an "ollice of profit under the Crown", except ministers of 
the Crown and servicemen, may sit in parliament.) Under the 
Commonwealth Constitution (s. 44) a government employee must 
resign to contest a federal election for either house, but thanks to 
the (N.S.W.) Public Service (Commonwealth Elections) Act of 
1943, if a slate public servant does so for that purpose within three 
months of the election, and fails to be elected, he is entitled to 
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reinstatement in his previous position without loss of superannuation 
or other rights. 
These privileges have resulted in all parties in parliament 
containing a number of former public servants, but have not 
produced any appreciable strain upon the conventional neutrality 
and loyalty to incumbent governments of the public service as a 
whole. When R.W. Askin, as state Premier and Treasurer, opened 
the Australasian Public Service Commissioners' Conference in 1969 
he referred to the challenge faced by the public service when his 
government took office after being in opposition for twenty-four 
years, and added: 
Those at the helm, the top strata of public servants, the heads of 
departments, the deputies, with perhaps an odd exception, had all 
received their appointments during the regime of our predecessors . . . 
None of my Ministers had had ministerial experience at all . . . Yet 
the change raised hardly a ripple. I believe this is the best tribute I 
can pay to our system of Public Service in New South Wales. . . . It 
was not a matter of months; it was only a matter of weeks and even 
days before the change-over was working smoothly and a completely 
new policy was implemented. . . . We have had nothing but the same 
type of loyalty and efficiency and dedication that our predecessors had. 
Public service and other state employment 
At this point the reader is again reminded that the foregoing 
account of staffing is mainly confined to public agencies and 
employees under the Public Service Act, and deals only incidentally 
with the major part of state employment which is governed by other 
statutes. This is partly because most of the available research 
evidence concerns the public service proper, and partly because 
separate descriptions of the many other personnel systems (and 
especially of state industrial employment) would not be manageable 
within the scope of this volume. But some further points can now 
be made. 
The first is that in 1895 the Public Service Act regulated 
practically the whole of state employment except in the government 
railways. Only in 1900, with the establishment of the Sydney 
Harbour Trust (now the Maritime Services Board), began that 
accelerating process of creating new public corporations exempt 
from the act which has now for some decades left nearly two-thirds 
of state employees—and nearly three-quarters since 1970—outside 
its ambit. The accompanying tables give a general idea of the 
expansion of the public service proper in size and complexity, of 
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Table 22. Growth of Employment under the Public Service Act 
(Permanent and Temporary, as at 30 June) 
Agency or Field 
Chief Secretary 
Treasury 
Atl,-Gen. and Justice 
Lands 
Public Works 
Education 
Mines (and) 
Agriculture 
Premier's 
Labour and Industry 
Ministry of Transport 
(Public) Health 
Social Services 
Local Government 
Ministry of Housing 
Conservation 
Tourism 
Child Welfare and 
Social Welfare 
Tech. and Further Edu-
cation 
Registry Co-op, Soc'ies 
Decentralization and 
Development 
Environment 
Sport and Recreation 
Youth and Community 
Services' 
Services 
Soil Conservation S'vice 
Statutory Bodies 
Public Service Board 
Forestry Commission 
Gov't Insurance Office 
Hospitals Commission 
Housing Commission 
Health Commission 
Planning and Environ-
ment Commission 
1 
1 
1909 
1910 
1932 
1938 
1939 
1941 
1941 
1944 
1946 
1946 
1949 
1953 
1965 
1971 
1971 
1973 
1975 
1976 
1895 
1916 
1926 
1929 
1942 
1973 
1974 
Totals 
1904 
2,047 
1,459 
1,375 
813 
960 
6,132 
489{ 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
28 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
13,303 
1939 
405 
2,497 
1,762 
717 
1,351 
12,626 
176 
756 
222 
585 
21 
3,205 
339 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
34 
218 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
24,914 
1970 
375 
10,743 
4,510 
1,596 
4,519 
36,905 
622 
2,865 
1,275 
843 
67 
9,766 
— 
828 
16 
1,413 
120 
1,710 
3,945 
68 
70 
— 
— 
— 
— 
209 
— 
986 
139 
1,279 
— 
— 
84,869 
1974 
544 
11,986 
5,370 
1,758 
4,874 
7,576 
691 
3,297 
2,052 
997 
63 
— 
— 
992 
13 
1,424 
149 
— 
4,380 
71 
118 
142 
1,055 
2,324 
— 
295 
— 
1,199 
— 
1,459 
10,997 
— 
63,826 
1975 
— 
1,418 
2,691 
4,539 
5,030 
11,602 
627 
3,970 
560 
1,116 
84 
— 
— 
182 
301 
— 
165 
— 
4,866 
74 
162 
— 
1,374 
2,535 
15,086 
383 
— 
1,340 
— 
1,611 
12,061 
686 
72,463 
1976 
— 
1,492 
2,736 
3,620 
4,723 
11,022 
614 
3,246 
3,365 
1,151 
78 
— 
— 
181 
328 
— 
170 
— 
5,383 
78 
180 
— 
203 
2,658 
14,144 
550 
404 
855 
1,386 
— 
1,525 
13,027 
733 
73,852 
Source: Public Service Board Animal Reports, appendix B. 
I, Included Stale Emergency Services in figures. 
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the relative magnitude of state employment outside the Public 
Service Act in recent years, and some comparisons with the 
Commonwealth. 
Table 22, based on a regular appendix in the Public Service 
Board's Annual Reports, gives only an approximate indication of 
the distribution of public service staff among government agencies: 
although the left-hand column began in earlier years as a list of 
departments and statutory authorities, the list was not always 
altered when structural changes occurred, so that its headings in 
time ceased to correspond with the actual range of units in 
existence. As one example, the four statutory authorities shown 
separately in the Board's figures for 1970 can be compared with 
the list of thirty-five statutory boards and commissions with staff 
under the Public Service Act in that year noted by Spann;'" the 
staffs of thirty-one of these are evidently included somewhere under 
the earlier headings in the appendixes on which table 22 is based. 
Other cautions apply when reading the table. The appearance or 
disappearance of a unit does not necessarily signify the beginning 
or ending of a function. For example there was a Public Health 
section in the Chief Secretary's Department in 1904 though the 
separate Department of Public Health was not created until 1938; 
when that department and the Hospitals Commission were 
abolished in 1973 the Health Commission took over their functions. 
Again, the Forestry Commission became part of the Department 
of Conservation in 1970 but was not abolished, and was separated 
again in 1976, while Government Insurance Office employees were 
included in the Treasury figures from the establishment of the office 
in 1926 to 1965. There is a continuous line of succession from the 
Social Services and Child Welfare Departments to that of Youth 
and Community Services. Similarly, sharp changes in some figures 
between 1974 and 1975 reflect the shuffling of functions between 
old and new units that resulted from the 1974 Machinery of 
Government Review. In 1976 Cultural Activities was transferred 
from Culture, Sport and Recreation to the Premier's Department. 
The most notable New South Wales change shown in the tables 
was the removal of about 32,500 staff in schools and teachers' 
colleges in 1971 from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Act 
to that of the Teaching Service Act 1970. This followed twenty 
years of pressure by the Teachers' Federation on successive 
governments to transfer control of the teaching service from the 
Public Service Board which the Federation painted as inexpert and 
restrictive, to an Education Commission for which the Federation 
would have a hand in selecting the majority of members, and which 
would also determine educational policy. On the advice of the Public 
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Service Board the Labor governments of the 1950s and 1960s 
steadily resisted the proposal. Their opponents seemed to espouse 
it in successive election campaigns, but after reaching office in 1965 
they temporized for two years, then appointed a Panel of Inquiry 
under Sir Norman Rydge, which reported in January 1969. 
Following the Panel's advice rather than the Federation's, the Askin 
government legislated to establish an Advisory Commission to the 
Minister on primary and secondary education policy (not including 
direct representatives of the Federation), and to give the Director-
General of Education full authority over appointments, grading, 
establishments, and discipline in the teaching service of the Educa-
tion Department, while leaving intact the Public Service Board's 
control of teachers' pay and working conditions—as could be 
inferred from the preceding pages. In the 1976 election campaign 
the A.L.P. proposed to establish an Education Commission to 
replace the Education Department and to give representatives not 
only of teachers but of parents and "all other sections of the 
education system a say in policy-making".'" 
To bring out some other highlights of the tables, we can note 
first that the pre-war proportion of New South Wales government 
employment under the Public Service Act was less than a quarter, 
and was little higher a decade after the war, but had risen by the 
Table 23. Government Civilian Employment, New South Wales and Commonwealth 
(In thousands) 
At 30 
June 
1939 
1955 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Local 
Govt. 
24.2 
28.8 
48.1 
47,1 
49,7 
49,1 
49.8 
50,9 
56,0 
57,4 
54,1 
64.3 
54.0 
New 
Under 
P S . 
Act 
24.9 
41,6 
71.7 
74.8 
78,1 
80,9 
84.9 
56.7 
58,5 
59,3 
63,8 
72,5 
73.9 
South Wales 
Other 
82,0 
117,0 
130.9 
132.6 
135.5 
139,4 
140.7 
177,8 
174,2 
175.6 
173,9 
181,3 
181.1 
Total 
106.9 
1 58.6 
202,6 
207.4 
213.6 
220,3 
225,6 
234.5 
232,7 
234,9 
237.7 
253,8 
255.0 
% 
under 
P.S, 
Act 
23.3 
26.2 
35,4 
36,1 
36,1 
36.7 
37.6 
24.2 
25.1 
25.2 
26.8 
28.6 
29,0 
Under 
P.S, 
Act 
47,1 
151.9 
192,2 
202,8 
211.7 
218.8 
229,4 
237.2 
244.4 
254.4 
266,7 
277.5 
160.3 
Commonwealth 
Other 
20.8 
53.2 
86.5 
89.5 
90.8 
96,2 
99.8 
102.0 
101.2 
104.0 
109.7 
118.8 
235.3 
Total 
67.9 
205.1 
278.7 
292.3 
302.5 
315.0 
329.2 
339.2 
345.6 
358.4 
376.4 
396.3 
395.6 
% 
under 
P.S. 
Act 
69.3 
74.1 
69.0 
69.4 
70.0 
69.5 
69.7 
69.9 
70.7 
71.0 
70.1 
70.0 
40.5 
Sources: N.S.W, Public Service Board Annual Reports; Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Monthly Bulletins on Employment and Unemployment, Canberra, table: 
Wage and Salary Earners in Civilian Employment; N,S.W. Official Year Books. 
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late 1960s to nearly 38 per cent. Appendix I to Spann" shows that 
this was much the highest proportion in any Australian state, the 
figure being under 20 per cent in other states except Queensland. 
The exclusion of the teaching service (already long outside the 
public service acts in other states) brought the New South Wales 
ratio after 1970 well below the Queensland figure of over 32 per 
cent, but it immediately began climbing back towards 30 per cent. 
By contrast the ratio of Commonwealth employees under the federal 
Public Service Act remained high and remarkably stable around 
70 per cent from before the war up to 1975, but was then 
substantially reduced by the removal of the Post Office, which had 
always accounted for at least three-quarters of federal public service 
staff up to 1939, and still comprised nearly half of it in 1975. 
From 1939 to 1970 at least, both state and Commonwealth 
employment were taking a steadily increasing proportion of the 
respective populations and workforces. In the nation as a whole the 
ratio moved from 13.5 per cent to 20 per cent of the workforce 
in that time, and total New South Wales state government 
employment increased by 111 per cent (compared to a total 
Commonwealth employment increase of 385 per cent) while the 
population of New South Wales rose by 65 per cent. Within these 
totals there were some other interesting disparities. Over the whole 
period both state and federal administrative and social service 
staffing (i.e., employment under the Public Service Acts) was 
multiplied much faster than other government employees—respec-
tively over three times in New South Wales and nearly five times 
in Commonwealth employ. It is also noticeable that while federal 
employment increased much more than state employment in this 
period, the greater part of the Commonwealth increase occurred 
between 1939 and 1955, whereas in the 1950s and 1960s the New 
South Wales public service grew much more rapidly than that of 
the Commonwealth, and the rates of increase in other government 
employment at both levels kept pretty closely in step. 
In an earlier section mention was given to some of the reasons 
why the staff of so many state authorities have been excluded from 
Public Service Act and Public Service Board control. However 
compelling these reasons may be, the exclusions clearly conflict with 
the basic rationale of the Public Service Act, which may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. An independent central public service authority is needed to 
establish consistency, economy, and fairness in salaries and 
conditions of work throughout all agencies of government—that 
is, to prevent conditions from varying with the arbitrary whims 
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of particular ministers or executives or the industrial strength 
of particular employee groups, and to avoid the unnecessary cost 
to the taxpayer of inter-agency competition for staff. 
2. An authority outside party politics is needed to maintain a non-
party bureaucracy by controlling recruitment, advancement, and 
discipline in all government employment. 
3. An expert extra-departmental authority is needed to stimulate 
greater efficiency, adapt the total organizational structure to 
changing needs, ensure co-ordination, and prevent duplication 
of effort. 
In New South Wales the effects of departing from these 
principles by excluding two-thirds or more of state employees from 
the direct jurisdiction of the central public service legislation have 
been mitigated in two broad ways. First, the attitudes and standards 
embodied in that legislation for three-quarters of a century have 
become generally accepted in the staffing of other government 
agencies, if only because the emergence of the modern party system 
furnished politicians with better alternatives to patronage for 
mobilizing political support, and because members of statutory 
boards (even if owing their own positions to political patronage) 
were under direct public—and trade union—scrutiny and had an 
interest in scrupulous methods of staffing and management. (That 
they did not always achieve either is a matter that will be taken 
up briefly at the end.) Second, the N.S.W. Public Service Board 
has an influence in these matters extending, indirectly, well beyond 
the scope of the Public Service Act. The latest examples of this, 
arising from the Board's crucial part in the machinery of govern-
ment review, were noted at the end of the section on administrative 
structure. This section will be concluded with some others. 
The underlying fact is the long-standing readiness of state 
governments to rely on the Board as a general adviser, co-ordinator, 
and service agency in matters affecting state administration and 
employment as a whole. For example, since 1950, under direction 
from successive Premiers, the heads of major public authorities have 
conferred regularly (sometimes with local government attendance 
as well), with the chairman of the Public Service Board presiding, 
to secure as much uniformity as possible in matters such as salaries 
and working conditions and the purchase of plant and materials. 
Collaboration over tendering and costs of supplies has declined in 
recent years, but officers of the Board and the authorities now confer 
at least once a month on movements in salaries and conditions, 
supplementing the formal conference of agency heads which is now 
annual. New South Wales Premiers, in fact, expect state instrumen-
talities not to change their more important pay levels or structures 
without reference to the Public Service Board, and they have rarely 
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done so except when forced by a decision of the arbitration courts. 
The Board also advises other authorities on industrial matters, 
sometimes reviews by request the wages and conditions of their 
employees, and even conducts arbitration cases or negotiates with 
unions on an authority's behalf.'* Further, by direction of the 
government the Board is directly responsible for fixing the salaries 
and wages of some sixty thousand people employed in hospitals and 
the police force and, of course, under the Teaching Service Act 
1970 is "deemed to be the employer", for salary fixing, determining 
employment conditions, and establishment control, of nearly forty 
thousand schoolteachers and staff in colleges of advanced education 
—though none of these groups is employed under the Public Service 
Act." 
The influential role of the Board can also be seen in other fields. 
It periodically lends its officers to statutory authorities for inspec-
torial duties or investigations and advice on particular problems of 
staffing, organization and methods, and technical aids to man-
agement. For example, in 1968 at the government's request the 
Board set up a committee representing state employing authorities 
and chaired by a Board member, to examine their attitudes to job 
applicants with a court record and arrive at a uniform policy; 
cabinet adopted its recommendations for the whole of the govern-
ment services.'™ A number of statutory bodies have adopted some 
of the Board's examination prerequisites for staff progression within 
their own organizations, and have sent their officers in hundreds 
to the Board's training courses."" In 1975 the monthly meetings 
of the New South Wales Government Services Personnel Man-
agement Group, for exchange of views among personnel officers 
from departments and statutory authorities, entered their twenty-
fifth year. The Board also fosters the N.S.W. Staff Development 
and Training Officers' Group, numbering in 1975 some ninety 
members from the public service and statutory bodies.'"^ 
It is particularly ironical, considering the aims of the Teachers' 
Federation campaign which led to the changes, that the Teaching 
Service Act 1970 has possibly set precedents which may enhance 
even further the scope of the Public Service Board's authority. So 
at least a member of the Board argued, pointing out that this act 
for the first time gave the Board direct responsibility for the salaries 
and conditions of employment of large groups of people not 
employed under the Public Service Act, and also for the first time 
provided that the Board be deemed the employer of such staff for 
the purpose of proceedings before industrial tribunals. Shortly 
afterwards the new principle was indeed extended to the health and 
police services, as noted. The Teaching Service Act also modified 
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previous principles by making the Director-General of Education 
solely responsible to the minister for the economy and efficiency 
of a large sector of his department—but left him responsible both 
to the minister and the Public Service Board for its central 
administration."" More recently, members of the Board have 
contemplated the possibility of being asked to take further responsi-
bilities on behalf of authorities outside the Public Service Act, such 
as training all their generalist staffs, finding positions for their 
redundant staff, managing their office accommodation, and de-
termining salaries for further categories of non-public service staff. 
CO-ORDINATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE 
Co-ordination is needed where different parts of the administration 
are engaged in activities which are related to one another, either 
by their nature (as laying water and gas mains in the same street 
or running bus and train services between the same suburbs or 
discouraging smoking and subsidizing tobacco-culture) or by their 
claims on a common stock of resources (as when two departments 
are recruiting from the same class of engineers). As the different 
examples suggest, these circumstances call for steps to avoid inter-
agency or public frustration, wasteful duplication of effort, mutually 
contradictory policies, and costly competition for resources. Not all 
government activities are related to others in any of these ways, 
so it is not necessary to try to "co-ordinate" everything done under 
a given government. Even competition for financial resources is not 
pervasive, since some quite important activities may be self-
financing. 
Modes of co-ordination 
Better co-ordination can be sought in various ways. One is to change 
the administrative structure, so as to bring under unified control 
more of the activities that have become more closely related (usually 
as a result of technological or social change). We have noted 
examples of this in New South Wales in the late 1960s and 1970s 
in the fields of public transport, physical planning and environmen-
tal control—and on a wider scale as a result of the Machinery of 
Government Review. In the absence of structural links, separate 
agencies may voluntarily consult or help one another over related 
operations, to avoid conflict or waste. The New South Wales 
departments of Education and Technical Education have had to 
co-operate to avoid duplication of teaching activities, maintain 
equivalent standards at comparable levels of their respective schools. 
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and share the use of sites, buildings, and equipment. The Public 
Works Department renders engineering, architectural, and survey 
services to most other departments and to some of the statutory 
corporations. Mines Department officers have inspected factories in 
the vicinity of mines, obviating the need for Labour and Industry 
factory inspectors in those areas. Such arrangements are legion. 
Co-operative co-ordination can be facilitated by various organiza-
tional devices. One of the oldest and most familiar is the inter-
departmental committee, ad hoc or standing, with or without non-
government representatives. Excitable journalists and others in 
Canberra have recently discovered I DCs (as they knowingly call 
them) in the federal public service, and invested them with a 
mysterious and sinister potency. Joint committees, like any others, 
can be misused or ineffectual, but like others they are inevitable 
and indispensable. As it reported in 1961, the N.S.W. Public Service 
Board 
places considerable reliance on the Committee technique as an aid in 
solving various administrative problems arising from time to time, and 
in undertaking special investigatory and advisory work. Apart from the 
substantial benefits flowing from an interchange of expert opinion, this 
technique encourages a spirit of teamwork within the Service. The Board 
has fostered many departmental, inter-departmental and inter-service 
committees to advise on policy matters and to assist in co-ordinating 
activities. These are too numerous to mention here. . . .'"" 
Spann'"* lists, as examples in 1969/70, New South Wales commit-
tees on apprenticeship, building, community services in new housing 
areas, new developments in energy, level crossings, the metric 
system, noise, occupational safety and health, river pollution, and 
regional organization. 
A rarely noticed means of policy co-ordination is the interlocking 
membership of administrative and statutory boards. Some of these, 
such as the former Sydney Harbour Transport Board and the State 
Mines Control Authority, have been entirely composed of senior 
officials of departments and agencies in allied fields. This is also 
a common method of composing major co-ordinating authorities 
such as the Public Transport Commission, the Planning and 
Environment Commission, and the State Pollution Control Com-
mission (though in the first case the different agencies represented 
were merged in a nominally unified organization). Such boards may 
also extend co-ordination by including representatives of local 
authorities, consumers, employees, or interested private organiza-
tions. 
Some key officials and departments strengthen co-ordination 
through membership of a number of boards. The Director of Public 
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Works has been a member of both the Maritime Services Board 
and the Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority. The most notable 
example is of course the Treasury, whose officers have part-time 
positions on the Development Corporation of New South Wales, 
the Hunter District Water Board, the Sydney Farm Produce 
Market Authority, the Grain Elevators Board, the Teacher Housing 
Authority and the Public Service Housing Authority, and a few 
others. But, ostensibly at least, these members are more often 
appointed for the financial expertise they bring to the board than 
to represent the Treasury as such. In addition, there is probably 
some co-ordinative by-product from the practice of appointing 
former senior departmental officers to full-time memberships of 
statutory authorities—as in the cases of former under-secretaries 
of the Treasury who became presidents of the Metropolitan Water 
Board and the Electricity Commission of New South Wales."" 
There may also be agreed or imposed rules and procedures 
intended to produce co-ordination automatically, such as the 
direction to statutory employing bodies to consult the Public Service 
Board before altering certain wages and conditions. In the last 
resort, a superior authority may intervene ad hoc or by arrangement 
to ensure consistency. We have given examples of the importance 
of the Public Service Board in this role, and as Sol Encel long ago 
discovered: "Because of its staff of inspectors and its powers to make 
searching investigations into the work of departments, the Board 
has an unrivalled insight into the workings of the entire machine, 
and is in a position to give the Government a great deal of advice 
on general policy.""" There are other co-ordinating authorities in 
special fields. For example, the Higher Education Act, 1969, gave 
statutory support to the N.S.W. Advanced Education Board and 
the N.S.W. Universities Board, set up to make reports and 
recommendations to the minister on the development of the 
respective kinds of higher education institutions—and the Higher 
Education Authority, established to co-ordinate the work of both 
kinds. The members of these boards are almost all senior officials 
and businessmen. 
Alongside the Public Service Board the most important co-
ordinating organization is the Treasury, through its control of 
finance for government departments and its advisory role in respect 
of those aspects of government policy that involve finance. Between 
the two there is a close association and an accepted division of 
labour. The Treasury was first developed into something more than 
an accounting office by Premier Stevens, who had himself been 
Under-Secretary of the Treasury until J.T. Lang, when Premier 
in 1925, in effect drove him out and into politics (to Lang's later 
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discomfiture).'"* Stevens innovated by appointing economists of 
distinction—such as E.R. Walker, Richard Randall, H.D. Black, 
R.C. Mills, D.B. Copland, and S.J. Butlin—as full-time or part 
time Treasury advisers upon economic trends and the preparation 
of budgets, and to help in preparing material for Commonwealth-
state financial meetings including those of the Loan Council. In 
1938 Stevens developed these arrangements into the Budget Bureau 
(later called the Budget Branch) of Treasury—complementing the 
Accounts Branch—with a staff of academically qualified inspectors, 
largely free of routine duties, to review all departmental estimates 
and expenditure, and advise on financial policy. 
In time these inspectors came to co-operate on a regular basis 
with those from the Public Service Board in checking the prepara-
tion of departmental estimates, and new appointees to the Budget 
Branch were seconded to the Board's office for a year as part of 
their training."" After the Second World War, "still less emphasis 
was placed on the book-keeping side of [Treasury's] activities— 
much of this work was passed over to the departments—and its 
role as a source of financial and economic advice to the Government 
was amplified.""" Today, as K.W. Knight observes, "officers of the 
Budget Branch in the normal course of their work examine 
departmental reports. Budget papers and financial statements of 
other Governments as well as their own; . . . they are able to build 
up an extensive knowledge of governmental administration and 
develop a much greater awareness of current developments than 
is usual among public servants".'" Knight has also suggested that 
budget officials in New South Wales constitute "a cadre group likely 
to move to high administrative appointments either in the Treasury 
itself or elsewhere in the service", partly because they possess a 
"level of qualification . . . not to be found in any other adminis-
trative group of the service with the possible exception of the other 
main cadre, the Public Service Board's inspectorate"."^ 
The Premier's Department has remained essentially an effective 
secretariat to the Cabinet and the Premier—who are of course the 
final co-ordinating authorities, at least in theory. This is not to 
overlook that Premiers have found experienced confidential advisers 
at the head of that department; the fact that nearly all New South 
Wales Premiers for half a century have also taken the Treasury 
portfolio helps to explain why the Premier's Department has not 
been developed as a substantive policy co-ordinating organization. 
However there are signs of change. In April 1977 formation of a 
policy co-ordination, analysis, and research division within the 
Premier's Department was announced. The similarity of its title and 
apparent purpose to new structures within the federal Department 
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of the Prime Minister and Cabinet suggests response to common 
problems: how to ensure that departments are implementing cabinet 
policy and to prevent the less effective ministers from being 
"snowed" by their public servants. As the first Premier for many 
years who was not also Treasurer, Neville Wran had already created 
an advisory unit within his department headed by an economist, 
and the later creation of an industrial development unit marked 
another increase in Premier's Department capacity to oversee and 
second-guess other influential parts of the bureaucratic machine. 
Yet other forms of co-ordination occur in relations with bodies 
outside New South Wales, including the governments of the 
Commonwealth and other states. Most of the financial, policy-
making, and administrative aspects of these relations, and the 
various councils, conferences, and agreements that co-ordinate them 
in different degrees, have been discussed amply elsewhere; the 
following are a few examples of their special impact on New South 
Wales.'" 
Spann illustrates the ramifications of inter-governmental co-
ordination by reference to the related fields of water conservation, 
drainage, and flood protection. The main interstate river is con-
trolled by the River Murray Commission, on which New South 
Wales is represented along with the Commonwealth, Victoria, and 
South Australia. Within the state— 
the work of the Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission has 
involved co-Operation with the New South Wales Department of Lands 
in developing holdings for land settlement; with the Commonwealth 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority on problems of the diver-
sion of Snowy waters into the Murray and Murrumbidgee systems and 
its effect on irrigation; with elected local authorities and land boards 
in the irrigation areas; with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation and the State Departments of Agriculture on 
soil surveys, irrigation research and extension services; with the Forestry 
Commission and the Rural Bank; and with many private citizens' 
associations concerned with the development of these areas."" 
The reports of the Public Service Board give numerous instances 
also of state government assistance to and co-operation with the 
Commonwealth, some of them dating from the time of Federation. 
They have included seconding teachers and providing teacher 
training to Papua and New Guinea, the Northern Territory and 
the A.C.T.; medical examination of military trainees; printing 
services for Commonwealth agencies; vocational guidance on behalf 
of the Commonwealth Employment Service; joint research by the 
Department of Agriculture and the C.S.I.R.O.; providing accom-
modation for newly arrived immigrants; and in former days 
administering the "Aboriginal Station" at Jervis Bay. 
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State-federal relations, mainly financial 
Of course, relations with other governments—especially with the 
Commonwealth—have included plenty of conflict as well as co-
operation. In the early decades of federation conflict flared over 
transitional issues that were more or less resolved in due course: 
the federal capital site, the channels of communication with Britain, 
how far state instrumentalities and employees were subject to 
federal taxation and arbitration awards."^ Gradually the attempts 
of Commonwealth governments to expand the scope and use of 
federal powers, the financial relations between the governments, and 
the use of federal financial powers and resources to influence state 
government policies became the dominant sources of conflict. As 
we have seen in earlier chapters, such conflict set the state and 
federal levels of the Labor Party at odds, during referendum 
campaigns for greater federal powers and when J.T. Lang was state 
leader of the party; inter-level conflict within the other parties is 
also not unknown. But the tension has been greatest when opposing 
parties were in state and federal office—notably during the "debt 
repudiation" crisis of 1932 and (with the parties reversed) when 
the Whitlam federal government of 1972-75 sought to impose its 
policies on the Askin state government. 
The state resistance was primarily political, for example in 
fighting federal plans to claim jurisdiction over all territorial waters 
and the continental shelf under them, plans to get appeals to the 
Privy Council totally abolished, proposals to make grants directly 
to local government authorities. But the conflict also had important 
administrative facets. The planning of federal programmes such as 
those for urban and regional development. Aboriginal and social 
welfare, and increased aid to schools and universities imposed heavy 
and often competing demands for information and advice upon the 
state public service. The state government could hardly refuse the 
increased federal grants which, however, often called for expanded 
state activities and extra staff to man them. There were disputes 
and misunderstandings over specific operations, such as that over 
the agreement for sharing the operating costs of the hospitals system 
which prevented New South Wales from joining the hospitals 
section of the Medibank scheme by the general deadline of 1 July 
1975. Within a year of taking office Prime Minister Whitlam 
(admittedly as part of a state election campaign) had been calling 
the New South Wales government the most "grudging, tardy and 
negative" among state governments in failing to respond to Com-
monwealth initiatives on price control, land commissions, represent-
ing local government on the Loan Council, welfare policies. Privy 
Council appeals, state and local taxation reform, and other 
matters."*' 
348 
Central Administration 
The state government, in its turn, set up the Federal Affairs 
Division in the Premier's Department to try to keep tab on Canberra 
proposals and activities, and tried to channel all federal approaches 
to state agencies through the Premier's Department in the hope 
of co-ordinating the responses. The Public Service Board pointed 
out that over 57 per cent of the 1974/75 increase in employment 
under its jurisdiction was in positions funded by the Commonwealth 
government, and added that serious problems had arisen because 
that government had "not adopted a consistent programme to 
ensure the continuing availability of funds, which in various cases 
ranges between 1, 3 and 5 to 10 years".'" 
Underlying such resentment and defensiveness was the whole 
complex of financial pressures that had long beset state govern-
ments. Technological development, population growth, and the 
electorate's demands had inexorably called for expanding state 
expenditures—on costly public works which had to be financed by 
loan-raising and on all kinds of services calling for increased 
revenues. State loan programmes (including, under a "gentlemen's 
agreement", the larger programmes of "semi-government" and local 
authorities) had to be approved by the Australian Loan Council 
on which the Commonwealth government usually had a decisive 
voice. 
A large proportion of state expenditure on current account 
depended on two main classes of transfers or grants from the 
Commonwealth. "Financial assistance payments" originated in the 
formulae for reimbursing state governments for income tax revenue 
the Commonwealth took over in 1942, and were "untied" grants 
which the state government could spend as it wished. "Special 
grants" were made under section 96 of the Constitution which 
permits the federal government to specify the purposes for which 
they can be spent, set standards and conditions (including 
"matching" state expenditure), and supervise the projects, as it 
thinks fit. Table 24 shows the relative proportions of the "tied" 
and "untied" grants received from the Commonwealth in recent 
times. Its main feature is the dramatic increase in the proportion 
of specific-purpose grants under the Whitlam federal government. 
This was a significant cause of the federal-state tensions in that 
period—even though some of the federal initiatives relieved the 
state government of heavy expenditure over which it already had 
only limited control."* 
The increase in specific-purpose grants was due partly to larger 
allocations in fields that had long been the subject of federal grants. 
Mainly as a result of taking over the full financial burden of tertiary 
education from the beginning of 1974, Commonwealth recurrent 
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Table 24. Commonwealth Government Payments to New South Wales, 1960-75 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Year Ended 30 June 
1960 1965 1970 1972 1975 
Financial assistance 
grants 166,900 230,537 373,908 462,204 737,522 
Special revenue 
assistance — — 4,775 35,813 18,641 
Total general-purpose 
revenue assistance 166,900 230,537 378,683 498,017 756,163 
General-purpose capital 
grants — ~ — 69,690 107,313 
Total general-purpose 
grants 166,900 230,537 378,683 567,707 863,476 
(As percentage of 
total payments) (68,7) (65,5) (66,5) (71,9) (46,7) 
Specific-purpose revenue 
payments 18,763 28,549 48,080 87,830 422,088 
Specific-purpose capital 
payments 57,137 93,119 142,830 133,837 564,297 
Total specific-purpose 
payments 75,900 121,668 190,910 221,667 986,385 
(As percentage of 
total payments) (31,3) (34,5) (33,5) (28,1) (53,3) 
Total Commonwealth 
payments to N,S,W, 242,800 352,205 569,593 789,374 1,849,864 
Source: Payments to or for the States and Local Government Authorities 1975-76 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975), tables 108, 120; ibid., 
1976-77 (1976), table 102, 
Note: These figures exclude transfers under state government Loan Council-
approved borrowing programmes. 
and capital payments to New South Wales in this field, which began 
in 1951/52 with a grant for universities of just over $1 million, 
jumped from $50.4 million in 1971/72 to $292 million in 1974/75 
—though by agreement at the June 1973 Premiers' Conference 
corresponding amounts were deducted from the general-purpose 
grants. Federal advances to New South Wales for public housing 
programmes under successive Commonwealth-State Housing 
Agreements began in 1945/46 with a sum of about $5 million; the 
amount was $48.3 million in 1970/71 when the last pre-Whitlam 
Housing Agreement lapsed; under new arrangements agreed in 
December 1972 and June 1973 the total of grants and advances 
350 
Central Administration 
was $ 1.4 million in 1971 /72, when housing grants were discontinued 
but loan allocations increased to provide housing funds with the 
Commonwealth subsidizing the interest on the increased loan 
allocations for housing, and $125.7 million in 1974/75. Federal aid 
for roads began in 1923/24 and had reached $74.5 million for New 
South Wales in 1971/72; under the agreement of June 1974 the 
figure was $115.8 million in 1974/75. Most smaller items of long 
standing were also increased in this period.'" 
Equally important was the stepping-up of comparatively recent 
programmes of federal aid, as for Aboriginal advancement. This 
programme began in 1968/69 with grants to the states (apart from 
the Commonwealth's own spending) which included $800,000 for 
New South Wales; that figure rose to $2.4 million in 1971/72 and 
$7.8 million in 1974/75. Federal aid for schools in the states began 
in 1964/65 with grants for science laboratories and equipment, 
totalling $3.7 million for New South Wales. By 1971/72 the grant 
was $20.9 million and included sums for secondary school libraries, 
for recurrent expenditures of non-government schools, and for 
capital expenditures of government schools. The adoption of the 
Interim Schools Commission's report in 1973 expanded the volume 
of federal grants to New South Wales to some $156.4 million for 
these and other purposes in 1974/75. More notable still was Labor's 
development of programmes of aid that were new or virtually new 
in 1972 or later. These included, of course, medical and hospital 
insurance (Medibank), expansion of public hospital and other 
health facilities and services, urban improvement and new "growth 
centres", assistance to local government, cultural activities and 
recreation, and "social development" through the Australian As-
sistance Plan.'-" 
Enough examples have been given to indicate how the specific-
purposes component of federal-state financial transfers came to 
expand so greatly in the mid-1970s, compared with general-purpose 
payments which increased substantially in money terms but could 
have risen much more but for the federal Labor government's 
determination to promote specific policies of its own by the use of 
its financial predominance. Of course, for a more accurate picture 
of the magnitude of change all money figures should be discounted 
for inflation. Two other general points should be noted. 
First, as indicated in the note to table 24, the foregoing discussion 
has excluded "transfers" under approved Loan Council borrowing 
programmes. When loan funds are required by the state, the 
Commonwealth undertakes the actual borrowing, issuing Com-
monwealth securities, and transfers the proceeds to the state 
government in accordance with decisions approved by the Loan 
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Council. These are essentially state borrowings and not grants or 
loans by the Commonwealth. Statutory and local authorities raise 
their own loans subject to the allocations determined by the state 
within the total sum decided by the Loan Council for semi-
governmental borrowing. 
Second, state borrowings aside, general-purpose transfers from 
Commonwealth to state have all been grants for revenue assistance, 
except for relatively small general-purpose capital grants since 
1970/71. By contrast, the figures for specific-purpose transfers 
include various kinds of payment, not in every case a once-for-all 
addition to the state government's resources. We have seen that 
the large increase in federal aid for tertiary education in 1973/74 
was offset by a corresponding deduction from the financial as-
sistance grants thereafter (thus reducing the state's freedom of 
disposal of federal aid to that extent). There were other cases of 
the kind. (A different kind of example of the same principle 
occurred in 1971/72 when the Commonwealth abandoned the 
payroll tax to enable the states to levy it, but simultaneously reduced 
the financial assistance payments by the current amount of its 
proceeds.) In addition, many transfers to the state (besides the 
proceeds of Loan Council borrowing) were not grants but loans or 
"advances" from the Commonwealth which must be repaid with 
interest over specified periods. From 1964/65 to 1972/73 such 
advances ranged between $35 million and $60 million in a year; 
in 1973/74 and 1974/75 they totalled $113 million and $217 
million respectively, the rise being due mainly to the new 
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement of 1973 and assistance 
for the development of the growth centres and for upgrading 
metropolitan sewerage provision. In the two latter years the 
advances represented 9'/2 and 11'/2 per cent of federal payments 
to New South Wales respectively (excluding Loan Council borrow-
ings). Cumulatively, the state's public debt has continued to grow 
since the Second World War, as shown in table 25. In the same 
period the Commonwealth government was "repaying its debt at 
the rate of $200m. a year . . . and by 1969 had attained a net 
creditor position".'^' 
The relative extent of the state government's dependence on 
federal subventions varies, of course, with the size of its other 
sources of income, and the relationship can be measured in a variety 
of ways. The simplest statement—equally true for all states—is one 
from the N.S.W. Official Year Book; "Receipts from the Australian 
Government constitute the principal source of [state] governmental 
revenue." Technically, revenue here means the receipts of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund, the account established by the Con-
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Table 25. Debt Outstanding 1956-75 
(In millions of dollars) 
Securities on issue on 
behalf of state 
Loans from Commonwealth 
government 
Total debt outstanding 
1956 
1,483 
169 
1,652 
As 
1960 
1,849 
262 
2,111 
at 30 June 
1965 
2,407 
420 
2,827 
1970 
3,079 
664 
3,743 
1975 
3,504 
1,071 
4,575 
Source: Payments to or for the States and Local Government Authorities 1975-76, 
table 170. ' 
Note: Figures exclude debts of semi-government and local authorities, and state 
debts in forms other than securities or loans from the Commonwealth. 
stitution Act into which most tax and other current income of the 
Crown is paid, and from which the main current expenditure of 
the government on administration and social services is met. Since 
it is a matter of state accounting decisions how much of the money 
received from the Commonwealth for various purposes is paid into 
this account, the ratio of Commonwealth payments to total receipts 
of the Fund is a somewhat arbitrary measure of financial depen-
dence on the Commonwealth—and certainly an incomplete one as 
can be seen by comparing the "Total Commonwealth payments" 
row in table 26 with the bottom row in table 24, though it should 
be noted that table 24 includes capital grants and advances whereas 
table 26 shows only revenue. The notable features of table 26 are 
the steadily rising share of state taxation and relatively declining 
share of Commonwealth transfers in the receipts of the Con-
solidated Revenue Fund. One important factor was the trans-
formation of the state's tax structure on taking over payroll tax 
from the Commonwealth in 1971/72. In that first year the new 
tax was mainly responsible for a rise of over 50 per cent in total 
tax receipts of the Consolidated Revenue Fund—and it steadily 
increased in importance, accounting for over half the Fund's tax 
receipts by 1974/75. 
However, the trend shown in Consolidated Revenue receipts is 
not misleading about the overall trend, according to a table 
compiled by Kenneth Wiltshire to show the percentages contributed 
by the main sources to receipts of all kinds—revenue and proceeds 
of loans, advances and grants—by each state government and its 
local authorities. This suggests that the Commonwealth's share of 
total New South Wales central and local government income fairly 
steadily declined from nearly 56 per cent in 1962/63 (and it had 
been higher still in the 1950s) to 51 per cent in 1972/73. The same 
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Table 26. Sources of Government Revenue: Consolidated Revenue Fund 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Commonwealth payments: 
Financial assistance 
grants 
Special revenue 
assistance 
Specific-purpose 
payments 
Total Commonwealth 
Percentage 
Slate taxation 
Percentage 
Land revenue 
Percentage 
Receipts for services 
rendered 
Percentage 
Miscellaneous 
Percentage 
Total Consolidated 
Revenue Receipts 
1960 
83,450 
2,917 
6,674 
93,041 
(57.2) 
43,147 
(26.5) 
4,794 
(2.9) 
1 1,016 
(6.8) 
10,685 
(6.6) 
162,683 
Year E 
1965 
230,537 
5,835 
11,357 
247,729 
(52.3) 
130,330 
(27.4) 
29,798 
(6.3) 
32,074 
(6.8) 
34,136 
(7.2) 
474,067 
:nded 30 
1970 
373,908 
4,775 
25,706 
404,389 
(52.4) 
259,242 
(33,6) 
27,893 
(3,6) 
52,975 
(6,9) 
27,345 
(3.5) 
771,844 
June 
1972 
462,204 
35,813 
50,400 
548,417 
(50.0) 
413,929 
(37.8) 
26,503 
(2,4) 
69,768 
(6,4) 
37,435 
(3.4) 
1,096,052 
1975 
737,522 
18,641 
157,498 
913,661 
(44.0) 
859,852 
(41.4) 
52,350 
(2.5) 
98,187 
(4,7) 
154,589 
(7.4) 
2,078,639 
Sources: For figures to 1972: Official Year Book of New South Wales, Public 
Finance chapter, q,v. for a full description of the subject briefly discussed in this 
section; for 1975: Report of the Auditor-General [of N,S,W.] for 1974-75 (Sydney: 
N,S.W, Government Printer, 1975), Review of Receipts, p, 15; for dissection of 
Commonwealth payments. Payments to or for the States and Local Government 
Authorities 1975-76, tables 106, 116. 
table notes that state "taxes, fees and fines" rose from 32 per cent 
of N.S.W. state and local government current revenue in 1962/63 
to 43 per cent in 1972/73, and from 25 to 35 per cent of combined 
revenue and loan receipts—much higher, incidentally, than the 
corresponding ratio in any other state.'" 
Detailed descriptions of the sources of Consolidated Revenue 
receipts under each of the broad headings in table 26, and of reasons 
for their fluctuations, appear annually in the N.S.W. Official Year 
Book and the report of the state Auditor-General. The past financial 
year's receipts and payments of all state government funds are 
summarized in the Public Accounts, published annually bound in 
a single volume with the Report of the Auditor-General. 
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The Public Accounts and parliamentary control 
Expenditure from the Consolidated Revenue Fund is classified in 
the Public Accounts primarily by portfolios and departments, and 
within departments under a heading system recommended by a 
committee of 1928 which reviewed the state's budget practice. This 
system improved on previous practice by standardizing the items 
in the estimates of all departments under the same three categories: 
salaries and like charges, non-salary standing charges more or less 
common to departments (grouped as "maintenance and working 
expenses"), and expenditures peculiar to each department (labelled 
"other services" in the estimates and public accounts). However, 
such a classification, together with the inevitable sharing among 
appropriate departments of specialized aspects of many activities, 
makes the public accounts an inadequate guide to the total costs 
of particular functions or programmes. A somewhat better guide, 
but only in the broadest terms, is given by a functional classification 
of Consolidated Revenue Fund expenditure published in the Public 
Accounts and, in a different form, in the Year Book. This at least 
gives a very general idea of the relative magnitudes of spending 
on the main functions of state government, and of changes in the 
distribution of financial effort, but of course only within the 
operations of that Fund (see table 27). 
The Consolidated Revenue Fund is the first of three major 
accounts in the New South Wales government accounting system; 
it deals with the day-to-day receipts and payments of departments 
—and has satellite accounts recording similar subsidiary trans-
actions. The second is the General Loan Account, the main account 
recording proceeds of and disbursements from public borrowing. 
The third is the Special Deposits Account, chief of a group of 
accounts recording transactions on funds allocated for specific 
purposes but not immediately required and so "deposited with the 
Treasurer"; they comprise mainly the working balances of state 
departments and government undertakings, and moneys held in 
trust, including some of the earmarked grants and advances from 
the Commonwealth. In addition, a large number of statutory and 
other bodies in the state keep their own accounts separately from 
the main government accounts—often on what accountants call an 
"income and expenditure" basis rather than the "cash" or "receipts 
and payments" basis of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. These 
bodies range from the big public transport undertakings included 
in the budget (see below), through other major public utilities such 
as the Electricity Commission, the Metropolitan Water Sewerage 
and Drainage Board, and the Rural Bank, which remain outside 
the budget, to miscellaneous bodies including the marketing boards. 
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Table 27. Objects of Government Expenditure: Consolidated Revenue Fund 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Function 
Legislature and general administration 
Maintenance of law, order and public 
safety 
Regulation of trade and industry 
Education 
Encouragement of science, art, and 
research 
Health, the environment, and recreation 
Social amelioration 
War obligations 
Development and maintenance of state 
resources 
Local government 
Totals 
1970 
160.732 
80,882 
3,656 
290,977 
5,930 
132,971 
18,231 
1,824 
72,705 
8,913 
776,821 
Year Ended 30 
1972 
251,431 
111,829 
4,882 
413,635 
7,726 
182,382 
39,394 
2,113 
93,260 
11,124 
1,117,776 
June 
1975 
512,071 
202,190 
8,825 
699,122 
16,666 
418,983 
82,200 
2,124 
186,789 
16,119 
2,145,089 
Source: Public Accounts prepared by the Treasurer for Financial Year Ended 30 
June 1975, Statement 2H, Consolidated Revenue Fund—Functional Classification. 
Note that the Year Book publishes a similar table, separating payments in respect 
of public debt charges and federal advances from current expenditure. However, 
the table is not up to date, and the totals in the two tables tally only approximately. 
smaller business undertakings, the universities and colleges of 
advanced education, and so on. The accounts of nearly two hundred 
of these bodies are summarized in the Auditor-General's annual 
reports. 
Though ostensibly established for different purposes, there are 
overlaps and interrelations between many of the state accounts that 
in total present an indescribably complex and confusing picture. 
None of the three main accounts (or its satellites) is wholly used 
for the purposes that originally characterized it. Some loan proceeds 
are paid to the Consolidated Revenue Fund, and others to the 
Special Deposits Account. Some federal advances pass through 
Consolidated Revenue and others through a variety of other state 
accounts. Payments for "capital" expenditure may come out of any 
of the three main classes of account—indeed the accountant's 
distinction between "capital" and "current" expenditure (abstract, 
artificial, and arbitrary at best) is frequently disregarded in state 
government accounting. The General Loan Account receives not 
only the proceeds of borrowings but also some Commonwealth 
grants and advances for capital purposes and small amounts from 
the sale of assets originally bought from borrowed funds. Items that 
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have formerly been financed from Consolidated Revenue may be 
switched and thenceforth charged to the General Loan Account 
(see, for example, the budget speech for 1966/67). However, despite 
such aberrations, it is generally true to say that Consolidated 
Revenue is used for meeting current expenses and the General Loan 
Account for capital items. The Special Deposits Account does not 
receive all moneys paid to the state for specific uses. In theory this 
account is for moneys set aside for designated purposes, or of which 
the state is a custodian but not necessarily the owner. But "long 
established practice makes the pool of Trust or Special Deposit 
funds available for the general purposes of government".'" In 
addition there is a thick web of transfers between the various funds 
—advances, loans, repayments, interest payments, and subsidies. 
The official excuse is that, in the nature of things, with the 
number of government authorities concerned, the wide range of 
activities involved, and the different accounting requirements to 
assist management and identify financial responsibility, governmen-
tal financial arrangements are complex. This is true not only for 
New South Wales, but also for the other states and for the 
Commonwealth. The basic problem is how to present meaningful 
statements in a summarized form. While state documents broadly 
have avoided classifications on an economic basis, the Com-
monwealth Statistician produces a series of documents which are 
helpful in examining on a functional basis the direction of expen-
diture and the sources of revenues. Unfortunately, some time elapses 
before these documents are available. 
A former Auditor-General of New South Wales, W.J. Campbell, 
has shown how the evolution of government accounting practices 
—dictated largely by temporary political expediency and adminis-
trative convenience—has blurred the principles of parliamentary 
control of public moneys. "Budget practice in New South Wales", 
he wrote, "does not reach the objectives of comprehensiveness and 
unity widely put forward as the criteria by which government 
budgets may be judged."''" These objectives were embodied in 
section 39 of the Constitution Act which stipulates that "all taxes, 
imposts, rates, and duties, and all territorial, casual, and other 
revenes of the Crown (including royalties), from whatever source 
arising within New South Wales, and over which the Legislature 
has power of appropriation, shall form one Consolidated Revenue 
Fund . . . " The intention was to ensure that no portion of the 
revenues escaped parliamentary control, and to avoid the rigidity 
of keeping unused separate balances in different "earmarked" 
funds. 
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"Perhaps no direction in the Constitution Act", Campbell 
continued, "is seemingly so well founded and yet varied so often." 
He listed the various segregated funds set up for closer settlement, 
for applying the proceeds of Crown lands sales to public works, 
"for the railways and other utilities and business enterprises, for 
the treatment of road finances and for unemployment relief and 
social services activities". Under legislation current in 1975, for 
example, motor taxes could be used only to finance road construc-
tion and maintenance, and revenue from driving licences and fees 
could be used only to meet the cost of police traffic control. Poker 
machine taxes were earmarked for hospitals and aged people's 
homes, and insurance companies paid a levy towards maintaining 
the fire brigades. In 1971/72 nearly 30 per cent of total state tax 
receipts went to earmarked funds outside Consolidated Revenue. 
Campbell concluded in 1954 that the separate funds of the public 
business undertakings, exceeding in their aggregate the volume of 
Consolidated Revenue receipts and payments, represented "the 
direct opposite of the traditional general revenue consolidation".'" 
Even the official Manual of Governmental Accounting admits that 
the increasing number of separate funds makes it "difficult for 
anyone accustomed to the ordinary business conceptions of financial 
statements to ascertain the true financial position of the State"— 
but hastens consolingly to add: "The fact is, the true financial 
position of a State cannot be simply stated".'-'' 
Thus parliament has reduced its own capacity to control the 
public finances by allowing the multiplication of funds. But it has 
rendered its control more tenuous still by multiplying the modes 
of dealing with the money in these funds. According to principles 
first evolved in British constitutional struggles, the raising and 
spending of all public moneys must be authorized by some act of 
parliament. Authority to raise taxes or loans or to levy fees must 
be given in acts or parts of acts passed for those purposes. A 
statutory authority to spend money is called an "appropriation", 
and is usually given for designated purposes. Many acts which 
authorize specified government activities also appropriate sums of 
money to finance the activities, and the appropriation remains in 
force until the relevant part of the act is amended or repealed. In 
New South Wales these are called "special" appropriations (in 
Britain, more graphically, "permanent" appropriations). They 
afford a certain security for some types of payment, such as the 
salaries of the Governor, Auditor-General, and judges which were 
appropriated from the beginning by the Constitution Act, and of 
Public Service Board members by the Public Service Act. In part 
this very security derives from the fact that once a special 
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appropriation is made, parliamentarians can forget about it. In 
recent years special appropriations (approaching $70 million in 
1974/75) have run at Ijetween 3 and 4 per cent of the annual 
expenditure from Consolidated Revenue. From some of the special 
funds, such as the Special Deposits Account, money can be spent 
when ministers or officials think fit, but usually because at some 
earlier time the money has been granted for the purpose in question 
by an appropriation of the state or federal parliament. 
"Annual" appropriations, as the name implies, are made each 
year from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to meet specified regular 
expenses of government not covered by special appropriatiorts or 
by provision for payments from special funds, and these authorities 
to spend lapse at the end of the financial year for which they are 
voted. The custom of voting specific sums for the "ordinary annual 
services of the government" for a defined period is a conventional 
legacy of the British parliament's seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century campaigns to curb the financial irresponsibility of the 
Crown; the practice is regarded as constitutionally important, but 
like other central "constitutional" rules is not prescribed by law.'" 
Another class of annual appropriations is included in the General 
Loan Appropriation Act, required to authorize expenditure from 
the General Loan Account. Unspent balances of such appropriations 
do not automatically lapse at the end of a financial year, the amount 
provided usually being sufficient for eighteen months. The nature 
and distribution of general loan expenditure are indicated in table 
28. As the annual appropriation acts for the ensuing year are never 
passed before the beginning of that year, there is standing authority 
under the Audit Act for payments to continue for three months, 
but only at the rate authorized for similar services in the correspond-
ing period of the previous year. Further short-term appropriations 
can be made, if necessary, by passing one or more so-called Supply 
acts. In practice the main revenue appropriation bill is usually 
introduced into parliament in September of the financial year to 
which it relates, but does not become law until a month or two 
later. 
As we have said in chapter 5, most modern parliamentarians are 
not interested in the technical details of financial control and 
management. It is not surprising therefore that they tolerate 
substantial departures, in form as well as in practice, from the 
theory that all public spending must be authorized in advance for 
specified objects. Of the two best-known departures of the kind not 
already discussed, the first is the voting each year of an Advance 
to the Treasurer, to be spent at his discretion, with a view to meeting 
unforeseen contingencies. This is a necessary practical precaution; 
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Table 28. Distribution of Annual 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Loan Expenditure 
Year Ended 30 June 
1970 1972 1975 
Railways, omnibuses and ferries 
Highways, roads, and bridges, etc. 
Ports, harbours, and rivers 
Electricity undertakings 
Other trading undertakings 
Conservation of water, soil, and forests 
Land settlement 
Water, sewerage, and drainage works 
Local government works generally 
Housing (excluding expenditure under 
Commonwealth-State Housing 
Agreements) 
Rural and agricultural institutions and 
services 
Decentralization and development 
Hospitals and health services 
Schools, technical colleges, and 
universities 
Administrative and miscellaneous services 
Total gross loan expenditure 
26,365 
2,085 
11,908 
16,905 
1,885 
26,804 
3,699 
21,610 
1,375 
32,450 
2,106 
13,148 
16,850 
708 
28,292 
3,750 
26,601 
1,068 
60,655 
2,295 
19,961 
18,607 
1,206 
35,664 
4,164 
40,283 
3,978 
1,809 
4,675 
2,059 
24,475 
68,891 
12,965 
57,113 
3,537 
2,500 
29,028 
83,015 
16,028 
3,395 
1,260 
8,922 
59,821 
150,802 
23,084 
227,510 316,194 434,097 
Source: Auditor-General's Reports, table grouping Expenditures from General Loan 
Account. Cf. somewhat different grouping in Official Year Book of New South Wales 
No. 63, 1974, table 228, showing also repayments to the Loan Account under 
corresponding headings. 
at least the spending has been authorized in advance, if not its 
objects. The other departure occurs when the Treasurer's Advance 
is exhausted: departments continue to meet unexpected commit-
ments, anticipating parliamentary approval by calling these outlays 
"Payments Unauthorized in Suspense". The extent to which the 
latter procedure is used in New South Wales is almost unique in 
Westminster-style parliamentary systems. It is an old practice, 
accepted by governments of different persuasions, and while it 
weakens parliament's role in financial control it has presumably 
been accepted on the ground that the government of the day—i.e., 
cabinet—controls the budget so long as it has the numbers in 
parliament. The advantage for the government is that it does not 
have to call parliament together in May to pass supply bills, unlike 
the Commonwealth's situation. It is these payments which the 
parliamentary Public Accounts Committee examines and reports 
upon as required by the Audit Act. If by force of habit the 
Committee always accepts the departmental explanations as "satis-
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factory"—leading to retrospective authorization in the next year's 
Appropriation Act—at least those explanations and the figures are 
appended in full to the Committee's reports, published as appendix-
es to the Auditor-General's report, for members and the public to 
scan if they wish. Nobody bothers. The sums in question, though 
large absolutely, are not a high proportion of total expenditure, as 
table 29 shows. 
In addition to the foregoing variations from the notion of 
legislative control of specific financial operations all transacted 
through a single consolidated fund, there is the power conferred 
on many statute-created bodies—business undertakings, public 
utilities, and others—to earn or borrow their own income and to 
dispose of it on their own authority without the need for parlia-
mentary appropriations. Many of the statutory bodies receive 
grants, advances, or other transfers from the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund, the General Loan Account or other parts of the state's 
financial system, and some make payments into public funds. Again 
the intricacy of these interrelations makes it very difficult for 
parliament or citizen to get a comprehensive and self-contained 
picture of the real cost of government or of any particular operation 
or institution. Departments and authorities produce annual reports 
which cover their financial activities, often in great detail, and these 
reports also contain non-financial information which can be useful 
Table 29. Treasurer's Advances and Payments Unauthorized in Suspense 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Year Ended 30 June 
1973 1974 1975 
Consolidated Revenue Fund— 
Vote: Advance to Treasurer 
Percentage of total below 
Payments Unauthorized in Suspense 
Percentage of total below 
Total expenditure from Consolidated 
Revenue Fund 1,336,101 1,579,618 2,145,090 
General Loan Account— 
Payments Unauthorized in Suspense 184 32 347 
Total payments from General Loan Ac-
count 589,733 695,220 761,143 
Source: N,S,W, Auditor-General's Reports for the years in question. 
Note: The higher figures for 1975 result partly from the reallocation of functions 
and abolition of portfolios in January following the Machinery of Government 
Review, which had the elTect of cancelling the votes for functions no longer under 
the portfolios to which the money had been voted. Payment for the continuing 
functions after that dale had to be provided for as "unforeseen expenditure". 
20,000 
(1.5) 
29,345 
(2.2) 
24,000 
(1.5) 
39,021 
(2.5) 
50,000 
(2.3) 
112,823 
(5.3) 
361 
Co-ordination 
and Public Finance 
in assessing their performance. However, apart from the few that 
may happen to be in the public eye, the existence of these reports 
is not well known and they rarely rate a mention in the press or 
parliament. The standard of reporting varies, and sometimes 
printing is delayed. But the reports do show what money comes 
under their control and what it is spent on. 
Also, the Auditor-General checks the account-keeping of virtually 
all these bodies, and gives summaries of their financial activities 
and situation in his annual reports. This is the best source for a 
general conspectus of the whole range of New South Wales public 
financial activities. However, subject to section 63 of the Audit Act, 
the Auditor-General's function is primarily to check that public 
money is spent as authorized by parliament in accordance with legal 
procedures and that all receipts and expenditure are properly 
accounted for. Occasionally criticism of waste may lead to adminis-
trative reform, but there is very little in the budgetary system to 
help the government to plan future spending by reference to 
changing objectives and available resources, or to appraise whether 
the best value has been obtained for money spent, or to assess how 
far and why a given programme has fallen short of its objectives. 
New South Wales budgeting has always been very much in the 
"incremental" mould—a question of annual negotiation between 
departments, the Treasury, the Public Service Board, and ministers 
in cabinet. The bargaining has been based primarily on the level 
of corresponding votes in the previous year, with little built-in 
pressure to question established activities and a tendency to consider 
new proposals in isolation "on their merits" rather than in a broad 
comparison of priorities across the board. It remains to be seen 
whether this traditional approach will be modified by the cabinet 
instructions following the 1974 Machinery of Government Review 
that departments should formulate their substantive objectives and 
submit "corporate plans" for their future development.'^* 
The budget 
In theory the focal point of parliamentary control of finance is the 
annual budget—a term originally having a similar meaning to 
portfolio, referring as it did to the leather bag or pouch in which 
Chancellors of the Exchequer once carried the budget papers. The 
budget is the government's annual financial plan as announced to 
and eventually approved by parliament. Defined comprehensively, 
it would include the Treasurer's estimates of receipts and expen-
diture on both revenue and loan account for the coming year, 
together with his speech outlining the general financial situation 
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of the state and the government, and drawing attention to the main 
features of the estimates, especially any important new expenditure 
proposals and taxation measures. In New South Wales the budget 
papers also contain a statement of the preceding year's payments 
from the Treasurer's Advance Account and of payments in excess 
of or without parliamentary appropriation. However, the loan 
estimates are not formally included with the budget papers and are 
approved in a separate appropriation act. 
In practice the budget is not used as a means of comprehensive 
parliamentary financial control. Not parliamentary control because 
for all practical purposes parliament cannot alter the estimates and 
in fact never does so. As perhaps the most significant single 
embodiment of the strong executive tradition, section 46 of the 
Constitution Act outlaws any appropriation not recommended by 
a "message" from the Governor during the same session—and a 
Governor's message can only be sent as the government advises. 
Hence parliament cannot add to the government's financial pro-
posals, and a vote to omit or reduce one would by convention be 
taken as a vote of no-confidence, thus removing the government 
and its budget together. It follows that the budget is not a means 
of financial control; but as it sets out the government's revenue 
programme in detail, the debate on the second reading of the main 
appropriation bill is the most general debate of the year on 
government policy—as we saw in chapter 5. Nor is the budget a 
comprehensive financial document, for reasons indicated in preced-
ing pages. It is confined to the expected receipts of and appropria-
tions from the Consolidated Revenue Fund and the expected income 
and expenditure (on a different accounting basis) of a few major 
public utility undertakings. It excludes the transactions of most of 
the state trading undertakings and semi-autonomous authorities— 
statutory and otherwise—some of them quite substantial. It ex-
cludes disbursements from those federal grants-in-aid which "find 
their way into Trust Accounts (designated Special Deposit 
Accounts)".'" 
The public utilities whose finances are included in the budget 
statement are the state railways and government buses (now under 
the Public Transport Commission), the business activities of the 
Maritime Services Board (mainly charges for wharfage, tonnage, 
berthing and storage, and rents of wharves, jetties and buildings), 
and the administrative expenses of the Department of Motor 
Transport. They are there mainly because until 1928 their accounts 
were included in the Consolidated Revenue Fund, in accordance 
with the consitutional rules of unity and comprehensiveness. They 
were withdrawn from it on the recommendation of the Budget 
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Committee of that year (already mentioned), in order to give the 
undertakings "some degree of financial autonomy". A number of 
other state industrial undertakings then in existence, and many 
statutory authorities created before and after 1928, were never 
associated with the Consolidated Revenue Fund, while the Sydney 
and Newcastle water boards were dissociated from it in the 1920s. 
Unlike these bodies, the transport undertakings were continued in 
a complex financial relationship with Consolidated Revenue even 
after their separation. 
For example, the Government Railways Fund set up under the 
1928 amendment to the Railways Act received all railway earnings, 
fees and fines, interest on investments, appropriate loan proceeds, 
and advances made by the Colonial Treasurer. It was to receive 
a regular subsidy from Consolidated Revenue to recoup some of 
the losses on "operating country developmental lines". Except for 
interest and sinking fund contributions on state loan allocations to 
the Department, which were permanently appropriated by the 
Government Railways Act, spending from the Fund still required 
annual appropriations by parliament. Expenditure from railway 
loan allocations likewise continued to be authorized by annual loan 
appropriation acts. Each of the other trading undertakings in the 
budget has its own roughly similar set of links with the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund. But within the parliamentary appropriations de-
tailed spending and accounting from day to day are controlled by 
the statutory bodies in charge of these undertakings rather than 
by the Treasurer. He receives at the end of the financial year only 
a statement of the year's operations on an income and expenditure 
basis for inclusion in the Public Accounts, and of the estimates for 
the ensuing year which Treasury cannot check or control in detail 
as it does in the case of departmental estimates."" 
The outstanding feature of the budget in its final form, then, 
is an aggregate statement which combines the expected operating 
results of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, the rail and road 
transport undertakings, and the business activities of the Maritime 
Services Board, in the form of net surpluses or deficits in each of 
their accounts. "From this aggregation there emerges a net final 
figure of estimated surplus or deficiency for the budget year 
contrasted with the actual outturn for the last period. The condition 
of the finances is thus appraised"'^'—or at least of that part of the 
finances covered by the budget. The Public Accounts give a 
statement in the same form showing the actual outcome at the end 
of the year—and the Auditor-General always begins his Annual 
Report by comparing the budget forecast with this result—a 
depressing exercise in recent times. Table 30 compares aggregate 
budget results during the past decade. 
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Table 30. Budget Surpluses and Deficits 
(In thousands of dollars) 
(A minus sign indicates a deficit) 
Consolidated Revenue Fund 
Business undertakings: 
Railways 
Buses 
Harbour services 
Total 
Total Budget 
1965 
-380 
176 
-4,938 
72 
-4,690 
-5,070 
Year Ended 30 . 
1968 1970 
6,997 
10 
-6,600 
53 
-6,537 
460 
4,282 
-2,809 
-5,938 
64 
-8,684 
-4,402 
June 
1972 
36,449 
-32,608 • 
-9,381 
55 
-41,933 • 
-5,484 
1975 
163,126 
-166,939 
-37,033 
301 
-203,671 
-40,545 
Sources: Official Year Book of N.S.W., No. 63, Sydney, 1974, table 217, p. 264; 
N.S.W. Public Accounts, 1974-75, Aggregate Statement, p. 3. (For adjustment of 
figures in Aggregate Statement to compare with Year Book table, see Year Book 
text, p. 262). 
The figures suggest some of the broad problems of New South 
Wales budgeting, but do not fully measure them. They show, as 
the Year Book of 1974 gently expressed it (p. 263) that "the 
finances of the transport undertakings strongly influence the bud-
getary results of the State. During the last ten years, the transport 
undertakings have had generally unfavourable results, while large 
surpluses have been recorded in the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
in each year except 1964-65." 
In part the unsatisfactory transport results have arisen from the 
crippling burdens of debt incurred in the earlier years of develop-
ment. For example in 1972/73, as the Auditor-General reported, 
the railway service showed a loss on operations "for the first time 
in its history". The loss was $28.2 million, but after bringing to 
account debt charges and allowing for Consolidated Revenue Fund 
contributions toward losses on developmental lines and super-
annuation liabilities the total railways deficit was $79.6 million. A 
second cause of transport losses has been wages and pricing policy. 
The last year in which the railways achieved an operating surplus 
was 1971/72. Fares and charges were not adjusted sufficiently to 
maintain this position, and it is arguable that they could not have 
fully maintained it because of competition from other means of 
transport; from 1971/72 to 1974/75 salaries and wages—the main 
component of cost.s—rose by 67 per cent while earnings went up 
by 9.4 per cent {Report of the Auditor-General 1974-75, p. 44). 
So whereas the railways had even shown overall surpluses (after 
paying debt charges) in half the years of the 1960s, at the end 
of that decade the deficits began mounting year after year, from 
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$7.9 million in 1968/69 to $32.6 million in 1971/72 to $166.9 
million in 1974/75. The bus services showed a parallel trend. By 
that time the Consolidated Revenue Fund was cushioning the 
operating losses of the transport undertakings to the tune of $148.8 
million in 1974/75, and paying virtually the whole of their annual 
debt charges (amounting to $50.7 million) without being able to 
recoup the amount from the undertakings themselves. (In conform-
ity with Year Book practice the figures in table 30 attribute these 
shortfalls to the undertakings rather than to the Fund.) 
That even these figures are not full measures of the state's 
financial problems will be illustrated by one or two out of hundreds 
of possible examples. First, the net deficits or surpluses in the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund shown in the aggregate statements of 
recent years have been arrived at after including as receipts various 
special payments by the Commonwealth "towards meeting the 
deficit" expected during the year: a special advance of $15 million 
in 1972/73, repayable over five years; an outright grant "for capital 
expenditure" of $16 million in 1973/74; a similar grant of $30 
million in 1974/75. In other words, the aggregate deficits in those 
years were actually greater by at least these amounts of outside 
help. Second, the transport undertakings form only a part of the 
endless and inextricable tangle of subsidization whereby some sets 
of Australians contribute indirectly substantial portions of their 
income towards the support of other sets, and in their turn are 
propped up in different ways by yet other groups. The Treasury, 
in the present case, subsidizes Transport Commission contributions 
to a superannuation scheme for railway employees, and (as we have 
seen) makes up some of the losses on "developmental" railway lines 
—a subsidy to rural dwellers. Both the railways and the Con-
solidated Revenue subsidize rural businessmen and farmers through 
freight concessions. On the buses the Treasury and other depart-
ments subsidize concession rates for children, students, pensioners, 
the blind, incapacitated veterans, members of the police force— 
and free travel for parliamentarians past and present. There are 
also Commonwealth grants for some of these same purposes. Third, 
ultimate net deficits, of course, have to be financed somehow—and 
"somehow" means by borrowing. For example, the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund has been in overdraft for many years, and the 
overdraft moved from $15 million at 30 June 1972 to $62.4 million 
at 30 June 1975. The financing of continuous deficits in this way 
simply means another form of subsidy: current beneficiaries of New 
South Wales state spending are arranging to have their welfare 
subsidized in part by posterity. 
The foregoing sketch has barely outlined the nature and extent 
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of the state government's financial dependence on the Com-
monwealth, the relative magnitudes of its own chief sources of 
revenue and of its main types of expenditure, the place of the annual 
budget within the larger financial system, and the complexity and 
opaqueness of the public accounting system from the viewpoints 
of citizen awareness and parliamentary scrutiny and control. The 
state accounts are essentially an elaborate system of bookkeeping 
that has grown "like Topsy", has not been reviewed in any 
comprehensive way for over forty years and, if it has any other 
function than bookkeeping, merely assists in maintaining financial 
rectitude in the legal sense. The real custodians of this rectitude 
are not the members of parliament but the officials of the Treasury 
and other departments and of the Public Service Board, and the 
Auditor-General and his staff, all of whom have an essentially 
professional interest in and loyalty to their responsibilities. 
A full appraisal of the system, therefore, would require following 
the operation of the system of Treasury and Audit control through 
its annual cycle. This would begin with the preparation of de-
partmental and agency estimates, showing the roles of the Treasury 
and Public Service Board in laying down standards and procedures 
for the process and determining priorities among departmental 
demands, leading to the drafting of the budget and the part played 
by ministerial bargaining and the Treasurer's leadership in the final 
documents as presented to parliament. The survey would follow the 
fortunes of the legislation in its passage through parliament, and 
then move to the rules and procedures which maintain Treasury 
and Audit supervision of the receipt, custody, and spending of public 
moneys as authorized formally by parliament. It would conclude 
by assessing the value of the final review of the year's completed 
transactions in the Report of the Auditor-General. Such an 
appraisal is beyond the scope of this book, especially as the processes 
themselves have been fully described in other accessible works.'" 
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Local Government 
It was once the custom for textbooks to discuss local government 
in terms of its imagined or potential political value for the citizen 
in a democracy. For example: 
First, local government provides a relatively direct and intimate avenue 
for the ordinary citizen to participate in the affairs of the community. 
Second, government in local units is more likely to adapt its actions 
to the differing circumstances and preferences of the local communities. 
. . . In this way the individual can be given a wider range of choice 
as to the kinds of community in which he may live. 
Third, . . . the strengthening of local government offers one means of 
staying a trend towards a standardized and colourless society. . . . 
Fourth, local freedom to be different . . . is likely to promote . . . 
experimentation and innovation, . . . 
Fifth, . . . local government seems necessary to correct an inbuilt 
distortion in the distribution of functions and powers between federal, 
state and local bodies. . . . deliberate steps to decentralize . . . would 
increase the efticiency of the whole machine, if the test of efficiency 
is the raising of the quality of people's lives.' 
The sentiments are genuine, but reality mocks at them. "The 
affairs of the community" turn out to be "the three Rs—roads, 
rubbish and . . . rating", as a president of the N.S.W. Local 
Government Association put it.' Local government has only a 
marginal influence on the basic nature of the communities in which 
the people of New South Wales live. There is little sign of relief 
from standardization and colourlessness (if these really are general 
trends) in the activities of local government. It is not a wellspring 
of innovation, nor especially renowned for efficiency—though it is 
served by many devoted and some quite idealistic people. 
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STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS 
To be precise, local government in the Australian states is not 
government, except within a very narrow field of law enforcement. 
A better term would be "local elective administration" of minor 
services. New South Wales has locally elected administrative bodies 
not in order to acquire the political blessings listed by Gates, but 
because central government from an early date was determined to 
make local landowners—urban and rural—provide and pay for the 
basic services needed to make their properties accessible, profitable, 
and comfortable. The services were: to provide and maintain local 
roads and bridges wherever needed, kerbing, guttering, and foot-
paths in the towns, lighting in their homes and streets, piped water 
supply, sanitation, garbage clearance, and public health and recrea-
tion facilities. From the beginning local responsibility for these 
services was foisted on local property-owners against their will. 
"Roads, rubbish, and rating" 
The colonial governors took the first steps before self-government 
was granted—creating elected urban market commissions in the 
1830s, and incorporating the city of Sydney under an elected council 
in 1842. None of these institutions lasted long, for lack of interest, 
income, or integrity. The infant parliament passed a Municipalities 
Act in 1858, enabling areas by petition to seek incorporation as 
municipalities to control, as the Governor's speech of 1856 said in 
forecasting the bill, "those local functions which the Government 
could not adequately undertake". By 1906 this measure had 
produced some seventy-eight boroughs and 113 municipal districts, 
mostly very small and including fifty-three in the metropolitan areas 
of Sydney and Newcastle besides a Sydney city council, and 
covering all the main urban centres elsewhere in the state. But in 
total this represented less than 1 per cent of the area of New South 
Wales. From 1876 bill after bill for compulsory incorporation of 
rural areas in part or whole had been defeated by rural opposition 
—sometimes bringing down a government in the process. As the 
historian of New South Wales local government reports: 
The permissive system of incorporation had encouraged people to remain 
outside the municipal system not only to escape rate payments but also 
to benefit from superior government expenditure, which enhanced 
properly values. It is not surprising that the Government sought to 
transfer the burden of providing for local services in the unincorporated 
area upon the locality concerned. As a result the compul.sory division 
of the State into local units became settled Government policy.' 
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That policy was finally realized in 1905 when, after long and 
determined resistance by country members of parliament, the 60 
per cent of the state outside the Western Division was compulsorily 
incorporated into 134 shires, few of which have ever had the 
resources or the wish to adventure beyond providing roads and 
bridges. In 1906 the shires legislation was included in the first 
general Local Government Act, which replaced boroughs and 
municipal districts by a single system of 193 municipalities, 
with areas exclusive of those of the shires, and permission for those 
with a larger population and income to be called cities. The 
qualifications for city status were altered from time to time, but 
since 1965 have been based on population alone: at present 100,000 
if in effect a distinct entity within a metropolitan area, or 15,000 
if "an independent centre of population", presumably a rural town. 
For electoral purposes most municipalities are subdivided into wards 
and most shires into ridings each with two to four members. Within 
a municipality, local districts may be created, with a district 
committee partly of aldermen and partly of locally elected members, 
to which the council may vote funds and powers for specified local 
works. Within a shire, urban areas may be proclaimed on request 
of a majority of the electors concerned, with or without an elected 
urban committee to exercise some of the council's powers. 
The consolidating Local Government Act of 1919 added the 
device—unique to New South Wales—of county councils cover-
ing several local government areas, elected by and from local bodies 
in their district, to administer public utility services beyond the 
scope and resources of individual councils. The business and 
industrial centre of Sydney was administered under separate 
legislation (primarily the Sydney Corporation Act) from 1842 to 
1948, after which it was brought under the general provisions of 
the Local Government Act. By the mid-1970s local government 
covered nine-tenths of the area of the state, including the whole 
of the Eastern and Central land divisions and two-thirds of the 
sparsely populated Western Division. At the end of 1973 there were 
ninety municipalities (including twenty-three "cities"), 133 shires, 
and fifty-three county councils. At the end of 1972 there were 
ninety-three urban areas and twenty-seven urban committees within 
the shires, but no "local districts" established within the municipal-
ities. In 1974 thirty-six of the municipalities (including part of the 
City of the Blue Mountains) and four of the shires were within 
the Sydney statistical division (extended metropolitan area). The 
whole system comprises a single level or tier of authorities operating 
within mutually exclusive areas (of course a municipality may be 
surrounded by a shire)—except for the county councils, each of 
378 
Local Government 
which performs specified delegated functions over the area of a 
group of authorities (not necessarily contiguous). With the same 
exception, there are no significant differences between the general 
statutory functions allowed to the differently named authorities. The 
title of city is purely honorific. If many municipalities provide a 
wider range of services than the average shire, it is simply because 
they can better afford them and there is more demand for them 
in urban areas. In addition to the Local Government Act, separate 
statutes covering some or all areas regulate the supply of water, 
electricity, gas and sewerage services, the construction of main 
roads, and land valuation. 
The use of county councils to provide public utility services 
developed very slowly until after the Second World War. Though 
the legislative provision was made in 1919 (answering the need for 
inter-council co-operation in controlling water-hyacinth in the 
northern coastal rivers), there were only four county councils in 
1930 and sixteen in 1945. By the 1970s the number exceeded fifty, 
of which thirty-four conducted electricity undertakings, nine con-
trolled eradication of noxious animals and weeds, six operated water 
supply schemes, five conducted an abattoir and one a gasworks, 
three undertook flood-mitigation works, and three operated aero-
dromes. Six councils combined electricity undertakings with one or 
two of the other services. The Sydney County Council, which 
supplied electricity to the metropolitan area, was unique in two 
ways: it operated under the Gas and Electricity Act as well as the 
Local Government Act, and the former act established an American 
council-manager system of administration (see below). In the post-
war period the county council form had also been used to establish 
planning authorities for Sydney and Newcastle (Cumberland and 
Northumberland County Councils) but as will be seen these bodies 
failed to survive the pressures of powerful interests, the expediencies 
of state ministers and the parochialism of their constituent councils. 
The numbers and titles of members of local government councils 
vary. Newcastle City Council is the largest with twenty-one 
members, while Sydney and Parramatta have twenty; the member-
ship of other municipal councils ranges from six to eighteen and 
of shire councils from six to fourteen. In municipalities all members 
are called aldermen and in shires all are councillors. (For 
convenience the latter term is used for both in this chapter.) The 
chief executive and presiding officer of a municipality is the mayor 
(lord mayor in the cities of Sydney, Newcastle, and Wollongong), 
and of a shire is the president. Council members receive no regular 
remuneration for their services, but may vote themselves fees, within 
a statutory limit ($500 in 1974), for time spent in council meetings 
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and on certain other council business. Most mayors and shire 
presidents are voted an annual expense and entertainment allow-
ance, which in the case of the larger cities can be quite considerable 
($26,000 in Sydney in 1976). 
As the veteran local government administrator A.R. Bluett 
observed in his Local Government Handbook for N.S.W., "Councils 
have administrative functions and they do only those things which 
they are authorised to do by Statute". The main statute, the Local 
Government Act, is a huge measure containing hundreds of sections 
which specify the duties and powers of councils in minute detail; 
it is supplemented by hundreds of regulations and ordinances made 
by the Governor-in-Council. But councils contribute to their con-
tents. One of the main activities of the two energetic organizations 
of councils—the Local Government and Shires Associations of 
N.S.W.—and of the devoted administrative staff they share, is to 
ply the state Minister and Department of Local Government with 
proposed amendments and additions to the legislation, stemming 
either from individual councils or from annual conferences of the 
Associations, their executives or ad hoc committees established by 
them. With the department also contributing, a continuous tinker-
ing ensues, including every couple of years or so an amending Local 
Government Act containing a string of miscellaneous changes to 
the main statute. These are largely concerned with filling gaps, 
clarifying meanings, and refining definitions in the existing legisla-
tion; one of the invaluable services of the Associations' secretariat 
is to issue several times a year its Bulletin, largely devoted to 
keeping councils and their staffs up to date with the latest legislative 
amendments and legal opinions and judgments interpreting the law. 
Councils are expected to build and maintain local roads and 
bridges and some highways, to pave and light the urban streets, 
to organize garbage disposal, to police the building and health 
regulations laid down by state authorities, and to plan future land 
use within their areas. They can impose higher standards than the 
authorities prescribe in these matters if they wish. The state offers 
them inducements by way of tied grants to provide certain 
additional services, for example public libraries and baby health 
centres, but the range of such activities as agents of a state-
sponsored policy is narrow. Other services that councils may offer 
if their constituents are willing and they have the means include 
abattoirs, swimming-pools, markets, parks and gardens, sporting 
facilities, art galleries, day nurseries, and community centres; and 
they may subsidize other activities such as orchestral concerts. 
Local authorities do not administer large-scale functions such as 
education, police, public housing, hospitals, ambulances, or mone-
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tary welfare services—or even the motorized fire brigades. The 
reasons lie in the Australian preference for centralization and 
uniformity and the unwillingness of state politicians to devolve 
functions from which political capital could be made—rationalized 
by the argument that most local bodies have lacked the population 
and resources to support such sophisticated services. 
Council functions can be classified in a different way—into the 
provision of public works and amenities for which direct charges 
are generally not made; the conduct of trading undertakings in most 
cases making user charges; and the administration and policing of 
their own and of state departments' regulations by issuing licences 
and permits, making inspections, and prosecuting offenders. Any 
class of functions may require dealings with state departments, not 
only of Local Government but of Main Roads, Health, and many 
others. For some departments, such as Main Roads, councils 
perform delegated functions and receive grants of state and even 
federal money. Some state authorities, such as the Planning and 
Environment Commission, have actually been supported in part by 
levies upon local bodies. There has been a tendency to reduce these 
interactions. Many shires, for example, have long been heavily 
dependent upon road grants for a substantial portion of their 
income. Until the mid-1950s the shires took care inter alia of well 
over half the mileage of state highways, for which the Main Roads 
Department has the statutory responsibility. Since then the Depart-
ment has assumed direct charge of an increasing proportion of the 
state highways on grounds of the urgency of the work or of its 
own superior technical resources. On the other hand state govern-
ments have sought electoral votes by reducing or removing some 
of the levies made on behalf of central agencies. 
Administrative style and safeguards 
Given the small scale of operations of most councils, and hence 
their relatively intimate acquaintance with the operations under 
their charge, it is possible for councillors to take a close personal 
interest in decision-making, and for applicants and beneficiaries to 
try to influence decisions pretty directly. The pattern seems to vary, 
however, with the class of function. It is most "particularistic" 
(working in a case by case, rule-of-thumb fashion), where the 
council is distributing some direct benefit: sealing a stretch of road 
here, repairing a bridge there, bringing electricity to a new area, 
deciding where to locate a branch library. Councillors tend to share 
such decision-making indiscriminately with the paid council staff, 
interposing in the ca.ses that interest them. While they accept the 
need for forward planning, they will tend to amend the plan as 
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short-term responses to political situations. This is the most fertile 
field for maladministration. Councils can, and do, exercise a good 
deal of discretion in applying regulations in fields where decisions 
must be largely subjective, as in town planning matters. Where 
there is no outside pressure for conformity they may bend or waive 
a regulation—to help roadside stall-holders or pensioners running 
backyard businesses, for example. 
In all these matters there are opportunities for undue influence, 
and sometimes corruption. Councils also generally refuse to delegate 
decisions about prosecutions. On the other hand, rules incorporated 
in superior legislation such as building, health, and subdivision 
regulations, often giving a right of appeal to a quasi-judicial 
tribunal, are treated differently. Realizing the risks of arbitrary 
behaviour, most councils delegate considerable authority in these 
matters, leaving them to building and health inspectors and allowing 
professional officers to defend "the public interest" against the 
arguments, pressures, and attempted evasions of the private in-
terests. But even here it is always possible for councillors to 
intervene." 
The problem of integrity in local council affairs has never been 
comprehensively investigated. It has always been assumed that 
councillors should serve on a voluntary, part-time basis, unpaid 
except for out-of-pocket expenses and some compensation for time 
spent on committee business and investigations. This implies that 
councillors would have adequate incomes from other occupations 
or interests to ward off temptation. Council service, on the whole, 
does not attract candidates prominent in public life beyond the 
immediate locality. Although quite a number of parliamentarians, 
including ministers, have had local government experience early in 
their careers, the great bulk of councillors are not associated with 
political parties, and people with wider political ambitions are in 
the minority among council candidates. Those of them who do serve 
rarely remain in local government for long. Moreover, given the 
time that conscientious council work takes up, it is relatively difficult 
for wage and salary earners to serve, though the attitudes of 
employers, particularly the public services, are beginning to change. 
Hence there is truth in the general image of councillors as being 
predominantly local businessmen, especially shopkeepers, builders, 
contractors, and estate agents in urban areas, and farmers and 
graziers in rural areas—and an increasing number of women. There 
is evidence that professional people and salaried executives make 
up the bulk of councils in privileged residential suburbs, and that 
wage-earners are more prominent on the few councils with strong 
A.L.P. representation. But the characteristic composition of the 
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general run of councils encourages two kinds of cynical general-
ization: that people serve on councils largely to protect or further 
local business interests, and that councils are too vulnerable to 
pressures from wealthy and sophisticated firms of developers and 
land speculators. "Local government in this State stinks in the 
nostrils of decent people," said the A.L.P. M.L.A. for Dulwich Hill, 
a Sydney suburb, in 1967, giving extravagant expression to a fairly 
common opinion.^ 
In a detailed study of six municipalities selected as a cross-section 
of the metropolitan local bodies, Martin Painter confirms that 
"corruption is often popularly associated with local government in 
Sydney", and adds that "there have been several cases of proven 
corruption in the six councils in the past twenty years or so." He 
instances cases of malpractice or corruption in Liverpool in 1953 
and 1963 and in North Sydney in 1969; the minister's dismissal 
of Bankstown council in 1954 after discovering irregularities in 
tendering and in dealings with council materials, and in 1963 after 
bribery charges against several aldermen; and the dismissal of the 
Sydney City Council in 1927, of Glebe council in 1939, and of 
the Leichhardt council in 1953, in each case after revelations of 
bribery, the manipulation of tenders, job patronage, irregular letting 
of contracts, falsification of records, and the like. In the last three 
cases the councils were controlled by Labor Party majorities and 
there was evidence of "a political regime that was pervasively 
corrupt".'" 
In 1967 the Warringah Shire Council was dismissed, and one 
ex-member, convicted of soliciting and receiving bribes, told the 
court that eight of the council (a voting majority) had formed a 
team for such purposes. In September 1976 the council of Mum-
bulla, a rural shire, was dismissed when a departmental investiga-
tion showed among other things that a development in which a 
councillor had a direct financial interest had been approved by the 
council without proper exercise of its building powers, resulting in 
the part erection of a structurally unsafe building.' Considering that 
there were from two hundred to three hundred councils in the state 
during the period, it puts the above cases into some perspective 
to note that between 1919 and 1976 councils, both rural and 
metropolitan, were dismissed on some twenty-one occasions, and 
these include the cases of alleged administrative or financial 
inefficiency as well as those of suspected or proved corruption or 
malpractice. 
It is partly fears of corruption, and of incompetence, that account 
for detailed statutory and departmental controls imposed on local 
councils. The legislation includes strict rules on the handling of a 
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council's accounts, the conduct of its business, the appointment and 
conditions of its staff, and the reports it must furnish. "Supervision 
and control by State officials is especially thorough in New South 
Wales," says Ruth Atkins in a comparative survey of local 
government in all states. "The department checks their accounts, 
their methods of raising money, their elections, and their adminis-
tration generally," say Miller and Jinks. "Council borrowings 
depend upon the sanction of the State government, and must fit 
in with federal and state loan requirements".' 
In addition, some categories of council decisions have long been 
subject to appeals to quasi-judicial bodies. The Land Court of 
Appeal, originally established in 1889, was reconstituted in 1921 
as the Land and Valuation Court, headed by a judge of the Supreme 
Court. It hears claims for compensation and appeals against 
decisions relating to the resumption, use, rating, and valuation of 
land and the operation of town and country planning schemes, 
originating in a variety of public authorities including local councils. 
Its former jurisdiction (and that of the defunct State Planning 
Authority and several minor boards of appeals) in such matters 
as building appeals and objections, subdivision appeals, and develop-
ment appeals and objections were transferred in September 1972 
to a new Local Government Appeals Tribunal appointed by the 
Minister for Local Government. Questions of law in dispute before 
the Tribunal may be referred to the Land and Valuation Court 
for decision. One continuing source of public complaint is that 
aggrieved residents cannot appeal against a council decision to 
approve a development proposal that might affect them adversely. 
They can state their case only upon a developer's appeal against 
council's decision to refuse his application. 
The final sanction of dismissal of a council lies in the discretion 
of the minister under section 86 of the Local Government Act. He 
may base his decision on an investigation by a departmental 
inspector and may appoint an administrator to straighten out a 
council's affairs or simply to hold the fort until a new council can 
be elected. When questions of corruption or malpractice have arisen, 
ministers have invariably dismissed the whole council, even when 
only one or a few members stood charged before the courts. For 
many years the Local Government Associations have objected to 
this practice as unnecessarily suspending the democratically elected 
body and reflecting upon innocent councillors. Ministers have 
always replied, unconvincingly, that to suspend or dismiss individual 
council members would "prejudge the outcome of criminal proceed-
ings" and damage the councillors' reputation even if they were 
exonerated by the court. The Associations' long-standing policy has 
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been that a councillor on charge should be suspended immediately, 
reinstated if found not guilty, but if guilty be not only disqualified 
for seven years from election to a council (as present law prescribes) 
but also required to seek clearance from the Supreme Court before 
being allowed to stand again. 
POLITICS 
Beginning with a property qualification only, and plural voting 
which was abolished in 1906, the local government franchise in New 
South Wales has been available since 1927 to residents of the area 
(since 1941, to people on the parliamentary electoral roll) and to 
owners, rate-paying lessees, and occupiers of land in the area 
whether residents or not, including rate-paying corporations which 
can nominate a trustee to vote. A voter may vote only once in each 
municipality or shire in which he is qualified. Council elections have 
always been triennial, held throughout the state on the same day 
—formerly the first Saturday in December, but since 1969 on the 
third Saturday in September to give the new council more time 
to consider its first annual estimates: budgeting in local government 
is for the calendar year. 
Voting 
The low participation in local government elections, and the hope 
of picking up more support for A.L.P. candidates, moved the Labor 
government to introduce compulsory voting in 1947. This doubled 
the turnout at triennial elections thereafter, but even so the figure 
never rose much above 75 per cent of the enrolled voters (70 per 
cent in the Sydney area), partly because councils could hardly bring 
themselves to send "please explain" notices to defaulters as the 
legislation requires, much less to pursue prosecutions against them. 
The lack of absentee voting facilities at local elections further 
reduced turnout. After 1953 eligible non-residents were no longer 
compelled to vote, removing part of the anomaly that enrolment 
for local government elections, a prerequisite for voting, was never 
made compulsory despite repeated representations by the associa-
tions. In 1968 the new Liberal-Country Party government, arguing 
that compulsory voting was inconsistent with and insulting to the 
spirit of local democracy, abolished compulsion. The turnout 
promptly slumped back to an average of 35 per cent or lower— 
and below 30 per cent in the metropolitan council areas, some of 
which registered turnouts of the order of 17 per cent and even 8 
per cent. Compulsory voting was restored by the Wran government 
at the end of 1976. 
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During the 1950s the Labor government experimented with the 
electoral system in other ways. In 1953 it replaced the long-standing 
first-past-the-post method of counting votes by a system of propor-
tional representation. This was made mandatory for the Sydney 
City Council, where also the existing wards were abolished; a formal 
vote must show numbered preferences for at least fifteen of the 
candidates for the twenty seats on the council. For all other councils 
PR was made compulsory for elections where three or more 
positions were to be filled, while a "preferential" voting method 
would apply to others; however, a poll demanded by one-tenth of 
the electors could opt for the use of the preferential system only. 
The Governor could abolish wards or ridings where PR applied. 
The two associations maintained that the government had no 
mandate for these changes, and strongly opposed them (to no effect) 
on the ground that PR, by assuring minority representation on 
councils, would allow party politics into local government or at least 
make factions inevitable and prevent councils following a strong 
and positive policy. By 1956, when the Liberal-Country partnership 
had regained office, ninety-two council areas had adopted preferen-
tial voting and 132 remained on PR.' 
Another change Labor inaugurated in 1953 (for reasons obscure 
to the present writer) was to provide for the election of the Lord 
Mayor of Sydney for a three-year term by direct popular vote at 
the time of council elections, in place of the time-honoured system 
of annual election by and from the elected members of the council. 
In 1959 the government imposed the same method on the cities 
of Newcastle and Wollongong, and made it optional for any other 
local authority to adopt it, either by ballot of the council members 
or by a poll of electors at the triennial elections. Again the 
government ignored the associations when planning this change. 
The Shires Association flatly opposed it, and the Local Government 
Association pleaded in vain that at least unsuccessful candidates 
for mayor or president under the new alternative should not be 
precluded from competition for ordinary council membership. The 
alternative method did not prove popular with councils generally; 
only a handful had adopted it when the Labor government fell in 
May 1965. On its return to office. Labor restored the pre-1965 
position. 
In the interim the Liberal-Country party government had reversed 
all these changes in addition to ending compulsory voting. After 
an abortive first attempt in 1965, blocked by Labor's then majority 
in the Legislative Council, they succeeded in 1968 in restoring 
council election of mayors and presidents as the only method for 
all councils, in abolishing the grouping of candidates (party-fashion) 
386 
Local Government 
on local election ballot papers (another Labor innovation), and in 
making an exhaustive preferential system the universal voting and 
counting method. It was now open to an area to change to PR 
if one-tenth of the electors petitioned for a poll on the question 
and if council resolved to take a poll. By August 1972 nine areas, 
scattered throughout the state, had switched to PR. Where polls 
were taken there was generally a higher turnout than for the 
elections, and PR was usually adopted by overwhelming majorities. 
We have seen in an earlier chapter how the Askin government in 
1967 ordered a contraction of the city boundaries and sacked the 
incumbent council of which the A.L.P. had secured control by its 
expansion of boundaries in 1949. The ward system was restored 
in the new and smaller area; an election was held in September 
1969 under the preferential system with voluntary voting—produc-
ing a turnout of 48 per cent and a council majority of twelve to 
eight against the A.L.P.; council then proceeded to elect the leader 
of the Civic Reform majority as Lord Mayor.'" 
Parties and other groups 
The significance of all these measures and counter-measures lay, 
of course, in Labor politicians' belief that in one way or another 
their measures would make it easier for organized groups (meaning 
the A.L.P.) to get a foothold in local government, and in Liberal 
and Country Party politicians' conviction that "party politics was 
bad for local government", if only because they took it for granted 
that "non-party" councillors would generally have similar views to 
their own on local government matters. In fact, the situation was 
not so simple, from either point of view. It is true that proportional 
representation (and perhaps compulsory voting) helped the A.L.P. 
—and a number of minuscule political parties—to win seats in the 
relatively few, mostly urban, councils which had any practical 
attractions for reform-minded party people. But given its limited 
functional scope, local government was less important to Labor's 
general aspirations than to the interest of a certain type of its fringe 
politicians in spoils and patronage. And if organized parties could 
win control of some councils, so could organized non-party groups. 
Further, the labels (including "Independent") which candidates 
gave themselves at local elections were not necessarily a reliable 
clue to their political affiliations—or lack of them—in other 
connections. For example, the refusal of the Liberals, on principle, 
to contest local elections as a party did not preclude a number of 
individual party members from doing so. Finally, there were flaws, 
as experience showed, in the Askin government's assumptions that 
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voluntary and exhaustive preferential voting would reduce the 
prospects of organized groups at local government elections. From 
1968 on the voluntary system reduced the total turnout, but 
stimulated vigorous and often successful campaigning by action 
groups, whose enthusiasm and capacity for organization had obvious 
advantages over the independent candidate in getting out a 
favourable vote. As for the so-called preferential majority block 
system of vote-counting, its general effect was to help tightly knit 
teams of candidates to win even more seats than they might have 
done under PR, as long as they were able to organize a strict 
exchange of preferences." 
The relation of party politics to local government in New South 
Wales can be illustrated by considering the A.L.P.'s experience 
against the background just sketched. Officially, viewing local 
government as a political training ground and a means of promoting 
a better quality of life, the state party had always assumed that 
its branches would put forward candidates for local councils where 
practicable, and this was judged to be where there was a substantial 
Labor vote at state and national elections. From the 1920s on the 
State Executive itself gave the closest attention to the selection and 
endorsement of candidates for the Sydney City Council, and as we 
have seen enlarged that council's area in 1949 to ensure a Labor 
majority. By the early 1970s, however, authoritites in the party had 
their doubts about Labor's participation in local government. The 
party had in general failed to win as high a proportion of the 
popular vote at local body elections as in state and federal elections 
in the areas it contested. And it did not contest very many. After 
the local elections of 1971 the chairman of the A.L.P. State 
Executive's Local Government Committee, C. Healey, M.L.C, 
noted that most A.L.P. municipal committees seemed to prefer not 
to run candidates: they had fully or partly endorsed candidates in 
only 38 of the 225 local government areas at the time. (These were 
almost all in the Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong, and Broken Hill 
conurbations.) Healey added that Labor activists were often preoc-
cupied with municipal matters to the disadvantage of the party's 
role at the more important federal and state levels of politics.'^ 
The party had made uneven gains at the 1971 elections, but 
suffered major losses at those of 1974, including such industrial 
strongholds as Broken Hill and Wollongong. Among Sydney's forty-
odd councils it lost nine, retained control in four, and made only 
one gain. The gain was in its traditional stamping-ground of 
Leichhardt, a former working-class suburb where it had lost control 
in 1971 in a campaign that concentrated largely on the previous 
Labor council's alleged corruption and mismanagement. After 1974 
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the new Labor majority in Leichhardt proceeded to reverse the 
innovations in planning policies and the encouragement of citizen 
participation introduced by the intervening "Open Council" major-
ity, representing resident action groups and recent middle-class 
settlers in the area.'^ 
Labor in local government had a number of long-standing 
problems. They began with the party's poor image in municipal 
politics, due partly to the scandals associated with Labor councils 
and partly to attempts to apply rigid caucus discipline in a field 
where it was widely considered out of place. There were inherent 
conflicts between the role of local politician and party member. 
Ward pressures often made it difficult for members to adhere to 
caucus rulings, and members often needed personal followings and 
alliances with non-Labor groups to ensure re-election in a situation 
where the mere slogan "Vote Labor" could not ensure a solid party 
vote. Local elections were notable for the small number of votes 
needed to win—especially after the resumption of voluntary voting 
in 1968—and this put a premium on face-to-face appeals: the 
personal familiarity of the candidate to the voter, his contacts in 
the clubs, the shops, and the neighbourhood organizations rather 
than his party label. These factors had long shaped council 
memberships to give the impression A.F. Davies had received of 
Victorian councils in the 1950s, as "a collection of elderly men of 
many years' local government experience appointed and reappointed 
more in the manner of trustees than of representatives".'" Hence 
A.L.P. members in New South Wales who lost pre-selection often 
stood for election as Independents and split the party vote—leading 
to public bitterness, resignations, expulsions, and a further loss of 
party appeal. Party platforms, moreover, were largely irrelevant to 
local government issues, which mostly concerned mundane matters 
like the level of the rate, the state of repair of the roads or the 
regularity of the garbage service. Even rates cannot easily be made 
a party issue when most wage-earners are also ratepayers. (In 1972 
71 per cent of homes and flats in New South Wales were owner-
occupied.) 
During the past decade the A.L.P. has acknowledged these 
difficulties by considerably relaxing traditional party practices as 
they affect local government. The N.S.W. Branch has amended 
several rules relating to caucus organization and pre-selection, 
enabling local branches to disengage from municipal politics to 
some extent. Branches have less frequently pre-selected and en-
dorsed a full ticket for local elections, and Party members are free 
to stand as Independents if they do not want to seek endorsement.In 
recent elections A.L.P. candidates in some areas have stood in teams 
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of "Independents" with non-party members. Caucus rules have 
lapsed among Labor groups in some councils. Paradoxically, the 
new tactics have had some success in increasing Labor representa-
tion in the areas concerned." 
On the other hand, just when Labor had reduced its formal 
participation in local politics, the Liberals began to acknowledge 
their interest more actively. The federal leader, B.M. Snedden, said 
that Liberals ought to contest council elections to counter Labor's 
influence. Although state Liberal Party backing for local govern-
ment candidates remained forbidden by the party rules, at the 1974 
elections local Liberal branches were tacitly allowed to endorse 
candidates and used official Liberal slogans and advertisements 
during the campaign. State and federal Liberal parliamentarians 
actively supported the campaign in their own constituencies. The 
number of Liberal candidates was small, but those the organization 
backed were local personalities rather than anonymous party men; 
the campaigns were carefully organized with ample resources of 
money and manpower, and there was a high ratio of successes. 
Labor councillors were unseated as a result in Drummoyne, 
Hurstville, Parramatta, Penrith, and Sutherland. 
It was once argued on behalf of party politics in local government 
that it might attract candidates of better quality; that it might 
enable the electors themselves to decide major policy issues at 
elections on the principle of the mandate; that it would increase 
public interest in local elections and in the performance of councils 
by allowing voters to choose between policies rather than persons. 
New South Wales experience hardly justifies any of these claims, 
nor does the evidence suggest that other kinds of organized groups 
have made much difference to the established ways. Organized 
"non party" groups have long been a feature of local government 
election campaigns. They have included ratepayers' associations 
especially in long-established municipalities, "progress associations" 
anxious to develop the range of council services in rapidly growing 
communities (but also active in some older areas), and Citizens' 
Reform and similar groups which have generally been anti-Labor 
combinations with their links to the anti-Labor political parties 
fairly thinly disguised. 
In the past decade or so these have been joined by new types 
of association of which "resident action groups" are typical. They 
have figured mostly in middle-class areas undergoing higher-density 
redevelopment and in former working-class suburbs recently in-
vaded by professional, academic and junior executive residents in 
search of "inner city living" and urban chic. The media have given 
an exaggerated impression of the impact of such groups. They have 
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run on limited, highly specific platforms advocating conservation 
or attacking pollution and freeways; they have featured significantly 
in only a dozen or so council areas in New South Wales; they have 
been substantially successful in about half a dozen places. In 
commenting on the 1974 local election results Matthews and 
Painter wrote: 
Local politics still offer major obstacles to success for resident action 
groups, and the elections certainly showed none of the great awakening 
of local community consciousness that some of the optimists in the 
resident action movement had hoped for. In the outer suburbs particular-
ly, the usual local notables drawn from the business community, sports 
clubs, service clubs, progress associations and party organizations still 
dominate the scene. Traditional patterns of administrative patronage, 
rather than political conflicts arising from unmet community needs, are 
still the main object of aldermanic political concern." 
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE 
By "administrative patronage" the authors mean the favours 
secured by faithful voters and supporters through the direct 
participation of councillors in daily administration. This habit is 
repeatedly criticized by those concerned with local government. A 
Labor Minister for Local Government warns an association con-
ference about "the inordinate clogging of a council's administrative 
machinery" by councillors trying to decide "every application in 
every sphere". His Liberal successor tells a later conference that 
more delegation to staff would "certainly free councils from long 
deliberations on minor matters". A Country Party Minister for 
Planning and the Environment advocates larger local government 
areas, and adds that then "the elected people—aldermen and 
councillors—would have to concentrate on policy and leave the day 
to day administration to the staff. . . . no longer should the Act 
place the responsibility for administration on the Council and expect 
the par t - t ime 'Mayor to be the chief executive officer". Painter 
points out that the council is legally responsible for both policy and 
administration, and as the act makes no distinction between the 
respective duties of aldermen and paid officials the tendency is "for 
aldermen to become involved in every aspect of the organization's 
activities, often down to the last detai l" ." 
Staffing and organization 
Painter argues persuasively that this situation could be seen as both 
inevitable in the existing circumstances and desirable in a truly 
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responsive democratic administration. However that may be, it does 
help to perpetuate a diffusion of responsibility among the paid staff 
of most councils. These vary greatly, of course, in wealth and in 
the size of their organizations. The basic staff of any council must 
include four qualified officers: the town or shire clerk, who is the 
executive officer of the council; the engineer, who manages construc-
tion work, mostly road-making; the building surveyor, who admin-
isters the building ordinances; and the health inspector, who is 
usually an officer trained in sanitation rather than a medical 
practitioner. Urban councils responsible for larger populations may 
also employ planning officers, librarians, social workers, and other 
professional staff, with subordinate staff under some of these as well. 
Generally, although the town clerk or shire clerk is designated the 
chief administrative officer and has some inclusive responsibilities 
—for example for council finances—the other senior officials are 
in charge of their own separate departments and work directly to 
and with councillors, not through the clerk, mayor, or president 
exclusively. Though this lack of integration is sustained partly by 
professional jealousies, it is facilitated by the desire of councillors 
to dabble directly in daily administration. 
The "Barnett" Committee of Inquiry into Local Government 
Areas and Administration (see below) recommended in 1973 that 
there be "a clearer distinction between policy and administration", 
and that one official be appointed as "chief officer" with con-
siderably wider powers than those of existing senior officials, to 
exercise administrative leadership and act as a chief executive in 
fact as well as in name. From its inauguration in 1935 the Sydney 
County Council, the largest local government organization in the 
state, has operated the American type of "council-manager" system 
—though not without friction at times. But, in Painter's words, 
"proposals by the Minister to amend the Act to allow for the 
appointment of salaried 'Council Managers' have . . . been met with 
storms of protest from local councils".'* 
Paid service under local councils is a permanent career—or rather 
a set of careers distinguished by occupation and regulated by 
legislation. Wages and working conditions are fixed by awards and 
agreements; promotions, subject to the awards, are a matter for 
the local authority; formal qualifications are established by or-
dinance. There is security of tenure for staff. No council employee 
with one year's service can be dismissed outright: he can be 
suspended, with a right of appeal to an independent tribunal. 
Officers can seek promotion in their respective careers either within 
their own local authority or by applying for positions in larger local 
bodies elsewhere." 
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One of its closest students has summarized in this way the 
realities of New South Wales local government: 
As far as administrative structure, internal procedures and the more 
highly routinised aspects of administration are concerned, the Local 
Government Department keeps a tight rein. There is little room for 
experimentation in alternative administrative forms or procedures. . . . 
Without some direction from the Minister or changes to the Act, 
rationalisation of a frequently criticised administrative structure is not 
possible. . . . A lack of imagination and enterprise on the part of most 
local councils coupled with the rigidity of most of the provisions of the 
Act has resulted in a general picture of uniformity.'" 
Thus local government in practice falls short of the potentialities 
listed by Gates. But local government spokesmen themselves have 
long attributed the gap to more deep-seated problems, summarized 
by Spann and Curnow as: "lack of resources to keep up with modern 
demands, demands for (and resistance to) amalgamation, unwilling-
ness of higher levels of government to encourage the growth of new 
local government functions, often a narrow 'property mentality'; 
there are also the special difficulties of coping with the problems 
of large urban areas''.^' We consider this set of issues in the 
remainder of the present chapter. 
Until the 1970s the functions, financing, and structure of the local 
government system were determined entirely by successive state 
governments, which alone had the constitutional authority to deal 
with local government matters directly. These aspects of local 
government were linked in a seemingly unbreakable chain. From 
the beginning the system had three related characteristics: most 
local bodies were small organizations, they were financed primarily 
by a single property tax—the "rate", and hence their function was 
seen mainly as the provision of basic services to property. Smallness 
limited their capacity to undertake more substantial functions—but 
councils persistently defended smallness as preserving intimate 
contact with constituents and local needs, and resisted attempts at 
consolidation which must necessarily threaten the survival of some. 
After the extension of the local government franchise in the 1920s 
and 1940s there gradually arose some demands for a wider range 
of services. Ratepayers tended to resist the concomitant increase 
in the rate burden, and state governments blamed the inadequacy 
of council administration and the parsimony of the Commonwealth 
for their own failure to enhance the status or strengthen the finances 
of local government to cope with growing functions and costs. Hence 
the central issue in local government circles ever since the Second 
World War was a cry for expanded sources of revenue directed 
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increasingly after the mid-1950s toward the governments at Can-
berra. 
The relatively modest functions performed by local government 
(compared, say, with those in Britain and the United States) 
resulted partly from its late arrival on the scene and partly from 
councils' jealous self-regard. The state government would not 
transfer its long-established, highly centralized police and education 
functions to the tiny local bodies it created around the turn of the 
century and earlier. Some of the local bodies set up before 1900 
ran into hopeless debt to the state for the water services they had 
established, and their own squabbles over sharing the costs of 
services extended by one council to other areas led, for example, 
to the creation in 1888 of the appointive Metropolitan Water Board, 
on a pattern later followed in Newcastle and Broken Hill. (Local 
councils continued to provide water supplies elsewhere in the state, 
however.) These experiences influenced the state organization of fire 
protection and the creation in 1936 of the wholly appointed 
Maritime Services Board to manage all navigable waters and 
harbours in the state. Metropolitan transport services have always 
been centrally controlled because they must obviously ramify 
beyond the areas of the petty local authorities that have repeatedly 
opposed plans for a more integrated administration of the big cities. 
Against this background it is not surprising that other important 
services administered by local government elsewhere, such as public 
housing and electricity reticulation, were entrusted mainly to single-
function special authorities in New South Wales. The process 
continued in the 1970s, with central agencies like the Fitness and 
Recreation Service and the Department of Youth and Community 
Services appointing their own officers for grassroots work in local 
communities rather than delegate such work to local councils. 
Outlays 
Table 31 indicates the distribution of local government outlays 
between their major groups of functions in recent years. The totals 
have fallen from a quarter or less of state government spending 
to 17 per cent in 1973/74. "Roads and bridges" (including 
footpaths, drains, kerbing and guttering, street lighting and con-
tributions to the Department of Main Roads) conspicuously form 
the largest group of expenditure items. This holds for all types of 
councils, although the distribution of outlays between services varies 
considerably as between, for example, large authorities and small, 
metropolitan and rural, municipalities in general and shires in 
general (for the last, cf. table 32), and between individual councils 
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Table 31. Outlay of Local Authorities, 1965-73 
(In millions of dollars) 
General public services 
Health and welfare 
Community amenities: 
Protection of environment 
Other 
Net current 
Cultural and recreational services 
Development and assistance to 
Other functions 
Interest 
Total current outlay 
General public services 
Roads and bridges 
Electricity and gas 
Water supply 
Health and welfare 
Community amenities: 
Protection of environment 
Other 
industry 
1965 
outlay 
20.0 
4.0 
4.8 
0.6 
10,0 
4.6 
0.2 
25.8 
70.0 
Capital outlay 
Cultural and recreational services 
Other functions 
Maintenance and stocks 
Net advances to private sector 
Total capital outlay 
Total outlay 
9.2 
75.7 
47,2 
8.0 
0.4 
6.8 
0.7 
6.2 
4.1 
5.2 
1.0 
164,5 
234.5 
1968 
25.7 
5.5 
5.7 
0.7 
14.0 
6.2 
0.4 
33.9 
92.1 
10.8 
94.5 
51.2 
12.0 
0.9 
13.1 
0.4 
7.9 
1.7 
0.6 
1.8 
194.9 
287.0 
1971 
36.3 
7.6 
5.9 
1.6 
20.1 
8.2 
0.3 
44.9 
124.9 
10.7 
121.5 
57.7 
7.4 
1.1 
16,6 
0.7 
8.8 
3.2 
0.6 
2.8 
231,1 
356,0 
1973 
39,9 
11.1 
10.4 
3.3 
29.0 
9.5 
0.4 
53.2 
156.8 
12.5 
150.4 
62.2 
9.4 
1.5 
16,5 
3,0 
10,9 
2.8 
3.0 
2,8 
275.0 
431.8 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Public Authority Finance: State and Local 
Authorities. 
Note: Tables 31 and 33 are based on figures being developed by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics on national accounting principles to facilitate inter-governmental 
comparisons. Using different classifications and eliminating intra-government 
transfers, they differ from Year Book and Register figures, 
within these groups. On the whole the proportion spent on "roads 
and rubbish" has remained pretty stable over the past decade; for 
thirty years or more before that their relative importance had 
steadily declined (while of course absolute expenditure was rising). 
Painter's thesis" gives a table covering the suburban councils of 
Sydney which suggests that the proportion of their "ordinary 
services" spending on roads and bridges reached a peak of over 
65 per cent about 1930 and then fell at a generally declining rate 
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Table 32. Local Authority Expenditure on Ordinary Services 1953 and 1971 
(Excludes trading undertakings and loan transactions) 
Function 
Roads and bridges (incl. 
street lighting) 
Sanitation and garbage 
Health (incl. baby health 
centres) 
Culture and recreation 
(incl. parks, baths. 
libraries) 
All other services 
General administration 
Equipment, interest, etc. 
Totals 
Municipalities 
1953 
$m 
17.2 
4,2 
0.8 
3,6 
2,0 
2.8 
5,4 
36.0 
% of 
total 
47.8 
11.7 
2,2 
10.0 
5.5 
7.8 
15.0 
100.0 
1971 
$m 
70.8, 
15.4 
6.3 
22,0 
23,0 
16,1 
31,5 
185,1 
% of 
total 
38,2 
8,3 
3,4 
11.9 
12.5 
8,7 
17,0 
100,0 
Shires 
1953 
$m 
18,8 
1.8 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.8 
1.2 
25.4 
7r of 
total 
74.0 
7.1 
1.6 
2.4 
3,1 
7.1 
4.7 
100,0 
1971 
$m 
74.5 
6.5 
2.4 
8.2 
11.4 
9.5 
16.2 
128.7 
% of 
total 
57.9 
5.0 
1,9 
6,3 
8,9 
7.4 
12,6 
100.0 
Source: N.S. W. Official Year Books. 
to just under 40 per cent in 1969. Table 32 shows the decline in 
the share of both roads and bridges and sanitation and garbage 
in the ordinary services expenditure of all municipalities and shires 
between 1953 and 1971, and indicates that these were the only 
major categories of outlay whose share did fall. Did this mean an 
important shift of emphasis in local government functions away 
from "property-oriented" services to those catering for residents as 
a whole? 
The general inferences to be drawn from the table are that health 
services continued to absorb a very small proportion of all council 
outlays, and that although public parks, sports grounds, swimming 
pools, and libraries as a group had outstripped sanitation and 
garbage by 1971, their share of total expenditure rose substantially 
only in the shires. P.D. Groenewegen makes a similar point in his 
study of local government finance in New South Wales. His figures 
for local authorities as a whole show that between 1959 and 1971, 
as a percentage of total expenditure on works and services the 
spending on parks, reserves, swimming pools, beaches, etc. rose from 
7.5 to 8.0, spending on all health services from 2.7 to 3.5, and 
spending on public libraries from 1.9 to 2.8. This does not represent 
a very large shift toward services available to local government 
electors in general, as against "services to property" (though some 
shift had already occurred before 1959). But again there are wide 
variations between councils. In a cross-section of Sydney councils 
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in 1971 the percentage of works and services outlays spent on parks, 
reserves, and beaches ranged from 3.5 to 11.8. Some Sydney 
councils devoted less than 10 per cent of their expenditure on public 
services to public libraries, while others devoted up to 25 per cent. 
This was in fact the only service in the categories so far discussed 
whose share of all local authority expenditure substantially in-
creased between the 1950s and the 1970s—and it was the only 
service receiving a considerable per capita subsidy from the state 
government.'^ 
Apart from this, table 32 suggests that the increase which most 
significantly offset the declining share of "roads and rubbish" 
spending fell under the heading of "other services". Easily the most 
important items here were town planning and contributions to the 
Fire Board (in municipalities) and fire prevention (in the shires) 
—all being functions primarily concerning taxpayers—and town 
planning accounted for almost all the relative increases in the 
previous decade. Local Government Minister P.H. Morton put the 
position fairly brutally to the N.S.W. Ratepayers ' Association in 
1972: 
. . . apart from the added responsibility of regulating building and land 
development, there has been very little real change in the primary role 
of councils. Some councils have become involved in welfare services and 
in the case of a few councils expenditure on these services may represent 
substantial expenditures but overall expenditure by councils on welfare 
services is insignificant. In the case of country shires the expenditure 
represents one cent in every dollar of rates collected. In municipalities 
the figure is no more than four cents in the dollar.''' 
This is not to dismiss the development of the community services 
as negligible. As Ruth Atkins wrote a few years ago: 
The importance of council services should not be judged simply by a 
financial yardstick. Even if only a small percentage of revenue goes to 
a library service, or to maintaining a centre for old people or towards 
providing a trained social worker, subsidizing an orchestra, or improving 
a city square, the contribution of the.se to local community life is 
significant. In fact, the sums involved in such activities are increasing. 
In New South Wales, for example, expenditure on amenities and welfare 
(including libraries, parks and reserves, swimming baths, child health 
centres, youth centres, etc.) rose from $8.95 million in 1957 to $16.65 
million in 1963, though it still represented only 4,2 per cent of total 
expenditure,•' 
In relation to local government's claims to additional sources of 
finance, the point here is that the average ratio of "resident-oriented 
services" remained low because the spread of such services was not 
general (except for public libraries which came within reach of 95 
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per cent of the state's population by the mid-1970s). As the 
executive officer of the local government associations put it, "after 
world war II . . . some councils began to experiment with services 
affecting people rather than property, and with total community 
development rather than ad hoc land use planning".^'' The relatively 
modest aggregate effort led Groenewegen to conclude: 
It cannot therefore be argued that councils have needed additional 
revenue sources to finance expenditures on functions which benefit all 
residents rather than ratepayers. For such an argument to be valid, it 
must be expressed in the form that health and welfare services, and 
cultural and recreational facilities, cannot be substantially improved 
unless such alternative revenue sources become available." 
Receipts 
The local government associations have not based their claims for 
additional revenue sources solely on the cost of resident-oriented 
services; they have also argued that increasing demand for and 
rising costs of roadworks and other property-oriented services have 
placed heavy strains upon the income sources designed to finance 
them—mainly rates on land. It is not easy to assess the merits of 
the whole debate, partly because of the complexities of in-
tergovernmental transfers in both directions (councils' contributions 
to different state instrumentalities and Commonwealth and state 
government grants to councils) and partly because of the techni-
cality of the subject and the inadequacy of available statistics on 
some points. A good deal of detailed discussion is readily accessible, 
and only a broad outline is given here.^* 
Consistently with the original Australian conception of local 
government as providing the basic necessities to facilitate the use 
and enjoyment of real property, councils' fund-raising instruments 
were restricted to rates on land, licence fees, and charges for 
commodities supplied and services rendered—and central govern-
ment subventions were kept small. Since 1906 general rates in New 
South Wales have been levied on the "unimproved capital value" 
of land, as determined from time to time by the state Valuer-
General in some areas and by councils themselves in others. 
Essentially the UCV is the amount which the land would bring 
if it were sold at the time of valuation without any of the 
"improvements" (drainage, buildings, fences, dams, etc.) that may 
have been applied to it. This basis of rating is supported by the 
argument that it offers an inducement to proprietors to develop their 
land to the full or to sell it to others who will do so, though the 
evidence for this is disputed. Apart from general rates (which 
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account for about 90 per cent of all rate receipts) rates may be 
levied on the UCV or the improved capital value for special local 
projects, to pay off loans, or to help finance trading or water and 
sewerage undertakings. However, a permanent bone of contention 
is the statutory exemption from rating of federal and state 
government property and land used by universities, hospitals, 
benevolent institutions, churches, and schools. Governments make 
ex gratia payments to councils in lieu of rates for some of their 
properties, but it was estimated in 1966 that exemptions cost local 
government in New South Wales something like 7.8 per cent of 
current rate revenue on average (27.2 per cent in the city of 
Sydney.)-' 
Table 33 summarizes the main sources of total income of local 
authorities. The dominance of rating is obvious. It accounted for 
a declining proportion of ordinary services revenue raised by 
councils themselves during the period—from 74.6 per cent in 1965 
to under 70 per cent in 1973; also for a declining percentage of 
total ordinary services revenue, from just over 60 to 53.4; and for 
Table 33. Receipts of Local Authorities, 1965-73 
(In millions of dollars) 
Source of Income 
Current Receipts: 
Rales, fees, fines, etc. 
Trading undertakings: gross operating 
surplus 
Property income 
State government grants 
Commonwealth government grants 
Total current receipts 
Capital Receipts: 
Net borrowing: local government 
securities 
Other capital receipts 
Total capital receipts 
Changes in cash, bank and security 
holdings 
Total receipts 
1965 
117,4 
32,1 
2.0 
24.S 
0.7 
176,7 
42,5 
15.9 
58.4 
-0,6 
234.5 
1968 
149.0 
31.9 
3,5 
30.3 
0.4 
215.1 
46.8 
42.8 
89.6 
-17.7 
287,0 
1971 
182,5 
38.1 
7,0 
47,1 
1.0 
275.7 
55.6 
34.1 
89.7 
-9.4 
356.0 
1973 
217.5 
56.7 
10.7 
55.8 
2.2 
342.9 
46.5 
64,9 
111.4 
-22.5 
431.8 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Public Authority Finance: State & Local 
Authorities 1973-74, adapted from table 13, 
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a stable proportion—slightly over a half—of total current and 
capital receipts throughout the period, as shown in the table. 
However, as usual these proportions vary considerably among 
councils, and rate revenues may be as low as 30 per cent of total 
receipts in, for example, rural shires that receive heavier government 
subventions, mainly for roads. Other revenue raised by councils 
included miscellaneous licence fees, charges on public works, 
sanitary and garbage services, parks and reserves, baths, public 
markets and in some cases libraries, and rents from council 
properties, proceeds of the sale of assets, and interest, in addition 
to user charges of the electricity, gas, abattoirs, water supply, and 
sewerage undertakings. 
The other main sources of council revenue are borrowing, and 
grants from the state and federal governments. The figures of grants 
for current purposes shown in table 33 record only part of the total 
payments of this nature as given in the Statistical Register: Local 
Government. The latter are set out in table 34, which shows that 
in the period 1965-73 over 88 per cent of total grant money was 
earmarked for spending on designated purposes, and that total 
grants were between 17 and 20 per cent of the total receipts of 
local authorities as shown in table 33. However, in any year the 
proportions varied greatly about this average as between types of 
councils; for example, in 1971, when total grants for ordinary 
services were a little over 17 per cent of all corresponding revenue, 
the averages were 4 per cent for metropolitan municipalities and 
shires, 9 per cent for the cities of Newcastle and Wollongong, 32 
per cent for rural municipalities and shires, and 52 per cent for 
county councils. Total grants included Commonwealth transfers for 
a variety of specific purposes (see below), of which only the 
Commonwealth Aid Roads grant was large enough to show 
separately in table 34. 
One of the persistent sources of local government complaint after 
the Second World War was the drop in the level of state government 
subventions compared with the pre-war period. Association officials, 
who were pressing governments from 1946 on for a committee of 
investigation into local government finance, used different measures 
of the change. Albert Mainerd, the veteran association secretary, 
estimated in the mid-1950s that after omitting the Commonwealth 
Aid Road grants, local government received in 1953 only about one-
third the amount of state grant, in real terms, that it had done 
in 1939; or that state grants represented 0.57 per cent of current 
state expenditure in 1954/55 compared with 1.27 per cent in 
1942/43.^° Repeated requests for larger state grants were met with 
the reply that uniform taxation had removed the state government's 
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Table 34. Total State and Commonwealth Grants to Local Authorities, 
(In millions of dollars) 
1965-73 
For roads, bridges, drains, etc.: 
From Main Roads Department 
Flood damage repair, n.e.i. 
Commonwealth Aid Roads' 
Other 
Total roads, bridges, etc. 
For flood mitigation works 
For baby health centres 
For parks, reserves, baths, etc. 
For libraries 
N.S.W. Grants Commission" 
Other grants 
Total Ordinary Services 
For public utilities: 
Electricity and gas 
Water 
Sewerage 
Other (incl, abattoirs) 
Total grants for utilities 
Total government grants 
Total local government receipts 
Percentage grants to receipts 
1965 
17.9 
0,1 
n.7 
2.5 
32,2 
1.4 
0.1 
0.5 
1,1 
— 
1,8 
37,1 
1.7 
1.3 
1.2 
0.0= 
4.2 
41.3 
234.5 
17,6 
1968 
18,7 
0,2 
13,8 
5.5 
38.2 
3.5 
0.1 
0.6 
1.2 
-^ 
2.4 
46.0 
2.9 
3.5 
2,2 
0.0= 
8.6 
54.6 
287.0 
19.0 
1971 
20.9 
3.1 
15.f 
4.9 
44,0 
1.0 
0,0= 
0.9 
1,9 
5.5 
0.8 
54,1 
3,9 
1,6 
4.1 
0,0= 
9,6 
63,7 
356.0 
17.9 
1973 
26,0 
0.7 
16.6 
16.7 
60.0 
1.4 
0.0= 
1.6 
2.5 
5.5 
4.6 
75.6 
4.3 
1.4 
3.8 
0.2 
9.7 
85.3 
431.8 
19,8 
Source: N.S. W. Statistical Register: Local Government. 
Notes: 
1. Portion of federal grant to state paid to local bodies, 
2. Less than $50,000, 
3. Untied grants. The Commission is discussed below. 
control over its main revenue source whereas councils were free 
to raise the level of rates to finance any additional services they 
wished to offer. 
In fact, a study made in 1946 had suggested that most municipal-
ities were imposing rates at between 50 and 70 per cent of the 
statutory limit which then applied." Thereafter rates were increased 
under pressure of rising demands for services and rising costs. The 
Stevens Report, commissioned by the two associations in 1956 "in 
the absence of action on the part of the State Government", asserted 
that total rate revenues had risen twice as fast as the wholesale 
price index in the ten years from 1947, and in areas undergoing 
rapid development were at from four to eight times their 1947 level. 
The Minister for Local Government had allowed some authorities 
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to exceed the statutory limit, and the limit itself had been repealed 
in 1954. Twenty years later the rates were still rising: between 1961 
and 1970 they increased by 35 per cent in real terms." 
Help wanted—state response 
The necessity to increase rates was only the central point of many 
that were repeated in an unremitting campaign waged by local 
government throughout the 1950s and 1960s for more financial aid 
from the state government or from the Commonwealth government 
through the state. Having been advised by the state government 
in 1946 (as at many other times) "to rely on their own resources", 
the associations early in the 1950s began to claim that local 
government should have a defined share of the federal income tax 
"reimbursements" to the state government, and implored federal 
and state governments in turn to convene an interstate conference 
on the subject. They argued insistently that the rate burden was 
becoming intolerable; that rating was an unfair imposition on 
property-owners to finance services increasingly relevant to every-
one; that rates were not related to ability to pay; that government 
subventions were niggardly; and that local government should be 
allocated other tax bases of its own or have a right to a share of 
the proceeds of general taxation. 
Objective students of local government finance put the situation 
in another light. While acknowledging that some councils were in 
difficulties, and that rating in general was a regressive form of 
taxation, they pointed out that from 1939 to 1971 rates in general 
grew more slowly in New South Wales than state and federal tax 
collections and gross domestic product; that the rate of growth of 
land values—the local government tax base—had greatly exceeded 
the rate of growth of rate revenue; that in general local government 
services unrelated to property ownership had not grown greatly in 
proportion to other services; that there was evidence that the burden 
of the property tax was largely passed on to the general community; 
and that New South Wales property-owners were lightly taxed 
compared with their counterparts in North America and the United 
Kingdom (where local government had far greater responsibilities). 
Such studies suggested in 1966 that "current rate levels are not 
excessive but can be substantially increased to expand the services 
provided by local government", and as confidently in 1976 that 
"New South Wales local government should be fully self-sufficient 
from rate revenue provided that it adequately exploits its tax 
base"." 
Hence while governments could not ignore the political pressure 
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of the local government movement, their responses were cautious 
institutional gestures having only a modest financial impact in 
practice. Fulfilling one of the portmanteau of promises with which 
it had finally won office in 1965, the Askin government appointed 
a Royal Commission on Rating, Valuation and Local Government 
Finance (chairman, Mr Justice Else-Mitchell), but confined its 
terms of reference to methods of valuing land and raising revenue 
for the existing kinds of services. Reporting in 1967, the Com-
mission confirmed the economists' view that the proportion of 
income paid in rates had not risen appreciably since 1938/39, that 
there was no evidence that rating had reached saturation point or 
that rates were too high in most rural areas, and that in most 
residential areas rates were very light. The Commission said that 
rates were still the most convenient form of local tax, but would 
both be fairer and bring more revenue if levied on "site value" 
(which, roughly speaking, takes account of the value of land 
improvements other than extraneous additions such as buildings) 
rather than UCV. Councils should have discretion to choose their 
rating base, and rates might be supplemented by: a poll-tax not 
exceeding twenty dollars a year on non-ratepaying residents over 
seventeen; a licence fee from businesses and clubs; a "development 
charge" on land values increased by planning schemes; and taxes 
on tourism and entertainment. The Commission recommended that 
most Crown land and some of the other exempted categories should 
be made rateable, and that developers should contribute to the cost 
of parking areas, access roads, and other facilities serving their 
developments. It also proposed that a statutory body be set up to 
distribute among councils any untied grants from the government.'" 
The government rejected most of the recommendations, especially 
the proposals for new forms of local tax and for removal of the 
exemptions from rating. In preference to the latter it legislated in 
1969 to establish a Local Government Assistance Fund from which 
grants of not less than $4 million a year would be distributed by 
a Local Government Grants Commission manned largely by local 
government people. The first chairman, appointed by the govern-
ment, was an ex-mayor and local government association office-
bearer of thirty years' experience; the other members were a 
departmental ofticer nominated by the Under-Secretary for Local 
Government, and one nominee each from the Local Government 
and Shires Associations. In its essentials the new body was modelled 
on the Commonwealth Grants Commission, which had been recom-
mending "equalization grants" for the poorer state governments 
since 1933. However, the New South Wales Commission had to 
work within a predetermined sum, although it was free to recom-
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mend "financial assistance" grants to all councils. The total grant 
was raised to $5.5 million in 1971, to $6.5 million in 1974, $7.75 
million in 1975 and $8.25 million in 1976. Up to 1974 the amount 
was under 3 per cent of total rates raised by councils in New South 
Wales, and in recent years has been barely enough to compensate 
for rising inflation; nor did all councils receive grants. The main 
value of this marginal state contribution was that it could be spent 
at the council's discretion upon any works or services other than 
water supply, sewerage, or trading activities.^' 
As it promised at the 1971 state election the Askin government 
thereafter made other financial concessions to councils. In 1972 it 
abolished the compulsory council contributions to the Main Roads 
Department towards main road works—an item that among coun-
cils in the greater Sydney area amounted to some 12 per cent of 
rate revenue in 1970. The government agreed to reimburse councils 
for a statutory 50 per cent rate rebate it allowed to pensioners. 
It also promised to increase the library subsidy in each of the three 
years after 1971, and to allot $10 million over five years towards 
rural electrification. 
The fact remains that the measures so far discussed made little 
discernible difference to the pattern of local government finance, 
as measured by the proportion of revenue contributed by govern-
ment grants. The total revenue of N.S.W. local authorities for 
"ordinary services" rose from under $25 million in 1947 to more 
than $300 million in 1971 and just over $400 million in 1973. But 
in the whole of this post-war era the only period in which the 
proportionate contribution of government grants rose appreciably 
was between 1947 and 1953, when it moved from 13.7 per cent 
to 19.4 per cent. Thereafter its highest level was about 21 per cent 
at the beginning of the 1960s and its lowest was around 16 per 
cent at the end of that decade. It had recovered to 18.6 per cent 
in 1973. The picture is no different if one compares total grants 
and "aggregate revenue" for all activities including trading under-
takings. (Aggregate revenue is a gross total, producing lower 
percentages than the net figure "total receipts" used in tables 33 
and 34, which is not available for the earlier post-war years.) This 
proportion rose from 7.7 per cent in 1947 to over 10 per cent in 
the late 1950s, declined to 8.8 per cent by 1971, and recovered 
to 9.3 per cent by 1973. In the aggregate, then, while local 
government receipts and outlays had increased substantially in real 
terms since the war, central government subventions barely kept 
pace with this increase except at the beginning of the period. 
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Help wanted—federal response 
This history partly explains the efforts of the local government 
associations from the mid-1950s to involve the federal government 
in the problems of local finance, by direct lobbying of federal Prime 
Ministers and political parties, by urging state governments to 
convene a federal conference on the subject, and by impressing their 
needs on state ministers before each Premiers' Conference. As 
already noted, the Liberal Prime Ministers up to McMahon 
remained impervious to these tactics. But the other federal party 
leaders began to respond as early as the general election of 1961. 
Earlier in that year the N.S.W. A.L.P. State Conference had asked 
the Federal Executive to request that "direct federal aid to local 
government bodies" should be included in the policy speech for the 
federal election—and it was done. The federal Country Party 
advocated increased allocations for local government by the Loan 
Council and a federal convention on local government. State 
governments were naturally unhappy about the development of 
direct relations between local government and Canberra. In New 
South Wales the Labor Ministers for Local Government and their 
Liberal-Country successors after 1965 all threw cold water on the 
approaches to the central government and parties, and read regular 
sermons to the association meetings on the need for councils to 
practise economy, improve their efficiency, show gratitude for the 
state government's largesse, and stop asking for more." 
But with an Australian Council of Local Government Associa-
tions (using the experienced N.S.W. executive and research staff) 
concerting the councils' pressures all over the country, even the state 
ministers for local government ultimately capitulated and at a 
conference in Hobart on 23 April 1971 resolved that further 
resources were needed by local government and should be supplied 
by including a special contribution in the federal financial assistance 
payments to the states. In 1972 the Australian Council submitted 
yet another Survey of Local Government Finance in Australia to 
all the state ministers, and in July of that year E.G. Whitlam as 
federal Labor leader convened a meeting at Campbelltown with the 
officials of the N.S.W. associations to discuss a three-point pro-
gramme they were submitting to all the federal party leaders. Its 
planks were: (1) that local government should be mentioned in the 
Constitution and local government representatives should take part 
in the Convention the Victorian parliament had proposed to revise 
the Constitution; (2) that the federal government should be directly 
involved in the financing of local government; and (3) that local 
government should be directly represented on the Loan Council. 
The result was that at the federal election of December 1972 which 
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brought Labor to power in Canberra after twenty-three years in 
opposition, local government became for the first time a national 
issue." 
To federal Labor under Whitlam, local government was 
significant in two ways, neither of them particularly comfortable 
for local government leaders of the time. First, local government 
might be one medium—among many—for implementing Labor's 
plans to improve urban living in the large cities. Second, local 
government could form the basis for a regionalization of Australia 
which Labor had long advocated in preference to the existing 
division into a few large states under "quasi-sovereign" parliaments. 
The discomfort of the first notion was to emerge in the way Labor 
implemented it, using local government as only one of a number 
of instruments. The second was of more obvious concern since 
"regionalism" contained the potential threat of superseding local 
councils which therefore had always been implacably opposed to 
any regional body that was not wholly or partly a delegate, in 
powers and personnel, of the councils within its area. For a time, 
however, these discomforts remained latent as federal Labor wooed 
local government with symbolic gestures about its constitutional 
status. 
According to the leader's speeches and revised A.L.P. policy in 
the year or so leading up to the 1972 election. Labor would make 
local government "a genuine partner in the federal system". As 
Prime Minister, Whitlam refused Commonwealth participation in 
the Constitutional Convention, whose first session was convened for 
September 1973, unless local government were separately repre-
sented as "the third tier", along with delegates from state and 
federal parliaments. The compromise reached to save the dignity 
of the states was that local government could nominate three 
"representatives" from each state (not "delegates" like the parlia-
mentary members), with full speaking rights but only one vote for 
each state group, and that only upon "constitutional financial 
matters of direct interest to local government"—and that these 
representatives must sit with the parliamentary delegations from 
their own states, not as a local government bloc. (There was 
provision also for "local government" representation from the 
Northern Territory, where there were two local authorities, and 
from the A.C.T., where there was none.) The local government 
groups at the 1973 session of the Convention made a united 
submission calling for recognition of local government in a new 
section 108A of the Constitution. This was anathema to most state 
governments, although the proposal was only for a declaratory 
section; a standing committee of the Convention later reported that 
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it was not in harmony with the style of the Constitution, but it 
remained on the agenda until the October 1976 session. There it 
was replaced, as a compromise, by a laughable recommendation 
that the states be invited to recognize local government formally 
in their constitutions and this, with other proposals on local 
government, was referred back to the standing committee for 
further study. 
Whitlam's next gesture took up the question of local government 
debts and borrowing disabilities. Several writers have noted that 
in New South Wales, for example, while at least two-thirds of the 
total outlays of local authorities are spent on new capital fixed assets 
(roads, bridges, power lines, etc.), they have been able to finance 
between three-quarters and four-fifths of this capital outlay from 
current revenue, so that net borrowing represented quite a smaU 
proportion of total receipts (see table 33). Nevertheless the outstan-
ding debt of local authorities was rising substantially—in New 
South Wales it increased from $584 million in 1967 to $771 million 
in 1971.^' 
Whitlam himself had cited corresponding Australia-wide com-
parisons: from 1947 to 1971 the Commonwealth's debts had fallen, 
the debts of the states had increased more than four-fold, local 
government debts more than nine-fold. Under the so-called 
Gentlemen's Agreement of 1936 the larger borrowing programmes 
of local authorities had been made subject to approval by the Loan 
Council, but all local body borrowers had to fend for themselves 
in the capital market. Local government spokesmen believed in the 
1970s that direct representation on the Loan Council would enable 
councils to borrow at lower rates of interest and for longer terms 
(presumably by using the Commonwealth as agent as the states 
did). Hence Whitlam put to a special Premiers' Conference in 
October 1973 the A.L.P. platform proposal that the Financial 
Agreement of 1927 should be amended to give local government 
(and other statutory authorities) "a voice and a vote" at the Loan 
Council. 
On this being rejected (most firmly by the N.S.W. Premier) 
Whitlam initiated a referendum for a constitutional alteration "to 
enable the Commonwealth to borrow money for, and grant financial 
assistance to. Local Government bodies". Typically, however, he 
held no prior consultation with the local government associations 
on the terms of the proposal, its implications, or the timing of the 
referendum, which was held in conjunction with the double 
dissolution election of May 1974. The Local Government Associa-
tion of N.S.W. conducted an active "Yes" campaign; the Shires 
Association remained neutral; the local government association in 
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Victoria campaigned for a "No" vote; those in other states remained 
neutral; the proposals were defeated in all states except New South 
Wales. The gestures had, predictably, proved futile, though the 
Melbourne session of the Constitutional Convention (September 
1975), boycotted by non-Labor delegates from the four states with 
non-Labor governments, passed resolutions in favour of amend-
ments similar to the referendum proposals. The Convention's 1976 
session referred all proposals on local government back to the 
relevant standing committee. 
Labor's more practical policies impinged on local government in 
two main ways: through a new role for the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission—Labor's only financial initiative directed wholly to 
assisting local government—and through a variety of other pro-
grammes of which councils could be incidental beneficiaries. 
The 1973 amendments to the Grants Commission Act enlarged 
the Commission itself and empowered it to recommend federal 
assistance payments to local councils (through state governments 
under section 96 of the Constitution) after investigating their 
expenditure needs and revenue-raising capacities. To local govern-
ment this had the advantage of a direct earmarking of federal funds 
for local government to spend without conditions. At first there was 
some alarm at the legislative requirement that applications could 
only be made through regional organizations of councils, but the 
Commission treated these merely as post offices to collect applica-
tions and organize hearings, and for practical purposes dealt with 
councils individually. Councils were more concerned to discover that 
the Commission worked on the same basic principles as it used with 
the states: its sole object was "equalization", namely, to supplement 
the "ordinary services" budgets of councils subject to disabilities, 
to an extent necessary to enable them "to function by reasonable 
effort at a standard not appreciably below the standard of other 
local governing bodies". Examples of "disabilities" included an 
excess of non-rateable property in the council area, above-average 
numbers of pensioners, isolation and sparse population, urban 
congestion, and recent rapid growth. In principle, the equalization 
criterion precluded "wealthier" councils from receiving a grant— 
a disappointment to the associations. But in the event the Com-
mission managed to recommend grants to over 90 per cent of 
Australia's councils in both years of the scheme. Although vari-
ations in the individual amounts were weighted heavily in favour 
of the needier areas, only a score or so of New South Wales councils 
failed to receive any grant at all. Total payments to the rest were 
$21.4 million in 1974/75 and $29.3 million in 1975/76. As a whole, 
the 1974/75 grant added less than 10 per cent to the rate revenue 
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of the previous year or just over 6 per cent to total current receipts 
of councils in New South Wales. But to a deprived area like 
Blacktown in western Sydney, which received nearly a million 
dollars, it was a significant "topping-up" of its other revenues, as 
Whitlam called it when introducing the amending legislation." 
Local councils figured in other federal assistance programmes 
simply as one kind of body which could apply for direct grants 
from Canberra under certain schemes, or under others as recipients 
of a share of payments made through state governments. Some of 
these programmes—for Meals on Wheels, old people's homes, home 
nursing. Aboriginal advancement, and development and main-
tenance of local aerodromes—were established at widely different 
times before 1972, and Labor merely expanded a few of them. Of 
those that Labor initiated, easily the most important in money terms 
in New South Wales was the Regional Employment Development 
Scheme, an emergency unemployment relief measure, under which 
local councils received most of the funds allocated. Its operation 
varied considerably in quality, and reactions of councils were 
correspondingly mixed. Next in quantitative importance was the 
Area Improvement Programme, directed primarily to outer urban 
regions suffering from lack of infrastructure or amenities, as in 
outer western Sydney. The emphasis was on projects of regional 
significance, but local bodies welcomed their share of the aid. The 
Australian Assistance Plan was the programme they most disliked, 
because it attempted to organize a variety of local welfare activities 
through self-appointed "Regional Councils for Social Development" 
in which local authorities might have little or no say. Councils had 
long believed that they should be the medium for administering 
all federal grants for local welfare. But the progress and expenditure 
of the Assistance Plan were inconsiderable by the time the Whitlam 
government fell. 
Taken together, N.S.W. local bodies' share of federal moneys 
for all schemes of the type described in the previous paragraph rose 
from $1.6 million in 1972/73 to $7 million in 1973/74 and $33.6 
million in 1974/75. Four-fifths of the 1973/74 grants were for Area 
Improvement ($4.4 million) and Aboriginal advancement ($1.3 
million), while two-thirds of the 1974/75 grants were for the 
makeshift RED Scheme."" 
An experienced journalist aptly summarized the situation: "Fi-
nancially, local government is better off than it has ever been— 
though not, of course, as well off as it would like to be.""' Including 
those recommended by the Australian Grants Commission, the 
federal grants specifically earmarked for local government in New 
South Wales under the Whitlam government added some $33.8 
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million in 1974/75 (disregarding the RED Scheme grant) to the 
established forms of federal and state grants (including road grants) 
which had totalled about $64 million in 1971/72; the RED Scheme 
provided an additional $21.3 million to N.S.W. local government 
in 1974/75, and this was tripled in the 1975/76 federal budget. 
Moreover, the payments recommended by the state and federal 
Grants Commissions had raised the proportion of unconditional to 
total government grants for ordinary services expenditure from less 
than 8 per cent in 1971/72 to about 25 per cent in 1974/75. 
Local government had thus established a direct financial rela-
tionship with the federal government; it had obtained token 
recognition as an element in the federal system through its 
admittance to the Constitutional Convention; and its claims to 
recognition by the Loan Council and in the Constitution itself were 
taken seriously by at least some state and federal politicians at the 
Convention. At the same time councils were dissatisfied and wary 
about some developments. They wanted from Canberra not only 
unconditional equalization grants, but "a broad scheme of as-
sistance for all Councils". They believed Area Improvement funds 
should go to every region in turn. Whitlam's switch of emphasis 
in federal aid for roads from rural to urban roads had exasperated 
the shires. The number and variety of specific purpose grants were 
bewildering. Above all, councils rejected all regional developments 
not controlled by themselves, and preferred federal assistance to 
be given through the state government as a necessary buffer against 
untrammelled federal power."^ 
It followed that local government welcomed the "new federalism" 
policies of the Liberal and National Country parties that won 
federal office in December 1975. These policies, in principle, hitched 
local government more firmly to the federal financial structure while 
proposing to abandon most specific purpose grants and any direct 
Commonwealth institutional nexus with local government. The new 
government ended the federal Grants Commission's brief connection 
with local government; it proposed to allocate to local government 
as such a determinate percentage of personal income tax collections 
in line with its new method of calculating financial assistance for 
state governments; and it ruled that federal moneys for local 
government should be distributed among councils in each state by 
a state grants commission on the lines of that already operating 
in New South Wales. However, like the state Premiers who 
accepted the new federalism so gullibly in the early months of 1976, 
the local government leaders were to discover (what was obvious 
to detached observers from the beginning) that the practical 
implications of the new principles hinged entirely upon the actual 
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percentages determined in Canberra, and upon the extent to which 
the new grants would replace the specific-purpose payments they 
were to lose. To add to these disappointments, all the main parties' 
state leaders approached the N.S.W. general election of 1 May 1976 
with vote-seeking promises to put a brake on local government rate 
rises. 
The A.L.P. leader, Neville Wran, who gained the majority, was 
the more discouraging on balance. He declared that during its first 
term his government would relieve councils of their remaining 
contributions to state statutory bodies. But he added that New 
South Wales local government had the highest rates and the worst 
municipal services in the country; that his government would 
prescribe maximum rate increases allowable in each year; that he 
would revise the land valuation system to preclude windfall 
increases in rate revenue. And on another theme which had long 
concerned Labor rather more than its opponents—the last theme 
to be traversed in this chapter—Wran repeated that there were still 
too many small local bodies in New South Wales, and there would 
have to be some sensible amalgamations."' 
The legislation Labor introduced during 1976 was not popular 
in local council circles. It empowered the Minister for Local 
Government (taking specified cost and wage factors into account) 
to determine the maximum percentage by which all councils could 
increase the 1977 rate over that of 1976. Councils with abnormally 
low incomes in 1976 could apply for dispensation. An even more 
irritating provision required the rate to be applied to 1976, not 1977, 
valuations. In its innocence and failure to consult council represent-
atives, the government failed to realize that many valuations, 
especially in cattle-raising areas, would have fallen since 1976, 
giving its legislation in these cases the opposite effect to that 
intended."" 
REFORM 
Local councils vary as greatly in the efficiency, equity, and probity 
with which they discharge their responsibilities as in the range of 
permissible services they actually provide. These variations are a 
function partly of the wishes of influential ratepayers or organized 
constituents, but partly also of the size and income of the units, 
of the technical guidance and financial help they receive from 
governments, and of the professionalization and integration of their 
administrations. However, although there is some evidence that 
higher levels of "bureaucratization" tend to go with greater popular 
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participation, the bulk of local councillors defend small units on 
the grounds of "community of interest" and "closeness and respon-
siveness to the citizen"; they resist any shift of function to "second-
tier" authorities covering wider areas; and they jealously maintain 
their right to take part directly in administration. These views may 
not always reflect the highest motives, but on the whole they have 
prevailed in New South Wales over the efforts of would-be 
reformers of the structure, including leaders of the local government 
associations, committees and commissions of inquiry, and ministers 
of the Crown of all political persuasions. 
"Greater Sydney" and planning 
There is probably some ironic connection between the prevalent 
attitudes in local government itself and the limited role and status 
accorded to it up to the present. Some of the irony is latent in 
the second reading speech of Joseph Carruthers in 1905 on the 
Local Government Extension Bill which formed the basis of the 
present system. He said the keynote of the bill was the idea of 
growth: "to provide for the perfectly natural and free growth of 
the local governing body in powers, functions and responsibilities 
pari passu with the needs caused by growth and development of 
the district and State". As an example of such growth, he added, 
the amalgamation of metropolitan municipalities would— 
bring into existence bodies to whom the Parliament of the country may, 
in the future, see fit to entrust the duties now carried out by 
multitudinous boards and commissions. Thus, the work of water supply 
and sewerage for the city and metropolitan area, the work of the Fire 
Brigades Board, the work of the Traffic Commissioners, the functions 
of the Sydney Harbour Trust—what are these but some of the higher 
forms of municipal duty'."* 
The minister naturally focused upon the metropolis, where 
problems of area and integration were to prove the most acute. 
When he spoke, state governments had already largely pre-
determined the fate of local government there, by their extempore 
responses to the practical demands of metropolitan growth. The 
population of Sydney was over a quarter of that of the colony in 
1858 when local government was in its infancy, yet no consideration 
was given during its formative stages to an administrative body for 
the metropolis as a whole. The city's population doubled in the last 
twenty years of the nineteenth century, and governments met its 
service needs through public service departments or by setting up 
ad hoc statutory bodies such as the Metropolitan Water Sewerage 
and Drainage Board and the Sydney Harbour Trust. Some of the 
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bodies for administering specific metropolitan functions, such as the 
Water Board, included local government representatives, and raised 
the main part of their current revenues through rates. Many of 
them became large organizations commanding formidable resources 
of skills and technology. 
But the multiplication of statutory authorities enormously com-
plicated the setting of priorities for development and the co-
ordination of day-to-day operations. It sometimes resulted in 
competitive taxation of the same groups, and virtually precluded 
any effective popular control. By 1960 there were some fourteen 
such authorities, separately responsible in the Sydney metropolitan 
area (and some of them over wider areas as well) for such services 
as public transport, water supply and sewerage, electricity gener-
ation, slum clearance and housing, fire prevention, and control of 
the port. In addition, ten state departments were concerned with 
the local administration of Sydney, and there were thirty metropoli-
tan municipalities, five shires, and six county councils—a total of 
sixty-five different authorities operating in an area of 670 square 
miles."' 
Yet throughout the century governments—more especially Labor 
governments—had made repeated essays at designing and creating 
a "Greater Sydney" administration. Even before the Carruthers 
local government legislation was introduced there had been a 
conference, a parliamentary committee, and various commissions 
which considered the subject. In 1912 there was a bill for a Greater 
Sydney Convention—abortive because the political parties could not 
agree on its main terms. In 1913 a royal commission reported; 
its recommendations for a unified greater Sydney administration 
were incorporated in a bill of 1915 which was abandoned under 
the stresses of war. In 1925 the Sydney City Council itself proposed 
legislation to amalgamate an inner group of nineteen municipalities. 
In 1928 a conference of suburban councils at Parramatta favoured 
an overriding County Council under the 1919 Local Government 
Act. Labor Local Government Minister W.J. McKell's Greater 
Sydney Bill of 1931 proposed a comprehensive rationalization: 
consolidation of the existing bodies into twenty-eight councils 
including an enlarged City of Sydney; superimposition of a directly 
elected Greater Sydney Council over an area embracing the County 
of Cumberland and reaching to Camden; immediate transfer to this 
council of the functions of the Water Board, Harbour Trust, 
Transport Trust, and National Park Trust, and of the functions 
within its area of the Main Roads Board, Fire Commissioners, 
electricity generation, public parks and cemeteries, and George's 
River Bridge; and allocation of town and regional planning duties 
414 
Local Government 
to the new council. This bill went into limbo with the third Lang 
government."' 
The first inquiry with some tangible result was the Royal 
Commission on the Boundaries of Local Government Areas in the 
County of Cumberland, appointed by a Labor government in 1946. 
This review was not concerned with a unified metropolitan govern-
ment, and its three members each recommended a different degree 
of consolidation of the sixty-nine local government units then in 
the area. The member from the Local Government Department 
proposed what became the "notorious 8-city plan", the chairman 
proposed eighteen units, and the third member, from the Local 
Government Association, suggested thirty-seven units. The govern-
ment introduced a bill for the eight-city plan, but met such 
opposition from the local councils and their parliamentary spokes-
men that it finally enacted a Legislative Council Select Committee's 
proposal for thirty-nine units—including, however, an extension of 
the City of Sydney to embrace eight adjoining authorities which 
Labor's opponents reversed on regaining power (as related above). 
The eight-city plan was still A.L.P. policy in 1976, when the Wran 
government set on foot an investigation of the "efficiency" of 
metropolitan councils."' 
During the 1950s the spectre of the eight-city plan, or at least 
of further amalgamations in Sydney, so haunted the Local Govern-
ment Association that its Executive revived the notion of a "two-
tier" structure which had been endorsed by Conference in the 
1946-48 confrontation. The Executive presented a scheme to the 
1959 and 1960 Association Conferences which would have pre-
served all the local councils "for the normal functions", while 
superimposing "an overall guiding, operating and planning author-
ity for inter-urban and Metropolitan services", including water 
supply and sewerage, metropolitan transport, main roads, and fire 
protection. The central authority, except for a government-ap-
pointed chairman, would be elected by but not necessarily from 
the members of councils within its area. This scheme was accepted 
by the Association but totally rejected by a conference of metropoli-
tan councils in April 1960. The Association's secretary attributed 
this to a mixture of parochialism, fear of higher rates, and vested 
interests in the councils."' 
One reason for attempts to rationalize the structure of metropoli-
tan local government is that local councils are the traditional 
instrument for land-use planning and planning administration, and 
although they determinedly clung to this function, the existing 
group of forty assorted local authorities could not possibly provide 
the necessary planning framework for a large conurbation such as 
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Sydney. The first planning authority for the Sydney region as a 
whole was a compromise that the local government pressure group 
insisted upon. The Cumberland County Council was established in 
1945 with the sole function of developing a broad planning strategy 
for a Sydney region of sixteen hundred square miles containing 
some sixty local authorities. It had ten members elected by the 
constituent councils, shared its legislative powers with the Minister 
for Local Government, and depended largely on the local authorities 
(by way of a levy on UCV) for its finance as well as for the 
administration of its guidelines. Similar authorities were established 
for the Newcastle and Wollongong regions (Northumberland Coun-
ty Council and lllawarra Planning Authority respectively). 
The story of the Cumberland County Council has often been told, 
and there is no need to labour it here. With a majority of members 
loyal to its aims, and the consistent support of a number of councils 
and the Local Government Association, the Council produced and 
fought for plans that saved much open space in a period of hectic 
expansion (greater Sydney's population grew by a third between 
1947 and 1961). It prevented the worst excesses of urban sprawl 
and so helped to ease the strain upon state authorities struggling 
to provide housing, water supply, sewerage, and similar services to 
the growing suburbs. 
But the County Council's decisions, especially the freezing for 
a "green belt" of large tracts of land still in private hands, implied 
a permanent check on urban expansion in the areas affected, as 
well as threatening property values. For these reasons the Council 
became increasingly unpopular with landowners and local author-
ities, and received inadequate support from state agencies and 
ministers themselves, who in time bowed to the pressure and 
released the bulk of the proposed green belt for other "develop-
ment". Governments of the 1950s and 1960s also freely betrayed 
other basic urban planning principles, such as limits to height and 
density of city building, control of land speculation, adequate public 
acquisition of land for housing, open space and better road 
alignments, and the updating of public transport. Failing to check 
private land speculation and the diversion of resources into a 
wasteful boom in office building, they contributed to the scarcity 
and spiralling prices of residential land and housing, and allowed 
the ramshackle central Sydney of Depression and war days to 
become the gloomy, hopelessly congested, glass-walled canyons of 
the 1970s. The Cumberland County Council survived threats of 
extinction for thirteen years thanks to the support of its first 
minister and the ability and devotion of its first two chairmen; after 
that it was steadily undermined, and finally abolished and replaced 
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by the State Planning Authority at the end of 1963. 
The new Authority's jurisdiction was state-wide, and its members 
included some state departmental heads, a professional represent-
ative, and the Lord Mayor of Sydney as well as nominees from 
local government generally. In its own turn it was superseded by 
the Planning and Environment Commission working directly to a 
minister with a corresponding portfolio. The transfer of the more 
important planning functions to these composite state planning 
bodies was a response to a number of considerations. They were 
a conscious if belated recognition that the state government was 
inevitably involved in the management of a city containing over 
60 per cent of the state's population—indeed, Newcastle, Sydney, 
and Wollongong together contained 85 per cent—and that any 
planned development of these areas was inseparable from that of 
the state as a whole. Effective metropolitan planning required clear-
cut commitment and policy direction at government level—as the 
chequered career of the Cumberland County Council had shown. 
That experience had also shown that relevant state departments and 
public utility corporations must be responsibly geared into the 
designing and operation of co-ordinated land-use plans. Finally, the 
apparent subservience of many small local councils to the pressure 
of vested interests, their inability to meet the planning challenges 
of the metropolis, and their resistance to all attempts to raise their 
potential through reorganization had sapped the very influence on 
planning they had striven so hard to retain.^" 
Amalgamation 
Problems of local government structure in the non-metropolitan 
parts of the state are somewhat different, though they stem from 
the same basic causes. Historically the structure and functions of 
local government have been determined by: (1) factors favouring 
smallness during the half-century of voluntary incorporation, includ-
ing difficulties of movement and the conditions of incorporation; 
(2) the resulting smallness of population in most units, precluding 
substantial concentrations of resources and staff; (3) the "respon-
siveness" which the previous factors made possible and the con-
spicuousness and hence unpopularity of local taxation, tending to 
minimize the functions councils were willing to undertake; (4) the 
tendency of governments, contrary to the prognosis of Carruthers 
in 1905, to reduce rather than expand the services entrusted to local 
government; and (5) outside the metropolitan areas, the ingrained 
habit of establishing separate local government units for a town 
and its rural hinterland, despite their obvious interdependence. Thus 
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the problems met in non-metropolitan New South Wales are not 
so much those of large-scale land-use planning and control as the 
struggle of some councils to provide even minimum services, the 
disparity of resources and services especially between urban and 
rural councils, and the most palpable inequities of this division 
where the fringes of a growing town have spread beyond the 
municipality into the neighbouring shire. 
These are largely structural problems which, as to the provision 
of services, were partly met by the creation of larger special-purpose 
authorities under the county councils provisions of 1919. (The 
county council device, unique to New South Wales as already 
indicated, is now widely used throughout the state, and the extent 
of trading undertakings conducted not only by county councils but 
also by general-purpose local councils is unmatched in local 
government in other states.) But the more serious structural 
difficulties obviously point to amalgamation: indeed while 
amalgamation—especially if initiated from without—is generally 
controversial, no one has ever suggested that any N.S.W. local units 
should be smaller (excepting, perhaps, the large shires on the 
outskirts of Sydney which have become suburbanized and are 
therefore among the most populous local government units in 
Australia). 
As a matter of fact there has been considerable amalgamation 
of local authorities in New South Wales—more, at least since 1947, 
than in all the other states put together.^' In 1973 there were one-
third fewer general-purpose authorities than in 1906. Most of this 
reduction occurred after 1930, and it was virtually confined to the 
municipalities, the number of which was halved in the next few 
decades (see table 35). The incorporation of small, uneconomic, 
rural municipalities into the surrounding shires had gone on steadily 
throughout the period after 1920, and of course there were 
periodical rearrangements of shire boundaries. The most notable 
consolidations were the merging of nine municipalities, one city, 
and parts of two shires in Greater Newcastle in 1938; that of two 
shires, a municipality, and a city into Greater Wollongong in 1947; 
the creation of Shoalhaven Shire from five municipalities and two 
shires and the enlargement of the City of Sydney by adding eight 
municipalities, both in 1948; the reduction from sixty-nine to thirty-
nine units in the County of Cumberland (already mentioned) in 
1949; and the incorporation of two municipalities and parts of two 
shires in the City of Grafton in 1957. 
Throughout the period the various changes had been proposed, 
investigated, and decided on an ad hoc basis, involving most 
frequently in the smaller cases a scheme prepared by a Local 
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Government Department officer and, where objections were raised, 
an inquiry by a single commissioner with the parties legally 
represented. Some of the large reorganizations followed royal 
commissions, as we have seen. Decisions to act were always reserved 
for the minister or the government. The magnitude of Labor-
initiated consolidations, especially in the first years after the Second 
World War, spurred the Local Government Associations as early 
as 1951 to argue for a standing boundary-investigating body on 
which they would be represented, with no change happening except 
by agreement of the affected ratepayers. Considered submissions 
by a joint committee of the two Associations in 1958-60 finally 
secured government acceptance, but with modifications, including 
omission of any requirement for local referendums." 
The Local Government Boundaries Commission, set up by a 1963 
amendment to the Local Government Act, comprises a chairman 
appointed by government, a departmental member appointed by the 
Under-Secretary, and a local government representative appointed 
from a panel nominated jointly by the two Associations. The 
chairman from 1967 was himself a veteran Association man. 
Central features of the Commission's operation were: (1) that it 
worked only upon precisely defined references from the Minister, 
usually after the department had carefully investigated a cogent 
proposal from an individual or a local government body seeking 
change; (2) that the Commission could only make recommendations 
to the minister, whose decision whether to approve change or not 
remained final; (3) that legal representation before the Commission 
was not allowed; (4) that the Commission held public inquiries when 
proposals were contested; and (5) that once entrusted with an 
investigation, the Commission could, within its terms of reference, 
initiate modifications of the original proposals. 
Apart from these machinery provisions, the legislation laid down 
no criteria or policy to guide the Commission, nor have the 
governments formally done so. The Commission has no research 
staff, its methods are largely informal and unsystematic, and its 
recommendations have at times shown apparent inconsistencies of 
approach. So have the decisions of ministers which have generally 
followed the Commission's recommendations. 
The main criticisms of this situation were that the Commission 
as constituted could not of its own motion make any consistent 
reassessment of the local government structure established in 1906 
nor pursue any systematic plan of reorganization of that structure. 
It could not even deal with secondary consequences of its recom-
mendations. It was not surprising that its early activity was sporadic 
—mainly responding to requests for the realignment of boundaries 
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Table 35. Number of Municipalities and Shires 
Municipalities 
Shires 
Totals 
1906 
193 
134 
327 
1930 
181 
138 
319 
1957 
96 
134 
230 
1963 
92 
133 
225 
1969 
92 
133 
225 
1973 
90 
133 
223 
Source: New South Wales Official Year Books. 
and regrouping of areas under different authorities—nor that (as 
table 35 shows) its work had made a negligible impact on the total 
number of local bodies in the ten years of its existence to 1973. 
By 1971 the Associations and the minister had already agreed 
on the need for a comprehensive review of the organization of local 
government areas throughout the state, to adjust the ageing system 
to new population patterns, secure a fairer distribution of the 
incidence of rating, and facilitate more efficient management. The 
government rejected the Associations' pleas that the Boundaries 
Commission, not a royal commission, should do the job and should 
examine functions along with structure. At the end of 1971 it 
appointed a Committee of Inquiry under C.J. Barnett, a former 
Under-Secretary for Local Government, to report whether existing 
local government areas and administrative practices were "the most 
appropriate to secure proper economical and efficient local govern-
ment" and if not, to propose appropriate changes. The Committee 
included the chairmen of the Boundaries Commission and the Local 
Government Grants Commission, well-known local government 
members of the Local Government Grants Commission and of the 
State Planning Authority, the Deputy Town Clerk of Sydney, the 
president of the state Local Government Engineers' Association, 
who became an Assistant Secretary with the federal Department 
of Urban and Regional Development, a professor of government, 
and a management consultant. The Committee reported in Decem-
ber 1973." 
On the subject of structure the Barnett Committee, two-thirds 
of whom had for decades been prominent local government coun-
cillors or council servants, were uncompromising. "Local govern-
ment", said the Report, "suffers from the existence of too many 
small uneconomic areas, resulting in fragmentation of authority, 
unnecessary duplication of assets, and under-utilization of plant, 
equipment and human resources, and inability to provide the varied 
kinds of expertise required by local councils in the modern world."'" 
The Committee's argument was deductive rather than empirical. 
"It must be conceded that if a council has a larger area and 
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population, it is not necessarily more efficient. If a council has 
adequate resources, however, it has the opportunity to be efficient 
and efficiency will depend only upon effective management."" 
Measured in terms of relative spending, the importance of local 
government in Australia was declining compared with that of other 
levels of government, and a more significant role could be claimed 
only if units were larger. The smallest units tended to be the most 
dependent on government grants, and this weakened local auton-
omy. 
The evidence showed there was no consensus among witnesses 
upon what area was "too large" to be "local", and the Committee 
did not think that larger areas would hinder public participation 
or submerge the identity of local communities. It did not agree that 
urban and rural residents in the country had different interests and 
problems for local government purposes. It recommended therefore 
the abolition of the formal distinction between municipalities and 
shires, and the reduction of the 233 existing bodies by amalgama-
tion to ninety-seven "district councils", including twenty to cover 
an enlarged Sydney region then embracing over forty. A district 
council should be empowered to levy different rates in urban and 
rural parts of its area. The time was not ripe for a two-tier system 
in the Sydney region, but the twenty new district councils should 
set up a joint committee for co-ordination. 
The minister allowed six weeks for comments and submissions 
on the proposals. Reasoned debate was difficult because the narrow 
terms of reference had prevented the Committee from providing 
its recommendations with a supporting context on relevant matters, 
for example the need to rewrite the Local Government Act and 
to reconsider councils' functions and finance (including the possi-
bility of a "home rule" charter). To the Associations the Report 
was "something of a bombshell". It had, they said, "gone a great 
deal further than most of us thought it would"." They agreed that 
some amalgamations and boundary changes were needed but 
rejected outright the proposed reduction of units to ninety-seven. 
The Shires Association, in addition, rejected the basic concept of 
merging country shires and municipalities and proposed that any 
suggested boundary changes should not be referred to the Bound-
aries Commission unless the adjustment was requested by the 
councils concerned. By April 1974 the Barnett Report was dead: 
noting the protests on all sides, and the threat that some Liberal 
back-benchers would cross the floor to defeat any legislative 
enactment, the minister of the day. Sir Charles Cutler, advised 
cabinet to take no action. 
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However, Cutler shared his predecessors' belief that some more 
systematic approach to rationalization was necessary in the rural 
areas, at least. Describing the Barnett Report as "a pretty good 
text book on Local Government", he adopted it as the basis for 
a series of references during 1974 empowering the Boundaries 
Commission (as the Associations had recommended before the 
Committee was appointed) to review local government boundaries 
throughout the state, in piecemeal fashion, beginning with the 
provincial cities in order. Metropolitan pressures persuaded him, 
however, to exclude the County of Cumberland. Progress was slow 
for a year, as the Commission left the initiative to the councils, 
most of which dragged their feet. By this time the minister was 
sufficiently committed to the programme to chide councillors and 
staff for merely "looking after their end of the stick" in opposing 
amalgamations; he told the leaders of the Shires Association in 
September 1975 that he thought "between 140 and 150 Councils 
would be appropriate for N.S.W.", and that he was aiming at this 
"to make it more difficult for a future Government to carry out 
gross amalgamations". He had already told the 1975 Country Party 
Conference that if rationalization continued to be frustrated he 
would seek his government's approval for legislation to force 
amalgamation." 
These hard words earned the minister no bouquets, but economic 
circumstances—particularly the changed basis of Commonwealth 
road grants—were now driving rural shires to seek amalgamations 
for financial survival. There followed a spate of activity which by 
June 1976 made the Boundaries Commission chairman think it "fair 
to say that Local Government has achieved more in the last twelve 
months regarding proposals to change its structure than it ac-
complished in the previous 100 years". The Commission's procedure 
was to arrange financial surveys and ask councils to make their 
own proposals to the minister, obviating a Commission inquiry if 
there were no objections. The Commission travelled the state to 
help councils to formulate proposals where there was disagreement, 
or to resort to proposals of its own. In the last six months of 1974 
four pairs of municipalities and shires voluntarily amalgamated and 
a large number of other negotiations were under way. By June 1976 
the minister had received over sixty proposals from councils, and 
there had been five more amalgamations, only one requiring a 
ministerial fiat to resolve a disagreement over the merger. In the 
words of one observer, in New South Wales structural "reform is 
firmly back in the hands of the Boundaries Commission"—but now 
with wider scope and somewhat greater momentum.'* 
The Barnett Committee's recommendations on council man-
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agement received shorter shrift. The Committee criticized the direct 
participation of councillors in detailed administration and the lack 
of statutory control of staff by senior officials, who nowadays were 
often better qualified for management than part-time elected 
members. In a nutshell, the Committee's view was that "local 
government must move from the ranks of amateurism to the ranks 
of professionalism if it is to keep pace with other arms of 
government and with private enterprise. In future, councils must 
be concerned with policies, not pre-occupied with potholes."" The 
Committee was impressed by the council-manager system operating 
in the Sydney County Council and in some places abroad— 
especially Ireland—and recommended a similar system, "under 
which the council exercises reserved functions [listed in the Report] 
mainly directed towards the formulation of policy and adminis-
trative review and under which a chief officer will be appointed by 
the council, who will not be an elected member of the council, to 
exercise all other powers necessary for the local government of the 
area"."" The Local Government Association Executive opposed these 
recommendations altogether; the Shires Association at a special 
conference on the Report resolved that adoption of such a scheme 
should be left to the discretion of individual councils. According to 
Cutler, cabinet was content with this policy, but would also approve 
the appointment of a chief officer "where he [the Minister] felt such 
an officer was needed"." 
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8 
Appraisal 
This book tries to describe and explain the more enduring parts 
of the institutional frameworks within which New South Wales 
politics, government, and administration go on. Some of the 
frameworks are constitutional, or otherwise embodied in law. Some 
are the internal rules and practices of institutions, like the standing 
orders of the parliamentary chambers or the rules and conventions 
of the political parties, which are not necessarily enforceable in the 
law courts. Some of the frameworks are neither legal nor extra-
legal rules, but sets of beliefs or allegiances distributed in some 
stable way among relevant people, such as the "party 
identifications" of voters, or the notion that the Opposition should 
have a share of debating time in the Assembly. Then there are 
wider social frameworks—the composition of the community, the 
economic system, and the distribution of property and income, for 
example—which affect such political phenomena as the patterns of 
party support, the operation of the electoral law and the relative 
efficacy of different organized groups. 
It is possible to picture these frameworks with some confidence 
because they are remarkably stable. It is arguable that they have 
shown no significant movement away from the patterns established 
half a century ago or more. Hence anyone concerned about politics 
and government needs to understand them: they condition all that 
happens in the daily interplay of influence, decisions, and reactions 
that agitates the media and the immediate participants and may 
entertain the casual observer. The frameworks include the patterns 
of interest and motivation that set political actors in motion, and 
they put limits (rarely breached but of course not absolute) on what 
the actors are likely to do. Among other things, the frameworks 
help to make predictable most of the actions and reactions of the 
bureaucracy to the challenges, demands, and pressures of politicians 
on the one hand and "the administered" on the other. Anyone who 
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thoroughly grasps the frameworks may be gladdened or saddened 
by this or that headline in the political news—but he should rarely 
be surprised. 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
An attempt to analyse and explain frameworks is necessarily an 
incomplete account of governmental reality, in at least four 
important ways. First, it does not provide a coherent running history 
of past or recent politics. Although this book recounts particular 
episodes and outlines the evolution of some institutions, it focuses 
mainly on the statics of the system. It needs to be complemented 
by historical narratives like Hawker's of the parliament and 
Larcombe's of local government. Second, the scope of even this 
modest analysis is limited by available space and the author's 
competence. Probably the most glaring omissions are descriptions 
of the internal organization of the line departments and agencies 
of the state, of the work of the large statutory corporations, and 
of the system of judicial administration. A record of changes in 
the former, in considerable detail, can be found in the annual 
reports which nearly all the agencies issue, and in those of the Public 
Service Board for agencies under its jurisdiction. Judicial adminis-
tration is in some ways as technical as agricultural science or 
railway engineering, and has been omitted partly for that reason 
and partly because there is no available body of political and 
administrative research on the subject.' 
Third, the book does not delineate its subject-matter in terms 
of any labelled "conceptual framework" such as social action, 
structure-functionism, behaviourism, systems theory, and the like. 
These are elaborate, ingenious, and in varying degrees influential 
systems of metaphors, attempting to make sense of society or 
government by drawing analogies between types of human rela-
tionships and some more or less complex physical "model" that 
works like an organism or a machine. It is, indeed, very difficult 
to talk about the "working" of society or government without using 
metaphor: we have been speaking here of "frameworks" and 
"patterns", and in earlier chapters of "pressure" groups and right 
and left "wings". Even in physical science, explanation often starts 
from metaphor. But it is possible to say a good deal about the statics 
of social relations without resort to metaphor, using direct psy-
chological description instead. Without needing to postulate that 
collections of people function like an organism or a machine, we 
can say more directly that men and women have interests such as 
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income and cherished beliefs, that they want different things to 
happen, that they associate with one another for common purposes, 
that some of them pass laws and can order others about, that 
individuals can acquire influence or suffer loss or initiate change, 
and that their scope for action is circumscribed by the influence 
and actions of other people and the constraints of the physical 
world. If we keep the "reification" and the personification of social 
collectivities to a minimum, we shall more easily remember to 
ascribe the responsibility for political and administrative action to 
the specific handfuls of individuals who actually initiate or carry 
it out. 
That was one guideline—imperfectly followed—in writing this 
book. Another was to keep where possible to the vocabulary and 
concepts used by politicians, party members, public servants, and 
plain people themselves in their respective pursuits. They are 
generally innocent of the abstract roles in which the models cast 
them, and this is one reason for the sense of unreality that many 
models convey. As a way of understanding human action, model-
building with its abstract yet subjective interpretations imposed 
from outside is an unsatisfying substitute for, say, the empathy and 
understanding that the participant-observer gains from inside. 
When Labor members of the Legislative Council vote against its 
abolition each will have his own peculiar reasons. Abstract analysis 
will label them as bourgeois traitors to the working class, or as 
instruments for system maintenance, or as the victims of role-
conflict, or as power-brokers clutching for spoils, and so on. One, 
or more, or all, of these aggregate concepts may be quite apt— 
even illuminating—given more detailed information about the 
action and the actors than this book commands. But the prerequisite 
for understanding is to know as much as possible about what each 
individual thought and did.' 
Fourth, the book is short on overt appraisal. For the most part 
it describes what is—and especially what has proved durable. "The 
descriptive approach", we read, "accepts the status quo'' (no doubt 
intended to mean "things as they are"). Clearly this is not 
necessarily true, and if it were it would not lessen the utility of 
the descriptive approach even for those who want great changes. 
History is littered with the bones of failed revolutionaries who did 
not understand the systems they sought to destroy. The book aims 
primarily at a broad understanding of the actual nature of politics 
and government in New South Wales, where stability (it observes) 
seems far more pervasive and probable than rapid change. To 
examine all the changes that might be desirable (from the various 
possible points of view) would take several books of another kind. 
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There are judgements in this one, based on pretty obvious but rarely 
explicit preferences, and mostly confined to brief asides. To remove 
any illusion that in this case description implies the irreproachable, 
some of the most debated aspects of New South Wales government 
are noted briefly. 
APPRAISING N.S.W. GOVERNMENT 
It should first be pointed out that the more sweeping the judgement 
the lower any consensus is likely to be. In mid-January 1971, for 
example, one Sydney daily gave an editorial view of the achieve-
ments of the Liberal-Country Party state government since it 
gained office in 1965. It had passed new anti-drug and anti-thug 
laws; increased the number of police; initiated prison reform; taken 
action against pollution; established a Consumer Affairs Bureau; 
resumed work on the Eastern Suburbs railway; cleaned up the 
government of the City of Sydney; extended the national park 
system and induced the federal government to relinquish its control 
(established for defence purposes) of the pick of the harbour 
foreshores; and obtained bigger shares of Commonwealth money 
for the state governments generally. In the following week the 
political correspondent of the other main Sydney daily listed the 
difficulties of the same government, stemming mainly from its "lack 
of money": it could not build needed new hospitals or modernize 
existing ones, speed up construction of the Eastern Suburbs railway, 
expressways, schools, dams, or harbour works, adequately update 
public transport services, improve education facilities, eliminate 
overcrowding in the prisons, provide more homes for low-income 
earners, provide and equip enough police to ensure road safety, or 
give relief to local authorities.^ 
Those statements are not directly contradictory on most points. 
Rather they illustrate some of the different criteria available for 
judgement and the multiplicity of issues to which judgement can 
be directed. One can point to the general standard of integrity of 
the N.S.W. public service as measured by the number of cases the 
Public Service Board deals with each year, including convictions 
in the courts for felonies at one end and minor offences warranting 
only a warning at the other. Over the past twenty years the annual 
figure has remained at fewer than two in a thousand of the people 
employed, and was nearer to one in a thousand in 1974/75. Offences 
serious enough to call for dismissals or forced retirements repre-
sented about one-third of this figure. Again, one can note areas 
where the modernity of the N.S.W. administration compares 
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favourably with that of others, as in the early introduction of 
personnel counselling and organization and methods techniques in 
the 1950s, or of management audits and corporate planning by 
objectives in the 1970s, or of a state archives and records disposals 
policy under the Public Library of N.S.W. in 1953 and of an 
independent Archives Authority under an up-to-date statute in 1960 
—this last some fifteen years in advance of the Commonwealth. 
On the debit side one could cite other random examples: the long 
survival of seniority as the dominant principle of promotion, the 
turbid jungle of the public accounts, or a court system whose last 
major structural reform, initiated in the late 1960s, was judicially 
satirized as "a great leap forward to 1875"." 
Of the matters that have aroused most public debate, a few, such 
as mental hospital administration in the 1950s, prisons, and perhaps 
educational administration to the mid-1970s, have lain within the 
domain of the public service proper.* More extensive and persistent 
problems have beset various statutory commissions, the main ones 
being concerned with planning, housing, ports, police, and public 
transport. For a selection from these we can list symptoms but 
attempt no diagnosis here. 
Take ports first. Only four ports matter on the New South Wales 
coast, and of these Sydney Harbour and Botany Bay between them 
handle 60 per cent of the shipping and cargo (Sydney alone over 
50 per cent). Port management is divided between various public 
authorities. The Maritime Services Board is responsible for provid-
ing and maintaining wharves, channels, and other facilities at 
Sydney and Newcastle, the state Public Works Department for 
corresponding services at Port Kembia and all others. The handling 
of cargoes remains with private enterprise, while the employment 
of waterside labour is regulated by the Australian Stevedoring 
Industry Authority, a federal government agency. In the mid-1970s 
a federal Transport Minister called the port of Sydney "the slowest 
container-handler in the world"—which was not seriously disputed 
since the port of Sydney was already notorious for its inefficiency, 
delays, and costliness in other operations. Botany Bay has hitherto 
served only some oil refineries, but the Liberal-Country government 
began to develop it as a second major port for Sydney. Under the 
Wran government (May 1976) the scheme was suspended for 
further investigation amid bitter controversy over its probable 
contribution to pollution and congestion, impact on the environ-
ment, and threat to ordered urban development. 
"Corrective Services" (to use the name given in 1970 to the 
former Department of Prisons) has operated under severe strains 
for a decade, resulting partly, it would seem, from well-meant but 
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inadequately supported attempts to transform in that period a 
system inherited almost unchanged from the last century. The press 
hailed J.C. Maddison (responsible for prisons from 1965 to 1974) 
as the best Minister for Justice the state ever had, one who by 
1971 had "already . . . made NSW the leader in prison reform 
in Australia".^ Aided by an equally reform-minded Commissioner, 
he pursued a policy emphasizing rehabilitation rather than retribu-
tion, and calculated incidentally to reduce overcrowding in the 
state's most ancient and outmoded gaols. The policy included: a 
greater use of probation instead of gaol for first offenders, enabling 
all prisoners to be considered for parole after serving twelve months 
in gaol; separating the apparently "reformable" convicts from the 
recidivists into different institutions or on to probation; introducing 
the "periodic detention" and "work-release" system (confining the 
convicted person only at weekends or at night); and releasing long-
term prisoners by day for educational courses—in short, dealing 
with as many convicted people as possible outside the prison system. 
The minister also reconstituted the Parole Board and gave it a more 
liberal charter, built a new "prison without walls" at Cessnock, 
established a Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, and 
appointed a permanent Corrective Services Advisory Committee 
with representatives of the bench, the church, academic social 
science, and public servants to investigate and advise on the 
operation and improvement of corrective policies. 
But the very reforms created problems which, along with a 
backlog of existing ones, outstripped the administrative provisions 
to implement the reforms. By its policy of increasing the maximum 
sentences for serious crimes while "classifying out" the milder 
prisoners from the maximum security gaols, the government filled 
these gaols with longer-sentence convicts. This increased the strains 
on both the inmates and the prison staff. The latters' occupation 
was neither attractive nor respected; warders remained poorly paid 
and trained, and they feared the effects of the new reforms. The 
prisons remained as grim as ever, and lack of staff hindered any 
diversification of their traditional routines. At the Bathurst gaol 
there were serious riots in October 1970 and February 1974, 
followed by persistent allegations by responsible people of brutal 
retaliation on prisoners by prison staff. After the second riot, when 
the gaol was virtually burnt down, the government at last agreed 
to hold a royal commission on the violence and its ultimate causes, 
then decided to defer it until charges against the prisoners were 
disposed of—producing an inevitable delay of up to three years. 
The royal commission was in progress at the time of writing. 
Warders at Long Bay Gaol (Sydney) had supported in 1971 the 
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calls for an inquiry into prison administration as a whole, but the 
government ignored them. There were further revolts of prisoners 
at Parramatta and other gaols. Warders throughout the state went 
on strike on three days in July 1973, and again in March 1974, 
partly in protest at misconduct charges against some colleagues, 
partly to support again a wider inquiry than the government had 
yet promised into the Bathurst burning. 
The strains outside the gaols were not so dramatic, but at least 
as severe for the staff and the convicts. The new policies required 
a massive expansion of the professionally staffed probation and 
parole services to supervise and help the increased numbers of 
convicted people at large in the community. For example, in 1952, 
a year after the probation and parole services were first established, 
the courts released 111 people on probation. The figure for 1973 
was 2,628, and in January 1974 there was a total of nearly 6,000 
people nominally under probation supervision. From 1966 to the 
end of 1972 over four thousand parole orders were issued; in 
January 1974 there were nearly eighteen hundred on parole or 
licence. But the necessary funds for expanding the staff propor-
tionately and for in-service training were apparently not forth-
coming. In three years after 1970 the average case load for an 
experienced officer increased by half, and staff wastage steadily rose. 
In January 1973 the two services were amalgamated, some said 
"to save the parole service" by pooling staff; the effects were to 
dilute the coverage of the probation service as well, and to accelerate 
the rate of staff wastage. The staffs of both services had resisted 
the amalgamation, and towards the end of 1973 more than half 
of them held a special meeting to "record their grave concern" at 
inadequate staffing, lack of facilities, the need to compromise on 
professional standards, and the wide discrepancy now existing 
between "the declared and the operational values in departmental 
policy". Reports to the Parole Board and the courts on individual 
cases had necessarily become perfunctory through lack of time to 
investigate them, and supervision had fallen to a level of which 
parolees themselves complained. In the circumstances, the propor-
tions of convicts who actually failed in their probation or parole 
obligations were surprisingly modest.'' 
Police forces around the world are not the proudest exhibits of 
any government in modern times. Whether or not they have actually 
changed for the worse, they have come to be seen as instruments 
for class discrimination if not oppression, as being careless of civil 
liberties, imperfectly under representative political control, inclined 
if not addicted to brutality, susceptible to corruption, and inefficient 
at combating crime, if not colluding in it. There has been evidence 
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of all these characteristics in the New South Wales Police Force, 
but the question is how much, and nothing would be more foolish 
than to stereotype the force in that way without close inquiry. The 
N.S.W. force has an established past of over a century and a certain 
tradition that most of its members seem to respect, and it earns 
public credit for effective and disinterested activities such as search 
and rescue operations, police-citizens' boys' clubs, unofficial chari-
ties, and the like. But, like other police forces, it has also suffered 
from the refusal of governments to see the need for better pay and 
working conditions, for more flexible methods of recruitment, 
training, and promotion, for modernization of equipment, organiza-
tion, and techniques, and for firmer parliamentary control and 
review. 
These are, at least, the kinds of factors which might account for 
some of the recent history. It seems that for much of the time there 
has not been enough ministerial interest in the police. The portfolio 
had been with the Chief Secretary until 1942, when Labor Premier 
McKell took it over from a Chief Secretary who had reason to 
dislike the current Police Commissioner. As most Premiers after 
that were also Treasurers, they had little time to spare for this minor 
portfolio, a fact acknowledged at last by Premier Askin in 1973 
when he transferred the portfolio to the Minister for Justice, 
Maddison. The inertia of ministers had been encouraged or excused 
by the statutory independence of the Police Commissioner. The 
Commissioner in 1973, N.T.W. Allan, was fully prepared to use 
this independence to wage a public battle against Maddison, who 
supported the idea of an independent tribunal to investigate the 
not infrequent complaints against police behaviour such as abuse 
of powers, mistreatment of people in custody, and harassment of 
disadvantaged groups such as Aboriginals. A tribunal had long been 
advocated in some of the media and by citizen bodies such as the 
Council for Civil Liberties, who claimed that the existing system 
of internal investigation by the Police Department was thoroughly 
unsatisfactory. After taking over the police portfolio Maddison 
induced the government to announce a compromise plan for a 
tribunal, not to investigate initial complaints but to review any 
police investigation deemed faulty; ultimately the proposal lapsed.' 
The police force was commanded by officers who had risen 
through a strict seniority system from the bottom where recruitment 
standards were undemanding educationally. When the government 
lifted one officer over two intermediate ranks to fill an additional 
Assistant Commissioner post in 1972, it was reported that his 
colleagues were profoundly shocked: "they feel they can no longer 
plan their careers with any certainty".' Under such a regime, and 
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with governments apparently unconcerned, the level of sophisti-
cation in intellectual, administrative, and material equipment 
lagged well behind social developments, according to some indica-
tions. Only in the late 1960s were moves begun to add several 
hundred public servants to the department for clerical and typing 
duties which had hitherto taken up the time of uniformed police. 
When public and political pressure forced the department into an 
investigation of organized crime in clubs, it was put in charge of 
a detective-inspector and conducted mainly by a sergeant, without 
back-up of any kind. Police evidence before a subsequent royal 
commission suggested that the inspector did not consider himself 
equipped for the inquiry, and that it needed a task force of experts 
including actuaries, accountants, and lawyers; the royal com-
missioner found that one of the three police investigators was 
unreliable and another incompetent, and that their reports were 
inconsistent, inaccurate, and superficial.'" When the government was 
subsequently challenged to put a stop to the well-known illegal 
gambling clubs flourishing in various parts of central Sydney, the 
efforts of the police were the butt of media and cartoonists' ridicule 
for months. 
Meanwhile, newspaper investigating teams were reporting that 
the rate of crime generally was increasing fast while the 
effectiveness of the police force "in solving crimes was diminishing. 
Towards the end of 1971, while the Police Commissioner was 
supplying the Premier with soothing figures on the subject for 
parliament, one of his own detective-sergeants, employed on the new 
police computer system, supplied the press with figures showing that 
police were clearing up only 27 per cent of serious crimes instead 
of the 45 per cent claimed in the Commissioner's annual report 
for 1970 and in his current assertions to the parliament. The 1971 
report, based on the computer calculations for the first time, fully 
confirmed the lower figure which the Commissioner and the Premier 
had denied—but by that time the conscientious detective-sergeant 
had been dismissed from the force for disclosing secret and 
"inaccurate" police statistics, knowing this would embarrass the 
Police Commissioner and the government. 
In April 1972 the Police Commissioner stated that the N.S.W. 
Police Force was "at a pitch of perfection which has never been 
known in the Commonwealth of Australia"." In March of that year 
eight policemen had been dismissed and two had resigned over the 
destruction of reports on traffic offences, and a detective had lost 
an appeal against his dismissal for accepting a two hundred-dollar 
bribe. In June a constable was gaoled for two years over dealings 
in stolen cars, three detectives were suspended after investigations 
into an alleged car-stealing racket, and four detectives were 
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dismissed for alleged association with drug addicts and pushers. In 
July twenty-six policemen were dismissed for selling accident 
statistics to private inquiry agents acting for insurance firms. In 
all, more than fifty police were dismissed between January and 
August, and by the end of the year the total was seventy-four, with 
at least another dozen resigning for disciplinary reasons.'^ Not for 
nothing had the Sydney Morning Herald called Allan "a Police 
Commissioner of . . . monumental complacency".'^ 
Public transport, especially railways, is an activity that plagues 
many governments in countries with sparse populations, great 
distances, and no lack of motor vehicles and passable roads. But 
why, in a state with the great bulk of its community and industry 
in densely populated metropolitan areas, are "the huge losses being 
made by the Public Transport Commission. . . the greatest single 
problem the NSW Government faces in trying to overcome its 
current budgetary difficulties"?'" The usual answers to this question 
form a vicious circle: massive increases in costs (of which 80 per 
cent were wages and wage-related items in the 1970s) have 
generally not been passed on to the public, and when fares and 
freight charges have been increased the services have lost passengers 
and goods to private road transport. Public passenger transport is 
unattractive and not as safe or comfortable as it should be, and 
to improve it in these respects means more costs and hence more 
losses still, at least in the short run. The general rises in wages 
which increase transport costs also enable the community to afford 
more cars. 
Whatever the explanation, the facts are clear enough. In 1972/73 
the N.S.W. government buses carried only one-third the number 
of passengers buses and trams carried thirty years earlier. Govern-
ment tram and bus services in Sydney and Newcastle have been 
consistently unprofitable since the Second World War. Country rail 
passenger services have always run at a loss, subsidized by urban 
dwellers. Urban passenger train services, once able to break even 
or nearly so, have been losing heavily in recent years. Freight 
revenue once carried the rest of the railways financially; indeed 
there was an overall profit on the railways in five of the six years 
to 1969. Freight services later became a major source of loss. 
Ignoring capital transactions and debt charges, the state rail and 
bus services' operating costs and revenue just balanced in 1971/72; 
the operating loss was $51 million in 1972/73, $159 million in 
1974/75,and $330 million in 1975/76. 
This was more than a question of inflation, nor was it entirely 
the result of social and technical changes like the spread of the 
automobile. Governments since the 1930s had neglected the upkeep 
438 
Appraisal 
and modernization of the railways and their rolling stock and 
ancillary equipment, spending probably more than ten times as 
much on roads, freeways, and traffic lights. Trains became en-
demically subject to accidents, breakdowns, and failures to meet 
timetables. Services were cut, on the ferries as well as the trains. 
Railway carriages and buses, and their stations and terminals, were 
dismal and dirty. Vandalism became rife. Industrial relations and 
working conditions, especially on the railways, suggested the 
atmosphere of the previous century— but the standards of service 
did not. 
The grand gesture, in 1972, of setting up a Public Transport 
Commission of several members on unprecedented salaries to 
control the completely disparate functions of rail, bus, and ferry 
changed little but the colour of the vehicles. Its attempt to revise 
metropolitan rail timetables in May 1975 produced chaos and had 
to be scrapped. The Chief Commissioner, specially recruited from 
Britain, lasted only three years of his first five-year term and 
resigned. Governments switched policies. The Askin government 
raised rail fares by 50 per cent in 1971, and 20 per cent in 1974; 
the Lewis government added 5 per cent in 1975 and cut back rail 
services; although fares were no higher in proportion to wages in 
1975 than in 1955, the 1971 rise alone lost at least fifty million 
passenger journeys a year. In June 1974 the director of the three-
year Sydney Area Transportation Study, a former member of the 
Transport Commission, told a press conference: "There has been 
a complete loss of morale by the executives and staff of the NSW 
Public Transport Commission. . . . You can see this lack of morale 
at every level from management to conductors."'-^ In 1974/75 bus 
fares increased by an average of 50 per cent; passenger journeys 
fell by over eight million; revenue increased by $2.9 million and 
costs by $13 million. At the end of 1975 the Lewis government 
decided to increase the spending allocation to public transport by 
60 per cent to $122 million, largely for new rolling stock for 
passengers and freight. In 1976 one of the first acts of the Wran 
government was to reduce rail fares by 20 per cent and announce 
a much costlier rehabilitation programme. 
The foregoing sketches are not presented as balanced appraisals; 
they merely offer a few facts to suggest why the services in question 
are particularly subject to criticism and concern, from a variety 
of "value" standpoints. Other results of state activity (or inactivity) 
are less prominent in the media but no less disturbing to the 
minority of people with strong egalitarian beliefs. They include, for 
example, the pronounced residential segregation of different social 
groups especially in metropolitan areas, and the way in which the 
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distribution of many kinds of public expenditure and services tends 
to be skewed in favour of the already more fortunate areas. This 
is due not only to the greater influence and wealth of people in 
these areas but to a variety of disparate factors, including the 
topography of the metropolitan region and the changing distribution 
of population. Typical results are that the newer and more deprived 
areas, proportionately to their needs, tend to have fewer hospital 
beds, less sewerage, inferior municipal services, inadequate personal 
social services, and inferior roads and public transport. Some of 
these differences may be exacerbated, for example, by systems of 
matching grants that favour the more prosperous bodies, or by 
massive investment in freeways and other public works that help 
the privileged areas first. Many of the federal Labor programmes 
of 1973-75 were directed against these kinds of inequality; New 
South Wales and Victoria were prime targets of these programmes 
because they had the most extensive and rapidly growing metropoli-
tan areas. 
Three other broad aspects of appraisal of a governmental system 
concern the extent to which the citizen, as an individual, is protected 
by government against various vicissitudes other than those covered 
by the health and social services; the extent to which he is directly 
consulted about government policies; and the extent to which he 
is protected from arbitrary treatment by the agents of government 
itself. 
GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
Apart from the long-standing provisions to ensure the safety of 
vessels, vehicles, lifts, buildings and other structures, to control 
poisons and drugs and to ensure pure food, to check charlatanism 
and fraud, and so on. New South Wales has awarded compensation 
to victims of violent crimes since 1967, and has had a Consumer 
Protection Act since 1969. Control of restrictive trade practices, 
of misrepresentation, of prices, interest, and the quality of goods 
is one of the most ancient functions of government, greatly reduced 
since the emergence of Western capitalism in the days of Adam 
Smith, but revived during the present century—with Australia a 
long way in the rear. For example, the consumer protection part 
of the federal Trade Practices Act of 1974 opens with a section 
modelled on American legislation of 1915. However, the New South 
Wales government was the first in Australia to set up a separate 
department for consumer protection, and its legislation is considered 
to be stronger and more comprehensive than that of other Austral-
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ian governments. By the end of 1976 the department was adminis-
tering twenty-two statutes. It investigated some fourteen thousand 
complaints and determined, through Consumer Claims Tribunals, 
some three thousand consumer claims in a year. It policed about 
four thousand motor dealers throughout the state, and was respon-
sible for rent control and the regulation of weights and measures. 
The department was also about to take on price control, licensing 
of credit providers, and administration of a Consumer Credit 
Tribunal.'^ 
New South Wales governments have consulted the voters directly 
by referendum rather sparingly. There were nine referendums 
between 1901 and 1976. The first, in 1903, chose a smaller 
membership for the Legislative Assembly following Federation. 
Four referendums concerned the hours of liquor trading: at the 
latest, in November 1969, a majority of voters rejected Sunday 
trading. An overwhelming majority rejected a proposal for Prohibi-
tion in 1928. The excision of a new state centred on New England 
was defeated in 1967 at a poll confined to electors in the proposed 
new state area. In 1929 the referendum was made a mandatory 
condition for abolishing or altering the Legislative Council. In 1933 
a small majority approved the reconstitution of the Council on 
present lines. In 1961 abolition of the Council was rejected by a 
much bigger margin. One interesting feature of the referendums 
of 1967 and 1969 was the government's commissioning of independ-
ent authorities—in the first case a panel of political scientists from 
the universities of Sydney and New South Wales, in the second 
case the Professor of Government from Sydney—to prepare official 
"cases for and against" that were disseminated during the cam-
paigns. Particulars of the questions and voting at all these referen-
dums are given in the Year Book. 
We come, finally, to restraints upon government's treatment of 
the individual, and Professor Whitmore's assertion of a few years 
ago: "There can be no doubt that in 1974, throughout Australia, 
administrative efficiency and political expediency are placed much 
higher in the scale of values than justice to the individual."" Among 
other things, Whitmore considered that "bad and unfair decisions 
in local government" were "commonplace", mostly in connection 
with planning and building approvals but also in relation to 
contracts, rating and land acquisition. He also noted that "in the 
state jurisdictions a day rarely passes when there is not newspaper 
publicity about unfortunate decisions concerning health, social 
welfare, education, marketing and many other matters . . . "" 
The ordinary citizen faces a number of problems in seeking 
redress against such decisions. He can ask a court for a declaration 
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or an injunction. Until recently he could test an official's powers 
or the way they were exercised by applying to the courts for one 
of the historic "prerogative writs"—certiorari, habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto. The N.S.W. Supreme 
Court Act of 1970 incorporated most of these latter remedies in 
statutory form and empowered the courts to make an appropriate 
order even if the citizen had sought the wrong form of relief. The 
Administration of Justice Act 1973 created an Administrative 
Division of the Supreme Court, enabling its judges to specialize 
in administrative cases and so acquire a better understanding of 
administrative methods and their bearing on individual rights. 
However, most citizens cannot afford the expense of court actions, 
despite current legal aid schemes; the citizen may have no means 
of guessing that a particular decision might be wrong; and decisions 
under some statutes are protected from review in the courts (though 
nowadays the courts can usually find a suitable remedy if they 
wish). These and other factors prevent the courts from playing a 
significant part in administrative review. "If numbers of cases are 
considered", writes Whitmore in another paper, "the proportion of 
administrative decisions reviewed by the courts is infinitesimal"." 
Partly to provide more appropriate and accessible forms of 
redress, governments have established special tribunals to review 
a variety of administrative decisions, including some of the local 
body planning and building decisions, determinations about social 
service benefits, and decisions by government employing bodies 
affecting members of their own staffs. But the common law 
countries have never developed any comprehensive system of 
administrative law, procedures, and tribunals such as the droit 
administratif and the Conseil d'Etat of France. 
The growth of administrative law and tribunals was as haphazard 
and incomplete in New South Wales as in other governments of 
the kind, and by the 1960s politicians were reluctantly sensing a 
demand for systematic reform. As the Labor Local Government 
Minister said when warning councils to exercise their "vast powers" 
impartially and reasonably: 
I mention this matter because there is a strong movement abroad for 
the establishment of procedures to protect the citizen against adminis-
trative acts or decisions. I refer to the suggested setting up of an 
Ombudsman. Local government can forestall any such movement 
developing in this State by exercising its powers on the lines I have 
mentioned.^ " 
In fact J.C. Maddison had been advocating appointment of an 
ombudsman since he entered parliament in 1962; the idea was 
mentioned in the Liberals' election-winning policy speech in 1965, 
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along with a proposal for a standing Law Reform Commission. In 
a few months the press could hail the new government of New South 
Wales as "the first in Australia to recognise that the appointment 
of an ombudsman might be valuable in this age of creeping 
bureaucracy. It has decided to refer the question to its proposed 
permanent Law Reform Commission . . . " '^ But the cabinet was 
deeply divided over the idea, and the Commission received no 
encouragement to hurry this job, although the Opposition and the 
opinion polls now came out in support of it. Nearly eight years 
passed. Western Australia got its ombudsman in 1971, South 
Australia in 1972, Victoria in 1973, and Queensland in 1974, and 
New South Wales was the last mainland state to appoint one. In 
the general context of administrative justice, this was a marginal 
reform." 
The Law Reform Commission did much other valuable work. 
The reference it ultimately received from the Attorney-General on 
this subject was to examine "whether a right of appeal should be 
granted from decisions of administrative tribunals and officers, and 
whether, in this regard, it may be desirable to appoint an 
ombudsman". In December 1972, after eighteen months' work, it 
produced an extensive and significant report and recommendations. 
It found that the existing avenues of redress were inadequate in 
four different ways: some were not available as of right, some were 
too expensive, some were not seen to be impartial, some gave too 
little scope for action. Among the thousands of official actions 
affecting individual citizens, the Commission estimated there were 
some 350 types of action against which an appeal could be made 
either to the government, a minister, the Supreme Court, the Land 
and Valuation Court, a District court, a court of Quarter Sessions, 
a magistrate, a local Land Board, or one of the many other statutory 
creations such as the Crown Employees Appeal Board and the Local 
Government Appeals Tribunal. It concluded that for every public 
power subject to a statutory right of appeal there were not fewer 
than twenty public powers against which there were no such rights." 
Obviously the most significant need (given the Commission's 
reluctance to urge further change in the court structure or 
procedures at this stage) was to make the administrative tribunal 
system more comprehensive and coherent, and the Commission's 
more important proposals were framed to this end. It recommended 
the establishment of a Public Administration Tribunal, to inquire 
into complaints by individuals who believed they had been adversely 
and substantially affected by the actions of a public authority. The 
Tribunal might take over the reviewing function from some existing 
tribunals and courts, and might in time become the sole body to 
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hear appeals from other administrative tribunals. The Commission 
believed the Tribunal should have wider powers than a court to 
call and examine witnesses, that its jurisdiction should extend to 
all government departments and semi-government authorities, the 
police, and universities (but not local government), and that it 
should have power to give directions to those authorities and if 
necessary to set aside their decisions. The Commission's second 
main recommendation was for the appointment of a permanent 
Commissioner for Public Administration, supported by an Advisory 
Council widely representative of different public interests, to keep 
under review the legal powers entrusted to public authorities and 
where desirable to recommend changes in the law. 
The Commission recommended, thirdly, the appointment of an 
ombudsman with somewhat wider powers than that familiar office 
carried elsewhere, but recognizing that the office could be no more 
than a supplement to whatever system of administrative procedures, 
appeals and tribunals formed the main safeguard of citizen rights. 
This was because that office, as generally understood, was essential-
ly intended to operate at low cost, with a maximum of informality, 
and with no coercive powers, to take up complaints which were 
"not justiciable at all, or not, for reasons of cost, worth litigating 
before a tribunal or a court".^" An ombudsman normally operates 
without expense to the complainant; he investigates the complaint 
in the simplest appropriate way, by talking with the officials 
concerned or calling for the relevant papers; if necessary he will 
suggest corrective action and may recommend changes in law and 
procedures for the future. If he finds the complaint is not well 
founded (as happens in up to four-fifths of complaints received by 
Australian and New Zealand ombudsmen), he can try to enlighten 
the complainant. If the authorities do not act on his suggestions, 
he can make the fact public in his reports to parliament. The 
N.S.W. Law Reform Commission's proposals were unusual only in 
suggesting that the ombudsman's power of investigation might 
extend to the decisions of the Governor-in-Council, individual 
ministers, and police. 
The Askin cabinet could barely stomach the minor proposal for 
the ombudsman: they could not be expected to swallow the major 
ones. All such proposals have been unwelcome to many parlia-
mentarians. Private members have feared a reduction of their own 
influence as brokers between constituents and the administration, 
aware that this role keeps some of them very busy, but unaware 
that it copes with only a small proportion of the electorate." 
Ministers resent any suggestion that an administrative tribunal 
might be empowered to set aside their decisions or bring their 
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actions under public criticism, and claim that this would be a 
derogation of ministerial responsibility. Both ministers and private 
members resort to the fictions that ministers are fully answerable 
to parliament and ought to be answerable to parliament alone, and 
that parliamentarians alone should and can control the adminis-
tration. These arguments flowed freely in N.S.W. government 
circles both before and after the tabling of the Law Reform 
Commission's report in February 1973. Cabinet lost no time in 
rejecting the proposal for a Commissioner for Public Administration 
and deferring the recommendation for a Public Administration 
Tribunal; it settled for an ombudsman with more limited scope than 
others already working in New Zealand (since 1962) and Australia. 
Another year and a half passed. 
The N.S.W. Ombudsman Act was enacted in October 1974. The 
Ombudsman was made a ministerial appointee, as elsewhere in 
Australia, not a parliamentary officer as in all other cases except 
Britain and France. His maximum term of appointment was seven 
years, and his staff were to be departmental employees under the 
Public Service Act. He could investigate complaints against de-
cisions of public authorities with the exception of ministers, most 
courts and tribunals, the government's legal advisers, the police, 
and local government councils; he could, however, examine the 
recommendations on which a minister's decision was based. He 
could not consider complaints that were frivolous, or the subject 
of a court hearing, or in which the complainant had insufficient 
personal interest, or where a legal remedy was available. The 
government could make further exclusions at will by regulation. 
The Ombudsman could make investigations on his own initiative, 
comment publicly on bureaucratic actions or omissions, and propose 
improvements in administration and the law. He could report to 
parliament through the minister at any time, and must do so 
annually. 
Early in 1975 a well-known Sydney solicitor, Kenneth Smithers, 
was appointed as the state's first Ombudsman, with a handful of 
assistants in the Premier's Department. He began work in April, 
and in September 1976 the Wran government extended his juris-
diction, by amending the Act, to cover "administrative acts" of local 
government—but not "policy decisions" of councils. 
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